Dismantling Rape Culture by Nicholls, Tracey

Dismantling Rape Culture
This book analyses rape culture through the lens of the ‘me too’ era. Drawing 
feminist theory into conversation with peace studies and improvisation theory, it 
advocates for peace- building opportunities to transform culture and for the impro-
visatory resources of ‘culture- jamming’ as a mechanism to dismantle rape culture.
The book’s key argument is that cultural attitudes and behaviours can be shifted 
through the introduction of disrupting narratives, so each chapter ends with a 
‘culture- jammed’ re- telling of a traditional fairy tale. Chapter 1 traces an overlap 
of feminist theory and peace studies, arguing that rape culture is most fruitfully 
understood through the concept of ‘structural violence.’ Chapter 2 investigates the 
gender scripts that rape culture produces, considering a female counterpart to the 
concept of ‘toxic masculinity’:  ‘complicit femininity.’ Chapter  3 offers analysis of 
non- consensual sex and a history of consent education, culminating in an argument 
that we need to move beyond consent to conceptualise a robust ‘respectful mutu-
ality.’ Chapter  4’s history of sexual harassment in the workplace and the rise of 
#metoo argues that its global manifestations are a powerful peace- building initiative. 
Chapter 5 situates ‘me too’ within a culture- jamming history, using improvisation 
theory to show how this movement’s potential can shape cultural reconstruction.
This is a provocative and interventionist addition to feminist theory scholarship 
and is suitable for researchers and students in women’s and gender studies, feminist 
theory, sociology and peace studies.
Tracey Nicholls lectures in Politics and International Relations at Massey University 
in Aotearoa New Zealand. Previously she taught peace studies and gender studies 
at Soka University (Japan), and philosophy at Lewis University (United States). Her 
doctoral work, in philosophy at McGill University (Canada), introduced her to 
questions of political and ethical significance of improvised music that shaped her 
research programme. Her first monograph developed an ethics of improvisation, 
translating practices of improvising musicians into strategies for building more 
democratic political communities. Her engagement with anti- rape activism has 
focused on student- led consent- education efforts. These strands of work inform 
this book’s exploration of improvised resistance (‘culture- jamming’) as a response 
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This book was conceived in upheaval and written in various shades of anger, 
despair, and determination. I was about halfway through a major transi-
tion in my life when ‘me too’ emerged into public awareness, and it became 
clear to me that I would have to write this book as a process of moving on 
to think about other things. I had been living and teaching in the United 
States (in the Chicago area) for almost ten years when I realised that I was 
no longer willing to sacrifice where I wanted to live in order to do what 
I wanted to do. I had previously been prioritising my career— building it, 
in fact— around my American job, and slowly putting to rest my hopes that 
I would get a Canadian job offer and be able to return ‘home,’ to the country 
where I grew up and where, thanks to Canadian taxpayers, I had managed 
to navigate my way through a university education that no one (least of 
all, me) ever expected I would have. Even as I was putting away my hopes 
of a Canadian job, I was making trips back and forth between the United 
States and New Zealand, and growing increasingly attached to the nieces 
and nephew I had there. As a child, I had grown up in a family where I had 
an aunt who lived overseas and was really only just a name to me. Unwilling 
to occupy that role in their lives, I decided early in 2015 that I was going to 
leave North America and return (‘return’?) to New Zealand.
Then we all lived through 2016. It’s hard for me to describe to people 
outside the US how terrifying it was to wake up in the country that had just 
elected Donald Trump President of the United States. It was terrifying for a 
lot of people who already had a lot less security, a lot less insulating priv-
ilege, than I had. In my case, fear was compounded by a crushing sense that 
all of the scholarship I was building my career on, work that was a genuine 
labour of love, had been refuted by that election. All of my belief that social 
progress was happening— that, in Martin Luther King’s words, the moral 
arc of the universe was bending towards justice— was shattered. Everything 
I  had written about democracy, justice, the transcendent power of music 
seemed wrong, silly, poorly conceived.
As I white- knuckled my way through 2017, working on figuring out what 
parts of my academic life I  could take with me in this transition out of 
what I had been trained to think of as the centre of the academic world, 
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Interpreting cultural fairy tales
I grew up female in relatively progressive versions of patriarchal societies 
(New Zealand and Canada), and I have always tried to live an autonomous 
life. My first marriage ended when I was 20, and I remember thinking at that 
point in time that I was tired of being someone’s daughter, and someone’s 
sister, and someone’s girlfriend, and then someone’s wife. I wanted to be 
someone. Not someone famous, or someone powerful, just someone— a 
person.
Living a dream
I remember the 1970s: being bored by books about the ‘good girl’ lives of 
Florence Nightingale and Queen Elizabeth I, and fascinated by the rule- 
breaking outsider of Arthurian legend, Morgan le Fay. I remember discovering 
in Ms. Magazine that women are people too; I remember Mary Tyler Moore 
and Harriet the Spy. And Pippi Longstocking. She asserts herself in my mind 
these days as the model of the life I want to live. I even read Stieg Larsson’s 
Girl With the Dragon Tattoo series several years back because I had read 
somewhere online that he had created the character of Lizbeth Salander as a 
thought experiment about who Pippi might be as an adult.
I remember the 1980s: being shocked by the rape statistics at the end of 
Jodie Foster’s movie The Accused; being horrified by news reports of the 
Central Park jogger. I remember hearing a co- worker in Sydney, Australia 
confide what she knew of the details of the vicious and fatal high- profile 
rape of Anita Cobby.
I also remember being proud of myself as an adult woman for not having 
internalised the fear and sense of vulnerability that characterised the thinking 
and behaviour of so many of the women I knew. Unlike them (I felt), I owned 
and fully inhabited the various cities in which I lived; I went out whenever 
I wanted, and reeled home after nights in pubs and bars through whichever 
shortcuts and alleys would get me home quickest. Every once in a while, if 
there was information being disseminated about a serial rapist on the loose 
or some other crime wave that might see me as a target, I would modify 




duration of the public safety campaign, for instance. But I  liked the idea 
that I made my choices about public space more like a man than a woman. 
I liked that I felt unthreatened. I believed I was an unlikely target, and maybe 
I was. Certainly, I was lucky in many respects. All of the threats to my safety 
and well- being that I had ever faced (at least until I was mugged one night 
in 2011 in the foyer of the Chicago apartment building where I lived) had 
taken place in the private spaces of my life, not in public space.
Then, in the waning days of 2012 and the new year of 2013, I woke up 
from the dream that I could live gender- neutral in public space. I was, at that 
point in my life, dividing my time between Chicago, where I lived during the 
teaching terms of the American university that employed me, and Montreal, 
where my then- partner had continued to live and work after I  finished 
graduate school and took up life on the tenure track. That Christmas, I was 
home in Montreal and the news was dominated by accounts of the brutal 
gang rape of university student Jyoti Singh Pandey (the ‘Delhi bus rape’). 
Sickened and revolted by thoughts of how vicious an attack would have to 
be to necessitate being airlifted to a country in which one could get state- 
of- the- art care and still die of one’s internal injuries, I returned to Chicago 
in January. There, the news was dominated by the Steubenville High School 
rape case in Ohio, in which a teenaged girl (who, to my knowledge, has 
never been named1) was sexually assaulted at a party by two young men 
whose actions were recorded on social media and shared widely in their 
peer group. Those two cases were followed in rapid succession by the 
sexual assault of Daisy Coleman, another teenaged girl in another American 
state, and the fatal sexual assault of a teenaged girl in South Africa, Anene 
Booysen. I woke up to the realisation that I lived in a world full of sexual 
violence and gendered insecurity concerning one’s right to bodily integrity. 
I realised I live in rape culture.
My immediate response to this realisation was to throw myself into the 
project of making my own little corner of the world— at the time, a tenured 
faculty position in philosophy and women’s studies at a small Midwestern 
university in the United States— a source of support and inspiration for 
students who were sexual assault survivors and those who were interested in 
becoming anti- sexual- assault activists. I helped form, and mentored, a stu-
dent group that promoted bystander intervention,2 and felt really proud that 
we were part of a national response to the problem referred to at the time 
as a ‘sexual assault epidemic’ on college campuses, and part of the ongoing 
conversation about consent norms. I  am still proud of having done that 
work, and I believe strongly that working locally in one’s own little corner is 
crucial, but the eruption into global consciousness of what I initially labelled 
to myself ‘the Harvey Weinstein parade of shitty men’ prodded me to say 
more, do more, on a wider scale.
Over the last couple of years, as I have relocated my academic life out 
of the United States and into, first, Japan, and now Aotearoa New Zealand, 
I have found myself reading compulsively and thinking obsessively about 
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these entitled men, the people they have abused and marginalised, and 
the outpouring of disclosure and support that has taken form in various 
countries around the world as ‘me too’ movements.3 It is, of course, still 
far too early to be able to say with any evidence- based conviction what 
changes in our social relations these movements will inaugurate. But as 
I watch ‘me too’ morph from its origins in African- American community 
activist Tarana Burke’s support for victimised black girls and women into 
a global movement that includes middle- aged Japanese women engaging in 
public protests (that their cultural norms tell them is most unseemly behav-
iour), I become increasingly convinced that I am witnessing one of the most 
important social movements of my lifetime. (Having spent most of my life in 
North America and the last decade of that North American life in the United 
States, specifically, I would identify the others as the Occupy movement and 
the Black Lives Matter movement.) The stories that are emerging under the 
‘me too’ umbrella have me thinking about whose stories we tell and listen to, 
how they are heard and understood, and what kinds of people we become as 
a result of being influenced by those stories.
We need— as individuals and as societies— to ask probing questions about 
who tells our stories, and who tells us what our stories mean. What are the 
lessons our cultures need us to learn? Are there other ways of understanding 
our narratives, our interpretive strategies, and the cultural constructs into 
which they are socialising us? In asking myself these questions, I have come 
to see Susan Brownmiller’s groundbreaking book Against Our Will: Men, 
Women and Rape as a helpful starting point for much of the conversation 
that I want this book to participate in— conversation about how ‘me too’ 
can be mobilised to dismantle rape culture.
Much has been written on rape, rape culture, and the related sexual 
violations and exploitations that rape culture nourishes since Against Our 
Will’s 1975 publication. It was an already large body of scholarship before 
the October 2017 New York Times reporting by Jodi Kantor and Megan 
Twohey, and the New Yorker reporting by Ronan Farrow, that now mark 
the beginning of the ‘me too’ era in the United States. In the discussion that 
follows, I will draw inspiration from both popular and academic writing on 
how we need to reconstitute our social relations. The scholarship I am espe-
cially indebted to includes the history of rape that Mithu Sanyal traces in 
Rape: From Lucretia to #MeToo; the analysis of how lived experience can 
ground an effective theory of resistance in Linda Martín Alcoff’s Rape and 
Resistance; the recovered history of African- American women’s organising 
against sexual assault in Danielle L.  McGuire’s At the Dark End of the 
Street:  Black Women, Rape, and Resistance; the early (1992) work that 
Nicola Gavey has done on ‘technologies of heterosexual coercion,’ and her 
more recent and comprehensive analysis of the cultural context of both rape 
and ‘grey area’ sex (often coercive, but not easily fitting into categories that 






My thinking has also been informed over the years by work collected in 
anthologies that mark the evolution of feminist thinking and writing about 
rape culture, from Transforming a Rape Culture (first published in 1993, 
see Buchwald et al.), to Yes Means Yes: Visions of Female Sexual Power and 
a World Without Rape (2008, see Friedman and Valenti); and anthologies 
that mark the emergence of ‘me too’ into popular consciousness: Roxane 
Gay’s Not That Bad: Dispatches from Rape Culture and the Verso Books 
collection Where Freedom Starts:  Sex Power Violence #MeToo (both 
published in 2018; for the latter, see Kindig). And there is a growing litera-
ture theorising the sexual and gendered harassment that women face online, 
in media and culture, and in face- to- face public interaction, and theorising 
strategies to neutralise that harassment. Notable contributions to this body 
of work include Kaitlynn Mendes, Jessica Ringrose, and Jessalynn Keller’s 
Digital Feminist Activism:  Girls and Women Fight Back Against Rape 
Culture, the multiply-authored public policy recommendations in Stopping 
Rape:  Towards a Comprehensive Policy (Walby et  al.), and Fiona Vera- 
Gray’s analysis in The Right Amount of Panic: How Women Trade Freedom 
for Safety of the ‘safety work’ women do in public life to rebuff harass-
ment and tactics for normalising women’s occupation of public spaces. All 
of these contributions offer valuable insights for those of us concerned to 
harness the accountability resources of ‘me too’ into the project of dismant-
ling rape culture.
My particular focus, however, is on the stories we tell ourselves. Unlike 
the ‘narrative politics’ Tanya Serisier develops in Speaking Out: Feminism, 
Rape and Narrative Politics— the telling of personal narratives as a form 
of political activism (13)— and the emphasis on survivors’ points of view 
that grounds Alcoff’s theorising of experience in Rape and Resistance, my 
emphasis is on cultural narratives rather than individual ones. In developing 
this focus, I do not intend to diminish either the power of personal narratives 
or the courage of the people who share them. What I hope to achieve is to 
underscore the now- settled principle in feminist theory of the personal being 
political in a way that amplifies Serisier and Alcoff’s personal approach 
through demonstration of the cultural ramifications of narratives. As ‘me 
too’ discourses take hold, they too offer the tantalising possibility that 
questions about our social narratives can instigate a reshaping of our gender 
relations. Serisier cautions us against an excess of optimism about the power 
of personal narratives, observing that survivors breaking their previously 
imposed silence has neither ended nor significantly reduced sexual violence 
(12), and she is correct in noting that telling stories does not immediately 
transform our social world. But, as Gavey argues in Just Sex?, there has 
been a sea- change in cultural attitudes about the seriousness of sexual vio-
lence as a widespread social problem. This is in no small part because of the 
personal narratives that have been put forward, and taken up, as political 
activism— from speak- out sessions organised by radical feminist gatherings 
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Here, in this consideration of stories that are told and why they matter, 
I want to note one very pointed disagreement I have with Brownmiller: her 
contention that Greek mythology has little to teach us about sexual violence 
in antiquity. In the course of her history of rape, she offers a discussion of 
mythology and culture in which she claims that ‘classic Greek myths reveal . . . 
very little’ (Brownmiller 283); the male gods raped as a matter of course, 
but ‘victims to these rapes . . . rarely suffered serious consequences’ (283). 
I  think, to the contrary, that this mythology shows us quite clearly what 
the norms and expectations are in the particular social worlds that are— or 
were— telling and hearing these tales. She herself seems quite aware of this 
point later in her book, when she turns her attention to what we might think 
of as the ideology of rape culture: widespread beliefs that women ‘want’ to be 
raped, and are colluding partners in a game of dominance and submission— 
beliefs she characterises as ‘the deadly male myths of rape [that function 
as] the distorted proverbs that govern female sexuality’ (Brownmiller 312). 
Myths about gods raping heartily and with impunity, and the goddesses or 
mortals surviving, often to give birth to gods and heroes, normalise the view 
that men’s sexual urges are to be given primacy and to be endured, perhaps 
in the hope that good things will occur as a result of a violation. To accept 
these myths is to accept that women are the servants of men, and ought to 
live subordinate lives. I do not accept that.
Why we believe our own story- telling
As I  began the writing of this book, I  was directing a reading group in 
which I was discussing Brownmiller’s book with a very bright young female 
graduate student who seems to have always been aware that she is living 
in rape culture. Our first discussion hinged on a common feature of my 
pre- 2012 thinking and Brownmiller’s:  the lack of awareness of our own 
vulnerability we appear to have shared, the groundless conviction that ‘it 
won’t happen to me’ (Brownmiller 8). I tried to explain to this smart young 
woman I was working with how it could be the case that the smart woman 
who wrote the book we were reading and the smart woman supervising her 
graduate studies could ever have not known this thing that she is so com-
pletely aware of. How could I have not known this feature of every culture 
I  have ever lived in? How could I  have watched the Jodie Foster movie, 
followed the rape cases of the 1980s, and lived in a fantasy of safety in 
public spaces all the way up to 2012? It seems as incredible to me now as it 
does to my student.
I could only explain to her— and to myself— that when I look back at my 
life as a woman in the countries where I have lived, I realise that I resemble 
the 1950s cartoon character Mr. Magoo. The defining feature of Mr. Magoo 
is that he is visually impaired to the point of bumbling dysfunction but 
refuses to acknowledge his limitations. In the particular cartoon that lives 
in my memory and provides the example I draw on when I describe myself 
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this way, Magoo accidentally wanders into a dangerous construction site 
and narrowly avoids death or serious physical injury at several points only 
because he is so unaware of the dangers that he does not flinch. Cluelessness, 
I told my student; that’s what got me largely safely through a life that more 
sensible and self- aware women might not have taken on. (I also now think, 
looking back, that what I  was labelling as cluelessness was a variant of 
what sociologist Liz Kelly calls ‘safety work,’ psychological and behavioural 
strategies one adopts as a woman to be able to move through public space 
without confronting danger.5)
Cluelessness, luck, privilege: they all strike me, these days, as synonyms 
describing the twist of fate that allows me, like Brownmiller, to write a book 
on rape culture without the autobiographical fact of being a rape survivor. 
Like her, I do not identify myself in that way. Unlike her, I am less certain 
that I can say ‘I may have been shortchanged here and there, but I have never 
been coerced’ (Brownmiller 7). Part of what I want to analyse in this book is 
the shading into each other of short- changing and coercing. This implicates 
the ‘grey areas’ of sexual relations that ‘me too’ is foregrounding as a concern 
in social media and popular discourse, discussion that has parallels in fem-
inist scholarship on ‘technologies’ of coercion in heterosexual relationships 
(see Gavey, ‘Technologies and Effects’ and Just Sex?) and has been advanced 
by books like Roxane Gay’s Not That Bad.
Another part of what I want to analyse is what we might think of as 
the ‘infrastructure’ of rape culture, or, to use Gavey’s terminology, the 
‘cultural scaffolding.’6 Like Gavey and Sandra Lee Bartky, I  draw on the 
understanding of power that Michel Foucault articulates in Discipline 
and Punish (published in French as Surveiller et punir:  Naissance de la 
prison in the same year Brownmiller published Against Our Will) and in 
his four- volume History of Sexuality. Foucault’s account of the exercise of 
power upon individuals (discipline) begins with an authority constituting a 
standard of measurement (a judgement of what constitutes a good perform-
ance), and then observing and ranking performances to assess individuals— 
in his examples, students, patients, prisoners, army recruits— in terms of 
how well they are training themselves to meet this standard.7 Discipline is 
successful once it has been fully internalised and the individual subjected to 
the disciplinary power has taken over their own monitoring, thus obviating 
the need for supervision by the authority figure.
Bartky takes up Foucault’s fairly abstract account of genderless bodies 
being acted on by authority and the normalising effects of peer pressure, and 
transforms it into a theorising of how women’s subjectivity, sense of value, 
and social behaviours are constructed in response to disciplinary practices 
of a modernised patriarchal domination (132). Arguing that women and 
men have different relationships to the institutions of modern life such that 
women’s ‘docile bodies’ are engendered in ways that men’s are not, she cites 
current fashions of the ideal female body and practices of dieting and exer-
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that govern how much space women feel free to take up in public relative to 
men (134– 136); and the ‘technologies of femininity’ that mandate clothing 
and cosmetics ‘choices’ which are not at all the ‘self- expression’ they are 
promoted as (136– 139).
Indeed, she asserts that
technologies of femininity are taken up and practiced by women against 
the background of a pervasive sense of bodily deficiency . . . [such that] 
virtually every woman who gives herself to it is destined in some degree 
to fail.
(Bartky 139)
This ‘disciplinary project of femininity’ constructs ‘a panoptical male 
connoisseur [who] resides within the consciousness of most women:  [we] 
stand perpetually before his gaze and under his judgment’ (Bartky 139– 
140). Internalising the male gaze as ‘self- surveillance’— ‘panoptical’ in the 
sense that we move in public space as if we are being watched even when 
we might not be (is my lipstick smeared? do I have visible panty lines?)— 
results, in Bartky’s view, in women’s constant awareness that ‘whatever else 
she may become, [a woman] is importantly a body designed to please or 
to excite’ (149). But, as Foucault is concerned to acknowledge, if power is 
everywhere, exercised in all normalising and standardising processes, then 
it is also in our hands: to be deployed as subversion as well as capitulation.9 
In this particular cultural moment, when ‘me too’ discourses are calling for 
male power to submit itself to a shifting social accountability, I find myself 
hopeful that, through improvisatory resistance strategies, we might be able 
to rework our standards of acceptable behaviour, and perhaps even open up 
cultural spaces in which we can dismantle the infrastructure of toxic sexual 
and gender relations.
We tell stories— including myths and fairy tales— for all of these kinds of 
reasons: to explain, to normalise, to share understandings about ‘what the 
world is like,’ and to change those understandings. Whether oppressive or 
liberatory, we tell the particular stories we tell to share particular knowledge 
of the world. But human beings are oddly unpredictable: we do not always 
learn the lessons our society thinks we need to learn, and we do not always 
learn our lessons the way we are expected to. Recognising the diversity of 
insights we might mine from our stories, this book is therefore primarily 
concerned with how they teach us to think about our sexuality, its import-
ance to our self- concepts, and the implications of a commodified or imposed 
sexuality for our sense of how valuable we might be to others— how that 
thinking fucks us all up, and how different thinking might help us all be a 
little bit less fucked- up. It’s also concerned with the philosophical backdrop 
of this commodified, disposable sexual field we live in (rape culture)— the 
patriarchal way of thinking that examines each woman and asks, ‘what is 
your use (to men)?’ Because of these concerns, each chapter is organised 
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around stories we tell, and could tell, about distinct elements of our socio- 
sexual lives: rape culture itself; gender scripts or roles we are socialised into; 
how we understand consent; the ‘me too’ call for accountability in sexual, 
social, and professional relations; and the subversive (culture- jamming) 
potential of particular stories we are telling currently. I describe each chapter 
more fully in the next section of this introduction.
This is a feminist book because it pushes back against the patriarchal 
thinking that (people we label) women are for (people we label) men and 
ought to live in accordance with what men might need from us or might 
expect of us. In explaining why the problem of rape is a public– cultural 
problem and can therefore have ‘no private solutions,’ Brownmiller observes 
that ‘to accept a special burden of self- protection is to reinforce the con-
cept that women must live and move about in fear and can never expect 
to achieve the personal freedom, independence and self- assurance of men’ 
(400). The uncompromising feminist who rejected and denounced that limi-
tation on women’s lives is the Susan Brownmiller I want to draw on, not 
her more recent derogatory and dismissive remarks about young women 
spending their feminist freedom recklessly in drinking ‘like men’ and going 
on ‘Slutwalk’ protests to make the point that one ought to be able to wear 
what one wants.10 Disappointingly, her current views undercut the very point 
about women’s rights to psychological and physical autonomy that appear 
to me as the strength of Against Our Will.11 To accept this notion of a spe-
cial burden to protect oneself from becoming a rape target, a rape victim, a 
rape survivor, is to accept subordination. As I have already asserted, I do not 
accept that— for myself, or for any other person.
But there is a great deal of difference between speaking words that assert 
one’s value and living a life that roots out the patriarchal, gender- hierarchical 
norms one has internalised in order to replace them with more self- affirming 
ways of thinking. We are susceptible to the ‘discipline’ that Foucault and 
Bartky theorise precisely because human beings are social creatures. To 
reject the norms of one’s culture is difficult at the outset and indescribably 
painful throughout the entire effort because it demands a constant state of 
conflict with and alienation from our social others who— if we would only 
just conform, be polite, be gracious, be what others expect us to be— would 
heap upon us the validation each of us craves, however much we might like 
to believe that we don’t.
When I consider this need we have to see our own selves reflected back 
to us, I start to see as a significant feature of the hell that Jean- Paul Sartre 
depicts in his play, No Exit, the fact that there are no mirrors. The characters 
who are consigned to the play’s infernal hotel room have no way of being 
reflected back to themselves except through each other. And part of the 
brutal brilliance of that play is that the three main characters are drawn 
precisely so that each of them is either unable or unwilling to give the other 
two the reflection of themselves that they desire. ‘Hell,’ Sartre tells us, ‘is 
other people’ (45). To be slightly more nuanced about it, though, human 
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emotional needs and socialisation are such that these other people in our 
worlds are both the home we seek and the hell we resign ourselves to. It is 
also the case that cultural norms are difficult to reject precisely because they 
get internalised and become our norms, as Foucault and Bartky both point 
out. Rejecting what we have internalised is not an easy process— nor even 
always a successful one; it is, to borrow words from Kahlil Gibran, not a 
garment that one casts off, but a skin that one tears with one’s own hands 
(4). This is why, I think, it proves easier for many of us to accept the cultural 
stories we inherit and try to make them work for us, rather than throwing 
them away and trying to fashion new stories. This is why, I think, women 
and men and those of us who struggle against gender- binary categories all 
put so much effort into coming to terms with the cultural scripts handed 
down to us.
A world in which women accede to the expectation that we will compete 
with each other for male attention is a world in which men can choose to 
never see their privilege and its consequences for the women in their lives. 
As Brownmiller observes, it is a world in which men can categorise sexual 
assault as a ‘women’s issue’ and not have to take any personal responsibility 
for the connection between women’s vulnerability to assault and coercion 
and their own male entitlement (400). It is also a world in which people do 
not have to interrogate their culture’s culpability (Brownmiller 400). She 
argues:
Once we accept as basic truth that rape is not a crime of irrational, 
impulsive, uncontrollable lust, but is a deliberate, hostile, violent act 
of degradation and possession on the part of a would- be conqueror, 
designed to intimidate and inspire fear, we must look toward those 
elements in our culture that promote and propagandize these attitudes, 
which offer men, and in particular, impressionable, adolescent males, 
who form the potential raping population, the ideology and psychologic 
encouragement to commit their acts of aggression without awareness, 
for the most part, that they have committed a punishable crime, 
let alone a moral wrong. The myth of the heroic rapist that permeates 
false notions of masculinity, from the successful seducer to the man who 
‘takes what he wants when he wants it,’ is inculcated in young boys 
from the time they first become aware that being a male means access 
to . . . a woman’s body.
(Brownmiller 391, emphasis in original)
These elements of culture that Brownmiller refers to constitute an 
‘ideology of rape’ that is enshrined in law, the putatively level playing field in 
which male control over the public sphere is sedimented, and is normalised 
at the level of culture. This ideology ‘is fueled by cultural values that are 
perpetuated at every level of our society,’ she asserts, ‘and nothing less than 
a frontal attack is needed to repel this cultural assault’ (Brownmiller 389). 
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Her notion of ideology has been taken up by new generations of feminist 
authors— Roxane Gay, Rebecca Solnit, and Jessica Valenti are perhaps the 
most well- known and widely read— whose work can explain why women 
don’t just uncomplicatedly use laws against rape to get ‘justice.’ (The argu-
ment that, if a woman is telling the truth about being raped, she would press 
charges is deployed by apologists for rape culture with wilful disregard for 
everything we know about the chronic and widespread under- reporting of 
sexual assault.) In Rape and Resistance, Alcoff helpfully frames the reluc-
tance of women to report rape and press charges in terms of the inadequacy 
and limitations of law; the cultural assumption that law is the instrument 
we should use when harms happen to us is undercut by rules of testimony 
that privilege the defendant, statutes of limitation that disadvantage the sur-
vivor of child sexual abuse, prosecutorial discretion that mitigates in favour 
of ‘winnable’ cases, and legal emphasis on individual culpability over cul-
tural or institutional accountability (46– 47). It is also helpful to consider 
Miranda Fricker’s account of testimonial injustice, which explores the notion 
of gendered credibility deficit (14– 15; 18– 21), when we are theorising what 
many women who don’t pursue legal solutions already know: they won’t be 
believed. And Mithu Sanyal’s and Nicola Gavey’s respective discussions of 
women’s unwillingness to use the word ‘rape’ to describe coercive or non- 
consensual sexual encounters both suggest that some women, at least, are 
resisting being identified (or self- identifying) as a ‘victim’ (Sanyal 66– 68; 
Gavey, ‘Technologies and Effects’ 335; Gavey, Just Sex? 147– 153).
Harshness towards women who do complain of sexual aggression is not 
only a feature of male- dominated social institutions; it also forms the first 
line of defence utilised by other women. Where men believe that women 
‘play the victim’ so they don’t have to examine their own complicity in the 
deeply shitty social world most women experience— from catcalls to victim- 
blaming for the abuse and assaults we might suffer— women might be more 
inclined to believe that other women ‘play the victim’ so that we don’t have 
to admit to ourselves how radically vulnerable each of us is. ‘She asked for 
it,’ we can tell ourselves, and if we can believe that, we can breathe a little 
easier, feel a little safer, because we know that we are not ‘asking for it.’ That 
story works to insulate us from the dangers in our patriarchal, misogyn-
istic social worlds— until the day it doesn’t work anymore. The day that an 
assault I didn’t ‘ask for’ happens to me, the day it happens to someone else 
who I recognise as ‘an innocent victim,’ the day I wake up from my dream 
that there is such a thing as gender- neutral public space— that is the day 
when I begin to realise that I need a better story.
How we can tell better stories
In addition to our shared identity as women who are not rape survivors, 
another thing Susan Brownmiller and I share is a motivation to write our 
way to these better stories our cultures need (a motivation that is also 
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shared by many feminist writers who are bringing to their work a first- 
person experience of the violence we are all hoping to end with words, 
ideas, and better stories). In her autobiographical prologue to Against Our 
Will, Brownmiller confides that it took her years to see rape as a feminist 
issue, and that she chose to write the book because she is ‘a woman who 
changed her mind about rape’ (9). The detailed and searing outcome of 
her coming to awareness of rape as a matter for feminist scholarship and 
activism concludes with the declaration that she has given us the history of 
rape and the challenge to her readers that ‘[n] ow we must deny it a future’ 
(Brownmiller 404).
My book, the outcome of my own belated awareness that we live in 
cultures that normalise sexual violence, particularly against women, is my 
own response to her challenge. While I have worked for years in a supportive 
capacity to end sexual violence, I had not previously felt competent to insert 
myself into this scholarly discourse, and when I consider that past hesitancy 
now, in the context of my desire to amplify the ‘me too’ conversations going 
on around me, I realise that I had not previously felt that my voice would 
add anything to this discourse precisely because rape is not something with 
which I  have direct experience. Although I  want to completely endorse 
the point Alcoff makes about foregrounding the voices and experiences 
of survivors in analyses of rape (45, 47– 49), I now think that, at the level 
of rape culture, the ‘me too’ impetus towards accountability is reframing 
conversations about sexual violence— including coercion, exploitation, and 
harassment— as everyone’s responsibility. I want to take up my share of that 
responsibility, and I hope that in doing so I can be part of shifting cultural 
attention to focus more squarely on perspectives that have previously been 
erased and ignored. This book is my best effort to bring my own scholarly 
perspective to the shared project of analysing how we need to understand 
and transform the rape cultures within which we live.
As someone whose very localised work in anti- sexual- assault education— 
at private religiously affiliated universities in the United States and Japan— 
has been transformed by this ‘me too’ moment, I feel an urgent imperative to 
participate in building our present social relations into a more just, peaceful, 
and equitable world for persons of all genders. Throughout this book, 
I draw on experiences I have had in the course of my work with students in 
bystander intervention and consent education, and the advocacy and support 
work I have done on their behalf. I also draw from my teaching and research 
in philosophy, feminist peace studies, and improvisation theory. The theor-
etical backdrop for my discussion is social constructionism in what I under-
stand as a broadly Foucauldian vein. I do not consider myself a Foucault 
scholar per se, and I will not pretend to have any expertise or authority in 
explicating the finer points of his views, but I find his work on disciplinary 
power and the production of knowledge in conjunction with the exercise 
of power— and Bartky’s extension of his work to a disciplinary project of 
femininity— to be the framework that best makes sense of how the concepts 
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I am exploring— rape culture,12 gender inequality, toxic sexual relations, and 
strategies for producing mutuality, accountability, and resistance— act upon 
us. As Foucault traces in his History of Sexuality, different historical eras 
and cultures have produced very different ways of thinking and behaving 
with respect to sex and the kinds of relations the men and women of those 
times and places have been expected to enact. What we are taught to under-
stand as ‘normal’ and ‘proper’ shape us. They do not fully determine what/ 
who we become, and they do not fully limit the extent to which we are cap-
able of becoming other than what/ who we are, but they do exert influence.
As a way of explaining how individuals who are shaped by techniques of 
social control can nonetheless craft acts of resistance or subversion, I want 
to draw on improvisation theory to offer an understanding of localised 
resistance. Improvisation theory is a multidisciplinary field that draws much 
of its inspiration and insight from improvisatory practices in music, but its 
interest is social processes, broadly construed. Regardless of whether the 
study of those processes begins with jazz ensembles or the serendipitous 
smooth functioning of Mumbai’s dabbawala system (which daily delivers 
200,000 home- made lunches to office workers and then returns the lunch 
box containers to their points of origin in a coordinated yet non- centrally 
planned effort that is reportedly the envy of global delivery companies like 
FedEx13), the goal of improvisation theory is, first of all, to examine social 
coordination efforts that emerge without ‘top- down’ planning or a single 
entity in control of the process. This view of possibilities for individual cre-
ativity and social coordination that can be brought to bear on projects of, 
for instance, subversion of canons and definitive versions of stories is con-
sistent with Foucault’s view that both power and resistance to power can be 
generated in any network of interaction.
As my discussion develops, the analysis of what rape culture is and 
how it influences us shifts into analysis of critical efforts to transform cul-
ture through both activism and improvisatory reconceptualising (culture- 
jamming) of our attitudes and social norms. What I hope to offer in this 
synthesis is a way of understanding how we can have individual agency 
within a social construction view like Foucault’s: a point about the micro- 
and macro- levels of thinking power and resistance that acknowledges the 
ability to critically assess ourselves in relation to social expectations and 
other social actors as a corollary of being our own jailors and disciplinarians.
If we have the ability to conform, we also have abilities, however latent, 
to resist. This is what improvisation theory articulates: it aims to show the 
socio- political possibilities for, and implications of, committing to processes 
of coordination— sometimes rather than, sometimes within— processes of 
control. For instance, the responsiveness that is so highly prized in impro-
vising ensembles supports a conception of community that undermines hier-
archical distinctions (like that of performers and audience members) and 
asserts instead that we all have a role to play in constructing and nurt-
uring our communities. Also of note is the value that improvisation theory 
 
 
Interpreting cultural fairy tales 13
places on the ‘codeswitching,’ or cultural fluency, that results from learning 
and knowing the stories and values of multiple communities well enough to 
be able to shift back and forth between them and interpret them for each 
other. Valuing an ability to hear shared meanings when they are spoken in 
different voices, or unfamiliar rhythms, gives rise in improvisation theory 
to an ability to recognise interpretational expertise that is demonstrated in 
the mapping out of real- time translations among cultures or perspectives. 
Improvisation theory judges all of these performances or processes context-
ually, according to how well they foster participation, community- building, 
respect for differences, and the capacity to embrace contingency in a world 
of risk and uncertainty.14 But these capabilities of responsiveness and inter-
pretational fluency also give rise to the kind of subversive insight that reveals 
the processes of social control that structure our lives and our thinking. 
Where Foucault insists that there is no ‘outside’ to power relations, impro-
visation theory encourages us to see how much playing around with norms 
and expectations is possible to us ‘inside.’ Because of this, it has obvious 
relevance to the practice of social critique and change that I am discussing in 
this book as ‘culture- jamming,’ and it forms the theoretical underpinning of 
the resistance strategies I explore in the book’s final chapter: the basis of the 
‘how do we do it?’ question I take up after my arguments for why we need 
to dismantle rape culture.
Awareness of our cultural influences, adoption of more fluid gender roles, 
and contestation of harmful social scripts all implicate the extent to which 
we are given— or not— epistemic credibility (the status of ‘competent knower 
of the world’) that in turn allows us to feel ‘authorised’ to participate in the 
mass global project of producing the cultures we live in. Each of these areas 
in which we see challenges to patriarchal hierarchy have been advanced, and 
can be furthered, by culture- jamming. We need to jam our cultures because 
it is only once we become aware of the distorted thinking we do not want to 
endorse that we can begin the conceptual conversions that will change the 
ways we act towards each other. Part of the point I aim to make in this book 
is that we have always been engaged in retelling familiar stories in order to 
derive different messages. ‘The most amazing part of the [real- life Bluebeard] 
Gilles de Rais story,’ Brownmiller recounts, ‘is that the legend of Bluebeard’s 
Castle that we know today has metamorphosed from a terrifying account 
of a sex- murderer of small boys to a glorified fantasy of a devilish rake who 
killed seven wives for their “curiosity” ’ (292). Analysing these retellings can 
reveal important insights about how we whitewash, who gets erased, and 
who gets trivialised. It can also show us ways in which we ourselves can 
retell a story to make it better, to make it fit our culture- jamming needs.
But there is more to say about what culture- jamming is. It is not simply 
a matter of retelling; it is ‘the practice of disrupting the mundane nature of 
everyday life and the status quo with surprising, often comical or satirical 
acts or artworks’ (Cole). As sociologist and journalist Nicki Lisa Cole tells 




public attention as a critical practice through the work of Adbusters, an 
organisation highly critical of cultural practices of conspicuous consump-
tion, easy acceptance of ubiquitous marketing, and ‘I shop, therefore I am’ 
mentalities. Cole traces the practice back to its conceptual roots in the crit-
ical theory of the Frankfurt School, which analysed the rise of mass culture 
and the attendant power of broadcast media and advertising to construct our 
desires, social attitudes, and self- concepts. Viewed in this context, culture- 
jamming is a tactic used to make us aware of the implicit assumptions and 
associations that shape our behaviours and our lived values, thereby making 
it possible for us to examine them critically and decide for ourselves whether 
they are indeed commitments we wish to hold. Cole argues that culture- 
jamming’s purpose is ‘to produce feelings of shock, shame, fear, and ultim-
ately anger in the viewer, because it is these emotions that lead to social 
change and political action.’
One of the examples through which Cole illustrates the power of 
culture- jamming is a performance that I  followed in the news as it was 
being performed and provoking controversy: Columbia University student 
Emma Sulkowicz’s senior thesis project, ‘Mattress Performance: Carry That 
Weight.’ Sulkowicz was raped in their dorm room in August 2012,15 and to 
draw attention to the university’s mishandling of disciplinary proceedings 
following that on- campus sexual assault, they conceived the idea of a gradu-
ating project that involved them spending the final year of their under-
graduate experience, 2014– 2015, carrying around a dorm- room mattress 
until the student who raped them was removed from campus. This piece 
of performance art was intended both to protest the university inaction 
that resulted in Sulkowicz having to continue to attend classes knowing 
that their rapist was also still attending the same university, and to edu-
cate others about the multi- faceted problem of ‘the campus rape crisis,’ 
as it was being referred to in North American discourse at the time.16 As 
I understand the way this performance unfolded, the mattress they carried 
was not the actual mattress from their dorm room, but a replica of the 
same dimensions and weight. The rules set for the project were that they 
had to carry it everywhere they went on campus, and they could not ask 
others for help carrying it, but could accept help if it was offered (‘Mattress 
Performance’).
Columbia’s non- response to Sulkowicz’s protest continued throughout 
their entire undergraduate experience— the other student was never 
expelled, asked to leave campus, or disciplined— so Sulkowicz and a small 
cadre of their supporters carried the mattress throughout their graduation 
ceremony in May 2015. According to Cole, this performance ‘ “jammed” 
the notion that sexual assault and its consequences are private matters, and 
illuminated the reality that they are often hidden from view by the shame 
and fear that survivors experience.’ In her analysis, successful instances of 
culture- jamming are events or performances that ‘surprise those who bear 
witness to them with their disruption of social norms, and in doing so, call 
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those very norms, and the validity of the institutions that [organise] them 
into question’ (Cole).
Sulkowicz’s performance resonated in a feminist protest climate that was 
ready for the ‘me too’ movement that was about to emerge, but it was ahead 
of the discourse, not part of it. For an example of culture- jamming that is 
squarely within the frame of ‘me too’ protest, we need to consider more 
recent performances. The song- dance developed by the Chilean feminist col-
lective Las Tesis, ‘Un Violador en Tu Camino’ [A Rapist in Your Path], has 
travelled around the world since its first performance in November 2019, 
performed in France, India, Palestine, and Turkey, and a bilingual (Spanish 
and English) version was adopted as a feminist ‘anthem’ by American 
women protesting outside the New  York City courthouse where Harvey 
Weinstein was sentenced in January 2020 for the crimes that catalysed the 
‘me too’ movement in that country. Styled ‘a live performance of feminism 
without borders,’ the choreography draws women’s voices and bodies into 
an indictment of the silencing of our voices and violating of our bodies 
that patriarchy, colonisation, and rape culture all depend on— ‘a collective 
awareness of gender inequality’ (González- López). News stories about this 
‘me too’ anthem in feminist outlets like Ms. Magazine have presented it as 
a manifestation of truly transnational feminism, a locutionary intervention 
from the Global South that is being heard and valued, rather than co- opted, 
by feminists in more privileged countries. As initial news coverage of cul-
tural interventions that ‘go viral’ are often uncritical, it seems to me that 
here is a role for improvisation theory; it can be a critical– analytical lens 
through which to assess the efficacy of culture- jamming efforts.
My approach throughout this book is to analyse the stories we tell, and 
the stories we need to tell, about various facets of rape culture in order to 
reveal the contours of the social structure we need to dismantle. I  begin 
in Chapter  1 with a story of what rape culture is that starts with Susan 
Brownmiller’s narrative, and weaves in Simone de Beauvoir’s analysis of the 
social construction of gender, Sandra Bartky’s gender- cognisant reading of 
disciplinary power, and Danielle L. McGuire’s recovered history of the anti- 
rape activism done by African- American women in the explicitly racialised 
rape culture of the pre- civil rights movement American South, along with 
analyses of our contemporary field— primarily Nicola Gavey’s work on cul-
tural scaffolding, Courtney Fraser’s argument that chivalry and misogyny 
form a symbiotic support structure, and Fiona Vera- Gray’s attention to the 
trade- offs women make to stay safe in public space.
I then introduce, as a story we need to tell, a discussion of peace studies 
scholarship that theorises rape culture— misogyny, sexual objectification of 
women, coercive prescriptions to uphold a gender binary and practice par-
ticular forms of heterosexuality, and devaluation of men and women who 
deviate from prescribed gender scripts— as a form of structural violence 
that harms us all. ‘Structural violence’ is a central concept in the academic 
discipline of peace studies; it is a way of theorising experiences of social 
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organisation— like chronic poverty or racism— that can be as damaging and 
traumatising as direct interpersonal violence. The term is defined by its ori-
ginator, peace studies founder Johan Galtung, as ‘violence [that] is built into 
the structure and shows up as unequal power and consequently as unequal 
life chances’ (‘Violence, Peace’ 171).
To underscore the ways in which rape culture shows up as structural 
inequality, I include in this discussion of peace studies an argument for a ter-
minology choice that runs throughout the book. At various points in these 
chapters, I will engage in specific discussions of particular harms— sexual 
assault and rape (terms I use as synonyms), sexual violation and exploit-
ation, sexual harassment, and sex– gender subordination— but where I am 
discussing the harms of rape culture in broad and inclusive terms, I will be 
using ‘sexual violence’ as an umbrella term. This terminology makes an even 
more forceful argument for the relevance of peace studies; the connections 
I identify between gendered social subordination, rape culture, and sexual 
assault are theorised as structural violence, and I think the use of sexual vio-
lence as my larger category helps to make this point. In showing how rape 
culture functions as structural violence, I draw on work in feminist peace 
studies by Betty A.  Reardon and Catia Confortini who have argued— as 
Bartky does on the matter of Foucauldian discipline— for the need to adapt 
the abstract discussion of persons, lives, and bodies in Galtung’s frame-
work of violence into a more gender- cognisant tool of analysis. I also link 
peace studies’ attention to gendered violence to work done by bell hooks 
on the politics of domination, and to Catharine MacKinnon’s origin stories 
of patriarchy— a connection that I  think helps to put feminist theory and 
peace studies in conversation with each other in the very way suggested by 
the collaborative work of peace scholar Duane Cady and feminist scholar 
Karen J. Warren.
In thinking about why we see resistance to acknowledging the reality of 
rape culture, I speculate that it is due in part to the fact that phenomena of 
structural violence are frequently presented as crises in far- off places (Rylko- 
Bauer and Farmer), and rape culture is the ‘water’ in which we swim in 
modern, industrialised cultures. Introducing the work on epistemic injustice 
done by Miranda Fricker, I shall argue that, precisely because of the fraught 
interplay of the familiar and the formidable, we are tempted to deny that 
there is a rape culture at all, or to deny that it rises to the level of a structural 
violence, a set of relations that we could, and should, formulate otherwise.
From the argument that rape culture is indeed a kind of structural vio-
lence, and needs to be seen that way if we are to truly comprehend it, I move 
in Chapter 2 to a story of the kinds of human beings it seems to aim at pro-
ducing. Here, I put recent discussions of ‘toxic’ masculinity in psychology 
into conversation with the personal testimony offered in Chanel Miller’s 
recently published book, Know My Name, her account of putting her life 
back together after being raped by Brock Turner. The world- wide attention 
the Turner case received cemented the idea that rape culture breeds sexual 
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entitlement in men, and I  argue that this sexual entitlement is conjoined 
with a perceived entitlement to authority to form the core of toxic mascu-
linity. What also needs sustained, interconnected attention is the model of 
femininity, or ideal womanhood, that is needed to shore up toxic mascu-
linity, a socialisation I conceive of as ‘complicit femininity.’ This piece of my 
argument is framed— through discussion of Beauvoir and Gavey again, this 
time also in conjunction with Adrienne Rich’s classic essay, ‘Compulsory 
Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence,’ and Sara Ahmed’s engagement with 
it in Living a Feminist Life— as a complex acknowledgement and dissection 
of the scripts women are given.
I consider the complicity that is collaboration: women who cleave to a 
patriarchal social structure in the belief that they, as ‘good women,’ will 
be protected by it and will benefit from it. And I consider the complicity 
that is survival: the choices and decisions that the vast majority of women 
find ourselves considering as ‘least- worst’ options in the sometimes savagely 
restricted menu of life chances that is our structurally violent, compulsorily 
heterosexist culture. Drawing most notably on Rich and Ahmed and Rebecca 
Solnit’s essays in Men Explain Things to Me as resources, I develop some 
thoughts on a counter- story that aims to further undermine the restrictive 
gender scripts feminism has been contesting as part of its theorising and 
strategising against rape culture.
In my third chapter, I examine stories of consent by first developing an 
account of the spectrum of problematic sexual encounters that we see as the 
consequence of our ‘toxic masculinity– complicit femininity’ gender social-
isation. I begin with an overview of how rape has been, and is currently, 
understood that contrasts Brownmiller’s Second Wave feminist history of 
rape (in her own words and as analysed from the current vantage point in 
feminist scholarship) as something that men do to women, with the view 
that Mithu Sanyal gives us. Sanyal points us to a more gender- inclusive 
understanding of rape, one consistent with crime surveys and personal testi-
monies that suggest a greater population of male survivors and victims than 
cultural understandings of sexual violence had previously accepted. This, 
I argue, is important to take note of because, despite the patriarchal male 
dominance that underpins rape culture and might seem to benefit men as a 
whole, the cultural and structural violence of patriarchy and rape culture 
damages us all, and damages us unevenly, producing effects in marginalised 
populations that are not suffered by more privileged individuals.
From my discussion of histories of sexual violence, I  move along the 
spectrum of problematic sex, to consider what Nicola Gavey theorises as 
‘heterosexual coercion,’ and I use her 1992 analytic framework to consider 
discussion of ‘grey areas’ of sexual relations exposed in the wake of the now 
infamous Babe.net article, ‘I went on a date with Aziz Ansari. It turned into 
the worst night of my life’ (Way). The overarching purpose of this chapter 
is met in the final section, a story of how our thinking about consent has 
developed, from the ‘no means no’ model to recent formulations of the idea 
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of enthusiastic consent, underpinning an argument that consent models of 
thinking about sex need to develop even further, into something like what 
Linda Martín Alcoff outlines in Rape and Resistance as the need to develop 
sexual subjectivity that supports agency and desire for all of us. Consent 
models have been useful in advancing our thinking about positive and nega-
tive sexual relations; that is undeniable. And in many cultures around the 
world they may still prove a necessary corrective to social norms that do 
not make space for (some) participants in sexual relations to say no when 
they mean no. Robust consent norms are obviously and undeniably better 
than assumptions of entitlement to sexual access, or perfunctory, pro- forma 
models. Networks of sex- positive feminists and anti- sexual assault activists 
have worked tirelessly to make these norms more robust and they have done 
valuable, life- saving work, but if we are to extricate ourselves from rape 
culture, one piece of that movement forward has to be evolving beyond the 
idea that sex is about letting, not wanting. As long as we are working with 
consent models, we are implicitly entrenching ourselves in a view of sexual 
encounters in which one party is letting another party obtain something that 
other party desires. We need to develop constructs of mutuality that allow 
all sexual agents to own their own desires (and lacks), to speak authentically 
of wanting (or not), and to learn how to negotiate mutually agreed- upon 
ways of satisfying these wants, instead of refining our existing models of 
consenting to what one’s partner wants.
Chapter 4 tells stories of the development of the concept of sexual har-
assment and the global ‘me too’ moment. The first section tells a story that 
links early 20th- century socialist feminist discussion of sexual predation in 
workplaces with American Second Wave feminist activism against sexual 
harassment and with later (Third Wave) feminist awakenings sparked by the 
Clarence Thomas– Anita Hill Senate hearings in the United States in 1991. The 
second section moves from a focus on how rape culture shapes workplaces 
to a history of African- American women’s activism against sexual assault 
(Danielle McGuire’s recovered history of the anti- sexual- assault activists 
who built the foundations of the civil rights movement) as the historical- 
cultural backdrop for the organising done by Tarana Burke, founder of the 
‘me too’ movement, that made #metoo possible. It also covers, through 
their own memoir She Said, the reporting done by Jodi Kantor and Megan 
Twohey, the New York Times reporters who broke the Harvey Weinstein 
story which marks the beginning of American ‘me too’ calls for account-
ability by powerful men engaged in sexual misconduct. In the third section, 
my critical analysis of the capacity of this present wave of ‘me too’ con-
sciousness to generate long- term systemic change, is global in scope, framing 
‘me too’ as an umbrella concept rather than a single movement. Articulating 
this phenomenon in a way that can accommodate diverse campaigns and 
culturally distinct histories gives us a non- homogenising lens through which 
to see similarities in current manifestations of women’s refusal to accept 
ongoing gender subordination, even as we take notice of the important 
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cultural differences. Through this lens, I explore whether there are any early 
indications that individual behaviour might be changing and institutional 
structures might be reforming, and what we might reasonably be able to 
conclude about the peacebuilding potential of ‘me too.’
In the book’s final chapter, I  draw on my previous scholarly work 
developing an ‘ethics of improvisation,’ a set of norms that can guide us 
as we improvise new strategies for more just, stable, and democratic soci-
eties. I apply that thinking to the question of how we can ‘culture- jam’ our 
present inadequate social relations through deployment of feminist/ woman- 
oriented subversions and readings of cultural productions. In the course of 
analysing stories we have told and stories we could re- tell, I argue, first, that 
this culture- jamming strategy has always been with us, and, second, that 
we need to be doing it more widely (in a more sustained manner) and more 
broadly (in a greater range of areas).
Among the examples of subverted and reimagined cultural productions 
I  identify are two historic declarations of human rights, the French 
Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen de 1789, which was 
reworked by French revolutionary and women’s rights activist Olympe de 
Gouges (Déclaration des droits de la femme et de la citoyenne, 1791) and 
the American Declaration of Independence (1776), which was reworked 
by American suffragist Elizabeth Cady Stanton (‘Declaration of Sentiments 
and Resolutions,’ 1848). Turning from politics to fiction, I  consider the 
instructive and thought- provoking example of Don Quixote, Miguel de 
Cervantes’s 17th- century contribution to the canon of Spanish literature. 
My attention then turns to the question of how rape stories are told in 
film— from Mithu Sanyal’s analysis of whose voice and point of view gets 
told in The Accused (1988) to analysis of the point- of- view shifts in the 
recent Netflix series Unbelievable— and speculate about how to normalise 
more empathetic cultures.
I close the chapter with a discussion of the extent to which we can already 
see transformation at work in perhaps the most regressive depictions in 
mainstream film of women’s potential: Walt Disney’s fairy tales. The ‘old- 
school’ princesses I  take on throughout this book are being replaced by 
more agentic, less male- identified characters who reflect to varying extents 
the figure (the wilful girl) Sara Ahmed introduces in Living a Feminist Life’s 
engagement with the Brothers Grimm fairy tale The Willful Child. The sheer 
range of these disruptions and subversive interventions can, I argue, draw 
our attention to the ways that the patriarchal thinking that perpetuates 
rape culture congeals in our perceptions of the world without us even being 
consciously aware of it. Stories alone cannot change the world, but telling 
stories differently can encourage each of us to think differently, to react dif-
ferently to our social worlds, and to see when and how others are reacting 
differently. It is perhaps less of a smashing of rape culture than I would wish 
for, but even an erosion over time is a better outcome than the status quo 




I would like to close this introduction with one further note of explanation 
about how I am organising this book, and why. In taking on the question of 
how to end rape culture, and framing rape- culture activism through the idea 
of improvisatory culture- jamming, I am calling into question the fairy tales 
we tell ourselves— about who gets raped, how it happens, why it happens, 
and what each of us could or should be doing about it. One way we (as 
cultures) have led ourselves into this rape- culture space that we need to get 
out of is literally through telling fairy tales— about princes who will appear 
in women’s lives as magical validators of our self- worth; about the passive 
princesses we (as individual women) should be— beautiful, and patient, and 
waiting; about the happily ever afters that will stretch out before us once 
we are chosen; about the dangerous paths through dark woods and the big 
bad wolves that lie in wait there for us should we be foolish enough to strike 
out on our own and try to be something other than princes and princesses. 
This is a point that Ahmed makes in Living a Feminist Life:  speaking of 
paths we are directed to follow in the hope they will lead us to happiness, 
she says that even though traditional, subordinated, heterosexual lives 
are no longer prescribed for women, ‘happy stories for girls remain based 
on fairy- tale formulas:  life, marriage, and reproduction, or death (of one 
kind or another) and misery’ (49). To reinforce the point that these stories 
are leading us astray and that we need to be telling them differently, I am 
‘jamming’ fairy tale tropes in the chapter sub- titles I use throughout. I also 
introduce a ‘jammed’ fairy tale at the end of every section, as a ‘coda.’17 My 
favourite stories are, and have always been, re- tellings of familiar tales with 
a twist— characters who don’t conform, plot lines that don’t resolve in the 
standard expected ways, morals of the story that justify an entirely different 
way of doing things than what was taught to us as children. Subversions.
Notes
 1 I have made a conscious feminist- political decision in this book to provide names 
for already publicly identified victims and survivors of sexual assault as these 
incidents emerge in my discussion of rape culture. I do so in the spirit in which 
Jyoti Singh Pandey’s mother and father publicly named her in the wake of her 
death— so that she might be seen as a full human person and not just as the 
shadowy victim of the Delhi bus rape. My contention throughout this book is 
that rape culture, as a structural violence of patriarchal societies, functions in 
ways that deny full personhood to women, most especially to sexual assault 
survivors and victims. In much of the journalistic reporting of sexual assault 
during the decades of my adult experience of the world, victims have not been 
named; this has been a principled effort to avoid stigmatising them (see Katha 
Pollitt’s 1991 analysis of media coverage of rape charges brought against William 
Kennedy Smith for a feminist defence of ‘the longstanding custom of media ano-
nymity’). But, as I am concerned to argue in the chapters that follow, times and 
social conventions are changing, and increasingly it seems that participating in 
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have always unfairly marked those who have been subjected to this form of vio-
lence. Obviously (I hope), I do not name anyone whose identity is not already 
in the public sphere. Equally obviously, I think that we can only challenge the 
stigma, and change the cultural tendency of widespread under- reporting, through 
a refusal to continue the silence that denies names and other facts of autobio-
graphical identity to these persons. (For the record, and in this spirit, I want to 
acknowledge here that the woman I knew of for years and refer to above only as 
‘the Central Park jogger’ is former investment banker, now inspirational speaker 
and author, Trisha Meili.)
 2 Bystander intervention is the peer- education strategy acknowledged and 
mandated by the 2013 Campus SaVE (Sexual Violence Elimination) Act, in its 
enumeration of the obligations colleges and universities in the United States have 
to protect students from sexual assault. The central focus of bystander interven-
tion, training students to intervene in social situations that might lead to sexual 
assault, is grounded in social psychology hypotheses that groups of people 
are less likely to intervene than lone individuals because of the phenomena of 
‘bystander apathy’ and ‘diffused responsibility’ that were theorised in the social 
psychology literature after the 1964 stalking and murder of a young New York 
woman, Kitty Genovese. Her death became a cultural touchstone because of the 
media reporting that three dozen of her neighbours had heard her cries for help 
and ignored them; during the half- hour in which she was suffering the attack 
that proved fatal, no one telephoned the police to report the crime in action, 
according to the standard accounts. Four years later, social psychologists, John 
Darley and Bibb Latané, wrote and published the paper, ‘Bystander Intervention 
in Emergencies,’ that introduced these hypotheses and laid the groundwork for 
subsequent research into bystander intervention. For an in- depth analysis of what 
is often forgotten and ignored about the Genovese murder and of the resulting 
mis- theorisation of the extent to which bystander apathy is a widespread social 
problem, see Peter C. Baker’s 2014 argument that this case needs to be under-
stood in its particulars: as an instance of sexual violence against women.
 3 Throughout this book I will be discussing ‘me too’ movements in the plural, 
as a way to draw connections among different local– national protests against 
sexual violence and sex/ gender- based exploitation, which— despite the very real 
and important differences between, say, protests against sexual assault in the 
United States and protests against workplace sexual harassment in India— I 
think we need to understand as a growing global refusal of patriarchal gender 
subordination. ‘Me too’ functions in my argument as a convenient umbrella term 
that captures the synchronous eruption of a variety of protests that women are 
making around the world against social conditions we are no longer willing to 
endure. In addition, I distinguish ‘me too’— the support movement started by 
African- American community activist, Tarana Burke, in 2006— from #metoo, 
the online discussion of sexual assault and male impunity that was inaugurated 
on Twitter by Alyssa Milano in 2017 (inspired by Burke’s years of work). These 
‘me too’/ #metoo histories will be the focal discussion of Chapter 4.
 4 One of the aspects of ‘me too’ testimony that tantalises me in its potential to 
trigger social change is that the wealthy and powerful men being accused of 
sexual assault, sexual predation, and sexual misconduct of varying levels of ser-
iousness occupy a very different social position than the men foregrounded in 







Tanya Serisier and Angela Davis (among others) note, tend to be poor men of 
colour. (I discuss Davis’s criticisms of Brownmiller in greater detail in note 11.)
 5 See Fiona Vera- Gray, 14.
 6 Nicola Gavey defines this as ‘discourses of sex and gender . . . that set up the 
preconditions for rape— women’s passive, acquiescing (a)sexuality and men’s 
forthright, urgent pursuit of sexual “release” . . . [and] script a relational dynamic 
that arguably authorizes sexual encounters that are not always clearly distin-
guishable from rape’ (Just Sex?, 3).
 7 For Foucault’s account, see ‘Docile Bodies’ in Discipline and Punish: The Birth 
of the Prison, and for Bartky’s gender- cognisant account of discipline, see 
‘Foucault, Femininity and the Modernization of Patriarchal Power,’ in Writing 
on the Body: Female Embodiment and Feminist Theory.
 8 Here, Bartky is drawing from the analysis of women’s perceived field of movement 
and intentionality offered by Iris Marion Young in ‘Throwing Like a Girl: A 
Phenomenology of Feminine Body Comportment, Motility, and Spatiality.’
 9 See Foucault’s History of Sexuality, Volume 1: The Will to Knowledge, 100– 101.
 10 On the matter of drinking, she asserts that ‘there are predators out there, and . . . 
women have to take special precautions.’ Of what she calls ‘slut marches,’ she says, 
‘sure, [you can wear whatever you want] but you look like a hooker.’ See Katie Van 
Syckle, ‘Against Our Will Author on What Today’s Rape Activists Don’t Get.’
 11 This is not the only point on which Brownmiller can be, and has been, criticised. 
Both bell hooks (in Ain’t I a Woman) and Angela Davis (in Women, Race & 
Class) have taken her to task for the ways in which they see Against Our Will 
perpetuating the devaluation of African- American women and colluding with 
racist historical revisionism, most notably for foregrounding in her history of 
rape the phenomenon of black men raping white women and largely ignoring the 
post- slavery history of white men raping black women (an erasure that requires 
correction of the historical record through the kind of scholarship we find in 
Danielle L.  McGuire’s history of black women’s anti- sexual- assault activism 
throughout the 20th century). Davis, in particular, charges Brownmiller with 
‘racist ideas’ exemplified by her account of the 1955 murder of Emmett Till for 
the alleged crime of wolf- whistling at a white woman (see Brownmiller 178). 
Brownmiller describes this incident exclusively in terms of gender politics— 
men objectifying women— to the point that the racial politics, which drenched 
all social relations in rural Mississippi and cannot be glossed over responsibly, 
recede. Equally problematically, the fact that Emmett Till was a fourteen year 
old boy is elided in Brownmiller’s attempt to locate his life and death in the 
context of sexual violence against women. Other criticisms that have been made 
against Against Our Will include the lack of evidence for Brownmiller’s categor-
ical assertions about the role of rape in pre- historical societies (for which we, 
by definition, have no records) and many of her more sweeping and essentialist 
statements about men and rape, which suggest, in contrast to her thesis that 
rape is a political issue, that it is a biological imperative or somehow otherwise 
‘natural’ and therefore ineradicable. See the analysis offered by Stevi Jackson, 
‘Classic Review— Against Our Will.’
 12 I want to acknowledge here the point made by a number of feminist scholars 
who incorporate elements of Foucauldian thought into analyses of sexual vio-
lence: Foucault has expressed views on rape that read as remarkably insensitive. 









Interpreting cultural fairy tales 23
19th century account of molestation of a young village girl, which he characterises 
as an ‘everyday occurrence in the life of village sexuality’ (31). There is also the 
public position he took to the effect that rape should not be seen as a special type 
of violence, that it should instead be treated as an instance of physical assault 
(cited by Gavey in Just Sex?, 94n10; quoted in Plaza 27). Chloë Taylor argues, 
concerning the first instance, that much of the dismissive language describing 
Charles Jouy’s victimisation of Sophie Adam was Jouy’s characterisation, not 
Foucault’s (see Foucault, Feminism, and Sex Crimes: An Anti- Carceral Analysis). 
And, concerning Foucault’s argument that rape ought to be treated as simple 
assault, Gavey describes the suggestion offered by Vicki Bell that desexualising 
rape might be a move to undermine its transgressive power (see Just Sex?, 
94n10). If Bell’s suggestion is correct, then Foucault’s view of rape appears much 
closer to the view that Susan Brownmiller and Second Wave radical feminists 
espoused: that rape is an act of violence, not an act of lust or passion.
 13 Emma Henderson, ‘How Dabbawalas Became the World’s Best Food Delivery 
System.’
 14 Ajay Heble and Ellen Waterman, ‘Sounds of Hope, Sounds of Change: Improvi-
sation, Pedagogy, Social Justice.’
 15 Post- graduation, Sulkowicz has publicly identified as gender non- binary and has 
indicated a preference for they/ their/ them pronouns.
 16 The problem of campus sexual assault is indeed a complicated social phenom-
enon: as with most incidences of sexual assault, it often occurs between people 
who know each other— sometimes are in, or on the threshold of, a sexual– 
romantic relationship— and, in the particular case of campus sexual assault, it 
often occurs between people who have neither the life experience nor the social 
education to be capable of nuanced conversations about consent and desire. 
(In this sense, they often are ‘he said– she said’ situations, although not as sim-
plistically as depicted by those who seek to minimise the problem.) The uni-
versities who have a moral obligation— and, in the United States, a Title IX (of 
the Education Amendments of 1972) legal obligation— to provide an equitable 
education to all students, regardless of gender, wrestle with questions of how to 
weigh a victim’s petition for justice against a defendant’s right to their own edu-
cation. The campus policing apparatus frequently finds itself tasked with investi-
gative, adjudicative, and outreach responsibilities for which it is not adequately 
resourced, a burden falling on them as a result of longstanding and widespread 
unwillingness of local law enforcement to take sexual assault seriously (on this 
last point, see Brownmiller 352– 367, and the more contemporary account in 
Rebecca Flintoft’s chapter, ‘Sexual Assault,’ in Violence Goes to College:  The 
Authoritative Guide to Prevention and Intervention).
 17 My codas borrow from musical composition the practice of adding to the end of 
a musical work or passage some additional material that allows the audience to 
look back at the ideas that have been expressed and consider them in a new light 
or from a different perspective.
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1  Once upon a time . . .
Rape culture is structural violence
What rape culture is: the prince’s battlefield
A ‘rape culture’ is not only, or merely, a culture that valorises or habit-
ually practices rape. It need not be a society in which roaming packs of 
insecure, violent young men are frequently spotted in the act of savaging 
innocent girls, or silly ones.1 It is also a society in which a powerful man 
you refuse to have sex with can end your career.2 And a society that raises 
its girls with the message that they need to make themselves attractive to 
men, that their value and well- being depends upon male validation.3 And 
a society that ignores the disappearance of racially and socio- economically 
marginalised women, as was the case when a serial killer was targeting First 
Nations women in the impoverished Downtown Eastside community of 
Vancouver (Canada) in the 1990s, or as continues to be the case in First 
Nations and Native- American communities across the Canadian Prairies, 
and the US Plains states and Pacific Northwest today.4 ‘Women are trained 
to be rape victims,’ Brownmiller contended in 1975 in Against Our Will; ‘To 
simply learn the word “rape” is to take instruction in the power relationship 
between males and females’ (309). Her further claim that this possibility of 
violence ‘seeps into our childhood consciousness by imperceptible degrees’ 
(Brownmiller 309) reads to me as an adaptation to ‘rape culture’ discourses 
of the socialisation processes that French existentialist philosopher Simone 
de Beauvoir describes as the ways in which female human infants are turned 
into ‘women.’5
A culture need not be something we honour, or are proud to be part of; 
despite the generally positive connotations we ascribe to the word, ‘culture’ 
is simply a label that points to an environment of embedded expectations 
for the individuals who act within it. It functions as a ‘discourse’ in the 
Foucauldian sense, a power- knowledge construct that imposes constraints 
and issues permissions in, and alongside, telling us what counts as know-
ledge.6 A rape culture is one that normalises and excuses rape, a social con-
text in which the desires of privileged aggressors are prioritised over the 
comfort, safety, and dignity of marginalised populations that are seen as 
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is. In most of the cultures that comprise our globalised world— the one that 
appears in films, in news media, on Facebook— men are normalised as the 
hunters for sex and the conquerors of women; women are normalised as the 
guardians of our own chastity and virtue. Those of us who ‘fail’ to be vir-
tuous are disparaged, disregarded, and pathologised in these cultures, which 
tend to be slut- shaming, and victim- blaming, and, of course, heterosexist. 
Implicitly, in films, songs, and the fairy tales told to us as children,8 we are 
presented with a world in which the young questing hero (the prince) goes 
in search of his ‘lady love’ (the princess). He knows her by her beauty, her 
modesty, her submission to him. He wins her. Her life from that point on is 
an appendage to his life. This is rape culture.
Let me offer a selection of personal experiences that illustrate what 
is involved in being seen as ‘prey’ in a society that normalises predatory 
relations. You know you’re living in a rape culture when:
A strange man howls or whistles at you from the passenger seat of a pick- 
up truck, and your first thought is to check that you’re not accidentally 
exposing ‘too much’ leg;
You’re sitting on the subway reading Plato’s Apology9 on your way to a 
friend’s dissertation defence, and all of a sudden you realise the man 
sitting across from you is masturbating— at you? because of you?;
Part of your getting- ready- to- leave- the- house routine involves standing in 
front of a full- length mirror and assessing your clothing choices with the 
question ‘pedestrian or prostitute?’ in mind;
One of your male work colleagues engages in friendly conversation, offers 
moral support, or otherwise does something kind, and you have to fight 
a niggling back- of- the- head worry that this might be one of those situ-
ations that will escalate into something needing to be ‘managed’;
You spend all morning reading online posts in the latest social media con-
versation about aggressive ways in which women are policed by men 
into compliant behaviour, thinking ‘no, that’s not me; I  haven’t had 
that experience,’ and then, on your three- block walk to the bus stop, 
are accosted by a drunk man who instructs you to smile at him and 
observes to no one in particular that you should be wearing a skirt 
instead of jeans;
You have a friendly, utterly non- flirtatious conversation with a man in a 
bar that ends in a handshake and leaves you pleasantly surprised, with 
unaccustomedly warm, positive feelings for ‘all men’;
You accept a ride home from a reunion with an old friend, and end up 
parked in the woods late at night trying to explain to him that, no, you 
don’t want to have sex with him, and no, you’re not ok with just sitting 
in the car with him while he masturbates;
You have sex with your husband even when you don’t want to because, 
‘no, I don’t feel like it,’ is apparently not a good enough reason to not 
have sex, and it’s easier to grit your teeth for ten minutes of not really 
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consensual sex than to argue for four hours the night before you have 
to work an early shift.
Some of these examples might seem trivial, others might seem neurotic, 
but the brute reality of gender- hierarchical societies is that any woman you 
know could, if she feels comfortable with you, give you a broadly similar 
list of aggressions that she has been subjected to and fears that she has 
internalised. And to the extent that any of them might strike a reader as ‘not 
that bad,’ I think this points us to the great value of the anthology Roxane 
Gay contributes to the growing ‘me too’ conversation. In her introduction 
to the volume, Gay describes how it evolved away from her original idea 
for a collection of essays about rape culture that would balance personal 
accounts with more objective analysis (xi). It became a collection of testi-
monies: from a Hollywood actress’s reflection on the structures of objectifi-
cation and exploitation of women (the ways in which Harvey Weinstein is 
revealed as emblematic rather than ‘one bad apple’) to the many accounts 
offered by women of their own childhood and adolescent experiences with 
sexual violence that effectively trained them into the view that living with 
these scars is just what it means to be female in their societies. Organised 
through Gay’s own recollection of coping with sexual violence by telling her-
self that it wasn’t that bad, that other women’s stories were worse than hers, 
the collection becomes a challenge to what she describes as ‘the calloused 
surfaces’ of our empathy (ix– x).
While there is considerable difference— across cultures, and across 
racial, sexual- orientation, and socio- economic or class identities— in how 
women experience the insistent pressure to orient our lives to men (the 
particular forms the pressure might take), the existence of that pressure to 
take responsibility for men’s sexual desire, to manage it, and to conform 
to it is something that typically exists as a background feature of women’s 
lives in male- dominated societies. Even as we acknowledge that women, 
women’s lives, and women’s experiences are not the same everywhere, it 
seems to me reasonable to hypothesise that the ability to recognise ‘my 
own social world’ in stories of other women’s encounters with abuse and 
aggression has driven world- wide attention to and global manifestations of 
‘me too’ news coverage and social media conversations. Being able to pro-
vide such a list of one’s own experiences of gendered power and policing is 
the consequence of having being shaped by the kinds of social forces that 
feminist philosopher Sandra Bartky describes in her gender- cognisant re- 
presentation of Michel Foucault’s disciplinary power: standards of behav-
iour, bodily presentation, and a compliant attitude that women internalise 
as ‘the disciplinary project of femininity’ in what Bartky contends is 
‘the regime of institutionalized heterosexuality . . . [characterising] con-
temporary patriarchal culture’ (139, 140). ‘The disciplinary power that 
inscribes femininity in the female body is everywhere and it is nowhere,’ 
she tells us; ‘the disciplinarian is everyone and yet no one in particular’ 
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(Bartky 142). We are socialised to believe and to expect that we are always, 
in every interaction, subject to being assessed in terms of how well we are 
performing the tasks assigned to women (an expectation Bartky discusses 
as internalisation of a ‘panoptical male connoisseur’); this subsuming of the 
male gaze is one aspect of rape culture.
In a 2005 anthology called Transforming a Rape Culture, the editors 
describe the scope of the social relations they seek to transform:
On TV programs and ads, in newspapers, novels, poetry, songs, opera, 
rock, and rap, on every billboard, in every shop window, on every 
museum wall we found evidence of rape culture. We began to under-
stand the ways girls and boys are programmed to be victims and rapists, 
and we saw how training for this behavior begins early— before nursery 
school, even before birth, in most cases, with our own parental notions 
of the (highly artificial) distinctions between male and female.
(Buchwald, Fletcher, and Roth xiv)
One such example of the public propaganda they describe confronted me 
every time I  visited the United Nations University in Shibuya (a neigh-
bourhood of Tokyo, the city in which I lived for the first two years of the 
‘me too’ awakening). A larger- than- life billboard down the road from the 
UNU building depicts a young woman holding to her waist a picture frame 
that reveals to us the underwear underneath her fairly nondescript casual- 
professional wardrobe. Outside the picture frame, she is a young woman 
dressed to go to work, or to go grocery shopping, or to go to the movies. 
Within the picture frame we see her bra, her underpants, and her very 
trim, flat- stomached waist. I’m not certain what she’s advertising because 
of the language barrier (my Japanese language skills are very rudimentary 
and I can’t read kanji), but it seems to be a weight- loss clinic, or maybe a 
women’s fitness centre. At any rate, it is yet another instance of women’s 
bodies being used within our cultures in ways that men’s bodies typically 
are not:  the use of sex and the implied promise of sexy young women 
available to you (or, if you are female, sexy young womanhood available 
to you), if you buy this beer, use this shaving cream, patronise this fast- 
food restaurant.
This is an old point about objectification and commodification of women’s 
bodies that has been made by media literacy analysts like Jean Kilbourne for, 
literally, as long as I have been alive. One of the students who commented on 
a presentation I gave about this book project in the early stages of writing 
responded to the photograph I showed of this billboard by saying:
Japanese culture depends on women[’s] attraction, like there are so 
many shops and books and products that show women[’s] sexiness. 
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I feel it’s weird and I really hate this culture. But I’m not sure how to sell 
products without using women[’s] attractiveness.
(Nicholls, ‘Jamming Rape Culture’)
When the commodification of women’s bodies is normalised to the point 
that even people who can see what is happening, and can see what is wrong 
with what is happening, cannot imagine alternatives: this too is rape culture.
Objectification and commodification of women are two of the features 
and logical consequences of the gendered social hierarchy that feminist 
scholars are pointing to when we deploy the term ‘patriarchy.’ The self- 
censorship, self- doubt, and self- blame underpinning my own ‘living in rape 
culture’ checklist are others, as is the story- telling that assigns heroic life- 
paths to men and subordination to women. Patriarchy (literally ‘the rule of 
the father’), a way of ordering societies that normalises male dominance and 
female submission, works to put power, wealth, and knowledge in men’s 
hands, and casts women as dependent on men’s largesse and approval. If 
we are ‘good girls,’ we are delicate (weak), trustworthy stewards of house-
hold budgets, and willing pupils of authoritative, learned men. If we are 
‘bad girls,’ we are schemers and temptresses, materialistic (unfeminine, if we 
attempt economic autonomy), and, if we presume to know more (or other) 
than what is given to us by the men who are our teachers, intellectually 
arrogant.
It is not the case that every society ever formed has followed this model— 
cultures like the Haudenosaunee Confederacy (called the ‘Iroquois’ by 
white settlers of North America) have social structures that are matrilineal 
(clan name and family identity is passed down from female ancestors) and 
matrilocal (men move into the family houses of their wives when they 
marry)— but societies that are not grounded in male dominance are typically 
understood as counter- examples to a perceived norm. Both Confucianism 
and Christianity, for instance, have developed doctrines that present men’s 
authority over women as the natural order of things, and the historical leg-
acies of colonialism are such that the gender hierarchy represented in the 
term ‘patriarchy’ is a settled aspect of the popular imagination in most parts 
of the world. When superiority and inferiority are understood to define both 
the social relations and the persons engaged in those relations, it becomes 
very easy— even natural— for the dominant group to normalise its desire to 
impose its will on the subordinated group.
In volume 1 of his History of Sexuality, philosopher Michel Foucault 
notes that ‘it is one of the essential traits of Western societies that the force 
relationships which for a long time had found expression in war, gradually 
became invested in the order of political power’ (102). This is how we end 
up living in rape cultures: within the only gender categories made available 
to us in most cultures, men are raised from the time they are boys to feel 
entitled to women’s attention, women’s care, and women’s bodies. Women 
are raised from the time we are girls to also believe that men are entitled to 
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these things, or at least, we are raised to be wary about openly contesting 
that entitlement. Patriarchy, and the rape culture that is its manifestation in 
many societies, becomes another latent violence shaping our social relations 
and our perceptions of our capacities. Its dominance- subordination ideology 
makes possible the
[p] hysical and sexual violence against women, usually committed by 
men, [that] is pandemic in our culture[s,] and the high rates of violence 
against women and girl children make it clear that we who are female 
are particularly vulnerable to violence simply due to our gender.
(Adams and Fortune 12)
‘How did this whole story begin?’ Simone de Beauvoir asks rhetorically 
as she sets up her discussion of how women have been relegated to being the 
‘second’ (inferior) sex (10).
Why is it that this world has always belonged to men10 and that only 
today things are beginning to change? Is this change a good thing? Will 
it bring about an equal sharing of the world between men and women 
or not?
(Beauvoir 10)
In the course of addressing these questions, she frames sexual relations 
between men and women in controversial terms usually associated with 
Susan Brownmiller’s contemporaries in feminist theory and activism, Andrea 
Dworkin and Catharine MacKinnon, claiming that woman is ‘a raped inter-
iority’ (Beauvoir 35). Her point here is to identify the divergence, in hetero-
sexual relations, between what gives men sexual pleasure and what gives 
women sexual pleasure, and to underline the presence of male dominance 
in what we think of as sex— a point that social psychologist Nicola Gavey 
more recently discusses as ‘the coital imperative’ (117– 119). ‘The clitoral 
system does not change with adulthood, and woman preserves this erotic 
autonomy her whole life,’ Beauvoir contends,
but it is only indirectly linked to normal coitus, it plays no role what-
soever in procreation . . . [whereas] the vagina . . . becomes an erotic 
center uniquely through the intervention of the male, and this always 
constitutes a kind of rape.
(384)
This characterisation might strike some readers as unhelpful or polem-
ical, but it seems to me to foreshadow some of the more conceptually messy 
yet necessary discussions taking place these days— not just in feminist ana-
lysis of rape and rape culture, like Gavey’s Just Sex?, but in ‘me too’- inflected 
commentary on how we should assess current dating norms and practices. (I 
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discuss Gavey’s work on technologies of heterosexual coercion, through the 
particular case of an online article about a young woman’s ‘bad date’ with 
‘woke’ pro- feminist comedian Aziz Ansari, in Chapter 3.) These discussions 
of how we distinguish sex that is criminal (rape) from sex that is problem-
atic (coercion and manipulation) and sex that, in our current understanding 
of consent, we think ought not be subject to reproach or condemnation 
are important conversations to be having in our current cultural moment. 
‘Me too’ has revealed not just despicable behaviour on the part of powerful 
men, and not just appalling failures of accountability and transparency on 
the part of corporations and institutions who have covered for these men.11 
It has also revealed, even in societies whose public discourse suggests wide-
spread acceptance of gender equality as a desirable feature of public life, the 
persistence of a disturbing complacency in socio- sexual norms. This compla-
cency encourages us to identify harassment and distinctly non- consensual 
experiences as regrettable risks of dating in the modern world (or, in the 
case of non- consensual sexual activity within an intimate- partner rela-
tionship, the downside of commitment). As Gavey asks, ‘what does it say 
about our culture(s) that there can be so much ambiguity over the differ-
ential diagnosis of rape versus sex?’ (159). Noting her own efforts to think 
through these questions and her reluctance to simplify complex issues for 
the sake of being able to put forth a coherent position, she characterises the 
challenge of destabilising these categories of rape, coercion and consensual 
sex as ‘an important part of the same fight [against rape] at a different level’ 
(Gavey 159).
In this era of the ‘me too’ hashtag, identifications and analyses of rape 
culture are increasingly mainstream, but they often come to us with little 
exposition of the history of the term and the concept. The term ‘rape culture’ 
emerged in the context of feminist organising in the United States during 
the 1970s, the height of what is known in feminist history as ‘Second Wave’ 
feminism.12 A growing feminist awareness of the pervasiveness and normal-
isation of rape was part of Second Wave contributions to building more 
gender- equal societies, and it forms the backdrop to canonical texts of the 
anti- rape movement, like Brownmiller’s history of rape, Against Our Will.13 
Brownmiller documents the phenomenon of rape as a longstanding practice 
of violence against women, motivated not by sexual desire, but by misogyny 
and men’s desire to assert and maintain social dominance; however, she does 
not deploy the term ‘rape culture’ as a label for what she is describing.
As the Wikipedia entry on rape culture presents the term’s history, its 
first uses were in a 1974 book edited by two members of the New York 
Radical Feminists, Noreen Connell and Cassandra Wilson (Rape: The First 
Sourcebook for Women) and in a 1975 documentary, Rape Culture, that 
was produced and directed by Margaret Lazarus and Renner Wunderlich.14 
From the mid- 1970s, the term gained acceptance as a way of denoting the 
social attitudes that make it possible for us to live with pervasive sexual vio-
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be mobilising. In Just Sex?, Gavey notes that the time elapsed between then 
and now has been a period of evolution from a social perception in which
rape was considered to be rare, and where complaints of rape were com-
monly regarded to be lies, distortions of normal sex, harmless anyway, 
and/ or provoked by the victim . . . to more widespread concern about 
rape as a serious social problem.
(162)
Linda Martín Alcoff likewise opens her book, Rape and Resistance, with 
the observation that our current relation to the concept of rape culture is ‘a 
moment of an unprecedented social revolution’ (1). But there is still consid-
erable debate about how much of women’s experience of male- dominated 
societies is actually, or appropriately subsumed under the concept of rape 
culture. At least in part, this is because we have come, over the course of 
the last five decades, to understand rape as an act of violence,15 and we 
don’t experience much of the relentlessly normalised cultural messaging that 
forms its infrastructure as violence. This is precisely why I want to tell an 
alternative story of what rape culture is, a discussion I turn to later in this 
chapter. The theorising of violence done in peace studies gives us resources 
to understand and explain violence that is latent in features and phenomena 
of social worlds, and which has become so sedimented that we— many of 
us— do not even recognise or experience it as violence.
Regardless of who we credit with coining the term, and what we agree 
counts as its constituent features, it is clear that Brownmiller was influential 
in bringing the concept of rape culture to public attention beyond commu-
nities of feminist scholars. In a recently published analysis of the possibilities 
and limitations for narrative politics (the telling of personal stories in the 
service of political activism) in ending sexual violence, legal scholar Tanya 
Serisier observes that Brownmiller’s book was a catalyst for the transform-
ation of our social understanding of rape, helping to shift the topic out of 
a criminal justice context and reposition it as a matter for feminist struggle 
and feminist theorising of gender politics (8). Against Our Will popularised 
a new understanding of why someone engages in violent sexual assault; this 
law- breaker was not the twisted pervert that psychologists and experts in 
criminal behaviour had previously hypothesised, but ‘for the most part, an 
unextraordinary, violence- prone fellow’ (Brownmiller 180). In this Second 
Wave understanding, rape is not an action that men are driven to because 
they are mentally defective or overwhelmed by lust, passion, or the wiles of 
seductive women; it is intentional violence.
According to Brownmiller, drawing on sociology and criminology of the 
1950s, the young men who, statistically, are most likely to be identified as 
perpetrators of rape are demonstrating their masculinity in the way most 
easily open to men of low social status: through violence (181). Powerful, 
socially influential men do not need to use force to get what they want, she 
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claims; violence is the province of the socially marginalised (Brownmiller 
181). In the 1970s, this depiction was a radical shift away from perceptions 
of rapists as either perverts or ardent men, and Brownmiller’s characterisa-
tion was supported by the crime statistics she was drawing from.16 Today, 
however, we are much more aware that under- reporting— of rape, generally, 
and of acquaintance rape and intimate- partner rape, in particular— gives us 
a distorted account of who the rapist is. And, of course, today, in the wake of 
the ‘me too’ revelations in the United States about culturally powerful men, 
like film producer Harvey Weinstein, television executive Les Moonves, and 
celebrities like Kevin Spacey (even the pre- ’me too’ revelations about then- 
IMF head Dominique Strauss- Kahn’s sexual assault of a maid in a New York 
hotel room17), Brownmiller’s contention that only the socially marginalised 
resort to sexual violence proves an inadequate picture.18
Part of what is so inadequate about this picture is that, even as an 
account of American history of rape culture, it is significantly and prob-
lematically partial in its inattention to the divergent experiences of women 
of different races.19 Within the predominantly white- liberal- feminist and 
radical- feminist networks of the 1970s, rape culture was an emergent idea. 
In African- American women’s experience of American life, however, this 
was an old idea, as was the awareness that powerful white men are, in 
fact, quite willing to use violence to assert their perceived right to African- 
American women’s bodies. There is a long history of anti- rape activism in 
African- American women’s groups, only now beginning to be recognised in 
feminist histories of anti- rape struggles in the United States. As this history 
is recovered in, for example, historian Danielle L. McGuire’s book, At the 
Dark End of the Street: Black Women, Rape, and Resistance, the organising 
that African- American women did across the segregated southern states in 
the early part of the 20th century is now being credited as the ground of the 
civil rights movement that successfully challenged legal enshrinement of a 
racial hierarchy that made African- American lives, and African- American 
women’s bodies, radically vulnerable to violence at the hands of the petty 
and powerful white ruling class.20 This was rape culture that was openly 
hostile to the women who were its targets; there was none of the latent vio-
lence that is expressed as patronising and infantilising behaviours (the facet 
of rape culture that legal scholar Courtney Fraser discusses as ‘benevolent 
sexism’).
McGuire documents the protest and resistance campaigns and the com-
munity organising of African- American women, the tireless work against 
racialised sexual violence they did in churches and with the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) to demand 
equal justice under the law for African- American women who had been 
raped and sexually terrorised. Her account of this fight for women’s bodily 
autonomy begins with a history of the campaign to get justice for Alabama 
woman Recy Taylor in the form of arrest and trial of the seven men 
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throughout her book, African- American women’s organising did not begin 
in the 1940s; from slavery onwards, there was ‘a tradition of testimony and 
truth- telling’ in which women claimed their basic human right to their own 
bodies (At the Dark End 35). Rape culture in the segregated American South 
was on display in competing narratives: the sanitising story told by the racist 
power structure— through mainstream cultural products like Gone With 
the Wind and The Birth of a Nation— of benevolent slavery, black men’s 
alleged propensity for sexual violence, and proud white men defending 
white womanhood, countered by the radicalising story of ‘equal justice and 
bodily integrity’ that was brought to life by African- American community 
mobilisation (McGuire 28).
Although Recy Taylor never did get justice for the sexual violence she 
endured, the principle African- American women were fighting for— that 
sexual violence against black women should be treated as seriously under 
the law as sexual violence against white women— was finally upheld as 
legal precedent in 1959 when the four white rapists of Betty Jean Owens 
in Tallahassee, Florida were convicted and sentenced for their crime against 
her (McGuire 169– 187). Only much later, in the mid- 1970s, would Second 
Wave feminists take up the case of Joan Little, a North Carolina woman 
who killed the prison guard who had raped her. McGuire observes:
[t] he Free Joan Little campaign is often portrayed as the product of 
second- wave feminism, which finally enabled women to break the code 
of silence surrounding sexual violence and ‘speak out’ against rape. 
While this may be true for white, middle- class feminists who became 
active in the antirape movement in the early 1970s, African- American 
women had been speaking out and organizing politically against sexual 
violence and rape for more than a century.
(277)
The narrative used by the white power structure in the pre- civil rights 
movement American South exemplifies a relationship in rape culture of ‘ben-
evolent sexism’ and ‘hostile sexism’ that legal scholar Courtney Fraser theor-
ises as a symbiotic structure. ‘Understanding these different manifestations 
of sexism is crucial to understanding rape culture,’ she argues, ‘because 
much of the social structure that encourages or allows sexual violence 
against women is, like benevolent sexism, more subtle than the misogyny 
that people typically associate with sexism’ (147). What she distinguishes 
as hostile sexism is that easily identified conventional misogyny; benevo-
lent sexism, on the other hand, is the commitment to chivalry that ‘place[s] 
women on a pedestal and strip[s] them of agency in the process’ (Fraser 
143). Fraser draws on law and psychology to make the case that rape and 
chivalry depend on each other; it is because of the threat of rape that women 
are thought to need men’s protection, and it is through chivalry’s imput-
ation of vulnerability and diminished agency that women are made more 
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vulnerable to rape— the ‘you know you want it’ justification, infamous from 
Robin Thicke’s 2013 hit song ‘Blurred Lines’ (145, 155).21
Cultural depictions of women as purer and in some ways better than men 
exist in tandem with more repugnant and more obvious depictions found 
in porn,22 crude locker- room talk, and phenomena like the ‘Burning Sun 
scandal,’ news reports that male celebrities from the Korean popular music 
(K- pop) scene are implicated in the allegedly pervasive and violent drugging, 
raping, and trafficking of sex workers and female nightclub- goers.23 These 
pop stars, putative role models and the objects of infatuation for countless 
adolescent girls and young women, have been questioned by police for 
activities such as sharing sex videos and bragging in chat rooms about 
their roles in sexual assaults— obviously revolting and degrading actions 
that are becoming increasingly common elements of rape scandals like the 
Steubenville High School case that I  mentioned in this book’s introduc-
tion. The activities of some men who openly engage in predation comprise 
a threshold for sexual violence within our societies that makes sexualised 
depictions of girls and women seem normal, makes women’s insecurity 
in public spaces look like sensible self- protection, and makes heterosexist 
accounts of men’s sexual dominance and women’s sexual subordination 
appear as the natural order of things. Rejecting attempts to normalise these 
elements of our social worlds, Fraser argues instead that they are features 
of a culture of dehumanisation. She contends:  ‘[d] ehumanization, more 
than simple objectification, entails treating women “as a tool for men’s 
own purposes” ’ (Fraser 152), and underscores throughout her discussion 
that de- agentification— even where it is motivated by a desire to protect— is 
dehumanisation. Rape culture is the battle many women struggle to survive 
on a daily basis, yes, but both forms of sexism Fraser analyses combine to 
ensure that it is ‘the prince’ who determines the battlefield and the terms of 
engagement.
Given an invitation to examine the messaging of their culture, many 
people— even those who have never previously considered the idea of rape 
culture— can easily identify ways that it erupts in their lives. Fairly early 
in the writing of this manuscript, I  had the opportunity to guest lecture 
about my book project in a sociology of gender class taught by a colleague 
at a Japanese university.24 At the end of the class, the students submitted 
comments responding to the guiding questions of the lecture:  have you 
heard the expression ‘rape culture’? what does it mean to you? The dom-
inant theme of the responses I received was consistent with data reported by 
another legal scholar, Fiona Vera- Gray, documenting that ‘at least 80% of 
women living in cities . . . have been subjected to harassment or violence in 
public’ (7). One female student observed, ‘I’ve been told to be careful,’ and 
several of them spoke of having been groped by strangers on crowded trains. 
These multiple references were of particular interest to me because I have 
often experienced the very crowded rush- hour trains in Tokyo as poten-
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violations in the same circumstances strikes me as a function of both age 
and ethnicity differences; in a society marked by male dominance, the cul-
tural expectation that young people will accede to demands made by their 
elders, and a sometimes uneasy incorporation of visible outsiders (‘gaijin’), 
it is easy to see why Japanese high- school girls would be targeted and a 
middle- aged foreign woman would not. As Vera- Gray observes, ‘the forms 
and frequencies of men’s harassment of women may be different across the 
world,’ but the strategies and responses that girls and women feel compelled 
to develop— the ‘safety work’ that sociologist Liz Kelly studies— constitutes 
a constant pressure on female persons in public spaces (12). The solution 
to train- groping threats that a number of these young women identified, 
carrying a safety pin that can be used as a defensive weapon to fend off a 
groping man, is a tactic that at least one Japanese woman of my own gener-
ation recalls using decades ago when she was in school.
The perception of young Japanese women and girls as available for 
opportunistic sexual satisfaction is reinforced by pornography, and was also 
referenced in one student comment in a discussion of the term ‘omochikaeri.’ 
This term, used in polite/ standard Japanese when one wants to order food 
to take away from a restaurant, has devolved into an anime- derived meme, 
and slang for a one- night stand or casual ‘hook- up.’ Literally translated as, 
‘I’m taking it home with me,’ and used popularly to comment on something 
(or someone) the speaker evaluates as ‘kawaii’ (cute), it has become a term 
for casual sex that the student noted ‘will easily be rape.’ This is because, as 
a number of other student responses testified, Japanese cultural socialisation 
is such that even though women know— in theory— they have a right to 
refuse sexual advances, they are hesitant to do so because it is perceived as 
rude or offensive.
Another student wrote, ‘I have agreed to things I didn’t want in order to 
keep myself safe [on] multiple occasions, and the fact that male counterparts 
do not feel that danger or pressure to conform is the patriarchy.’ Yet another 
student, who characterised women saying no as ‘dangerous,’ concluded 
that ‘people don’t care much about women.’ Vera- Gray contends that the 
reason we don’t ‘see the full impact of the sexual harassment of women . . 
. [is] because we’ve separated out safety from freedom and are only meas-
uring the former’ (16). However, when we think about freedom and safety 
together, she says, we realise that one common strategy women use to stay 
safe is to relinquish freedom: we stay home instead of going out in public, 
we stick together in groups and do things like deputising one of our group 
to stay at the table in a bar and watch our drinks when others of us head to 
the bathroom or the dance floor. ‘[I] n women’s lives, the two [freedom and 
safety] work together’ but in inverse relationship, such that we accept as 
necessary giving up one in order to claim the other (Vera- Gray 16, emphasis 
in original).
What I think stands out most clearly in this Second Wave story of rape cul-
ture is that hatred of women— misogyny— is not an accident of messaging. 
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It is, in fact, one defining characteristic. Patriarchal misogyny and chivalry, 
theorised by Fraser as an inseparable symbiosis, form the ground out of 
which rape culture manifests and reveal it as a system of social control. Rape 
culture is the casual and pervasive presentation of women’s bodies as both 
territory and commodity. Rape culture is also the relentless normalising of 
a masculinity governed by a ‘conquest mentality’ and a femininity that is 
enacted through feigned resistance to being conquered, which we all know 
will only be a prelude to eventual submission. Recalling Brownmiller’s char-
acterisation of rape as grounded not in desire for sex but in hatred of women 
(391), and considering anthropologist Kathleen Gough’s inventory of the 
economic, political, and cultural respects in which women, across cultures, 
have been subordinated to men (69– 70)— an account Adrienne Rich draws 
on to explain how compulsory heterosexuality is imposed on women— it 
becomes clear that rape culture is the set of social relations that emerges 
from an ideological commitment to the view that women exist to be used 
by men. Without the belief that women are for men and inferior to them, 
we would not have cultural practices that are so dismissive of whether a 
woman is saying yes or no— a point that I here intend to be about sexual 
consent, but applies equally to housework, pregnancy, underpaid labour in 
the workforce, emotional support, and all the other ways in which women 
are expected to serve men’s interests without ever being asked (or ever 
questioning) whether those interests coincide with our own. Rape culture 
is, at its core, a training manual for how to be sexual— one that encourages 
men and women to harm, disrespect, dislike, and distrust each other. It needs 
therefore to be rewritten.
What structural violence is: the ivory tower view of the 
battlefield
One of the resources I think we can and should draw on in the project of 
reconceptualising rape culture is the canonical theory of violence that has 
been produced within the academic discipline known as peace studies. This 
theory, described by feminist peace studies theorist Catia Confortini as ‘a 
unified framework within which all violence can be seen’ (333), was first 
articulated by Johan Galtung, founder of the discipline as an academic field 
of study, in a 1969 journal article, ‘Violence, Peace, and Peace Research,’ and 
was expanded in a 1990 follow- up, ‘Cultural Violence.’ In the discussion 
that ranges across these two articles, Galtung develops a theory that links 
the violence we typically recognise quite easily— ‘direct violence,’ which 
may be physical or psychological, but is always initiated by individuals or 
groups of individuals— to forms of violence that are normalised as social 
institutions and structures (‘structural violence’) or as broader, ‘big picture’ 
cultural forces (‘cultural violence’), thereby going unnamed as violence. 
These three forms of violence interact, co- produce, and justify each other 
such that, in his 1990 explication, Galtung speaks of them as a triangle of 
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violence (‘Cultural Violence’ 294). ‘[P] ersonal violence [what Galtung labels 
“direct violence”] is violence with a subject [initiating agent], structural vio-
lence is violence without a subject, and cultural violence serves as legitim-
ization of both personal and structural violence,’ explains Confortini in her 
analysis of what a feminist- theory reading adds to Galtung’s theory of vio-
lence (336).25
I think it is clear that all of the facets of our social organisation com-
monly identified as ‘rape culture’— not only the pervasive fear of sexual 
violence among women and girls, but sexual commodification and object-
ification of women and girls, and coercive prescriptions of gender binaries 
and particular forms of heterosexuality— comprise a structural violence that 
harms us all as people, even if and where we do fail to see it as violence. 
And I  think this structural violence of rape culture can be understood as 
produced by the cultural violence that is the ideological commitment to mis-
ogyny, chivalry, and the devaluation of men and women who live outside of 
prescribed gender scripts. The structural violence of rape culture enacts the 
cultural violence of patriarchy such that it becomes the ‘reality’ that proves 
the truth of patriarchal thinking. And, of course, they both work together to 
produce as unfortunate but inevitable, and therefore ineradicable, the direct 
violence that is rape and the other forms of interpersonal sexual aggression.
My argument that rape culture is a structural violence nourished by the 
cultural violence of patriarchal ideology depends, of course, on clear delin-
eation of both Galtung’s theory and the need to filter it through a gendered 
analysis, as Sandra Bartky does with Michel Foucault’s articulation of dis-
ciplinary power. Galtung sees all forms of violence ‘as avoidable insults 
to basic human needs, and more generally to life,’ because each of them 
functions in an individual’s life to produce conditions of existence, and con-
sequent abilities to meet our own basic needs, that are less than they might 
be (‘Cultural Violence’ 292, emphasis in original). He identifies culture as 
‘the symbolic sphere of our existence’ and cultural violence as the aspects 
of that sphere ‘that can be used to justify or legitimize direct or structural 
violence’ (‘Cultural Violence’ 291).26 Confortini notes, however, that his 
theorising proceeds without recognition of the ways that social structures 
are gendered. In her view, a feminist approach ‘contributes to Galtung’s 
theory by seriously tackling issues of power and gender, which are essential 
to an understanding of violence as a complicated process through which 
social relations of power are built, legitimized, reproduced, and naturalized’ 
(356). It achieves this understanding, she explains,
[b] y viewing gender as a social construct . . . [which] dispels the myth of 
a peaceful or peace- prone femininity (and correspondingly a warrior or 
war- prone masculinity). We are then able to see that a variety of mas-
culinities and femininities exist, which experience violence in different 
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But, without a feminist corrective, we are left with, and within, social/ cultural 
relations that privilege ways of life in which men lead and women follow, 
ways of life in which men make war and women make peace— relations that 
enact violence in the form of imposed gender identities.
Because it serves as justification, ‘[c] ultural violence makes direct and struc-
tural violence look, even feel, right,’ Galtung observes (‘Cultural Violence’ 
291). It does this in a number of ways, one of which is ‘by changing the 
moral color of an act’— as in, ‘a cat- call is a compliment; it means he finds 
you attractive.’ Another is by ‘making reality opaque, so that we do not see 
the violent act or fact’ (Galtung, ‘Cultural Violence’ 292). We learn, through 
cultural training and desensitisation, to see dehumanisation, exploitation, 
and repression as normal— or, better still, we learn to not see them at all 
(Galtung, ‘Cultural Violence’ 295). Galtung details a number of processes 
by which cultural violence presents structural violence as an acceptable 
and unremarkable reality, but the three I think most relevant to my discus-
sion of rape culture are ‘penetration,’ ‘marginalisation,’ and ‘fragmentation’ 
(‘Cultural Violence’ 249). The unintentionally aptly- named penetration is a 
process of consciousness- formation in which the values and perspectives of 
a dominant group (the ‘topdog,’ in Galtung’s parlance) are ‘implanted’ in the 
minds of a subordinate group (the ‘underdog’). Marginalisation is a process 
of ‘keeping the underdogs on the outside,’ which he understands to be fre-
quently combined with fragmentation, a process of ‘keeping the underdogs 
away from each other’ (‘Cultural Violence’ 294).
While Galtung says nothing to suggest that he is familiar with Simone 
de Beauvoir’s work, this does seem to me to be a pretty good way of 
understanding the arguments she makes in The Second Sex about the ways 
in which girls and women are trained (socialised) into seeing ourselves as 
the ‘inessential Other,’ the add- on, to the male subject, for whom the world 
is made into a field of conquest (5– 7). The ‘archetypal violent structure . . 
. has exploitation as a center- piece,’ Galtung contends; ‘some, the topdogs, 
get much more . . . out of the interaction in the structure than others, the 
underdogs’ (‘Cultural Violence’ 293). Applied to gender, this is the defin-
ition of patriarchy as an ordering of our social world in which men are 
superior to women. Betty A. Reardon, whose early, inaugural work in fem-
inist peace studies asserts a relationship between sexism and the organised, 
state- directed violence that she theorises as ‘the war system’ (10), defines 
patriarchy as a society in which ‘men are conditioned to play winners and 
women losers’ (37). In a ‘competitive social order’ in which control and 
dominance are ‘submerged in cultural norms, traditional myths, and polit-
ical ideologies’ (Reardon 10– 11), we will find patriarchal cultural violence 
everywhere, and nowhere— for it is, as Galtung notes, precisely the case that 
we are raised to not see the violence that plays out, and is internalised as, 
devaluing of women.
There is a convergence of Galtung’s cultural violence, Reardon’s 
sexist- patriarchal culture blinded by its own myths, and Beauvoir’s social 
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construction of the feminine experience in the way this internalisation 
of contempt appears in women— as self- hatred, deep- seated insecurity 
about one’s value, the willingness to rationalise poor treatment by others, 
heightened tendencies to suffer depression, eating disorders, low self- esteem, 
etc. This internalised cultural devaluation is reinforced by the structural 
violence that is women’s experience of rape culture:  the reinforcement of 
cultural hierarchies and value- judgements through media messaging, cor-
porate directives, and peer/ family pressure on matters as diverse as one’s 
dating, mating, and reproductive choices and the extent to which one is 
free (or not) to perform femininity in one’s workplace (e.g. by not wearing 
make- up; see Bartky 138– 139). I defined structural violence in my introduc-
tion, borrowing from Galtung’s words, as ‘violence [that] is built into the 
structure and shows up as unequal power and consequently as unequal life 
chances’ (‘Violence, Peace’ 171). It should be obvious when we look at facets 
of our social structures— like the gendered wage gap, the dominance of men 
in political representation and corporate leadership, and the disparate scru-
tiny of men’s and women’s behaviours and personal appearance in public 
spaces— that unequal power and unequal life chances are gendered (as well 
as raced and classed).
Galtung’s project of (re)defining violence is driven by his conviction that 
the commonly intuited definition— ‘physical harm caused by an identifiable 
actor with mens rea— excludes too much’ (Galtung, ‘Violence, Peace’ 168). 
One key element of the expanded understanding he offers is that violence 
need not be committed by a defined subject; in defining the phenomenon 
as the causal explanation of the difference between actual and potential 
realisations (how much of ‘what we are capable of’ our society gives us 
opportunities to achieve), he is thinking of avoidable negative outcomes 
like starvation and illiteracy as violence (Galtung, ‘Violence, Peace’ 168– 
169).27 He is also thinking of avoidable inequality and the unequal power 
to decide as instances of violence (Galtung, ‘Violence, Peace’ 171), precisely 
the features of social organisation that, when gendered, mark a society as 
patriarchal.
Structural violence is thus what many of us are more inclined to speak 
of as social injustice (Galtung himself notes these are synonymous terms 
(‘Violence, Peace’ 171). It is violence (rather than just bad luck or misfor-
tune, and also as opposed to natural disaster) because it could have been 
otherwise; we could have organised our social structures in ways that did not 
disadvantage those who suffer— or could have organised them in ways that 
minimise the suffering— but we simply did not bother to make those changes. 
It is precisely because rape culture meets these two conditions defining the 
peace- studies conception of structural violence— the diminishment of an 
identifiable group’s life chances and the could- have- been- otherwise nature 
of that deprivation— that I use the term ‘sexual violence’ as the expansive/ 
inclusive category into which I fold my discussions throughout the book of 
various facets of rape culture. Sexual assault (rape), sexual coercion, sexual 
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harassment, and the sometimes brutally repressive imposition of male dom-
inance and female subordination (gender socialisation) are not interchange-
able concepts and are not reducible into each other, but they do all function 
as aspects of the social relations theorised as rape culture and they are all 
recognisable within a peace- studies framework as the direct violences that 
cultures and structures render as inexplicable, inevitable, or ‘not that bad.’ 
They are all ‘that bad,’ in that each of them makes it vastly more difficult for 
the person who experiences them to face their social world with confidence 
that their value as a human being will be affirmed and respected. Labelling 
all of them ‘sexual violence’ enables the conceptual context that Galtung 
deploys in his redefinition of violence.
In addition to insisting that social forces and social processes of organ-
isation can be agents of violence— that intentionality is not a necessary 
condition— Galtung also wants to include in his expansive concept both 
physical and psychological manifestations, and both latent and manifest 
forms: implicit or imminent threats to destabilise are, for instance, a form 
of violence (‘Violence, Peace’ 169, 172). Just as it is not necessary to have a 
defined subject initiating a harm or deprivation for it to count as violence, 
so too the harm or deprivation does not require a defined object (Galtung, 
‘Violence, Peace’ 170). A lie no one believes, or is expected to believe, can 
be an act of violence, as can the burning down of a shop that has not been 
targeted but is nonetheless destroyed in a rage- filled protest. Rape, a threat 
that women live with and because of which we (many of us, at any rate) 
modify and constrain our behaviours in public or sexualised spaces, even if 
the actual crime is one we never experience personally, is an example of vio-
lence that has no defined subject (there is no council of patriarchal elders that 
plots and implements rape culture) and has no (obviously) defined object.28 
It matters that we see rape culture through Galtung’s lens because one of 
the core features of his theorising is that structural violence is a chosen, 
could- have- been- otherwise, set of social relations. Because it is chosen, it is 
therefore changeable.
This theoretical view of the violence that is rape culture might, with 
reason, be criticised as a view from ‘the ivory tower’ of peace studies. Indeed, 
if the analysis were left there, that would be precisely the criticism I would 
level against it. But that is not where I want to leave the matter. As an aca-
demic discipline, peace studies is valuable for its ability to give us a broad 
overview of both how we need to understand the violence we are dealing 
with and what peace- building models might lead to social transformation, 
but it needs to be joined, as Confortini urges, with a feminist- theoretical 
analysis of how violence and peace- building show up ‘on the ground’ of 
rape culture. The common ground of feminism and peace studies lies in 
the potential each discipline has to sharpen and enrich the insights of the 
other (Confortini 334). Specifically, it is the conceptual capacity to grasp 
and critique the ‘logic of domination’ that represents a significant point of 
overlap between feminist theory and peace studies, claim feminist theorist 
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Karen J. Warren and peace theorist Duane Cady in their analysis of shared 
frameworks of the two disciplines (5). In the context of sexual violence, 
peace studies has the capacity to give us a deeper and clearer understanding 
of the (structural) violence embedded in rape culture and the (cultural) vio-
lence that produces it, as supplements to the work feminist theory has done 
to reveal the violence of rape itself.
Confortini offers the insight that violence can be exercised in positive 
and negative forms: as rewards for obedience, as well as punishments (337). 
Applying this insight to rape culture, we can see the sexism that Courtney 
Fraser distinguished as chivalry (benevolent sexism) and misogyny (hostile 
sexism) aligning with Fiona Vera- Gray’s articulation of the choice women 
face in public space as one of safety or freedom. If one conforms to the 
patriarchal/ masculinist structuring of public space as a place in which 
women should choose safety— often by choosing to not be there— then one 
is accorded the protection that chivalry prescribes for ‘good women.’ If one 
chooses freedom, one runs the risk of misogynistic violence as the cost of 
being a ‘bad woman.’
Looking at structural violence as a phenomenon that manifests as ‘avoid-
able impairment of fundamental human needs’ (Ho 1), we can see that the 
human needs avoidably impaired by rape culture include the need for bodily 
autonomy, the need for healthy self- esteem, the need for self- actualisation (as 
opposed to having gender roles and scripts imposed upon us), and the need 
for social relations grounded in mutuality and respect. Anthropologist Mary 
K. Anglin’s feminist approach to structural violence is helpful here because 
her presentation of the many forms this violence takes also reveals the many 
violations of what Kathleen Ho characterises as fundamental human needs. 
Like Galtung and Ho, Anglin wants to move beyond a narrow conception 
of violence as overt harm or damage. Relevant to the needs I list here, she 
draws our attention to
expropriation of vital economic and non- material resources . . . oper-
ation of systems of social stratification or categorization that subvert 
people’s chances for survival . . . imposition of categories of difference 
that legitimate hierarchy and inequality . . . [and denial of] the oppor-
tunity for emotional and physical well- being.
(Anglin 145)
All of these exclusions and impositions produce ‘structural violence that is 
normalized and accepted as part of the “status quo”,’ she notes, ‘but that 
[normalised violence] is experienced as injustice and brutality at particular 
intersections of race, ethnicity, class, nationality, gender, and age’ (Anglin 
145– 146).
Recognising this fact that injustices are experienced disproportionately 
by some groups because of their identity characteristics, and are invisible 
to members of other groups, international organisations like the United 
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Nations have been working over the last few decades to foreground, and 
mandate attention to, perspectives that have historically been overlooked 
or disregarded. For instance, the UN Security Council’s landmark resolution 
on women, peace, and security (S/ RES/ 1325) calls upon all UN agencies and 
personnel involved in peace and security initiatives to incorporate gendered 
perspectives, to recognise the particular gendered vulnerabilities that civilian 
populations face in war zones and during refugee crises, and addresses the 
specific issue of rape as gender- based violence.29 We need, of course, to 
acknowledge, as Anglin does, that speaking of gender- based violence or of 
violence as having gendered structures does not mean that violence— even 
sexual violence— only happens to women; what it does mean is that we need 
to be aware of ‘the differential effects of coercive processes on women and 
men, girls and boys’ (Anglin 147).
In the context of Confortini’s more recent thinking about the overlap of 
feminism and peace studies, it is instructive to consider the views that shaped 
earlier efforts to synthesise the two disciplines. Reardon, for example, argues 
that we need to put peace studies and feminist theory in conversation with 
each other because of her feminist conviction ‘that sexism is the most per-
vasive and most fundamental problem of world order— indeed, of human 
social evolution— because it is a root cause of violence, especially socially 
sanctioned violence’ (5). That latter view, that sexism, or the patriarchy, is 
the most fundamental problem facing human communities is a claim I find 
implausible. I  think— indeed, I  am arguing throughout this chapter— that 
patriarchal misogyny– chivalry constructs (that I discussed in the previous 
section in the context of Courtney Fraser’s work) are the cultural violence 
that produces the structural violence that is rape culture, but I also think 
we need to recognise that both cultural and structural violences take many 
forms:  race, gender, ethnicity, class, sexual orientation and identity, age, 
physical and mental (dis)ability, and a host of other grounds we have for 
deciding that some people have less value than others.
The thesis that sexism is the foundation of violence has two implications 
we should reject out of hand: it renders these other bases of oppression and 
marginalisation invisible, and it essentialises a single monolithic ‘woman’s 
nature’— a false view that renders the diversity among women invisible. 
Neither is it the case that women are any more naturally desirous of, or 
even necessarily more socio- culturally inclined to, peace than are men, as 
Confortini makes clear in her overview of earlier feminist peace- studies 
scholarship. Accepting such views encourages the belief that that if we could 
just end patriarchy, all of the other allegedly subordinate oppressions would 
wither away in the wake of that victory.
Confortini’s rejection of the view that sexism is the feminist priority is 
reminiscent of bell hooks’s discussion of ‘the politics of domination’ in one 
of her early works of feminist theory, Talking Back:  Thinking Feminist, 
Thinking Black. The essay in which she discusses this politics, ‘Feminism: A 
Transformational Politic,’ argues that if we need to identify an oppression 
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that is most fundamental, the most obvious place to look is in our family 
units. We learn domination in the same way, and in the same place, we 
learn love, she argues: from our parents and caretakers (hooks 21). In some 
respects, I find hooks’ analysis of domination a more useful way to think 
about the issue of patriarchy and rape culture: we typically understand dom-
ination more broadly and recognise it more frequently than what we iden-
tify as violence. This, of course, is Galtung’s point about the normalisation 
of cultural and structural violences; we don’t see them as violence because 
we are raised in a social context in which those who have power over us are 
seen as entitled to exercise that power. And, as hooks observes in another 
essay from that same book, ‘Violence in Intimate Relationships: A Feminist 
Perspective,’ one pernicious effect of learning this politics of domination in 
the family is the way in which we carry it through our adult lives— living it 
out in our own parenting and relationship styles, in some cases, or sharing 
our childhood harms with intimate partners in ways that effectively pro-
vide them with scripts or models they might use to inflict their own damage 
(85– 86).
In his analysis of cultural violence, Galtung tells us that
massive direct violence over centuries seeps down and sediments as 
massive structural violence . . . After some time, direct violence is for-
gotten, [structural violence like] slavery is forgotten, and only two labels 
show up, pale enough for college textbooks: ‘discrimination’ for massive 
structural violence and ‘prejudice’ for massive cultural violence.
(295)
These pale labels— the sanitising of language— are, of course, another way 
cultural violence operates (Galtung, ‘Cultural Violence’ 295). We can see 
both the ‘pale label’ version of history and a version that openly names vio-
lence in the incisive origin stories Catharine MacKinnon offers in Feminism 
Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law. The stories she tells illustrate two 
theories about how we came to be living in patriarchal, gender- hierarchical 
societies, how it got decided that men should rule over women. The first 
story tells us that, ‘on the first day, difference was; on the second day, a 
division was created upon it; [and] on the third day, irrational instances of 
dominance arose’ (MacKinnon 34). This story, that MacKinnon decisively 
rejects, naturalises gender hierarchy, and presents it as a fundamental dis-
covery of early humans: we just are so very different that we need to have 
the social division (gender roles) that just appeared on the second day, and 
these roles have just happened, on the third day, to fall into a problematic 
hierarchy that is with us still.
The hidden politics and veiled violence of this story is such that feminist 
theory is encouraged to expend its efforts on the issue of whether the ‘third 
day’ dominance is justified or whether the ‘second day’ division is rational; 
the field is also discouraged from challenging the ‘first day’ premise that 
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gender is a difference pre- existing and shaping human social organisation.30 
The second origin story, the ‘dominance’ view of gender hierarchy (the story 
MacKinnon endorses), tells us that
on the first day that matters, dominance was achieved, probably by 
force. By the second day, division along the same lines had to be rela-
tively firmly in place. On the third day, . . . differences were demarcated, 
together with social systems to exaggerate them.
(40)
Here we can see through the pale labels of the ‘difference’ view, to a struggle 
for power that took place so long ago that there is very little history of 
gender relations that does not impose patriarchal roles and scripts upon 
us.31 MacKinnon’s stories help us see that what many of us take to be a nat-
ural and therefore unassailable difference is the outcome of a violent power 
grab. And the particular contribution I see in adopting a peace- studies lens 
from which to view rape culture is its revelation of domination as congealed 
violence.
Further support for MacKinnon’s ‘dominance’ story can be gleaned 
from Gillian Youngs’s history of the ways in which feminist international 
relations is challenging masculinist assumptions that structure mainstream 
thinking (she calls it ‘malestream’ thinking) in the academic discipline of 
international relations. ‘The history of state formation and identity is . . . 
one of gendered (and other forms of) oppression,’ she tells us (Youngs 81). 
‘At least since Aristotle, the codification of man as “master” [subject] and 
woman as “matter” [object] has powerfully naturalized/ de- politicized man’s 
exploitation of women, other men, and nature’ (Youngs 81)— relations that 
Galtung’s theory would classify as cultural violence. And we can see what his 
theory would classify as structural violence in Youngs’s quotation of another 
international relations theorist, V. Spike Peterson: ‘Masculinist dominance is 
institutionalised by the “sovereignty contract” and the “sexual contract” of 
modern European state- making’ (Peterson, quoted in Youngs 83). The state, 
its social institutions, and social structures manifest the gendered dominance 
that MacKinnon hypothesises was achieved by force, and does so in ways 
that appear natural or inevitable rather than violent.
Why we fail to see the violence: the princess’s  
rose- coloured glasses
To varying extents, we are all the princess, looking out at the world through 
rose- coloured glasses and failing to see the forms of violence that continue to 
structure our social relations. One of the most difficult things we can ask of 
another human being, I think, is to correctly identify and analyse the social 
environment in which they are embedded. This is not because we are dumb, 
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see things most clearly when we can stand apart from them and inspect them 
‘from the outside,’ so to speak— a condition of epistemological experience 
that de Beauvoir is referencing when she observes that ‘alterity is the funda-
mental category of human thought’ (6). The experience of alterity, of being 
other than the thing one is analysing, crucially involves what is sometimes 
called critical distance. Distance, whether spatial or temporal,32 reveals the 
contexts in which we live by making them strange where they had once 
been familiar: this is why we can look back at our past selves in an earlier 
time or in a different society and gain insight about our surroundings that 
we simply were not capable of having at the time. If we did not have the 
capacity to recognise things (including our past selves) as other to our (pre-
sent) selves, we would exist in worlds that are undifferentiated masses, like 
a giant lump of Play- Doh. Another way to say this is: without a capacity to 
understand through differentiation, we would not be able to demonstrate 
(self- ) consciousness.
In making this point, I do not mean to suggest that we can never know 
the cultures or social worlds in which we are currently embedded. Nor do 
I mean to suggest that there is something exceptional about people who have 
analysed, and can criticise, their worlds contemporaneously. It is work that 
we are capable of doing, but we need, first, to choose to do it and, second, to 
get a ‘foothold’ that will give us a way into this process of gaining the critical 
distance that gives us perspective. Thinking of what sorts of things can be 
those footholds, I want to suggest that events that rupture the social fabric 
and refuse to be narratively assimilated, events taking place in an aspect of 
culture we feel alienated from,33 and events we recognise as repetitions or 
parts of a pattern are the most likely candidates. In this book’s introduction 
I spoke of having lived in rape culture for decades before I realised that this 
was part of the backdrop of my life. I think I needed all of these types of 
events to bring me to my own realisation: the vicious and fatal rape of Jyoti 
Singh Pandey was the incident I found myself struggling with, incapable of 
processing into a story that made sense; the Steubenville and Daisy Coleman 
rapes took place in the United States, a country in which I lived at the time 
but— living there as a Canadian— felt very culturally detached from; and all 
three of them, together with the fatal rape of Anene Booysen in South Africa, 
happened so close together in time that they just seemed to fall into a pattern 
of violence against women I could no longer not see. I still don’t quite know, 
though, why and how I could have heard of all the other rape cases before 
them without identifying to myself the existence of rape culture. That is why 
I describe my pre- realisation life, the ‘before,’ as living in a dream.
Having woken, I see the structural violence of rape culture now, and I see 
that what I had always recognised in my world as a latent social contempt 
for and disparagement of women is more than contempt; it is an under-
lying hatred. This hatred of women, misogyny, is part of the cultural vio-
lence I discussed in the previous section as the ground of rape culture. It 
is difficult to tell a coherent story about how one comes to suddenly see 
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something obvious that had previously been outside one’s frame of con-
scious awareness, but part of how I came to a (re)constructed awareness of 
the normalised misogyny in so many of our cultures is through the critical 
and activist voices of feminist thinkers I have read over the years. In trying 
to put the story together, I find myself filtering Brownmiller’s analysis of rape 
as misogynistic violence not just through the more recent work I have been 
drawing on throughout this chapter, but also through work I  read when 
I was much younger and that I now realise has marked my thinking about 
the status of women in the cultures I have lived in. For me, two formative 
influences are Margaret Atwood, Canadian author of the feminist dystopian 
novel The Handmaid’s Tale, and Australian feminist Germaine Greer, whose 
major work, The Female Eunuch, I first read at 15 years old and did not 
read again until my late 40s.34
Brownmiller, in dissecting some of the more baffling legal attitudes 
towards rape— police officers, for example, tend not to dismiss burglary or 
theft complaints as ‘he said– she said’ disagreements in the way they do with 
rape— notes that there is a ‘disparity in thought’ that makes ‘male logic’ about 
rape a very different thing from ‘female logic’ (377). This perception of social 
narratives as partial, incomplete, and dismissive of truths women tell about 
our lives is reflected in what is probably, in this global ‘me too’ moment, 
the most frequently quoted line of Atwood’s oeuvre: ‘men are afraid women 
will laugh at them, women are afraid men will kill them.’35 And then there 
is Greer’s analysis of misogyny and patriarchy, dating to 1971. My enduring 
memory of my first reading of that book was her observation towards the 
end that ‘women have very little idea of how much men hate them’ (249).
It is deeply shocking and destabilising to accord any truth to Greer’s claim 
and then go on living with, working with, socialising with these people who 
(might) hate you. Even though fear might well be, as feminist literary critic 
Elaine Showalter contends, ‘a logical response to a society in which women 
are genuinely in danger’ (171), it is much less functional than denial. If we 
can convince ourselves that Showalter and Greer are wrong, or are talking 
about cultures other than the one in which we find ourselves, we can go on 
living out the polite social fictions we have been taught. The question of why 
we would want to do that— to go on living in a world that is hostile, dan-
gerous, and, as a student I quoted earlier in this chapter observed, doesn’t 
care much about women, and to remain unaware of what is confronting 
us— is explored in Beauvoir’s account in The Second Sex of the funda-
mental deforming of female- identifying human beings within patriarchal 
worldviews. We are profoundly shaped by the norms and expectations of 
our societies, she argues; the social norm of accepting men as full- fledged 
Subjects, and treating any female deviation from the male norm as evi-
dence of women’s diminished entitlement to recognition as autonomous 
human adults, produces a distorted social world in which women’s pas-
sivity is presented as the polite and appropriate response to men’s sexualised 
attention and microaggressions in public space. In short, we ignore the vio-
lence because it would be rude not to.
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Rape culture’s misdirection of our thinking about gender relations 
depends upon the acceptance of traditional gender roles that, for many, help 
define cultural or religious identities, and depends upon the justifications of 
women’s commodification offered by rape culture’s apologists, the ‘pick- up 
artists,’ ‘incels,’ and so- called men’s rights activists. Their justifications all 
build on the expectation that women will be men’s means to conquering the 
natural world, that we will be the challenge, the prize, and the ‘soft place to 
fall,’ as needed. Expectation, inculcated in both men and women, that women 
will be (must be) oriented towards meeting men’s ‘needs’ (read:  desires) 
results in the relentless prioritising of men’s interests and preferences and the 
discounting of women’s interests and preferences. As my research assistant 
on this project, Monica Thomas, observed in a discussion tangential to this 
book, ‘men are taught to be for something; women are taught to be for 
someone.’ Rape culture’s misdirection also characterises discourses in which 
acquaintance rape and date rape are normalised, discussions in which the 
question of which non- consensual sexual relations count as ‘legitimate rape’ 
are taken seriously.
Unquestioned normalisation of sexual practices that meet our cul-
tural understanding of what produces men’s sexual satisfaction and an 
often equally unquestioned belief that women should strive to meet men’s 
sexual needs are both generally agreed to be socially constructed, things 
we could bring to an end. (This is why rape culture is a structural vio-
lence.) We choose not to because the subordination of women to men and 
the erasure of women’s sexual autonomy— a system that feminist poet and 
essayist Adrienne Rich theorises as ‘compulsory heterosexuality’— helps 
make coherent a social hierarchy in which the putatively strong rule over the 
putatively weak. Showalter notes that ‘women as a group are so conditioned 
to the victim’s role, and so far from attempting any kind of violence, even 
in self- defense, that [our] expanded awareness of sex crimes only increases 
[our] sense of helplessness, vulnerability, and fear’ (166). This is the learned 
helplessness that structural violence produces; we can’t fight the system, so 
we resort to hoping it doesn’t happen to us. I  would add that women’s 
personal experiences of sex crimes tend to only increase any pre- existing 
feelings of shame and unworthiness, because of the cultural violence inherent 
in messages that the victim, not the perpetrator, is the damaged party.
In a discussion of why people deny violence of all kinds, feminist queer 
theorist Sara Ahmed points out that people who identify the existence of 
violence tend to be blamed for causing the violence they are bringing to the 
attention of others. ‘Feminists are not calling for violence,’ she argues:
We are calling for an end to the institutions that promote and naturalize 
violence. Much violence that is promoted by institutions is concealed by 
the very use of stranger danger . . . the assumption that violence only ever 
originates with outsiders. It is because we expose violence that we are 
heard as violent, as if the violence of which we speak originates with us.
(Ahmed 253)
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It is also the case, I think, that because we expose violence, we are heard as 
outsiders. To speak of rape culture as a violence that permeates one’s society 
is to be blamed for making others see something they would rather not see, 
and therefore, to be made to feel like an attacker of the society one hopes 
to reform. After all, if we admitted that the violence exists, we would have 
to do something about it, and that seems like an overwhelming problem, 
one that would in turn cause us to be alienated from the society that would 
rather not see.
Turning now from the structural violence that is rape culture to the direct 
violence that is rape, there are some very good reasons here, too, to deny 
rape as a standard feature of reality. One of those reasons is that we, as 
individuals, often fail to understand a crucial distinction— the difference 
between arousal and consent— because our societies do not provide us with 
the conceptual or discursive resources to recognise that distinction. When 
I was teaching in the United States, I would, from time to time, raise this 
issue in classes touching on sexual ethics or in extracurricular workshops, 
typically in the context of students trying to make sense out of the idea that 
a woman could rape a man. The suggestion that this could be the case was 
and is often met with incredulous disbelief,36 but it is a very obvious distinc-
tion. Any sexual activity that is not mutually consented to37 can be under-
stood as a violation of the party that has not consented, and many of those 
activities are classified legally (depending on the jurisdiction in question38) 
as sexual assault (rape). Consent is a psychological state; it happens in the 
mind of each individual, and crucially requires the person who is consenting 
to convey that state of mind to their partner— in words or in utterly unam-
biguous behaviour. Conversely, the withholding of consent is also best 
conveyed in word or unambiguous gesture, but here we need to be sensi-
tive to all of the reasons why someone either might not consent and might 
not convey that they are not consenting (one might be unconscious, or be 
convinced that withholding consent is shameful or dangerous39), or might 
not be capable of giving genuine consent (one might be intoxicated, and 
therefore incapable of the clear- minded judgement that consent requires).
But, as anyone who has a body has probably had occasion to realise, 
bodies are weird. Sometimes they do things that our minds do not command, 
or accord with. Arousal is one of those things: it is physiological, not psy-
chological. A body— male or female— can exhibit arousal, and can function 
sexually, without the mind connected to that body issuing its consent. A sex 
partner who takes note of the state of arousal in their partner’s body and 
assumes that this arousal means their partner is consenting is potentially 
making a huge mistake. We might, perhaps, not always want to call this 
mistake ‘rape,’ in every case, but it is always a troubling instance of non- 
consensual sex. Knowing that there can be arousal without consent— and, 
of course, consent without arousal— helps us to be more aware of the many 
pitfalls on the path to the bedroom.
To avoid those pitfalls, we need language for sex that distinguishes 
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When we don’t have that language, and the arousal– consent distinction it 
presupposes, we don’t know that we are making these very serious errors 
in judgement about whether our partners are truly, fully ‘there’ with us 
in the way that I think most of us do really want a partner to be. In such 
cases, we can see ourselves as suffering a version of what virtue epistem-
ologist Miranda Fricker theorises as ‘hermeneutical injustice.’40 Fricker 
defines this as the harm suffered when one is disadvantaged by a force one 
does not have the epistemic resources to name (6). Someone who is doing 
what I described in the previous paragraph— having sex in circumstances 
in which they take signs of arousal (their own or a partner’s) to be signs 
of consent— is the victim, and potentially the unwitting perpetrator, of 
a hermeneutic injustice of rape culture. The person who experiences 
arousal but has not assented to the sexual encounter may find themself 
deeply ambivalent about that encounter; it strikes me as reasonable to 
think that at some level of consciousness this person feels pushed into the 
encounter, subjected to something rather than being a willing partner to 
it, even as they categorise it as consensual (because of the acknowledged 
arousal that is being mistakenly read as consent). Lacking awareness of 
the arousal– consent distinction, this person can ‘know’ (intuit) that there 
was something not right about the encounter, but cannot identify— or 
explain to others— what that troubling feature was. Repeated over time, 
this experience can lead someone to conclude that they have some deep- 
seated personal problem with sex— or, perhaps more concerning, can lead 
that person to normalise this type of encounter as just ‘what it is to have 
sex’ and to never realise that it is importantly non- consensual. And, of 
course, lacking awareness of this distinction, this person is at real and 
immediate risk of becoming a harm to others when they mistake their 
signs of arousal for consent.
Yet another reason we have for denying that rape is a standard feature 
of reality is explained by the other type of epistemic injustice that Fricker 
considers: testimonial injustice. She characterises this as ‘the primary form 
of epistemic injustice’ and defines it as ‘prejudice on the hearer’s part [that] 
causes him to give the speaker less credibility than he would otherwise 
have given’ (Fricker 4). ‘[T] he point of any operation of social power,’ she 
tells us, ‘is to effect social control . . . [and] it always has an object whose 
actions are being controlled’ (Fricker 13, emphasis in original). When 
this power invokes some shared conception of social identity, it is ‘iden-
tity power’ (Fricker 14) which, in a patriarchal society, may be gendered. 
Illustrating this notion of identity power through discussion of a screenplay 
(The Talented Mr Ripley) in which the plot turns on a man’s refusal to 
believe a woman’s suspicion about who has murdered the man’s missing 
son, Fricker asserts that
exercise of gender identity power is active when, for instance, a man 
makes (possibly unintended) use of his identity as a man to influence 
a woman’s actions— for example, to make her defer to his word. He 
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might, for instance, patronize her and get away with it in virtue of the 
fact that he is a man and she is a woman.
(14)
In communicative exchanges that involve one person offering their testi-
mony to others, those who are hearing the testimony have to assess whether 
they think the testifier is credible (Fricker 18); injustice results when we 
deploy stereotypes or prejudices that affect those assessments. Here, in this 
concept of testimonial injustice, we can see how the cultural violence that 
is patriarchy results in a culture in which ‘we’ (some of us) don’t see rape 
at all:  in addition to the hermeneutic injustice that disrupts our ability to 
identify particular encounters as non- consensual, we typically accord less 
credibility to women and more credibility to men. In the ‘he said– she said’ 
that so much police investigation, public opinion, and personal judgement is 
reduced to, his words are more credible than hers.
Fricker contends that ‘our everyday moral discourse lacks a well- 
established understanding of the wrong that is done to someone’ who suffers 
testimonial injustice (40). ‘The idea that . . . testimonial injustice constitutes 
an ethical wrong that can be non- trivial, even profoundly damaging, and 
even systematically connected with other forms of injustice in society, is not 
much appreciated,’ she says (Fricker 40). Not being believed when one offers 
testimony about something one has experienced is very definitely not a trivial 
matter; she is utterly correct on that point. As she explains, our capacities to 
give and receive knowledge are significant aspects of reason— and rationality, 
the ability to exercise reason— has long been identified in philosophy as the 
source of human value. ‘To be wronged in one’s capacity as a knower is to be 
wronged in a capacity essential to human value’ (Fricker 44). It is, in effect, 
a way of calling a person’s status as a human being into question, and, says 
Fricker, ‘in contexts of oppression the powerful will be sure to undermine the 
powerless in just that capacity [their rationality], for it provides a direct route 
to undermining them in their very humanity’ (44). This is precisely what the 
cultural over- valuing of men and under- valuing of women does. We tell girls 
and women they should wait to be chosen by men, we encourage them to 
go along with what the man wants, and then— when politeness leads them 
in to dangerous situations— we qualify and constrain their right to construct 
their own narrative (e.g. the unwillingness of some people to identify their 
experiences as ‘rape’), which simply reinforces the fundamental subordinated 
Otherness, the unimportance, of women’s experiences. We cannot even be 
trusted as story- tellers of our own experiences?
Really?
Coda: culture- jamming Cinderella’s structural violence
What’s wrong with this story: Cinderella is not cared for by anyone with 
the means to help her realise her potential and make her own decisions 
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about how her life takes shape. She is abandoned to exploitation by her 
stepmother. This lack of resources and choices makes marriage to some man 
she doesn’t even know the only path out of a life of servitude. And to even 
get that chance at a different life, she needs the magical intercession of a 
fairy godmother.41 Why? It doesn’t have to be that way.
What if the story unfolded this way instead?
Once upon a time, there was a girl whose father loved her very much and 
tried his best to ensure that she had some security in an uncertain world. 
She was an only child whose mother had died when she was very young, 
and her father worried that she needed the influence of women in her life. 
So it was, he thought, a blessing for them both when he met and fell in 
love with a woman who had two daughters only slightly older than his 
own. He married this woman and she became his little girl’s stepmother. Her 
daughters became his little girl’s stepsisters.
But, being a prudent and thoughtful man, he realised that this blended 
family might not give his daughter everything he wanted for her. He decided 
that she needed to have access to wealth of her own, in the event that the 
future unfolded differently than he hoped it would, and so he drew up a will 
that both provided for his new wife and set aside a lump sum of money for 
his daughter when she came of age. The little girl wept when he told her of 
his financial arrangements and swore that they were unnecessary, for she 
could not bear to think of a world without her father. She was only consoled 
when he hugged her, wiped away her tears, and explained to her that this 
inheritance was something she would get when she came of age, regardless 
of what the family circumstances were at the time. The inheritance was to 
be the mark of her having attained adulthood; it was a recognition by her 
loving father that, like all persons, she needed her own resources with which 
she could build her own future.
As sometimes happens in an uncertain world, the girl found herself 
fatherless shortly thereafter, and totally under the control of her stepmother 
who had grown to bitterly resent the girl her late husband had loved so 
much. In anger and spite she ruthlessly exploited the girl, turning her into the 
household servant. Her daughters, modelling themselves on their mother’s 
example, derided their younger stepsister as the household’s chimney 
sweep— Cinderella, they began to call her.
As Cinderella’s coming of age approached, the household was thrown into 
turmoil by the news that the king was throwing a ball: his son had returned 
from studying abroad and the king desired to introduce him to all of the eli-
gible young women of the kingdom. The stepsisters were beside themselves 
with excitement, each dreaming of capturing the prince’s heart and being 
spirited off to live in the grand castle at the top of the hill. Cinderella was 
pressed into service day and night, preparing their dresses, styling their hair 
in various fashions so they might each find the style most flattering to them, 
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tending to their every whim. As her exhaustion grew, Cinderella too counted 
down the days to the ball— not because of the ball itself, but because she 
would officially come of age the very next day and would be able to claim 
the inheritance her father had left her.
Finally, the big day arrived. The stepmother and stepsisters, all bedecked 
and powdered, climbed into their carriage and went off to the palace to try 
to impress the prince. Cinderella, for the first time in longer than she could 
remember, had an evening to herself in the house she had grown up in all 
her life. She wandered through the rooms, recalling the happy memories of 
growing up there with her loving father, and starting to collect the things she 
would need to take with her: mementos, her important documents, the few 
precious books she had managed to hold onto in the years since her father 
died and her life had become a gruelling struggle, her warmest cloak, her 
favourite hair ribbons. She ate her dinner in peace and blissful quiet, and 
went to bed with a sense of eager anticipation. Unable to sleep, she lay there 
looking out the window at the almost full moon. It would be full tomorrow 
night, she knew, on her first night of her newly independent life. She was still 
awake when the clock in the town centre struck midnight. It was tomorrow. 
She was free, no longer Cinderella.
The next morning, as her stepmother and stepsisters slept off the effects 
of the previous night’s party, she carefully packed her things into the suitcase 
she had been keeping under her bed for just this occasion, ate a quick break-
fast of bread and cheese, fed her stepmother’s cat, and quietly let herself out 
the back door. The cat mewed and scratched at the door as she closed it, so 
she let him outside too. He followed her down the lane towards the street; 
the cat might technically ‘belong’ to her stepmother but she was, after all, 
his caretaker. She and the cat arrived at her father’s attorney’s office just as 
it was opening and, because he had been expecting her arrival on this day, 
he was able to promptly furnish her with a letter of introduction to the bank 
and the documentation of passage he had booked for her on a ship leaving 
port this very morning. Could she bring the cat? Of course, he assured her. 
She had enough gold to pay for her own cabin on the ship; she could share 
the cabin with any companion she chose, and could disembark wherever she 
wanted.
Notes
 1 Susan Brownmiller’s research into sociological studies and law enforcement 
statistics leads her to the observation, in Against Our Will, that ‘[t] he typical 
American perpetrator of forcible rape is little more than an aggressive, hostile 
youth who chooses to do violence to women’ (176). She draws on criminologist 
Marvin E. Wolfgang’s concept of a ‘subculture of violence’ to argue that socially 
marginalised young men often adopt violent, explicitly coercive behaviours to 
get for themselves the things that men with more prestige and influence can get 
with mere heavy- handed manipulation (Brownmiller 180– 181). As I discuss later 
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in this chapter, that characterisation of rape culture (and the research on which 
Brownmiller draws) is partial, and ultimately misleading.
 2 I initially had in mind the early #metoo- era news story of how Mira Sorvino’s 
career was crushed by Harvey Weinstein because she rebuffed his advances 
(Farrow, ‘From Aggressive Overtures to Sexual Assault’), but as I  write an 
early draft of this chapter, Ronan Farrow has just broken allegations of similar 
retaliations committed by high- level executives at CBS (see Farrow, ‘Les Moonves 
and CBS’). One consequence of ‘me too’ stories, I shall argue throughout this 
book, is a richer and more critical understanding of who might be a perpetrator 
of sexual violence than what we find in the Brownmiller view summarised in the 
previous note.
 3 See the American Psychological Association’s Report of the APA Task Force on 
the Sexualization of Girls.
 4 The police bias that made possible a staggeringly high number of victims— 
women publicly disparaged and dismissed as sex workers— of this serial killer 
is documented in Forsaken:  The Report of the Missing Women Commission 
of Inquiry, the final report submitted to the province of British Columbia by 
Wally T. Oppal, the appointed Commissioner, in October 2012. Oppal’s report 
documents a ‘pattern of predatory violence’ that deserved but did not receive 
timely investigation (4). ‘Aboriginal women as a group have a heightened vulner-
ability to violence simply because they live in “a society that poses a risk to their 
safety,” ’ Oppal concludes. ‘In British Columbia and around the world, vulnerable 
and marginalized women are exposed to a higher risk of violence including sexual 
assault, murder and serial predation’ (7). At the national level, the Government of 
Canada commissioned a 2015 inquiry, Canada’s National Inquiry into Missing 
and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls (MMIWG). The final report of that 
inquiry implicated postcolonial racism, gender bias, and heterosexist prejudices 
in the ongoing crisis of violence against indigenous women and girls, and the 
societal inattention to this violence (see Buller et al., Reclaiming Power and Place 
49– 82). Of particular note is the report’s framing of this violence through pre-
cisely the peace- studies lens I argue for as an aid to enhanced understanding of the 
violence of rape culture: the ways in which crimes of sexual assault, abduction, 
and murder are the direct violence that is produced as manifestations of cultural 
and structural violence (77– 78). Analysis of the report by journalist Justin Ling 
quotes Roxanne White, MMIWG activist and member of the Yakama Nation in 
Washington state: ‘Exactly what happens in Canada has happened here, and has 
happened in Alaska, and is happening in South America. . . . There are no borders.’ 
Linda Martín Alcoff consistently makes a related point throughout Rape and 
Resistance, that disproportionate attention is given to cases of sexual violence in 
which (female) victims are white and perpetrators are men of colour, immigrant- 
outsiders, or otherwise socially coded as ‘Other.’ Taken together, both of these 
observations demonstrate the deep truth of Kimberlé Crenshaw’s intersectionality 
thesis: the dangers and harms that threaten indigenous women and girls are not 
due only to gender bias, or to heterosexist prejudice, or even to the additive effect 
of (postcolonial) racism to those two phenomena; it is the interlocking of all these 
forces that works to produce widespread and institutionalised social indifference 
to these women and girls, to make their lives and deaths less valuable, less note-
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 5 ‘One is not born, but rather becomes, woman,’ Beauvoir tells us in the first sen-
tence of volume 2 of The Second Sex (La Deuxième Sexe), ‘Lived Experience’ 
(283). This observation of ways in which one is trained into an identity that is 
subsequently perceived by others— indeed, experienced by oneself— as ‘natural’ 
is the common feature I see in Beauvoir’s and Brownmiller’s analyses. I do not 
intend to suggest that rape culture and gender socialisation are the same thing; as 
I explore in Chapter 2, the relationship is murkier and more nuanced than mere 
equation.
 6 See volume 1 of Foucault’s History of Sexuality (The Will to Knowledge) for 
his account of how this process works to constitute our thinking about sex and 
sexuality. See Nicola Gavey’s discussion in Just Sex?: The Cultural Scaffolding 
of Rape of Foucauldian discourse as ‘material poststructuralism’ for argument 
that this theorising of social construction goes beyond language to implicate 
social practices formed out of social and economic structures (86– 89). It is this 
understanding of a broad field of influences that construct our understandings of 
thoughts and actions as ‘normal’ or as ‘deviant’ that I am drawing on when I use 
the term ‘culture’ or ‘rape culture.’
 7 This characterisation of women has been made explicitly in a 2019 BBC report 
about the drug- fuelled sexual abuse scandal currently being investigated by 
police in South Korea. An unnamed wealthy patron of elite nightclubs in the 
upscale Gangnam neighbourhood of Seoul is quoted in this report comparing 
prostitutes and so- called ordinary women (club- goers) to ‘a business car versus 
your own car’ and explaining that the lure of sex with a woman who is not a 
sex worker is ‘[t] he sense of achievement . . . when you gain access . . . that not 
everyone is allowed.’ He justifies the drugging of these women by comparing the 
nightclubs to a predator- filled jungle: ‘You say innocently that “I’m only here to 
dance.” Sure, but will people let you only dance? . . . Sexy beautiful women are 
prey’ (see Bicker, ‘Gangnam: The scandal rocking the playground of K- pop’).
 8 Note that my reference here to films, songs and, most especially, fairy tales is 
drawing from a Western/ North American cultural context. There are stories 
from many parts of the world (including many of the European folk tales on 
which modern, ‘Disneyfied’ fairy tales are based) that do not fit this pattern, but 
to the extent that Western cultural constructs are packaged into a homogenised 
‘global’ culture exported from the United States, the pattern I describe here is 
familiar to children in a diverse array of cultures.
 9 I swear I’m not making up this detail, but it does strike me as too perfectly fitting 
to be plausible that I should have happened in that moment to have been reading 
a text that can be interpreted as an entitled man’s manipulation of his social con-
text to serve his desires. I don’t fully endorse this reading of Socrates on trial, 
but it is a plausible way of accounting for the historical record that a segment of 
jurors who had voted to acquit him in the determination of his guilt or innocence 
also voted for the death penalty in the sentencing vote (see I.F. Stone, The Trial 
of Socrates, for a fuller argument in support of this reading).
 10 Beauvoir’s contemporary, Martinican theorist of decolonisation and the social 
construction of race, Frantz Fanon poses a similar question about white men (see 
Black Skin, White Masks, for instance, 258– 260).
 11 Linda Martín Alcoff makes this point even more forcefully in Rape and 
Resistance, contending that ‘several kinds of social institutions have been in 
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of an individual pathology than a form of structural organization that either 
promotes sexual violation or finds ways to avoid addressing it’ (234). She rejects 
‘universalist pronouncements’ in favour of more nuanced and context- sensitive 
discussions of patterns of sexual violation (the broad- category terminology she 
uses where I use ‘sexual violence’), but she does commit herself unequivocally to 
the view that these forms of structural organisation— what I discuss later in this 
chapter as the structural violence that is rape culture— ‘can be changed, and the 
changes [can be] enforced’ (Alcoff 234). However, she does caution us that the 
medium in which ‘me too’ critiques of these individual and structural patholo-
gies have been most vigorously pursued is not necessarily a benign or progressive 
force: ‘Social media has shown itself to be a rather sharp double- edged sword,’ 
she observes, ‘a tool for whistle blowers but also an easy means to stage a virtual 
stoning of victims’ (Alcoff 1).
 12 Briefly, this history identifies the suffrage struggles of the 19th and early- 20th cen-
tury as ‘First Wave’ feminism, the argument for political equality of the genders. 
Once the right of women to vote had been established in law, it became apparent 
to those concerned with gender equality that political participation was not suf-
ficient, that social and economic equality was also needed. This was the focus 
of ‘Second Wave’ organising: arguments for wage parity, for women’s rights to 
enter traditionally male- dominated occupations and graduate programs in uni-
versities, for reproductive freedom and the right to control our own bodies, and 
for social resources like domestic violence shelters. During this Second Wave, we 
also saw more attention by feminist groups to anti- rape activism, like ‘Take Back 
the Night’ marches, and more theorising of the cultural attitudes that give rise 
to widespread acceptance of sexual assault as inevitable, and sexual exploitation 
and objectification as aspects of normal social relations.
 13 Brownmiller’s book is the most well- known of these writings by Second Wave 
feminists but she was by no means the only feminist writer of her era to take on the 
topic; Andrea Dworkin, Germaine Greer, Susan Griffin, Catharine MacKinnon, 
and Robin Morgan, among others, all produced influential accounts of sexual 
violence.
 14 The Wikipedia entry ‘Rape Culture’ does observe that a journal article written 
by Patricia Donat and John D’Emilio, ‘A Feminist Redefinition of Rape and 
Sexual Assault:  Historical Foundations and Change,’ gives grounds to accept 
that the term comes from Brownmiller’s references in Against Our Will to ‘rape- 
supportive culture.’ But a ‘co- production’ origin story, in which Brownmiller 
and Connell and Wilson develop the concept collaboratively, makes the most 
sense: Brownmiller too was a member of the New York Radical Feminists, and it 
was NYRF consciousness- raising work on women’s experiences of sexual assault 
that inspired her to write Against Our Will.
 15 Gavey discusses the postmodern analysis of rape offered by Sharon Marcus as 
a repudiation of Brownmiller et al.’s thesis that rape is an act of violence, and 
presents Marcus’s view as an argument that effective resistance to rape culture 
requires us to disassociate rape from the harms of violence, on the grounds that 
failure to do so reinscribes the masculinist logic of female purity that sees rape 
as ‘a fate worse than death’ (Gavey 176). The corollary of equating rape with 
violence, and not with sex, Gavey suggests, is the notion of ‘an innocent hetero-
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 16 As Gavey and Courtney Fraser both note, this method of calculating preva-
lence and analysing features of rape and rapists is now widely understood as 
inadequate, due in large part to awareness of chronic under- reporting. New 
methodological approaches, pioneered by psychologist Mary Koss and sociolo-
gist Diana Russell, began deriving more accurate data as early as the 1980s by 
asking questions not just about whether a woman had been raped but whether 
she had experienced activity that met researchers’ definitions of rape, thereby 
identifying instances of rape regardless of whether the woman herself identified 
the incident that way (see Gavey, 160– 162, for a discussion of social science 
research protocols that justify these data classification choices). In addition, 
Russell also developed interview protocols that involved intensive training for 
interviewers, race and ethnicity- matching of subject and interviewer, and sched-
uling of extended periods (in excess of one hour) in the subject’s home, all to 
make the subject more comfortable, develop rapport, and give the interviewer 
time to draw out the nuances of the subject’s account of her experience (Gavey 
50– 59). These refinements of the survey process are responsible for documenting 
rates of sexual violence that are much higher than previously estimated— far 
from being a rare occurrence, research by Koss, and by Gavey herself, has found 
that over 50% of women have experienced some form of sexual victimisation 
(Gavey 161)— and have provided a picture of sexual violence that reveals that 
women are much more likely to be assaulted by an intimate partner or acquaint-
ance than by a stranger.
 17 See Rebecca Solnit’s essay ‘Worlds Collide in a Luxury Suite’ for an account of 
Strauss- Kahn’s crime and its broader political context. For Nafissatou Diallo’s 
story in her own words, see ‘Dominique Strauss- Kahn’s Accuser, Nafissatou 
Diallo, Speaks Out to “GMA’s” Robin Roberts.’
 18 Alcoff offers a pertinent analysis of who we (societies) identify as ‘the rapist’ in 
Rape and Resistance’s discussion of the controversial account Michel Foucault 
offers in the first volume of his History of Sexuality of the molestation of Sophie 
Adam by Charles Jouy, who was classified by his 19th- century rural French 
society as simple- minded and who Foucault appears to defend as a man seeking 
the same kind of ‘bucolic pleasures’ sought by other men and boys in his village 
(Foucault 31). In reference to Foucault’s distinction between transactional sex 
and coerced sex (made in the context of whether Adam was a consensual par-
ticipant), Alcoff points out that ‘one can be forced into engaging in transactional 
sex’ and then draws our attention to the more important point ‘that the only 
reason the other males who are engaging in such acts are not also classified 
as “dangerous individuals” is likely because this would invite a more sweeping 
cultural reform. If the tendency to rape can be sequestered to the certain social 
outliers deemed abnormal, then heterosexual conventions, and male privileges, 
can be largely left intact’ (108). As helpful as Brownmiller’s analysis of rape 
as violence was to Second Wave anti- rape activism, the account she offered of 
who the potential perpetrators are effectively gave societies yet another reason 
to demonise socially marginalised men— often, as Alcoff notes, men of colour 
(28)— and obscured the culture of sexual predation and impunity that ‘me too’ 
has emerged to challenge.
 19 Kimberlé Crenshaw makes this point about the erasure/ exemption of African- 
American women from discussions of patriarchal norms in her critique of 
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of women are too often indexed to white women’s experiences, she points out 
that ‘analysis of patriarchy that highlights the history of white women’s exclu-
sion from the workplace might permit the inference that Black women have 
not been burdened by this particular gender- based expectation,’ an inference 
that disregards both the historical (and current) social positioning of African- 
American women and the historical economic dependence of African- American 
households on their paid labour outside the home (see Demarginalizing 
the Intersection of Race and Sex 33). In this critique, Crenshaw also details the 
exclusion of African- American women from legal protection or redress in the 
case of sexual assault. The effect of this erasure of their personhood on both 
fronts comes together in a posthumously discovered essay by Rosa Parks (see 
McGuire, ‘The Maid and Mr. Charlie’).
 20 This part of my discussion is a version of an essay previously published as ‘The 
Unapologetic Blackness of the Me Too Movement’ in The Elephant, a Kenyan 
magazine of current affairs and ideas.
 21 This concern about seemingly benign attitudes that work in practice to reduce 
women’s agency is something that both Nicola Gavey (in Just Sex?) and Linda 
Martín Alcoff (in Rape and Resistance) also worry about in terms of women’s 
capacity to frame our own choices and decisions.
 22 As I  write this, I  find myself quite ambivalent about Fraser’s discussion of 
the empowering and culturally transformative effects of feminist/ woman- 
friendly porn (194– 197). I am stuck on the question of whether the problem 
of pornography is that the types that tend to be available are objectionable 
(violent, exploitative, demeaning)— which suggests that Fraser might be 
right: the solution is better porn— or whether the problem is pornography in 
all its forms. In the context of its relation to rape culture, I find myself leaning 
towards the latter viewpoint; even the most respectfully produced variations 
are representations of people performing sex, and seem to me to be neces-
sarily implicating the ‘male gaze’ that I will discuss in Chapter 5’s analysis of 
cinematic treatment of rape. Regardless of how diverse it is in its depictions 
of body types, how non- heterosexist, how concerned with treating all of the 
actors with respect and ensuring their mutual comfort and consent, it gives 
me pause insofar as it still encourages us to see sex as something people do, 
as performance, rather than as a way of engaging in interpersonal connection 
with another human being.
 23 See Laura Bicker, ‘Gangnam: The Scandal Rocking the Playground of K- Pop.’
 24 ‘Jamming Rape Culture: Why and How We Need to Stop the Patriarchy,’ guest 
lecture in Gender and Everyday Life, International Christian University.
 25 Her focus in ‘Galtung, Violence, and Gender,’ is something of a counterpoint 
to my project in this section; where Confortini argues that Galtung’s general 
theory of violence is strengthened by feminist theory’s use of gender as a cat-
egory of analysis, I am arguing that there are important insights we can gain 
into rape culture by drawing on (a gender- sensitive version of) the theory of 
violence Galtung has developed in peace studies. Confortini herself notes that 
‘a feminist theory of violence that takes into account violence of different 
kinds does not exist. Galtung and the peace studies framework provide us with 
one . . . [that] maintains a critical focus on systems and structures of inequality, 
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 26 As examples of these aspects he offers religion, ideology, language, art, and empir-
ical and formal sciences (Galtung, ‘Cultural Violence’ 291). His characterisation 
of science as cultural violence might strike one as implausible on first hearing, 
but there is a wealth of analysis to support that characterisation. On the ways 
in which empirical sciences— physical and social— might be the instantiation 
of colonial cultural violence, see Keolu Fox and Chanda Prescod- Weinstein’s 
‘The Fight for Mauna Kea Is a Fight Against Colonial Science’ in The Nation 
(astronomy), and Linda Tuhiwai Smith’s Decolonizing Methodologies: Research 
and Indigenous Peoples (anthropology and sociology). On the ways in which 
formal sciences like logic might be cultural violence, see Bruno Latour’s post- 9/ 
11 essay, ‘War of the Worlds: What about Peace?’ It is important to note, as 
Galtung takes pains to acknowledge throughout his discussion, that none of 
these aspects of culture are necessarily violent; all too often they are, but as both 
the Nation article and Tuhiwai Smith’s book make clear, there are non- colonial, 
non- violent, culturally respectful ways of practising science.
 27 A contrast with direct violence is perhaps instructive: a society at war is engaging 
in direct violence against the ‘enemies’ it kills, and is engaging in indirect violence 
against its own residents, whose taxes are financing bombs instead of hospitals 
and schools. This indirect violence is what Galtung is theorising as structural 
violence.
 28 I am sympathetic, however, to arguments that contest the latter point: while 
there is no ‘hit list’ of particular women targeted to become rape victims in 
rape culture, there quite evidently are populations of girls and women who 
are identifiably vulnerable:  refugees, undocumented migrants, sex workers, 
insecurely housed and economically marginalised girls and women, cognitively 
and physically disabled girls and women, indigenous girls and women and 
other racial minorities, and civilian populations in war time. This is not an 
exhaustive list.
 29 Of course, it is one thing to call for gendered perspectives in policy planning, 
and another thing entirely to staff missions and agencies with people who have a 
robust understanding of what this means and how to implement it. There is illu-
minating discussion of this particular gap between theory and practice in Carol 
Cohn’s conversation with Cynthia Enloe, ‘Feminists Look at Masculinity and the 
Men Who Wage War.’
 30 Judith Butler’s Gender Trouble is of course a notable exception to this tendency.
 31 I am aware that there have been societies throughout history that might 
be described as matriarchal, but, as I  suggested earlier in this chapter, in my 
comments on the Haudenosaunee Confederacy, it does not seem to me that 
women- led societies have ever exercised any considerable widespread geo- 
political power or enduring cultural influence. Looking around the world today, 
acceptance that men should rule and women should serve is one of the few 
common assumptions jutting out of global cultural diversity— the exception to 
this, perhaps, being the feminist- influenced gender equality that characterises 
Scandinavian countries and is also a feature of (some) western European nations 
(see World Economic Forum, Global Gender Gap Report).
 32 Critical distance may be understood in either way; one can conceptually pull 
back from the networks in which we function by trying to see oneself as histor-
ically situated— embedded in a particular time— or as geo- culturally situated— 
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 33 This notion of alienation as a provider of critical distance is a plausible explan-
ation for why people who are members of racial or ethnic minorities can typ-
ically very easily identify even subtle institutional racisms or micro- aggressions 
that members of the majority (racist) culture struggle to understand as racism. 
But if it does explain awareness of racism, then the curious lacuna would be 
women’s failure— refusal?— to identify sexism and misogyny. I will wrestle with 
this question in- depth in Chapter 2.
 34 Like Brownmiller (as I discussed in this book’s introduction), Greer has recently 
taken positions that undermine and appear to contradict the valuable insights 
I derived from her work, and that I deplore. In Greer’s case, she has made a 
number of trans- phobic public statements that express quite vicious hostility 
towards trans women, denying that they are ‘real women’ and accusing them 
of acts of self- inflicted violence (see Saul, ‘Germaine Greer Defends “Grossly 
Offensive” Comments’ and Wahlquist, ‘Germaine Greer Tells Q&A Her Trans 
Views Were Wrong’ as examples). On the matter of how feminism should under-
stand trans people and trans rights, I endorse Sara Ahmed’s position that fem-
inism (generally, in my view, although she is speaking quite specifically about the 
political programme of lesbian feminism) is about ‘loosen[ing] the requirements 
to be in a world, . . . [thereby] creat[ing] room for others to be’ (232). This 
means that ‘[a] n antitrans stance is an antifeminist stance’ (Ahmed 234). On the 
matter of how we should assess problematic, even offensive, views of thinkers 
who have made important contributions to discourses that matter to us (and 
I am thinking here not just of Brownmiller and Greer, but of some of Foucault’s 
public comments on rape), I think it is important to acknowledge that which we 
repudiate, and why, and critically examine the extent to which our engagement 
with (anyone’s) ideas puts us in positions of seeming to endorse views we abhor. 
Given Greer’s transphobia, I would not want to give her present- day views a 
platform, but in fact her early work was an influence on me. It feels intellectually 
dishonest to not acknowledge that.
 35 Margaret Atwood, Second Words:  Selected Critical Prose, 1960– 1982. The 
quotation as I have rendered it in the text is a common abbreviation of the anec-
dote in Second Words. The full text reads:
‘Why do men feel threatened by women?’ I asked a male friend of mine. So 
this male friend of mine, who does by the way exist, conveniently entered 
into the following dialogue. ‘I mean,’ I  said, ‘men are bigger, most of the 
time, they can run faster, strangle better, and they have on average a lot 
more money and power.’ ‘They’re afraid women will laugh at them,’ he 
said. ‘Undercut their world view.’ Then I  asked some women students in 
a quickie poetry seminar I was giving, ‘Why do women feel threatened by 
men?’ ‘They’re afraid of being killed,’ they said.
(Atwood 413)
Two things strike me about this full- text passage, neither of them evident in 
the more well- known abbreviated version:  first, that male socialisation is so 
bound up with the power to set the terms of reality that challenges to one’s 
worldview are cognised as threats (as opposed to being a sign of epistemo-
logical diversity) and, second, that both the conveniently existing friend and the 
women in the poetry seminar spoke of abstract, generic men and women (those 
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of female speaker from female experience, in particular, is something I see fre-
quently, even in feminist writings about women, and make a point of explicitly 
correcting when I notice myself doing it in Women’s Studies classes or lectures. 
It speaks, I think, of a distance women are encouraged to put between ourselves, 
a lack of solidarity that is seen in habitual failures to identify different women’s 
experiences as points of overlap or possible sites of empathy for other people’s 
struggles to navigate a culture in which one does not feel valued.
 36 One particularly sad example of this disbelief and uncertainty was expressed 
in an early response to the 15 October 2017 tweet by actress Alyssa Milano 
that is credited with launching the ‘me too’ hashtag: ‘If you’ve been sexually 
harassed or assaulted write “me too” as a reply to this tweet.’ The response, 
from a man, was, ‘Not sure how much this counts. I was 14 and she was 27. 
I was coerced. Definitely was not informed legal consent.’ To their credit, other 
respondents to Milano’s tweet jumped in to reassure him that his experience 
‘100%’ counted as a ‘me too’ instance. The fact that he was not sure makes 
this, in my opinion, an instance of the hermeneutical injustice I discuss in a 
following paragraph.
 37 In Chapter 3, I take up the troubling nature of consent that has been a feature of 
feminist analysis of heterosexual norms and practices in Second Wave and Third 
Wave thinking. For now, I  use the term as a kind of short- hand, a culturally 
accessible way to introduce the distinction I am immediately concerned with.
 38 There is a lot of divergence in legal codes of various nation- states as to what 
counts as rape or sexual assault, and which is the preferred terminology. In the 
United States, for instance, the legal term used in the Uniform Crime Reporting 
(UCR) program of the Federal Bureau of Investigation is rape, and it is defined 
as any non- consensual vaginal or anal penetration with a body part or object 
or non- consensual oral penetration by another person’s sex organ. In Canada 
the legal term is sexual assault. The Women’s Legal Education and Action Fund 
(LEAF) notes that Canadian law defines sexual assault broadly, to include 
all unwanted sexual activity. In Japan, 2017 amendments to a very outdated 
1907 law against rape included renaming the crime ‘forced sexual intercourse,’ 
expanding the definition to include oral and anal penetration as punishable 
acts, and acknowledging the possibility of male victims. The People’s Republic 
of China has also moved to include men as potential victims, but, except in 
cases of sexual relations with a girl under the age of 14 (statutory rape), seems 
to require the presence of violence or coercion for a crime to have taken place. 
Indian law assumes that the perpetrator must be a man, and includes an exemp-
tion for marital relations. While it does not recognise marital rape as a category, 
it does make a distinction between rape per se and rape committed by a man 
in a position of authority or public trust (for instance, a police officer). Across 
Africa, categories of sexual assault/ sexual exploitation are used to capture crimes 
considered less severe than rape, although what counts as rape differs notice-
ably. In Kenya, it is forced, non- consensual penetration with genital organs; 
in Ghana, it is more vaguely defined as non- consensual carnal knowledge of 
a female 16 years or older. Of the European nations, Sweden is notable for its 
legal stipulation that causing someone to be incapacitated (hence, incapable of 
consent/ decision- making) is the equivalent of (sexual) violence. At the inter-
national level, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
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form of unwanted or coerced sexual acts, attempts, advances, and/ or comments 
directed against a person’s sexuality. Such violence takes multiple forms, the 
OHCHR contends, including rape and sexual abuse, and extending to forced 
reproductive acts (pregnancy, sterilisation, abortion), sexual enslavement and 
trafficking, forced circumcision, castration, and forced nudity (see www.ohchr.
org/ Documents/ Issues/ Women/ WRGS/ OnePagers/ Sexual_ and_ gender- based_ 
violence.pdf).
 39 Submitting rather than consenting because of a perception that refusing might be 
dangerous is a phenomenon that is being subjected to quite a bit of ‘me too’- era 
analysis, but submitting because refusing is perceived as shameful also needs our 
attention. One of the concerns about ‘hook- up culture’ in American universities 
and ‘omochikaeri’ culture among Japanese youth is that parties who might appear 
to be consenting in the minimalist way that contractual- transactional legalistic 
perspectives recognise (did you say yes? well then, you must have meant yes) may 
actually feel unwilling but also feel obligated in some sense. Here, for instance, 
is a social space in which there is significant room for coercion of male sex part-
ners:  the stereotype of the ‘real man’ is that he always wants to have sex. So, 
when an actual man (or a boy) is presented with what the ‘real man’ stereotype 
understands as an opportunity to have sex, his actual feelings of exhaustion, stress, 
reluctance to be intimate with this particular person (feelings he has because he 
is, after all, a human being) can appear to him as embarrassing revelations that he 
is not a real man, and can push him into sex he is not in fact robustly consenting 
to. Dismissing such situations as instances of weakness of will or as less harmful 
disregards the power that social norms and conventions have in all our lives. The 
need for a social field in which all of us feel free to say ‘yes’ when we mean yes and 
‘no’ when we mean no is the point I will be building to throughout Chapter 3.
 40 Epistemology is the branch of philosophy that is concerned with theories of 
knowledge: how we formulate ideas and how we justify them. Much of the epis-
temological work done in academic philosophical circles in the English- speaking 
world is done in a tradition known as ‘Analytic Philosophy,’ and has emphasised 
abstract study of logic, linguistic meaning, and theory justification. The questions 
Fricker is working out as ‘virtue epistemology’ are questions of how knowledge 
and epistemic judgements (credibility, trust, bias) are tempered by social power, 
and are therefore infused with ethical and political concerns. Thus, virtue epis-
temology, in Fricker’s words, ‘renegotiates a stretch of the border between’ epis-
temology and ethics that philosophy in the Analytic tradition had previously 
seen as a settled boundary (2).
 41 Putting this point in peace studies terms, Cinderella is a victim of structural vio-
lence: lack of resources results in diminished life choices. In a liberal- democratic 
society, there would be a social safety net that could ameliorate her deprivation; 
in the universe of fairy tales, however, it seems to me that these resources can 
only be furnished within the family structure. Unfortunately, this limitation— 
either of the story- world or of my imagination— does lend credence to a reading 
of my culture- jammed Cinderella as a ‘poor little rich girl’ (read:  white girl) 
living off a trust fund. I deplore the elitist cast this gives my Cinderella, but I see 
no way to stretch the story and still have it be recognisable as a version of the 
Cinderella story. Perhaps this needs to be seen as a limitation of the culture- 
jamming strategy I pursue in this book: it can unsettle (in ways that Foucault 
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2  A beautiful girl met a handsome 
prince . . .
Toxic masculinity and complicit 
femininity
How to be a man: Prince Charming
Rape culture— which I defined in Chapter 1 as casual, pervasive commodi-
fication of women’s bodies and relentless normalising of a masculinity 
steeped in conquest and control— depends on policings of masculinity and 
femininity that, like rape culture itself, are both manifestations of cultural 
violence. The traditional conceptions of masculinity and femininity that we 
find embedded in our fairy tales are in fact mirror- image concepts: feminist 
international relations theorists Carol Cohn and Cynthia Enloe note that 
‘particular masculinities— especially of the sort that states think they need— 
. . . [are] confirmed by women in their role as wives’ (1188). Essentially, 
the prince would not be a hero if there were no helpless damsel for him to 
rescue. It is true that we can articulate a variety of ways of being mascu-
line and ways of being feminine (and ascribe those ways of being to per-
sons of either gender identity) and I want to be clear that I do not think 
all of these ways of performing gender are harmful or odious. What I am 
analysing in this chapter are the pernicious effects of rigid commitments to 
traditional views of manhood and womanhood that cast men as owners or 
caretakers of women and as ‘mini- sovereigns,’ rulers over ‘their’ families and 
households, and cast women as vessels of care and procreation. These views, 
that I am talking about here as ‘toxic masculinity’ and ‘complicit femininity,’ 
are, to borrow Cynthia Enloe’s words, ‘decisions . . . masked as “tradition” ’ 
(Cohn and Enloe 1192). Traditional and prescriptive, they condition those 
raised with them to accept as natural and unchangeable the idea that men 
ought to have power over women, and they give legitimacy to the kinds of 
social relations that characterise rape culture.
Throughout this chapter, I  illustrate my analysis of problematic gender 
scripts with examples drawn from the dystopic world portrayed in Margaret 
Atwood’s novels, The Handmaid’s Tale and The Testaments, and in the Hulu 
television series that retells and extends Atwood’s original story and provides 
the backstory for her sequel. This storytelling about fundamentalist patri-
archy resonates for me in the ‘me too’ era through its depiction of powerful 
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roles of wives, daughters, and aunts and those who populate the exploited, 
terrorised classes of handmaids, household servants, and ‘unwomen.’1 In 
particular, I see the symbiotic relationship of the Commander— Waterford, 
in the television series; unnamed in the novel— and Serena Joy as illustrating 
the toxic masculinity and complicit femininity through which marriage is 
enacted as ‘a transaction of power that create[s] a social system’ (Cohn and 
Enloe 1199).
The messaging our societies give us about how a male human being goes 
about the process of being a ‘real man’ implicates the Prince Charming of 
fairy tales insofar as he appears as the rescuer of the damsel in distress and 
offers her a path out of her miserable existence by becoming his princess. 
In many tales, he is the stylised, public relations version of the masculinity 
script that patriarchal social organisation mandates. ‘It is not men- on- top 
that makes something patriarchal,’ Enloe explains.
It’s men who are recognized and claim a certain form of masculinity, 
for the sake of being more valued, more ‘serious,’ and ‘the protectors of/ 
and controllers of those people who are less masculine’ that makes any 
organization, any community, any society patriarchal.
(Cohn and Enloe 1192)
In her conversation with Cohn, Enloe notes that she deliberately uses the term 
‘patriarchy’ in discussions in which others might speak of ‘gender inequality’ 
because ‘using patriarchy . . . reminds us that we’re investigating power’ 
(Cohn and Enloe 1193, emphasis in original). In these power relations, men 
are in charge, and one of the things they’re in charge of is us: women. That 
is why people (men and women) raised in patriarchal social conditioning 
grow up to believe that men are entitled to women’s attention, women’s 
care, women’s respect, and women’s bodies.
What rape culture does, then, in its performance of patriarchal norms, is 
to cheerlead for girls the enthusiastic adoption of a femininity that serves 
male dominance and to venerate for boys the patriarchal figure of the ‘real 
man.’ This notion of ‘how to be a man’ appears, in areas of scholarship as 
diverse as sociology of gender and international relations, through engage-
ment with RW Connell’s concept of ‘hegemonic masculinity.’ Connell’s first 
articulations of this ‘contested concept’ were structured as a corrective model 
of masculinity— a pluralisation (into ‘masculinities’) and a non- essentialist 
theorisation of the hegemonic instantiation as a ‘pattern of practice (i.e. 
things done, not just a set of role expectations or an identity) that allowed 
men’s dominance over women to continue’ (Connell and Messerschmidt 
830, 832). Despite two decades of contestation in the academic literature, 
Connell and Messerschmidt contend that ‘the issues it [hegemonic mas-
culinity] names are very much at stake in contemporary struggles about 
power and political leadership, public and private violence, and changes 
in family and sexuality’ (830)— struggles now taking place under ‘me too’ 
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banners around the world. In their review of the scholarship this concept 
inaugurated, Connell and Messerschmidt acknowledge that it is not a mas-
culinity that all men can or do perform, but they also argue that hegemonic 
masculinity does require other men— practitioners of ‘subordinated mascu-
linities’— to orient themselves to it and that it does function as a Galtungian 
cultural violence:  ‘ideologically legitim[ising] the global subordination of 
women to men’ (Connell and Messerschmidt 832).
We see this symbolised in The Handmaid’s Tale; in Gilead, the Commander 
is both the ruler over subordinated men— drivers and Guardians— and, as a 
social role, the promised reward for these men who, unlike the ‘econopeople’ 
(in other discourses, ‘the masses’), are placated and co- opted by the hope of 
rising through the ranks to this coveted position. Another point of note about 
this ‘performative’ conception of masculinity is that it is not a monolith; one 
may enact it more or less competently, more or less faithfully or subversively 
(Connell and Messerschmidt 837)— so it could even be performed in a spirit 
of parody or camouflage, as we might understand Commander Lawrence’s 
arguably less brutal participation in Gilead leadership.
‘[I] n some contexts, hegemonic masculinity actually does refer to men’s 
engaging in toxic practices— including physical violence,’ Connell and 
Messerschmidt concede (840). The hegemonic model ‘embeds certain 
notions of consent and participation by the subaltern groups’ (Connell and 
Messerschmidt 841)— we can see this in The Handmaid’s Tale in the orien-
tation of wives, aunts, and drivers to the rulership of the Commanders— 
but the performance of hegemonic masculinity devolves into toxicity 
when it becomes a legitimisation of domination and ownership— as when 
Commander Waterford notes to Serena Joy in season 3 that ‘God has made 
me the master of an incredible woman’ (episode 1: ‘Night,’ emphasis added).
It is this latter, particularly harmful— to both genders— version of mas-
culinity that the American Psychological Association (APA) focuses on, in a 
2018 communication to clinical practitioners, as ‘masculinity ideology’: what 
we believe to be the case about what boys and men are like and what they 
ought to be like (2). ‘Although there are differences in masculinity ideologies,’ 
the report notes, ‘there is a particular constellation of standards that have 
held sway over large segments of the population, including: anti- femininity, 
achievement, eschewal of the appearance of weakness, and adventure, risk, 
and violence’ (APA 2– 3). While the guidelines for recognising and engaging 
with this patriarchal ideology sparked controversy upon their release 
in 2018— largely because supporters of ‘traditional’ (toxic) masculinity 
glossed it as demonising and disparaging men as a population— the APA 
was actually trying to encourage greater awareness on the part of prac-
tising clinical psychologists of the ways that men and boys suffer because 
of the gender scripts imposed on them. In explaining the need for these 
guidelines, the report says, ‘socialization for conforming to traditional mas-
culinity ideology has been shown to limit males’ psychological development, 
constrain their behavior, result in gender role strain and gender role conflict’ 
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(3).2 The report cites extensive research showing that negative behavioural 
and cognitive consequences of conforming to traditional ideas of how to be 
a man include tendencies ‘to endorse and commit higher levels of intimate 
partner and sexual violence,’ an inhibited ‘ability to be emotionally vulner-
able and form deep connections in adult relationships,’ and adoption of 
‘an approach to sexuality that emphasizes promiscuity and other aspects of 
risky sexual behavior’ (10– 11). ‘Many boys and men have been socialized 
to use aggression and violence as a means to resolve interpersonal conflict,’ 
conclude the report’s authors (15).
This socialisation is what peace studies theorist Bill Gay refers to as 
‘violentism,’ a concept he defines as ‘the belief that violence— overt and 
covert, personal and institutional— is and perhaps should be used to achieve 
goals’ (468). Returning to the trio of violences I discussed in the previous 
chapter as the significant insight that Johan Galtung’s work (‘Violence, Peace’ 
and ‘Cultural Violence’) can contribute to thinking about rape culture— 
cultural (symbolic), structural (institutional), and direct (personal)— I think 
we can see the violence that makes hegemonic masculinity toxic showing up 
in two distinct aspects of male entitlement.
Regardless of whether any individual man has access to the social status 
that confers these entitlements upon him personally, patriarchal thinking 
normalises for men an entitlement to authority— a belief in their own 
fitness to rule, to set the terms of engagement in their social relations— 
and a sexual entitlement. Entitlement to rule over others is symbolised 
in Christian religious discourse by the figure of God the Father,3 in The 
Handmaid’s Tale by the figure of the Commander (the only member of 
the household allowed to read the word of God, and the one charged with 
interpreting it for all the others), and in the world of global politics by the 
pervasive figure of the authoritarian leader (the ‘strict daddy’ who keeps 
us all in line). This symbolism flows out into the world as the cultural 
and structural violences of paternalistic justifications for imperialism and 
of men’s occupation and monopolisation of social spaces they designate as 
‘theirs.’ Entitlement to sex, to women’s bodies, is symbolised in the figure 
of ‘the ladies’ man,’ a glib and allegedly irresistible man who conquers and 
abandons women almost as a distraction on his way to saving the world, or 
ruling it. Think James Bond. Or real- life ‘wanna- be’ James Bonds: Donald 
Trump, for instance, or Jeffrey Epstein. Or the figure Susan Brownmiller 
dubs ‘the heroic rapist’ (283– 308). When this symbolism manifests con-
cretely, it becomes the direct violence of rape, sexual harassment and dero-
gation of women, and sometimes, murder.
Men’s perception of their fitness to rule— seen in fairy tales as the prince’s 
right/ duty to rescue the impoverished princess or kiss the sleeping one— 
underpins geopolitical adventures, which are both culturally violent in their 
depictions of cultural ‘others’ as savage (in need of civilising) or helpless 
(in need of rescuing), and structurally violent in their organisation of colo-
nial occupations to meet the needs and build the wealth of the colonising 
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nation, not the colonised territory. Enloe, for instance, speaks of her interest 
in the ways that women’s status in foreign cultures is perennially used to 
justify colonial occupations, linking the post- 9/ 11 American invasion of 
Afghanistan to the ‘benighted woman’ tableaux at American ‘World’s Fairs’ 
when the United States was pursuing colonisation of the Philippines in the 
late 19th century. ‘The oppression of women . . . has been used as a[n inverse] 
measure of how enlightened a society is, without much deeper commitment 
to deprivileging masculinity,’ she observes. ‘That’s why you have to have a 
feminist understanding of orientalism’ (Cohn and Enloe 1201).4 This com-
mentary on the masculinist/ patriarchal assumption of a right to enter what-
ever spaces they choose, for our own good, is reminiscent of the influential 
postcolonial feminist critique that Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak makes of 
British ‘abolition’ of sati in India in her essay ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’— 
‘[w] hite men . . . saving brown women from brown men’ (93).5 ‘Imperialism’s 
image as the establisher of the good society is marked by the espousal of the 
woman as object of protection from her own kind,’ she contends (Spivak 94, 
emphasis in original).
In addition to asserting the right to enter any space they choose, to rescue 
and to civilise, men also assert entitlement to rule by marking off their own 
spaces and forbidding entry to ‘outsiders.’ When that assertion of ‘sacred’ 
space is perceived as having been violated, claimants can and do resort 
to direct violence— sometimes, physical harm, but also linguistic and psy-
chological. One such instance of violent male outbursts at perceived intru-
sion on ‘their’ space is the notorious phenomenon known as GamerGate. 
GamerGate erupted as a Twitter hashtag in September 2014 and was claimed 
by users of the hashtag to be a movement by the self- perceived core of ‘the 
gamer community’— young men who play video games— concerned that 
video- game journalism was giving preferential reviews of games developed 
by women, and frequently involved accusations that this bias was the result 
of sexual relationships between developers and journalists. It was an out-
pouring of violent, misogynist anger— performed primarily on Twitter, but 
coordinated on Reddit and 4chan message boards— that was directed most 
forcefully against female video game developers and cultural commentators 
who were arguing for greater representational diversity in video games. At 
least two female video game developers were harassed and ‘doxxed’ to the 
point that they had to leave their respective homes as a matter of personal 
safety.6 Although this months- long online campaign was supposed to be 
about ‘ethics in game journalism,’ none of the male journalists who were 
accused of colluding with the female video game developers were doxxed, 
threatened with physical violence, or harassed to the point of needing to 
hire personal assistants to manage their social media accounts. This led 
Brendan Keogh, a writer for the Australian literary and cultural magazine 
Overland, to conclude that GamerGate ‘does not represent a marginalised, 
discriminated identity under attack so much as a hegemonic and normative 
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After 4chan banned discussion of GamerGate in September 2014, the 
disgruntled feminist- hating gamers migrated to 8chan, a site that has billed 
itself as ‘the Darkest Reaches of the Internet’ (Roose). Here, on this site 
where hate- fuelled gunmen like the Christchurch mosque shooter and the 
El Paso Walmart shooter have posted their ‘manifestos,’ posters, adopting a 
tone that they think is irony but is in fact an utter lack of empathy, discuss 
the fatalities these gunmen cause as their ‘high scores.’ It has also become, 
reports New  York Times journalist Kevin Roose, ‘an online home’ for 
another collection of misogynists who are to sexual entitlement what the 
GamerGaters were to authority entitlement: a group who label themselves 
‘incels’— involuntarily celibate. 8chan’s celebration of violence and vicious-
ness towards other human beings is a vivid illustration of the toxic ‘mascu-
linity ideology’ dissected by the APA (3): anti- women/ anti- feminist rhetoric, 
valorisation of the killing this echo chamber counts as ‘achievement,’ dis-
avowal of empathy as weakness, and endless depictions of life as a video 
game. It is a chilling example of the problem Carol Cohn discusses in the 
context of American willingness to use violence: ‘the refusal to acknowledge 
the inevitability of our vulnerability . . . [a] s a fact of human and political life’ 
(Cohn and Enloe 1204, emphasis in original). More than a generation ago, 
in 1975, Susan Brownmiller spoke optimistically towards the end of Against 
Our Will of her confidence ‘that men will cease to define their manhood in 
terms of their aggression toward, or protection of, women’ (306). Sadly, the 
re- evaluation of manhood and heroism that she hoped would emerge from 
the 1970s seems still to be struggling against the doubling- down into resent-
ment, cruelty, and denial of women’s humanity that continues to flourish in 
spaces designated as men’s spheres.
The failure to make greater progress away from some of the more toxic 
aspects of traditional social expectations of who men are and what they 
do is, in part, attributable to the role- modelling of male power and success 
that continues to link authority entitlement to sexual entitlement. This has 
been most (in)famously expressed by America’s 45th president, Donald 
Trump, in the ‘Access Hollywood’ hot- mic incident that many political 
commentators and observers expected would end his presidential run in 
October 2016: ‘when you’re a star, they let you do it. You can do anything 
. . . Grab them by the pussy’ (‘US Election’). Just as the Atwoodian dystopia 
of Gilead will give you both a wife and a handmaid if you are a Commander, 
so too will the world give you all the sexually compliant women you want 
if you become wealthy and famous. That is what boys are told, and that 
is what men come to believe. No wonder so many of the high- profile fig-
ures caught up and brought down in various ‘me too’ scandals feel that 
the goalposts have shifted on them:  they have been trained into the view 
that attaining social status would insulate them. (The position I have taken 
throughout ‘me too’ debates and arguments is that goalposts have not, in 
fact, shifted; they have always been there. The difference now is simply that 
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we are beginning, through ‘me too’ discourses, to point to them and say, 
‘look, goalposts!’)
Gilead’s Commanders feel entitled to women as tribute to their authority; 
so too do our societies’ powerful men feel entitled to their ‘spoils.’ It is, then, 
not all that surprising that we find young men like Elliot Rodger and Brock 
Turner in the world, men whose youth means they have less social status 
(less immediate access to authority), but whose social positioning as upper- 
middle class white men confers just as robust a sense of entitlement as their 
country’s 45th president. In an account of his first week of college, Elliot 
Rodger recalls,
I saw two hot blonde girls waiting at the bus stop. I was dressed in one 
of my nice shirts, so I looked at them and smiled. They looked at me, but 
they didn’t even deign to smile back. They just looked away as if I was a 
fool. In a rage, I made a U- turn, pulled up to their bus stop and splashed 
my Starbucks latte all over them. I felt a feeling [of] spiteful satisfaction 
as I  saw it stain their jeans. How dare those girls snub me in such a 
fashion! How dare they insult me so! I raged to myself repeatedly. They 
deserved the punishment I gave them. It was such a pity that my latte 
wasn’t hot enough to burn them. Those girls deserved to be dumped in 
boiling water for the crime of not giving me the attention and adoration 
I so rightfully deserve!
(Rodger, quoted in Solnit 132– 133)
As evidently unhinged and narcissistic as this diatribe is, it might be tempting 
to dismiss it, and the writer. But the young man who wrote those words 
nurtured his entitlement and resentment into a rage that, just months before 
GamerGate, became the Isla Vista Massacre in which he killed six people 
and injured another 14 because ‘beautiful girls’ were ‘denying’ him sex that 
they were ‘giving’ to other men— as if that sex were his, by right, and these 
women he perceived as owing him sex were inappropriately choosing others 
over him.
In the sphere of sexual entitlement, this is where direct violence, structural 
violence, and cultural violence all intersect: Rodger, the son of a successful 
film- maker, was raised in a cultural environment that told him he was the 
kind of man a woman I once knew used to refer to as ‘prime property,’ and 
both he and Turner went to prestigious universities in Southern California 
that nurtured their senses of themselves as special, important, valuable 
men.7 In the aftermath of Rodger’s crimes, online discussion of it as mis-
ogyny prompted a Twitter hashtag battle between men who wanted to paint 
his actions as an isolated incident and women who wanted to point out that 
this was part of a discernible pattern in our social worlds. In response to the 
#NotAllMen postings, a message authored by ‘Jenny Chiu’ observed: ‘Sure 
#NotAllMen are misogynists and rapists. That’s not the point. The point is 
that #YesAllWomen live in fear of the ones that are’ (quoted in Solnit 125).8
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Since his 2014 rampage, Rodger has become a figure of adoration and 
admiration— not from the ‘hot blondes’ he felt entitled to but from online 
communities of misogynists who have adopted the incel label. To them, 
he has become ‘Saint Elliot’ and ‘the Supreme Gentleman,’ an exemplar of 
how men who ‘can’t get’ girlfriends (or can’t attract the sexual partners 
of their fantasies) should conduct themselves. Feminist author and anti- 
misogyny activist Jessica Valenti notes that in incel forums, references to 
Rodger have become a kind of shorthand for attacks on women that are 
motivated by a sense of revenge for having been ‘rejected,’9 and some of 
the posters on these message boards have ‘advocated rape as a means to 
end their celibacy.’ Troubled by the media tendency to dismiss this growing 
incel violence against women as isolated incidents,10 she argues that we 
should instead be speaking of them as ‘misogynist terrorism,’ a character-
isation that would highlight the preventability of the radicalisation that is 
occurring in these communities, and in other related forums dedicated to 
‘men’s rights activism’ and ‘pickup artists’ (Valenti). ‘While these movements 
differ in small ways, what they have in common is an organized hatred of 
women,’ Valenti contends.
In cases where we have first- person thoughts promulgated in media, they 
typically express and amplify Rodger’s point of view, not the perspectives 
of the two young women minding their own business at a bus stop. Chanel 
Miller, the young woman who was first presented to the world— infamously, 
in the entitlement propaganda and apologia that victim- blamed her in 
order to excuse him— as Emily Doe, author of the most viral victim impact 
statement of our time, has given us a corrective to this usual course of events 
in her 2019 memoir, Know My Name. Miller recalls her first foray into the 
police report taken in the aftermath of the sexual assault on her by Brock 
Turner:
In the report, all the people he’d kissed were named girls, but because 
he’d assaulted me, I was never called girl, only victim . . . [as in] He was 
having a good time with VICTIM and stated that she also seemed to 
enjoy the activity.
(Miller 45, emphasis in original)
If you followed the reporting and commentary on this case back in 2016, you 
might recall that the two Swedish graduate students who came to Miller’s 
rescue that night reported that their initial suspicion of something being 
wrong was provoked by her unmoving body. She was unconscious. But, 
according to Turner, she ‘seemed to enjoy’ lying unconscious on the ground 
behind a garbage dumpster while he digitally penetrated her. Miller recalls 
the police report as the moment in which she first realised that Turner’s 
defence strategy was going to be ‘to prove that to his knowledge, the sexual 
act had been consensual. He’d force moans into my mouth, assign lecherous 
behavior, to shift the blame onto me,’ she concluded (46). She described the 
 
 
Toxic masculinity and complicit femininity 75
feeling of being a rape victim in a criminal process organised around the 
accused’s presumed innocence as ‘like watching wolves being clipped off 
their leashes while someone whispered in your ear that meat has been sewn 
into your pockets’ (Miller 46).
Yet another analogy plays out in her account of the casual, pervasive har-
assment she encountered from strange men in public space as she worked to 
put her life back together after the rape: each comment ‘felt too subtle to be 
consequential, like a tiny thumbtack inserted into a thick tire . . . [but over 
time] pockmarked with thumbtacks and nails . . . [she] felt the tire becoming 
misshapen, lopsided, deflating’ (Miller 80, 86). One question recurs repeat-
edly throughout her book: why is it our job to manage this harassment? 
This challenging of the ‘safety work’ that receives more systematic scholarly 
analysis in Fiona Vera- Gray’s The Right Amount of Panic is most pointed in 
Miller’s observation that:
It is [a woman’s] job to know how to handle the stream of bombs, 
how to kindly decline giving her number, how to move a hand from the 
button of her jeans, to turn down a drink. When a woman is assaulted, 
one of the first questions people ask is, Did you say no? This question 
assumes that the [default] answer was always yes, and that it is her job 
to revoke the agreement. To defuse the bomb she was given. But why are 
they allowed to touch us until we physically fight them off? Why is the 
door open until we have to slam it shut?
(83, emphasis in original)
Running through our cultures and our news feeds alongside the con-
stant judgement of women’s self- policing are the numerous sexual assaults 
that only sometimes come to the attention of the law that is supposed 
to, as the American cliché has it, ‘serve and protect’ us all. When assaults 
become indictments, and then court cases, they also too frequently become 
instances of rape culture in which teenage boys and young men are given 
light sentences for sexual assaults because they ‘come from good families’ or 
‘have promising futures.’ Miller describes this as a perception that ‘his future 
[is] patiently waiting for him to step into it,’ a privilege- drenched departure 
from the understanding most of us have of our desired futures as projects 
that each of us needs to build, to earn (281). There are so many instances of 
this kind of sentencing— biased concern for boys’ futures rather than girls’ 
futures— that a 2019 report on yet another such story began: ‘File this one 
under “where have we seen this before” ’ (Wang). Sexual entitlement, when 
combined with ‘authority’ entitlement to set the terms of interaction, to be 
the priority, means that a woman who pursues legal remedies is pushed to 
‘think hard about what this will mean for his life, even though he never 
considered what his actions would do to her’ (Miller 288).
And this entitlement is learned behaviour; in the wake of Turner’s 2016 
sentencing to a six- month prison term (he served three months) for his 
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vicious assault on Miller— an attack that took two bystanders to stop and 
hospitalised her— his father was quoted as saying that the sentence was ‘a 
steep price to pay for twenty minutes of action out of his twenty- plus years 
of life’ (Miller 232). Miller recalls that this comment helped her make sense 
of Turner’s persistent evasion of responsibility for the rape he committed 
against her: ‘[h] e had lived shielded under a roof where the verdict was never 
accepted, where he would never be held accountable’ by a father who did 
not see his son’s actions as either violent or criminal (232). Indirectly referen-
cing toxic masculinity’s influence over even putatively objective and neutral 
social institutions, Susan Brownmiller observes in Against Our Will that,
[t] he real reason for the law’s everlasting confusion as to what constitutes 
an act of rape and what constitutes an act of mutual intercourse is the 
underlying cultural assumption that it is the natural masculine role to 
proceed aggressively toward the stated goal, while the natural feminine 
role is to ‘resist’ or ‘submit.’
(385)
How to be a woman: Cinderella, Snow White, Rapunzel
Susan Brownmiller remarks on the teaching value of our fairy tales:
As a lesson in female sexuality, Sleeping Beauty’s message is clear. . . . The 
prince is the only one who can awaken the princess. She cannot manage 
this feat by herself. . . . Thus is female sexuality defined. Beautiful pas-
sivity. Wait, just wait. Prince Charming will soon be by; and if it is not 
Prince Charming but the Big Bad Wolf who stands at the door, then 
proper feminine behavior still commands you to stay immobile.
(310)
In stark contrast with the messaging Prince Charming provides about what 
it means to be a ‘real man,’ fairy tales tell little girls that being a woman is 
about waiting to be chosen, and then managing the chooser’s expectations 
gracefully. Perhaps the most deeply shocking aspect of that socialisation is 
how early it cuts into female psyches. I  can recall reacting to the world 
through that messaging as a child, even when I was so young that I couldn’t 
understand why I  was experiencing my reactions as imperatives. In pos-
sibly the earliest example, which I think must have been when I was about 
six years old, I  went on a cross- neighbourhood excursion with a friend 
who lived down the road from me in the Auckland suburb of Glendowie 
that was my childhood stomping- grounds. It was so long ago that I cannot 
remember my friend’s name; I remember only where she lived in relation to 
my childhood home, and that it was a hot summer day. We journeyed to the 
far side of the neighbourhood, further than I had ever been on my own, so 
we could swim in the pool at her cousins’ house.
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There we were, by the pool, just hanging out and enjoying ourselves, 
when one of the cousins appeared. He was a boy slightly older than we 
were, not authoritative or unwelcoming or even particularly assertive in his 
personality, but my afternoon with my friend suddenly, weirdly, shifted into 
us being his audience as he screwed up his courage to try the diving board. 
‘Just jump,’ I  recall advising him, although I  also recall not much caring 
whether he did or not. (I don’t remember his name either; I’m as satisfied 
about that memory lapse as I am ashamed of not remembering my friend’s 
name.) About a week later, she told me that her cousin liked me, thought 
I was ‘cool’ (or maybe the terminology of the day was ‘neat’; pardon my 
unreliable narration, but I don’t remember that detail either), and at that 
moment my lack of interest in her cousin and my sense that she had been the 
significant human in my interactions that day vanished utterly. A boy had 
expressed interest in me, and it was suddenly very important to understand 
what I had done ‘right’— so that I could keep doing it, I guess? Over time, 
that incident got buried under piles of newer memories until the day, decades 
later, in a women’s studies classroom when it bubbled up as I searched for 
an anecdote to illustrate how early a girl can internalise the idea that what 
makes you valuable is being approved of by boys. It’s a trivial example in 
many respects, but it astounds me to realise how natural that thinking— that 
a boy was (should be) interesting to me because I was interesting to him— 
already was to me at such a young age.
In keeping with Brownmiller’s observation that one might wait for Prince 
Charming but then end up having to be sweet and compliant to the Big Bad 
Wolf, I  look back at the life I  lived before I discovered feminist theory in 
graduate school, and I realise that many of the corrective lessons my society 
taught me as a girl and as an adult woman were less about how to unthink 
harmful thoughts than they were about how to not speak unsanctioned 
or unpopular thoughts. I still reflexively default to thinking a lot of those 
harmful things, even if I think I don’t believe them. This is the essential harm 
of social conditioning: it instils messaging years before our cognitive capaci-
ties to think critically have developed, and when we do finally develop the 
tools to critique our (instilled) beliefs, they have settled so deeply into our 
minds and have come to feel so natural that critical examination amounts to 
tearing away at our (perceived) identities.
For me, this is exemplified nowhere more clearly than in my engage-
ment with Adrienne Rich’s essay, ‘Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian 
Existence.’ Rich offers an extensive analysis of the ways in which feminist 
theory has erased or failed to engage with lesbian experience of our social 
world, recovers some incredibly valuable history of lesbian communities and 
other groups of women who have resisted traditional heterosexual marital 
arrangements, and inventories the social strategies that have been instituted 
to convince women that heterosexuality is our only option. I teach this essay 
regularly in women’s studies and gender studies courses, and I have grown 
to love and appreciate the very unsettling challenge it poses to women like 
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me, who identify as sexually oriented/ attracted to men. I  feel this orien-
tation as ‘just how I  am,’ and yet I  recognise all of the characteristics of 
male power that Rich borrows from Kathleen Gough’s analysis of family 
structure to show us how heterosexuality is constructed as compulsory and 
imposed upon us (638– 640). It is social conditioning, and I do experience it 
as natural. Both of those things are true, yet they exist in tension with each 
other. Each time I wrestle with the unnerving idea that I am living a sexuality 
that is not my own, that is something that I might not have chosen in a less 
heteronormative world, I gain a deeper appreciation for Rich’s dissection of 
the social construction of usefully compliant and male- identified women.
Rich’s commentary on Gough’s inventory identifies and elaborates com-
pulsory heterosexuality’s training program for how to be a woman, the 
mechanisms that convince many women of their vulnerability and of the 
futility of adopting any attitude other than the passive acceptance of male 
authority (see Gough 69– 70). These include obvious strategies, such as using 
direct violence to force women into male- oriented sexual activity and to 
punish anything that is suggestive of lesbian orientation. The training also 
uses structurally violent systems of control, such as an economic system 
that pays women less than men, hampers our ability to be financially self- 
sufficient, and demands as a condition of getting and keeping a job that one 
conform to ‘feminine’ standards of dress and presentation.11 There are also 
structurally violent systems of law and social custom that place the primary 
responsibility for child care on women— it is disproportionately mothers, 
rather than fathers, who take time off work when a child is home sick, 
and statistics show that when a couple divorces, the woman’s household 
income typically decreases while the man’s typically increases12— and place 
primary responsibility on women for ‘staying safe’ in public spaces— that 
is, for not getting raped. And this training is embedded in culturally vio-
lent societies that discourage and denigrate women as artists, musicians, 
writers, scientists, and philosophers, sorting us instead into categories of 
muse, groupie, or object of study— in short, cultural messaging that tells us 
that women cannot be symbol- makers or manipulators, that we are merely 
symbols to be manipulated by and for others.13
One of the ways that cultural acceptance of toxic masculinity works to 
produce complicit femininity is by inculcating the idea that sexually active 
women are somehow more questionable— more deviant, more irresponsible, 
more dishonest and anti- social— than sexually active men. It is not just that 
being ‘a slut’ is a bad thing; it’s that sluts are understood to be ‘bad’ (mor-
ally inferior) people. No one really wants to be, or think of themselves as, a 
bad person; even the most sociopathic people I have known in my life have 
versions of reality they tell themselves in which they are the (misunderstood) 
heroes. So, clearly no young woman would really want to be thought of as a 
slut. For young men, on the other hand, social capital often gets constructed 
very differently; they get to be the sexually active problem their girlfriends 
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Time and again, when I was running anti- rape consent education pro-
gramming on college campuses in the United States, I would encounter stu-
dent attitudes that demonstrated an unquestioned, internalised acceptance 
of male dominance as the baseline of ‘normal’ sexuality: policing of one’s 
own body image, sexual identity, and gender identity, and that of other 
students; slut shaming; and resignation about perceived male tendencies to 
engage in sexual manipulation or predation. Both young men and young 
women would engage in analysis of sexual ethics that was underpinned by 
the view that women have the responsibility for occupying the moral high 
ground of sex:  saying no, being good, keeping a relationship ‘functional’ 
(which seemed, much of the time, to amount to ‘him not cheating on me’). 
‘Promiscuity’ is something we shame women for only because we have in 
place a set of harmful ideological commitments (patriarchal gender roles) 
that mete out social status to men and women in terms of the roles we 
ascribe as masculine and as feminine. We accept that it is valuable for a man 
to have experience and for a woman to have purity, and we shame members 
of each gender if they don’t meet those expectations.
What we should instead be acknowledging is, first, that sex drive, like 
every other human characteristic, is something that exists on a spectrum 
across which individuals are arrayed regardless of their gender, and second, 
that girls who grow up in a culture that tells them they are valuable for their 
capacity to perform sexually will engage in that behaviour (for which they 
are subsequently shamed) in an effort to get access to social capital. This is 
what we teach them with women’s magazines featuring articles on ‘how to 
please your man’ and girls’ magazines that promise them that the right lip 
gloss will get them a boyfriend. We teach them complicity— in ways that self- 
abnegate, and in ways that denigrate others. Part of the harm this gender- role 
messaging does to boys’ conceptions of masculinity is to cut, early and deep, 
a bifurcation in the young boy’s psyche: sex on one side, love on the other. It 
cuts into girls’ psyches too, of course, as sex on one side, love on the other— 
just differently. Because the process of ‘growing into’ (being deformed into?) 
femininity requires a girl to objectify herself— both to compete with other 
girls as rivals for the potential boyfriend, and to self- police so that she isn’t 
shamed out of consideration as ‘girlfriend material’— she is effectively pushed 
towards seeing her life’s path as determined by her ‘choice’ of how she relates 
to men: as the object of sexual desire or the object of love.
We see this paucity of choices for women illustrated in a conversa-
tion during the first season of the Hulu television series version of The 
Handmaid’s Tale in which Commander Waterford expresses the view that 
women have a biological destiny of procreation we should all live out (epi-
sode 5:  ‘Faithful’). ‘What else is there?’ he asks. June, the title handmaid 
who, in being assigned to his household, has become ‘Offred’ (his given 
name is ‘Fred,’ and the handmaids of Gilead are renamed, in each new 
assignment, ‘Of- the assigned Commander’s name’) responds: ‘love.’ Strictly 
speaking— to the extent that we recognise women as human beings— neither 
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answer is correct: human beings have diverse interests and preferences, and 
the idea that this diversity can be compressed into a single destiny is non-
sense. But in fictional Gilead, the patriarchal– authoritarian state that has 
installed itself after a group of home- grown terrorists overthrew American 
democracy, women’s single biological destiny is an article of faith— biblical 
faith, because, as Atwood explains in her introductory essay to the 2017 
reissue of her novel, ‘[t] he regime uses biblical symbols, as any authoritarian 
regime taking over America doubtless would: they wouldn’t be Communists 
or Muslims’ (xvii).
The fertility crisis that forms part of the backstory of the novel and tele-
vision show is explained as the punishment of American society by an angry 
God, and the women who— relatively speaking— are privileged and rewarded 
in the new regime, the groups I see as culpably complicit, are the ‘winners’ 
in the new regime’s management of fertility. The wives of the Commanders 
are promised babies as rewards for their loyalty, and are given ‘dominion’ 
over their households in exchange for their collaboration with a state that 
no longer permits them to read, to participate (openly) in political decision- 
making, or to work outside the home. They and their husbands enact some 
of the most emotionally devastating acts of linguistic violence in the Gilead 
story- universe: the namings (renamings) of the babies that the handmaids 
bear and hand over to the wives.14 Babies are given names by the women who 
bring them into the world (the handmaids who are impregnated through a 
process of ritualised rape), and then the wives, asserting possession, give the 
babies new names by which Gilead recognises them.
This presentation of ‘privileged femininity’ underscores the point that 
Connell and Messerschmidt make about hegemonic masculinities being, 
not a description of actual lived experiences, but models that ‘express wide-
spread ideals, fantasies, and desires’ (838). The Commanders’ wives are all 
presumed to have motherhood as their goal, a goal that, in circumstances of 
widespread infertility, the institution of the ‘handmaid’ role is designed to 
fulfil. They are also presumed to endorse norms of monogamy, thus the insti-
tution of the euphemistically named ‘ceremony,’ in which the Commander’s 
wife holds ‘her’ handmaid down during a ritualised monthly rape by the 
Commander during what has been identified as the handmaid’s window of 
fertility.
The other privileged group of women in Gilead, the aunts, are promised 
a limited access to authority: management of the handmaids who are forced 
to provide the wives with the promised babies. The aunts, who are per-
mitted to read and write in the course of their administrative duties, run 
the institutions that, drawing from biblical lore, are officially called Rachel 
and Leah Centers. Unofficially, these places where fertile women the regime 
has rounded up are held when not ‘assigned’ to a household are referred 
to as ‘the Red Centers,’ because the handmaids wear red, a colour that 
represents the blood of childbirth and, as Atwood notes, ‘is easier to see if 
you happen to be fleeing’ (xvii). Early in season 1 of the television show, 
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the handmaids’ duties were explained by Aunt Lydia to the handmaids- in- 
training at the Red Center through the biblical story of Rachel, the infertile 
wife of Jacob, who favoured her over his other wife— Rachel’s sister, Leah 
(episode 4:  ‘Nolite Te Bastardes Carborundorum’). ‘Give me children, or 
else I die,’ says Aunt Lydia, quoting the passage of Genesis in which Rachel 
demands of her husband that he impregnate her handmaid so that ‘she shall 
bear upon my knees [and] I  may have children through her’ (‘Nolite Te 
Bastardes Carborundorum’).15
The aunts are depicted as serving for a variety of reasons: some, Atwood 
tells us, are ‘true believers,’ others are ‘sadists’ or ‘opportunists’ (xvi).16 This 
too mirrors real life;
women will gang up on other women . . . will gladly take positions of 
power over other women, even— and, possibly, especially— in systems in 
which women as a whole have scant power: all power is relative, and in 
tough times any amount is seen as better than none.
(Atwood xvi)
There is a cynical power calculus on display in the conduct of the wives and 
aunts, implicitly acknowledged by Commander Waterford when he tells June/ 
Offred they were trying to build a better society: ‘Better never means better 
for everyone. It always means worse for some’ (‘Faithful’). For the some who 
participate in ‘better,’ that can be enough. At least in part, women’s failure to 
contest social institutionalisation of sexism and misogyny is a refusal: women 
who benefit from regimes that exploit other women have, as Atwood notes, 
a vested interest in disavowing gendered solidarity.17
In this same episode, we see also the other type of complicity that I want 
to analyse as germane to traditional gender scripts women are given:  the 
accommodation that many of us perform in the course of our lives simply 
to survive and/ or make life bearable. This is not accommodation that I want 
to name as blameworthy or grounds for condemnation of the women 
who make such choices; it is ‘complicity’ in a value- neutral sense, if that 
is possible. It is a ‘going along’ with the power structure, but it is the kind 
of going- along that is performed in circumstances where the woman has 
few options and is doing what she can to not harm or exploit others less 
powerful than she. The woman who is initially introduced to us as ‘Ofglen 
2’ (whose real name, Lillie, is revealed late in season 2) instructs June (who is 
herself ‘Offred 2’18) not to ‘mess this up’ for her, disclosing that, pre- Gilead, 
she ‘used to get fucked behind a dumpster just so [she] could buy a sixth 
of Oxy[contin] and a Happy Meal’ and now she has ‘a safe place to sleep 
every night and . . . people who are nice to [her]’ (‘Faithful’). Objectively, 
Ofglen 2’s life in Gilead is better than her previous existence as a homeless, 
drug- addicted prostitute, but even her willingness to accommodate herself 
to the new system has its limits: as events progress, she does get pushed to 
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her life. In her example, we see that, for some women, complicity, even with 
survival dangled as the reward, can become too high a price to pay.
The fertile women who are forced into the ritualised sex slavery justified 
by biblical Rachel’s exploitation of her own maid, Bihlah, only really have 
two options— submit or die; they are the population most ruthlessly driven 
to enact complicity- as- survival. Señora Castillo, the Mexican ambassador 
who visits the Waterford household as part of a trade delegation, asks June/ 
Offred, ‘Did you choose to be a handmaid?’ (episode 6: ‘A Woman’s Place’). 
One might argue that, of her severely limited options, yes, June did choose 
this— as a way of staying in Gilead and tracking down the daughter taken 
from her during her attempted escape at the outset of the story. But June 
herself later tells the ambassador, ‘I didn’t choose this. They caught me. I was 
trying to escape’ (‘A Woman’s Place’).
We are later introduced to less overtly brutal, but no less desperate, gambles 
on complicity made by the women who work as prostitutes in puritanical 
Gilead, the jezebels who staff the illicit nightclub/ hotel/ brothel that June/ 
Offred is smuggled into on multiple occasions (episode 8: ‘Jezebels’). These 
women— some of whom are former prostitutes who have transitioned to the 
new regime; others, former academics and professional career women— are 
described by the Commander as women who couldn’t assimilate (and presum-
ably preferred this fate to working the toxic wasteland of the colonies). ‘I’m 
told you can have quite a good conversation with some of them,’ Waterford 
tells June. Episode 8 (‘Jezebels’) closes with June listening to the music box 
with the little ballerina in it that had been given to her by Serena Joy, and 
vowing, ‘I will not be that girl in the box.’ And yet, throughout the show, she 
does, after multiple escape attempts, each time choose to put herself back into 
the box/ prison that is Gilead to find a way to get her daughter, Hannah, out 
too. So many of us choose life in a box, often for equally valid reasons.
Making the choice to stay isolated, in a box, in circumstances like the 
ones the handmaids, marthas, and jezebels find themselves in— serve or die— 
makes sense on an individual level. But, to return to the question I raised 
in a note in the previous chapter, it is hard to understand why women as 
a societal sub- population have not built supportive community spaces in 
response to widespread sexism and misogyny on the same scale at which we 
see racial, ethnic, and religious minorities building protections against hos-
tility and discrimination. There is the point that Atwood noted in discussion 
of what motivates Gilead’s aunts: the scramble for scraps of power, even at 
the expense of more powerless individuals. This, though, seems like both 
only a partial answer and an answer that substitutes description for explan-
ation. It does not explain why, to put the point in Simone de Beauvoir’s 
words, women fail to contest male sovereignty (7). ‘Proletarians say “we,” ’ 
Beauvoir tells us; ‘So do blacks’ (8). But, unlike these groups,
[w] omen— except in certain abstract gatherings such as conferences— 
do not use ‘we’; men say ‘women,’ and women adopt this word to refer 
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to [our]selves . . . [we] live dispersed among men, tied by homes, work, 
economic interests, and social conditions to certain men— fathers or 
husbands— more closely than to other women.
(8)
This analysis mirrors the one given by Adrienne Rich: we ‘have no past, 
no history, no religion of [our] own . . . no solidarity of labor or interests’ 
(Beauvoir 8). At the risk of seeming to offer a pat answer— for I do not think 
what I am saying here is at all a simple or easy solution— this seems to me to 
be the legacy of feminism, left by Second Wave radical feminists to the Third 
Wave of activism: to build solidarity in ways that women and girls can envi-
sion a welcoming community that makes space for each of us, in our indi-
viduality. If we consider the (re)building of social space as an ultimate goal 
of, for instance, movements to dismantle rape culture, we can see, I think, 
both the potential power and the enormous amount of work that lies before 
us in this global ‘me too’ moment; it can be— if we make it— a movement to 
transform our societies, and our consciousnesses.
Cultural anthropologist and queer theorist Gayle Rubin discusses this 
question of how women are taught to think about ourselves in her influ-
ential essay, ‘The Traffic in Women.’ Rubin grounds this part of her larger 
discussion in Freudian psychoanalysis which, she argues, is a powerful the-
oretical tool in our efforts to understand the gendered nature of human 
sexuality. She presents an account of Freud’s theory of sexuality in which 
‘the creation of “femininity” in women in the course of socialization is an 
act of psychic brutality,’ and argues that ‘it leaves in women an immense 
resentment of the suppression to which they were subjected’— an anger for 
which we have few outlets of expression (Rubin 196). ‘One can read Freud’s 
essays on femininity as descriptions of how a group is prepared psychologic-
ally, at a tender age, to live with its oppression,’ she asserts (Rubin 196). We 
are told the biological capacity some of us have for procreation is a destiny 
that all of us must fulfil, if we are to be ‘real women,’ and that this is what 
constitutes and justifies our subordination to men. We are given no resources 
to question this destiny, to resist it, or to replace it with something that 
an individual woman might feel suits her better.19 It is small wonder, then, 
that Rubin understands ‘[t] he psychoanalytic theory of femininity [as] one 
that sees female development based largely on pain and humiliation,’ and 
believes that ‘it takes some fancy footwork to explain why anyone ought to 
enjoy being a woman’ (197).
Trained into a sometimes painful and humiliating complicity with a cul-
tural and social framework that tells us either that we are unsuited for any-
thing else or that we will bitterly regret choosing lives that do not centre 
around having children, we are also raised to be purveyors of deception.20 
Beauvoir’s account of how girls are socially constructed into women points 
out that we are taught to hide our romantic and sexual attractions (to not be 
thought too eager or forward), to hide our emotions (to not be thought too 
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needy), to hide any desires we might have to lead or to run things (to not be 
thought too pushy), to hide any effort or burden that femininity places on us 
(to not be thought too artificial), to hide, even, evidence that we menstruate 
(342– 349, 369). All of this makes it difficult for a woman to live any life of 
integrity and self- awareness that is not oppositional and seen by others as 
deviant. But, as I observed in my introduction to this book, living in a state 
of conflict and alienation is a painful experience: it deprives us of our psy-
chological need for validation from others. Compared to the prospect of a 
constant fight to articulate your own view of yourself as a distinct individual 
in a world that tells you that you are (or should be) just like every other 
woman— look at her, she’s happy; what’s the matter with you?— living in a 
box starts to look almost easy.
Sara Ahmed’s meditations on living a feminist life similarly position com-
plicity as a kind of exhaustion or unwillingness to endure alienation. ‘These 
are complicated scenarios,’ she says:
you can receive some benefits by adapting yourself to a system that is, at 
another level, compromising your capacity to inhabit a world on more 
equal terms. . . . for many women, becoming willing to participate in sexist 
culture is a compromise, even if it is not registered as such, because we 
have been taught (from past experience, from what we come up against) 
that being unwilling to participate can be dangerous. You risk becoming 
alienated from all of the existing structures that enable survival.
(Ahmed 36)
The failure or refusal to even see or name the sexism and misogyny that is 
widespread in most of the world’s cultures, let alone build independent com-
munities of support that could give us refuge from those phenomena, can be 
explained as occurring because ‘resistance to recognizing something might 
be a way of coping with or living with that thing’ (Ahmed 36). It is not 
always, perhaps not even often, a case of failing to care about our own well- 
being or that of the other women in our lives; I think of The Handmaid’s 
Tale’s Serena Joy when I read Ahmed’s observation about women who do 
society’s work of policing other women: they ‘become the rod as a way of 
avoiding the consequences of being beaten’ (158).21 Perhaps because (most) 
women have, throughout history, been shut out of power so thoroughly that 
we have not developed the trappings or the habits of self- sufficiency, it is 
harder than we suppose it ought to be to separate the sadistic aunts Atwood 
spoke of from the colonised wives and mothers and the cowed handmaids. 
Ahmed speaks of the unwillingness to be disruptive— to be the figure she 
labels ‘the feminist killjoy’— as a kind of fragility, and connects accommo-
dation to self- preservation. ‘We might . . . decide not to become a killjoy in 
certain moments, because the costs would be too high,’ she speculates; ‘we 
would break what we need to hold on to, a relationship that we care about, 
a person we love, a world we cannot let go of . . .’ (Ahmed 171).
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On not being a princess: Little Red Riding Hood, and other 
paths through the woods
‘We have been stalled in a maze of false dichotomies,’ Adrienne Rich tells 
us (659). She concludes her analysis in ‘Compulsory Heterosexuality and 
Lesbian Existence’ with the observation that:
[T] he absence of choice remains the great unacknowledged reality, and 
in the absence of choice, women will remain dependent upon the chance 
or luck of particular relationships and will have no collective power 
to determine the meaning and place of sexuality in [our] lives. As we 
address the institution [of heterosexuality] itself, moreover, we begin 
to perceive a history of female resistance which has never fully under-
stood itself because it has been so fragmented, miscalled, erased. It will 
require a courageous grasp of the politics and economics, as well as the 
cultural propaganda, of heterosexuality to carry us beyond individual 
cases or diversified group situations into the complex kind of overview 
needed to undo the power men everywhere wield over women, power 
which has become a model for every other form of exploitation and 
illegitimate control.
(Rich 659– 660)
It is worth quoting her concluding comments at such length because they 
give us an overview of the challenges we face in the project of creating other 
paths through the enchanted woods that is our social world— ‘enchanted’ 
because we see and interact with gender roles that are distortions of the 
complexity and diversity of individual human beings. We can all be more 
than the aspirations that have been inculcated in us through fairy tales and 
other cultural propaganda. Part of what we will need, as we map out these 
other paths possible to us, is a rethinking of the social relations I have been 
describing in this chapter, a rethinking that brings an end to the world in 
which masculinity is the defining feature of those who rule and femininity is 
the defining feature of those who submit.
Articulating life paths beyond the corrosive power relations of domin-
ance and submission is the project of a lot of contemporary feminist theory 
and adjacent ethics scholarship. A  world without dominance is, in fact, 
another point of convergence between feminist theory and peace studies; 
as a manifestation of cultural violence, assertion of dominance is one of 
the behaviours that theorisation of nonviolence is widely concerned to con-
test. Australian masculinity theorist Rob Cover, drawing on Connell’s work 
on masculinities and on American philosopher and gender theorist Judith 
Butler’s ethics of nonviolence, identifies vulnerability as the ground of the 
Butlerian ethics that asserts itself against dominance and submission:  we 
all inhabit bodies that are exposed to the world and each other in ways 
that make us easily harmed, make our lives precarious, and we are all also 
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dependent upon others for the conditions in which we can sustain our lives 
(Cover 442; Butler 31– 32, 43– 46). Because vulnerability is part of our shared 
human experience, ‘we are compelled to engage with others in ways which 
are responsible and responsive to that vulnerability; that is, in relations of 
non- violence,’ asserts Cover (442).
Extending Butler’s articulation of vulnerability into a discussion of 
sexual ethics, he tells us that ‘the capacity to recognise vulnerability of 
the other through vulnerability of the self is a way of thinking about eth-
ical relationships’ (Cover 436). In the context of his discussion of how 
‘hypermasculine’ men (high- performing team- sport athletes) relate to 
women, ethical sexual behaviour, and sexual violence, development of this 
capacity is a way of challenging the sense of inviolability that is often part of 
masculine identities. But I think his formulation of the Butlerian ethic of vul-
nerability is also useful in shedding light on the power of ‘me too’ as a way 
for women to respond to each other as we grapple with the politics, eco-
nomics, and cultural propaganda Rich has dissected for us. ‘Me too’ is a way 
of recognising my own vulnerability when I am confronted with your story, 
and seeing your vulnerability through seeing my own. It is not a solution in 
itself, not a panacea, but it is a first step on a path to a world in which we 
all have more choices, more autonomy, and more compassion for the ways 
in which the jagged edges of our world have wounded, even broken, some 
of us. This empathy expansion is part of what I understand Sara Ahmed to 
be drawing our attention to when she says, in her discussion of feminists’ 
fragility in a hostile world, that ‘[p] erhaps feminism is how we pick up the 
pieces’ (171).
‘To be engaged in the creation of a world for women is to transform 
what it means to be women,’ Ahmed says (224). She contends that ‘[t] he 
history of woman is impossible to disentangle from the history of wife: the 
female human [is presented] not only as in relation to man but as for man’ 
(Ahmed 224, emphasis added). Writing, like Rich, from a lesbian- feminist 
standpoint, Ahmed’s mapping of a new path for social relations, a way of 
being in a world that is not populated by princes and princesses, is a vision 
of a woman- centred, woman- identified world. ‘Woman identification,’ she 
explains, ‘. . . is about refusing as women to identify with male culture. 
To refuse to identify is to withdraw your own energy from relationships 
to men’ (Ahmed 226). Amplifying the call Rich makes in ‘Compulsory 
Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence’ for women to reorient our capacities 
for love and care away from men and towards other women— encapsulated 
in Rich’s use of the term ‘lesbian continuum’— Ahmed crafts her own call 
‘not as taking the sex out of lesbianism (by putting friendships between 
women on the same continuum with sexual relationships) but as a call to 
redirect our attention’ (227). ‘To attend to women, we have to unlearn how 
we have learned to screen women out,’ she says (Ahmed 227).
I want to acknowledge that there is indeed an uncritical way that hetero-
sexual feminists can approach Rich’s concept of the lesbian continuum that 
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Ahmed rightly calls out in her rejection of putting women’s friendships on 
the same plane with women’s sexual relationships; it can trivialise the sexual 
orientation of some women to our own sex, and can erase the political and 
ethical implications of that orientation, themselves an important strand of 
at least some lesbian feminism. I hope I am not committing that error. What 
I want to hypothesise as possible, however, in the creation of a more woman- 
oriented world, is space— not co- identical with, but linked to, the space Rich 
and Ahmed are carving out— a space for a ‘me too’ solidarity among het-
erosexual and lesbian women. I  am conscious of the troubled history that 
mainstream strands of feminism (‘white liberal feminism’) have produced in 
this regard: lesbian feminism has been both erased and colonised at different 
points in feminism’s cultural evolution in both the United States and Canada, 
for example. But there is a sharedness of women’s experiences with patri-
archy that is broader than an uncritical claim to ‘sameness,’ and it is in this 
sharedness that I position my hopes for an attending to women, an unlearning 
of our screening out of women, that can include heterosexual women who are 
willing to learn ethically and politically from the insights of lesbian feminism. 
After all, as Ahmed notes, ‘[e] ven to withdraw your energy from relationships 
to men will then be pathologized as hatred of men’ (226). She follows this 
observation with the comment that ‘[t]his is why the lesbian appears so regu-
larly as a man hater’ (Ahmed 226), but the fact is that heterosexual women 
too are commonly accused of hating men if we live self- sufficiently and show 
any overt commitment to mentoring and economically supporting other 
women as a matter of political principle (for instance, deliberately choosing to 
patronise woman- owned businesses or work with female professionals wher-
ever possible). Perhaps our paths through the woods will necessarily diverge 
at some points, but we do have some grounds for common cause.22
One point of divergence in the project of building a world more hos-
pitable to women can be identified by drawing American feminist essayist 
Rebecca Solnit’s work into this discussion. Solnit’s 2014 book Men Explain 
Things to Me had been on my reading list ever since the word ‘mansplaining’ 
was coined from its title, and when I finally turned to it as a resource for 
this book, I was struck by— not surprised, exactly, but keenly appreciative 
of— the fact that two of the high- profile rape incidents that had drawn me 
into thinking and writing about rape culture— the Delhi bus rape and the 
Steubenville High School rape— had also had a galvanising effect on her 
writing about gender relations. Her views about men, women, patriarchy, 
and feminism resonate with my own; notably, we are both committed to the 
view that patriarchy, as an ideology of male dominance, needs to be clearly 
delineated from men as a population, all of whom are harmed in some ways 
by patriarchy— even those few who benefit— and many of whom are allies 
in feminist struggle. Solnit herself notes that ‘[g]ay men and lesbians have 
already opened up the question of what qualities and roles are male and 
female in ways that can be liberating for straight people’ (58), and both of us 
acknowledge our own good fortune in having kind, principled, loving men in 
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our lives. So, while it arguably makes sense for lesbian feminists to commit 
themselves to what Ahmed labels ‘woman identification,’ perhaps even up 
to and including withdrawing from relationships with men (Ahmed 226),23 
for heterosexual feminists it is important, I  think, to make the distinction 
between ‘male culture’ and men.
‘Women’s liberation has often been portrayed as a movement intent on 
encroaching upon or taking power and privilege away from men,’ Solnit 
observes, ‘as though in some dismal zero- sum game, only one gender at a 
time could be free and powerful’ (35). ‘But,’ she continues,
we are free together or slaves together. Surely the mindset of those who 
think they need to win, to dominate, to punish, to reign supreme must 
be terrible and far from free, and giving up this unachievable pursuit 
would be liberatory.
(Solnit 35)
This liberation, for all of us as individual human beings, could be a sharing 
of social power, not the role reversal that anti- feminists depict: the implaus-
ible dystopia in which women would rule over men and expect the same 
submission from them that patriarchy has historically demanded of us. The 
power sharing that Solnit describes as feminism’s ideal would need to be ‘a 
happy medium between these poles to which the genders have been pushed, 
a warm equatorial belt of give and take where we should all meet’ (5). This 
is a vision of the world in which men and women are all acknowledged as 
bearers of human rights, in equal measure— rights that confer respect, rec-
ognition, and full participation in public life (Solnit 14). Fighting misogyny, 
patriarchy, and rape culture does not demonise men— at least, it should not, 
if we are fighting on the ground of basic human rights. To assume that men 
will be harmed by a social movement for gender equality is to endorse a very 
dim view of men, and what a healthy masculinity is (or could be).
The need to think more deeply and carefully about healthy identities for 
men and boys is increasingly a feature of Anglophone feminist discourses 
about misogyny. Solnit’s take on the matter is that
[t] here’s something about how masculinity is imagined, about what’s 
praised and encouraged, about the way violence is passed on to boys 
that needs to be addressed . . . Kindness and gentleness never had a 
gender, and neither did empathy.
(34)
Jessica Valenti, similarly, points out the multiple ways in which denials of 
misogyny, patriarchy, and rape culture don’t just endanger girls and women; 
they short- change boys and men. We are, she says:
failing to raise them to believe they can be men without inflicting pain 
on others, failing to teach them that they are not entitled to women’s 
 
Toxic masculinity and complicit femininity 89
sexual attention and failing to allow them an outlet for understandable 
human fear and foibles that will not label them ‘weak’ or unworthy. Not 
every attack [on women] is preventable, but the misogyny that drives 
them is.
(Valenti)
This attention to the ways that misogyny is produced through how boys are 
(inadequately) taught to be men demonstrates the need for comprehensive 
dismantling of patriarchal social structures. We need to be building more 
than a climate of respect and egalitarianism in sexual interaction; body 
image, media representation, workplace equality, and parenting (versus 
mothering and fathering) all contribute to ethical orientations that allow 
each of us to see and accept that who we are to each other, as individuals, has 
been shaped by our gender identities, but is not reducible to the very rigid 
gender scripts we have inherited. We need to be pushing back against patri-
archal expectations by, among other things, challenging the stigma of being 
a sexual assault survivor; telling stories of trauma and survival; being willing 
to have vulnerable, emotionally revealing conversations (in itself an act of 
resistance to rape culture, which doesn’t know what to do with emotion 
other than to mock it as weakness); celebrating mutuality; and disrupting 
traditional gender roles through affirming the value of strong women, kind 
men, and whole people. Each of these things is being advanced in ‘me too’ 
discourses that I will be looking at in the chapters that follow, and all of 
them, taken together, are capable of bringing us to a deeper understanding 
of the gendered violence of our world. It is, in Solnit’s words, a matter of 
‘look[ing] at the abuse of power as a whole rather than treating domestic 
violence separately from rape and murder and harassment and intimidation, 
online and at home and in the workplace and in the streets’ (14).
As paradoxical as it might seem to some, it is crucially important to 
the cause of gender equality that we notice gender, as opposed to trying to 
build out our social systems as ‘gender neutral.’24 Feminist peace studies the-
orist Betty Reardon observes that ‘for both boys and girls the first socially 
encountered other, a person they perceive as being different from them-
selves, is usually of the other sex’ (7). We learn early to see gender identities 
as differences, and to believe that these differences are naturally occurring, 
totalising in the characteristics they produce, and unbridgeable; many of us 
spend our entire lives acting on those lessons and beliefs. Yet, as legal scholar 
Martha Minow has theorised, what she calls ‘the dilemma of difference’— 
what differences matter, in what contexts, and for what reasons— is only 
really a dilemma because of ‘powerful unstated assumptions about whose 
point of view matters, and about what is given and what is mutable in the 
world’ (13).
First among the assumptions she names that I  think trip us up in 
thinking about gender is the view ‘that “differences” are intrinsic, rather 
than viewing them as expressions of comparisons between people’ (Minow 
32); that is, difference, as a concept, is relational in ways we habitually 
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fail to appreciate. This is a point that Catharine MacKinnon makes too, 
in Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law: to say that women 
are different from men says as much about who/ what men are as it does 
about who/ what women are (37). Second, ‘typically we adopt an unstated 
point of reference when assessing others’ (Minow 32), a view that some of 
us, as subjects (persons), are marked by descriptions of our race or gender 
or other relevant ‘differences,’ whereas others are ‘unmarked subjects’ who 
provide the point of reference and therefore need no qualifying descriptors. 
These ‘unmarked subjects’ are the ‘norm’ against whom all others are judged 
as persons whose personhood might be contested and needs to be asserted 
to be accepted. In a world structured by Western hegemony, this norm is 
the straight, white, able- bodied cis- gender male human being whose human 
rights do not get called into question by his clothing, his drinking habits, or 
his past decisions about whom he socialises with and how.
Finally, when we add ‘an assumption that the existing social and eco-
nomic arrangements are natural and neutral’ (Minow 33), we end up with 
a rhetorical universe in which people who are ‘different’ are demanding 
that the world be recreated to fit their/ our ‘special needs.’ For those who 
assume that the status quo is the way it is because of a social contract to 
which all parties had previously consented, our justice claims look like a 
wilful disregard of neutrality and freely chosen social relations. Rape cul-
ture looks like a trumped- up accusation by wilful and vengeful women 
who are trying to take from men the power and status they have earned. 
Identifying each of these assumptions and mapping them onto a world that 
has been constructed out of millennia of male dominance shows us how 
men’s authority entitlement and sexual entitlement continue to function in 
the present, and could reasonably continue to function in a gender- neutral 
future (one that refuses, in its studied neutrality, to recognise the role of 
gender in producing privilege or marginalisation). We can only arrive 
into a more gender- equal future by naming and addressing the existing 
inequalities— for instance, the way that #YesAllWomen are at risk of vio-
lence from #NotAllMen. And, of course, we need better stories to guide our 
path to this better future. Chanel Miller gives us a snapshot of a ‘counter- 
script’ for masculinity when she speaks of the Swedish graduate students 
who rescued her from Brock Turner’s assault:
I learned that before they had chased Brock, they had checked on me. 
Masculinity is often defined by physicality, but that initial kneeling is 
as powerful as the leg sweep, the tackling. Masculinity is found in the 
vulnerability, the crying.
(123)
The ways in which Minow’s analysis of unstated assumptions reveals 
power relations that have been congealed in our everyday habits of thought 
parallel the critique of power and knowledge that Gayatri Chakravorty 
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Spivak weaves into her landmark essay that I referenced at the beginning of 
this chapter, ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’ Spivak, one of the most influential 
voices in postcolonial thought, explores the role of power in constructing 
knowledge: the legitimisation of some perspectives as purveyors of know-
ledge (the colonising Europeans), and the subjugation of others (the colonised 
populations of the Third World/ Global South). ‘It is well known,’ she says, 
‘that [in his book, Madness and Civilization, French philosopher Michel] 
Foucault locates epistemic violence, a complete overhaul of the episteme, 
in the redefinition of sanity at the end of the European eighteenth century’ 
(76). ‘But what if that particular redefinition was only a part of the narrative 
of history in Europe as well as in the colonies?’ she asks; ‘What if the two 
projects of epistemic overhaul worked as dislocated and unacknowledged 
parts of a vast two- handed engine?’ (Spivak 76). The marginalisation of the 
‘other’ (the subaltern) in relation to the unmarked subject is effected in part 
through what Foucault is calling epistemic violence: what we speak is not 
considered knowledge; we are therefore effectively epistemically voiceless, 
unable to speak.
What is suggested to me by Spivak’s figure of the vast two- handed engine 
chewing up the diverse array of things that might previously have counted as 
knowledge in order to spit back at all of us the coloniser’s point of view as 
the knowledge is that the condition of possibility for any reclamation of our 
own speech/ knowledge is recognition of the normativisation processes of 
(privileged/ powerful) men’s knowledge. We have to see how they set them-
selves up as the epistemic standard to have any hope that we can learn how 
to speak back to their knowledge, against their knowledge. And we have to 
challenge that standard. ‘Language is power,’ Solnit tells us;
You can use the power of words to bury meaning or to excavate it. If 
you lack words for a phenomenon, an emotion, a situation, you can’t 
talk about it, which means that you can’t come together to address it, 
let alone change it.
(129)
This is why it is so important that we have words like ‘mansplaining,’ words 
that allow people to name, and begin to understand, the problems they are 
wrestling with. The fairy- tale equivalent here would be the questions that 
Little Red Riding Hood poses to her grandmother- wolf— what big ears you 
have? what big teeth you have?— questions that help her identify the dangers 
of the situation she finds herself in. And this is why the two little words ‘me 
too’ have such potential; as I  noted earlier, they name the sharedness of 
experience that can point us towards how to understand— and therefore, 
how to dismantle— the complex exercise of power that rape culture exerts 
over women.
In her concluding essay of Men Explain Things to Me, Rebecca Solnit 
opines that, ‘the future of something we may no longer call feminism must 
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include a deeper inquiry into men’ (150). ‘Feminism sought and seeks to 
change the whole human world,’ she argues;
many men are on board with the project, but how it benefits men, and 
in what ways the status quo damages men as well, could bear far more 
thought. As could an inquiry into the men perpetrating most of the vio-
lence, the threats, the hatred— the riot squad of the volunteer police 
force— and the culture that encourages them.
(150)
When she wrote these words in 2014, she finished the passage with the 
tantalising thought that perhaps this process was already underway. I think 
the way that ‘me too’ discourses have taken hold of the popular imagin-
ation in many countries shows that she is correct in that assessment— and 
gives further credence to her positioning of feminism as, to use a phrase she 
borrows from geology and biology, a ‘punctuated equilibrium’:  ‘a pattern 
of change that involves slow, quiet periods of relative stasis interrupted by 
turbulent intervals’ (Solnit 133).
I think too that her prediction that the movement we now call feminism 
might develop in the future under a new label is prescient. I was living in 
Canada in 2005 when the laws about marriage changed, and marriage 
became a union of two adult persons instead of a union between a man and 
a woman. Then, in 2006, I moved to the United States to take up my first 
appointment as a university professor and I was living there, ten years later, 
in 2015, when that country’s marriage laws also changed. Solnit is right 
that language is power; for most of the time that I was paying attention to 
the campaigns in both countries to change marriage laws, the thing that 
was being fought for was called ‘same- sex marriage,’ and I remember the 
moment when I knew that the change in US law was going to happen. It 
was the point at which I realised the news I was reading and hearing was 
no longer speaking of same- sex marriage and was now referring instead to 
‘marriage equality.’ Over the years that I have been teaching gender studies, 
I have encountered many students who understand that, as Solnit puts the 
point, ‘feminism is not a scheme to deprive men but a campaign to liberate 
us all’ (153), but have objected to the label, sometimes suggesting that 
‘humanism’ (a term with a history all its own) would be a better name. 
I suspect we will know that we are beyond the patriarchal world of princes 
and princesses when we find ourselves, at some future point, speaking not 
of the ideology of feminism but of the widely accepted principle of gender 
equality. In order to get to that future point of human social evolution, how-
ever, we need to stop accommodating ourselves to patriarchy and instead 
commit ourselves to undermining it— using subversion strategies that I dis-
cuss in Chapter 5 as ‘culture- jamming’— so that it crumbles into an irrele-
vant, impotent, discredited idea that will no longer have the power to fuel 
rape culture.
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Coda: culture- jamming Snow White’s gender roles
What’s wrong with this story? Snow White escapes the circumstances in 
which she has been pitted against another woman in a competition over 
which of them most successfully conforms to society’s beauty norms, only to 
end up playing the role of mother- substitute to the seven dwarves who give 
her shelter. She has the potential to be more than her pretty face and more 
than her ability to do endless domestic chores and unceasing emotional 
labour. What she needs is the freedom to rethink everything she has been 
taught about women’s roles in life, and find a life- path that works for her.
What if the story unfolded this way instead?
Once upon a time, there was a young princess who lived in a palace with her 
vain, appearance- obsessed stepmother, the queen. It wasn’t really the queen’s 
fault that she was so concerned with her looks; she lived in a world where 
that was just how women were evaluated, and it was her looks that had 
brought her to the attention of the now- deceased king who had transformed 
her from commoner to queen. The princess, Snow White, knew all that, and 
felt quite a bit of sympathy for her stepmother, who— if she was lucky— was 
going to age and, because of social beliefs the kingdom had about women, 
would be seen by her society— and sadly, herself— as less worthwhile as she 
became less conventionally beautiful. Snow White also knew that many 
people thought she resembled her own mother, who herself had been a great 
beauty when she was still alive.
As she grew up, Snow White became more concerned that her stepmother 
was beginning to see her as a rival in this attractiveness competition she 
didn’t even want to be part of. This belief the queen had, that beauty and 
value were the same thing, was depriving Snow White of the only family 
she had, and, as the queen’s jealousy and competitiveness grew, was making 
Snow White fearful for her safety. She tried to downplay her looks, and she 
tried to avoid her stepmother, but nothing seemed to diminish the queen’s 
growing paranoia that her stepdaughter would become more beautiful than 
she. It was all quite ridiculous really, in Snow White’s mind; her stepmother 
was so invested in being attractive to men, but she showed no interest in 
any particular man. She just had this compulsive need to be adored and 
admired— not for actual accomplishments, but for her looks. It was funny, 
and sad, and increasingly dangerous. Snow White knew she had to leave 
before things progressed to the point that she would no longer be able to 
convince the queen that she wasn’t a threat.
Her birthday was approaching and she would be coming of an age when 
the princes of neighbouring kingdoms would start seeking to ally their 
kingdoms with hers through marriage. That was a bit repulsive too, Snow 
White thought; it made her feel like a commodity, there for other people to 
judge and to use. It wasn’t just that she was repelled by all of the very serious 
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discussion at court about how good a marriage she could make by using her 
beauty and the wealth of the lands she would bring with her; the princes 
who had started to visit were pompous, and shallow, and boring. All they 
talked about was their wealth and her beauty. Her real distaste for the idea, 
though, was her fear that she would lose her sense of herself as a person, 
that she would turn into the kind of woman her stepmother was: needy of 
reassurance about her beauty and dependent on male adoration. She just 
couldn’t live that life, which meant she just couldn’t stay.
So, early one morning, she set out from the palace, with no particular 
destination in mind. She had her warmest cloak and her sturdiest boots, the 
horse who had been her constant companion from the time she was a foal, 
and, tucked safely into her saddlebags, some food she had scavenged from 
the kitchen, a few coins, and the contents of her jewellery box. As she rode, 
she realised that she hadn’t really planned her escape into her new life very 
well. She had known for a while now that she was going to have to leave, 
but because she had been reluctant to acknowledge the necessity, she hadn’t 
gathered any of the life skills that would come in handy. As night fell, she 
was getting tired and would have liked to stop and rest by a fire, but she 
didn’t know how to make one.
That first night was miserable; she rode slowly, letting the horse con-
serve her energy, but they were both tired. By the end of the second day, 
Snow White’s food had run out. There was plenty of grass for her horse, 
and water for them both, but Snow White couldn’t eat grass. If only she 
had gotten one of the groundskeepers at the palace to teach her how to 
hunt, she thought. But it wouldn’t have done any good; she didn’t know 
how to make the fire she would have needed to cook anything she might 
have caught. If only she had paid more attention to what the kitchen staff 
had said about the mushrooms and berries in the woods. Surely some of 
them were edible; she just didn’t know which ones. Maybe by the next day 
she would be far enough away from the palace to risk stopping at an inn 
for food, she thought. She would have to be careful that no one recognised 
her; it had been bad enough being the compliant and obedient ever- more- 
beautiful princess in the queen’s palace, but it would be intolerable if she 
were returned to the queen as a rebellious runaway. She’d put me in the 
dungeon, for sure, mused the no- longer princess.
As darkness fell, she saw a faint light coming through the trees lining 
the wooded side- road she and her horse were travelling. A house? Maybe 
a house with a bit of food to spare in exchange for a coin? She was hungry 
enough to dismount and lead her horse quietly through the woods to inves-
tigate. It was a house, a small house, a cottage. She tied the horse’s reins to 
a tree, fished a coin out of one of the saddlebags and approached the door, 
willing her stomach to not embarrass her with its very unladylike growls of 
hunger. Just as she was screwing up the courage to knock, the door opened 
and a slight figure exiting in a hurry bumped into her. Snow White had spent 
her life as a child in the company of adults, and even as she approached her 
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own adulthood, she was not what you would call tall. It was an uncommon 
experience for her to tower over anyone. Well, not tower exactly, but the 
figure who had just bumped into her only came to her shoulder.
Mutual apologies out of the way, the slight figure introduced himself 
(herself? Snow White wasn’t sure and didn’t want to be rude) as Bashful. 
Jokingly, Snow White introduced herself as Hungry, and asked if the house-
hold had any food they would exchange for a coin. Grinning in appreciation 
of the joke, Bashful invited her in and introduced her to the others: Doc, 
Happy, Sneezy, . . . Snow White wasn’t sure she’d be able to keep their names 
straight. One of them— Dopey, maybe? or was that Bashful again?— got a 
bowl out of a cupboard and served up some game stew with bread. It was 
delicious, the tastiest meal Snow White had eaten in recent memory. When 
she was finished, she thanked them all for their hospitality and offered her 
coin, but they refused to take it. ‘There must be some way I can repay you?’ 
she asked. ‘You could do the dishes,’ one said irascibly . . . ah yes, that would 
be Grumpy. Her memory was better now that her stomach was full. ‘It’d 
be nice to have a real girl looking after things in the kitchen,’ he continued; 
‘Bashful usually does that work but he’s not even that good at being a girl.’ 
Snow White had never washed dishes before, but it seemed like a fair trade 
and she muddled through well enough. (Bashful hovered near her elbow, 
helpfully offering tips in a way that made clear he was used to doing this 
household work for the other men, dwarves, they had called themselves.)
Sleepy yawned, and the other dwarves started to prepare for bed. Snow 
White rose to leave, and Doc, who seemed clearly to be the head of the 
household, asked her where she was intending to spend the night. ‘My horse 
is tied up outside,’ she explained; ‘we’ll just make our way back to the road 
and keep travelling.’ The dwarves would not hear of that plan, insisting 
that she stay the night. ‘You can sleep on the floor,’ Grumpy said. ‘The fire 
will keep you warm,’ Happy observed. ‘You can have my blanket,’ Bashful 
offered, blushing furiously. ‘Oh, that’s not necessary,’ Snow White insisted. 
‘I’ll go unsaddle my horse and I can use the saddle blanket.’ That night was 
the first time she had ever slept on a floor; it wasn’t terribly comfortable, but 
Happy was right about the fire keeping her warm.
When she woke the next morning, the cottage was quiet and seemingly 
empty. Someone had tended the fire as she slept and it was now giving off 
too much heat for her to stay so close to it while wrapped in such a warm 
blanket. As she stretched, the door of the cottage once again opened unex-
pectedly and this time a slight figure entered: Bashful, again. ‘The guys are 
off to work in the mines,’ he explained. ‘I hate going down into them every 
day so I  volunteered to stay home and keep you company; Grumpy was 
convinced you’d rob us blind if we left you alone.’ ‘I would not!’ Snow White 
stoutly insisted. ‘I know,’ said Bashful. ‘I don’t need money,’ she explained; 
‘I’m the princess.’ ‘I know,’ said Bashful; ‘I recognised you because you’re 
so beautiful.’ Snow White sighed heavily. ‘I wish I weren’t. If I were plainer, 
maybe I would have been able to stay at home in the palace, and not have 
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had to run away like I  had done something wrong.’ The next thing she 
knew, she was pouring her heart out to the sympathetic dwarf, telling him 
all about her jealous stepmother, and the mirror she was always staring into 
and muttering at, and the suitors, and how much she hated being treated 
like a side of well- marbled beef, and how she just was not going to live like 
that anymore.
Bashful listened with a wistful expression:  ‘you’re brave, and I  wish 
I  could do what you’re doing,’ he finally said. ‘Remember how I  almost 
knocked you over last night?’ he asked. She nodded. ‘I was desperate to get 
away from them after dinner last night,’ he explained; ‘they had been teasing 
me again because I don’t like the mines and prefer to spend my time here by 
myself, taking care of the cottage. I’m by myself a lot of time,’ he continued. 
‘I just don’t feel all that comfortable around the other guys— I’m different, 
and they don’t seem to realise that they’re teasing me for something I can’t 
help, but I do.’ He told Snow White how much he dreamed of going away, 
living a different life, being a different self. ‘I like your self,’ she said, ‘and 
you don’t seem uncomfortable around me.’ ‘No, you’re like me,’ Bashful 
agreed, ‘— you’re different too. Only, maybe different in a different way. The 
other dwarves expect me to be a guy like them, and I look like I am, but 
I don’t feel like I am. Inside, I feel . . . different. Like, not a guy.’ ‘I’m not a 
guy, either,’ Snow White agreed, ‘but I’m also not much of a girl, not by other 
people’s standards. I don’t want to be beautiful, I don’t want to get married, 
I don’t want to have babies, I don’t want to run a household where I take 
care of everyone and slowly fade into invisibility until I’m nothing more 
than an appliance.’
‘So what do you want to do?’ Bashful asked. ‘I don’t know,’ Snow White 
answered. ‘That’s why I need to leave the kingdom. I need to go someplace 
where these expectations about what I’m going to do, and think, and look 
like, just because I’m a girl, aren’t thrown in my way all the time, some place 
where I can stretch out and breathe, and think for myself about what kind 
of person I want to be and what kind of life I want to live.’ ‘That sounds 
amaaaazing,’ Bashful said, a little bit dreamily and a little bit mournfully; ‘I 
wish I could go to that place too.’ ‘You could come with me,’ Snow White 
offered; ‘we could go together.’
Notes
 1 The ‘unwomen’ are those who, because they are not valuable to the state in any 
other way, have been sent to ‘the colonies’ to clear, and presumably reclaim, 
land that has been contaminated by industrial pollution and nuclear disasters. 
This is a slow death sentence that, like the quicker death sentences of hanging 
and stoning, is deployed as a threat to keep the valuable women in line. The 
resonances of the original novel and the early seasons of the television show to 
the exploitation and abuses of power that are being articulated under the ‘me 
too’ umbrella are coincidental— the novel was published in 1985; the television 
show was commissioned in 2016, and two seasons were ordered before any of the 
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reporting or social media that brought #metoo to popular awareness. (Season 1 
was both filmed and released in the pre- ’me too’ era; season 2 was filmed contem-
poraneously with the first ‘me too’ allegations in the United States; and Atwood’s 
sequel and subsequent seasons of the show were all released into a cultural con-
text infused with ‘me too’ discourses.) But, as Atwood observes in an introduc-
tion for a (pre- ’me too’) February 2017 reissue of her novel, she wrote imbued 
with a commitment to ‘not put any events into the book that had not already 
happened’ (xiv). ‘So many different strands fed into The Handmaid’s Tale— 
group executions, sumptuary laws, book- burnings, the Lebensborn program of 
the SS and the child- stealing of the Argentinian generals, the history of slavery, 
the history of American polygamy . . .’ (Atwood xviii). Gilead is ‘anti- prediction,’ 
created by Atwood in the hope that it will not come true (xviii), but in themes 
and attitudes, it is a world that is a searing, albeit highly stylised and dramatised, 
account of many women’s lives.
 2 The APA report defines ‘traditional masculinity ideology’ as ‘the dominant 
(referred to as “hegemonic”) form of masculinity that strongly influences what 
members of a culture take to be normative’ (6), and defines ‘gender role strain’ 
and ‘gender role conflict’ as, respectively, ‘a psychological situation in which 
gender role demands have negative consequences on the individual or others’ 
(2) and ‘problems resulting from adherence to “rigid, sexist, or restrictive gender 
roles . . . that result in personal restriction, devaluation, or violation of others or 
self” ’ (3). The guidelines outlined in the report have as their goal ‘enhanc[ing] 
gender- and culture- sensitive psychological practice with boys and men from 
diverse backgrounds in the United States’ (2), so they are necessarily culture- 
specific. Similarly, Connell’s hegemonic masculinity is historically specific; 
‘gender relations [a] re historical, so gender hierarchies [a]re subject to change’ 
(Connell and Messerschmidt 832).
 3 Even in non- Abrahamic traditions— Greek and Roman mythology, the Hindu 
pantheon, and less personified belief structures like Buddhism and Shintoism— 
we find patriarchal figures that command a level of obedience and assert an 
authority reminiscent of God the Father.
 4 ‘Orientalism’ is the term coined by Palestinian- American cultural theorist 
Edward Said to describe the European and American (‘Western’) racism that 
variously disparages and romanticises ‘Eastern’ cultures by depicting them as 
unchanging, decadent, mysterious, and populated by men and (stereotypically, 
veiled) women whose thoughts and values are ‘other,’ always foreign and (sup-
posedly) largely incompatible with Western liberalism, modernism, and human 
rights.
 5 Spivak makes the point that sati, the practice of a Hindu widow throwing herself 
on her dead husband’s funeral pyre, ‘was not practiced universally and was not 
caste- or class- fixed’ (93). As her careful analysis makes clear, sati was also not 
well- understood by the British would- be rescuers of Indian women.
 6 ‘Doxxing’ is the practice of publishing personal identifying information about 
individuals— in these cases, home addresses and telephone numbers— on the 
internet so that strangers can threaten that individual’s sense of privacy and 
personal safety. It is direct violence on the part of the individuals who post and 
share this information, but it is structural violence insofar as platforms like 
Twitter are designed and maintained in ways that make consequence- free trans-
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online misogynists over the safety and security of the women they are targeting 
is cultural violence.
 7 One of the most surprising things, for me, about Chanel Miller’s 2019 memoir 
of rebuilding her life after being sexually assaulted by Brock Turner was the 
discovery that there was an actual link in her lived experience between Rodger 
and Turner. I had associated them, in my mind and in early sketches of this dis-
cussion, only as similar tokens of a type— the sexually entitled American college 
student— but Miller had been a graduating student at University of California, 
Santa Barbara and had been physically present in Isla Vista during the weekend 
Rodger committed his murders. She describes vividly in her memoir the ways 
in which sexually motivated violence against women coloured her fears for her 
personal safety in the lead- up to Turner’s trial (Miller 87– 91).
 8 One might point to social media phenomena like the recent ‘wife guy’ cluster of 
men who have gained online recognition by posting about their wives, and argue 
that this trend exists in opposition to, and undercuts, both online misogyny and 
toxic masculinity in general. It is true that wife guys do not display the hatred 
of women that has been implicated in real- world violence, but, as a New York 
Times think- piece on the phenomenon notes, these men are exploiting ‘a rather 
sexist tradition— of men gaining social status through the physical appearance of 
their wives— and pitch[ing] it as a newly enlightened stance’ (Hess). The author 
of the piece, Amanda Hess, notes a similarity between the wife guy and the 
incel: where the incel ‘has crafted a whole online persona around his nonexistent 
sex life . . . [and feels] entitled to a relationship with a woman, the wife guy seems 
to expect to be congratulated for entering into one.’ His online adoration of his 
wife is not really about her; it’s about him, and aims at enhancing his status.
 9 I put this word in scare quotes because it is not clear from their posts that any 
of them have actually put any real effort into trying to form a relationship and 
been subsequently rebuffed. Many of the posters seem to channel their time and 
energy into claiming victimhood because they are not being actively pursued 
by stereotypically hot, eager, young women, and the gunmen they lionise seem 
to have only approached women— or, in Rodger’s case, sprayed them with 
Starbucks latte— with hostility and violence, some of it deadly. As journalist 
Stassa Edwards puts the point, the incel claim to victimhood is ‘engendered 
solely by women exercising autonomous choices,’ something that is simply not 
licensed in traditional/ toxic masculine views about what/ how women should be. 
The women who have been killed by the men incels hail as their heroes ‘were 
stand- ins for abstractions, for women who had erred by not submitting to some 
natural order, some hierarchy of gender meant to be determined by these men 
alone, meant to satisfy their needs’ (Edwards, ‘Saint Elliot Rodger’).
 10 The ‘isolated incident’ explanation usually hinges on identifying the perpet-
rator of violence as mentally ill or troubled, but this explanation ignores the 
fact that mentally ill people are vastly more likely to be victims of violence than 
perpetrators, and that troubled people do not exist in vacuums. Rebecca Solnit 
quotes the observation of a friend of hers that ‘the ill brain’ will fixate on ‘the 
surrounding culture’s illness’ in attempts to make sense of the situation in which 
one finds oneself (122). In a violent, misogynist culture with easy access to guns 
and an online community that valorises your violence as striking a blow for all 
‘involuntarily celibate’ men, we would see precisely the kinds of violent gendered 
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 11 I once, in my early 20s, waitressed in a hotel restaurant whose human resources 
department required all female staff (the employee handbook in which this was 
written called us ‘ladies’) to ‘wear a little make- up to highlight your femininity.’
 12 These statistics include the fairly well- known estimate from the late 1990s (see 
Peterson, cited in Leopold) that American women (those who have become 
single mothers, post- divorce) suffered an estimated 27% decline in household 
income following a divorce whereas their former husbands’ household incomes 
increased up to 10% (because they are now paying child support instead of 
splitting family expenses). Andress and Bröckel found similar results following 
divorce in German families (for a detailed analysis, see Leopold).
 13 When I was first studying philosophy, during my undergraduate years in uni-
versity, I recall an older male professor once singling out the women in a mixed 
undergraduate– graduate class of both genders, telling us that if we worked very 
hard and were very lucky, we too might be able to get jobs in this field I loved 
so much. At the time, I and my friends were merely annoyed and contemptuous 
at how patronising he was, but when the ‘me too’ moment erupted in the United 
States and I  found myself obsessively reading online accounts of women who 
had been driven from academia for things like not wanting to have sex with 
a dissertation advisor or an influential teacher or colleague, I  realised he had 
actually been correct about the ‘lucky’ part. Of that group of friends— all highly 
intelligent, driven people who aspired to academic careers— I am the only one 
I know of who is still in academia; the academic aspirations of at least two of 
the women in that group did not survive the male professorial attention they 
encountered at that institution.
 14 One way to see the world of The Handmaid’s Tale as tapping into the decon-
struction of toxic masculinity and complicit femininity that I understand as a 
significant aspect of the ‘me too’ challenge is by tracing the instances of linguistic 
violence in its universe, particularly those that involve naming, renaming, and 
not naming. We can see the priorities of patriarchy in the fact that the men 
who are servants are still addressed by their pre- Gilead names, whereas the 
handmaids are not (unless they are between assignments, in the limbo of the 
Red Center). The ‘marthas’ (household servants) don’t have names as fully as 
the male servants do— they are called by their names to their faces but defined 
by their social roles in conversations that wives and commanders have with each 
other, where they typically get referred to generically as marthas. They clearly 
don’t need to be ruthlessly suppressed in the way the handmaids do; they’re just 
residually erased. The ‘jezebels’ (sex workers), like handmaids, have names other 
than their pre- Gilead names, but there is some ambiguity about whether their new 
names are chosen by them or are assigned. There is also the linguistic violence 
of category labels: gay and lesbian people are hunted down and condemned as 
‘gender traitors’ (indicative of a brutal, overt compulsory heterosexuality); and 
the general, non- elite population, the masses, are referred to as ‘econopeople’ 
(suggestive of their lives being expendable within this regime). Then, of course, 
there are the ‘unwomen’ I have already mentioned, analogous to the ‘unperson’ 
label George Orwell deploys in Nineteen Eighty- Four for people who, once 
deemed inconvenient by the state, ‘did not exist . . . had never existed’ (44).
 15 This cast of biblical characters plays a foundational role in the propaganda of 
Gilead:  the Christian terrorist group that constituted and now rules Gilead is 
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 16 Like all of the castes of women in this universe, however, aunts are shown as cap-
able of breaking free of the bad bargains they have made. In season 1 of the tele-
vision show, there is a brief reference to an aunt who escapes from a nearby Red 
Center and makes her way to Canada where she gives an anti- Gilead interview to 
the Toronto Star newspaper (‘Nolite Te Bastardes Carborundorum’). Serena Joy, 
characterising herself as naïve, observes that she expected better from an aunt. 
Likewise, there is a passing reference later in the season to the arrest of ‘a ring of 
marthas,’ the presumably non- fertile women whose compliance and skill sets have 
qualified them to perform the role of household servants (episode 10: ‘Night’).
 17 In a nod to the closeness to real life of this story- world, I want to acknowledge 
the ‘meta- textuality’ that runs throughout the Hulu television version, in par-
ticular: there is teleplay and co- producer credit given to Dorothy Fortenberry in 
the show’s credits, and in the episode 4 reference to the escaped aunt, Serena Joy 
suggests to Commander Waterford, ‘Have Fortenberry send a written response’ 
(‘Nolite Te Bastardes Carborundorum’); in episode 5 June/ Offred recalls a poem, 
‘You Fit Into Me,’ that, in real life, is a Margaret Atwood poem (‘Faithful’); 
and in episode 2’s depiction of their first scrabble game, the commander’s tile 
pick to see who goes first is A  and June/ Offred’s is M, a clear reference to 
Margaret Atwood’s initials— MA (‘Birth Day’). What is probably unintentional, 
though, is that these initials constitute a common shorthand among Jezebel.
com commenters when discussing misogyny, and men and women’s divergent 
perceptions of the social world:  a post that says only ‘MA’ means ‘Margaret 
Atwood’ and refers to her observation that ‘men are afraid women will laugh 
at them; women are afraid men will kill them’ (Edwards, ‘The Internet of Dead 
Girls’).
 18 Offred 1, the first handmaid assigned to the Waterford household, is unnamed in 
both the novel and the television show. Her assignment ended with her suicide, 
which is shown in flashback in season 1, episode 8 (‘Jezebels’).
 19 We are, in fact, given poisonous propaganda to the contrary. I  have had 
conversations with young female graduate students— brilliant, capable, ambi-
tious young women— who wrestle with self- doubt about their life choices because 
they have been exposed to patriarchal messaging like the pop psychology advice 
served up by internet ‘guru’ Jordan Petersen who tells them, almost in the same 
breath, that while he experiences his own career as deeply rewarding, they will 
find their efforts to build a career unsatisfying and probably unsuccessful. If they 
do succeed in building careers for themselves, he informs them, they will find it 
difficult to do their ‘real’ job as mothers, and if they follow the lead of women 
like me, who have chosen to not have children, and end up childless and not in 
a relationship by the time they reach 40, they will be ‘lost souls.’ This ‘one size 
fits all’ life advice for young women is, to put it mildly, unhelpful. To put it less 
mildly, it is patronising and misogynistic.
 20 ‘You do that so well,’ observes Commander Waterford, when June lies to him 
in season 1 of The Handmaid’s Tale that the baby she is carrying is his (episode 
10: ‘Night’). Of course she lies well; her life depends on that ability.
 21 The context for this is Sara Ahmed’s reworking of a traditional German folk- 
tale, ‘The Willful Child,’ told by the Brothers Grimm. Ahmed’s version reads:
Once upon a time there was a child who was willful, and would not do as 
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become ill, and no doctor could do her any good, and in a short time she 
lay on her death- bed. When she had been lowered into her grave, and the 
earth was spread over her, all at once her arm came out again, and stretched 
upwards, and when they had put it in and spread fresh earth over it, it was 
all to no purpose, for the arm always came out again. Then the mother 
herself was obliged to go to the grave, and strike the arm with a rod, and 
when she had done that, it was drawn in, and then at last the child had rest 
beneath the ground.
(66– 67)
 22 I am using the ‘paths through the woods’ metaphor here as a way of continuing 
to link fairy tales with the ideology of rape culture, both to make my explicit 
argument that fairy tales are a messaging device that contribute to this offen-
sive and harmful ideology and to make my implicit argument that rape culture 
ideology is itself a fairy tale (insofar as it is a story ‘about the world’ that is not 
true). That said, I do want to acknowledge and endorse Rebecca Solnit’s observa-
tion that ‘[t] he road is a neat image, easy to picture, but it misleads when it tells 
us that . . . change and transformation is a linear path’ (140).
 23 What troubles me about some ways of understanding ‘woman identification’ is 
that they foreground relationships with men that are sexual– romantic in nature, 
and leave in the background all the many relationships with men that both 
lesbians and heterosexual women have with brothers, fathers, uncles, nephews, 
co- workers, and all the other male human beings who populate our individual 
social circles.
 24 Here I am making the same point, for the same reasons, as proponents of anti- 
racism who point out that ‘not seeing colour’ is not an effective anti- racism 
strategy: if you ‘don’t see’ someone’s race, you are quite likely overlooking some-
thing that person would consider a significant part of his or her identity; and 
if we all run around studiously ‘not seeing colour’ in societies with systemic-
ally racist pasts and presents, then we deprive the people who are harmed by 
that racism of a language in which to identify and articulate the harms they are 
suffering.
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3  And it was love at first sight . . .
The spectrum of problematic sex
‘Real’ rape and really bad dates: as she slept, he leaned  
forward to kiss her
Sooner or later, once we’ve discussed the wider culture that allows it to 
flourish and the types of people such a culture produces, we need to start 
talking about the vicious, disgraceful act itself: rape. What are we talking 
about, when we turn to this topic? I am theorising it throughout this book 
as one kind of harm that exists alongside sexual harassment, objectification, 
and exploitation, within the broader category ‘sexual violence’— so named 
to capture the peace- studies connotation of violence as inclusive of both 
individual acts and social forces. Because many of the harms I want to count 
as sexual violence require more nuanced culpability stories than ‘individual 
attacker terrorising individual victim,’ I  am working from the view that 
challenging rape culture effectively requires us to acknowledge both harms 
to the individual who is raped and the contribution each assault, each act 
of violence, makes to cultural conditions that normalise violence as ‘a thing 
that happens to women’ (even when the victim of the particular act of sexual 
violence is not a girl or woman, but a man or a boy).
Histories and surveys of feminist theorising of rape present these kinds 
of divergent views— ‘rape as a harm is individual in nature’ versus ‘rape, 
and persistent threat thereof, harms women as a group’— as markers of 
ideological divides between liberal feminism and radical feminism (a divide 
that appears most tangibly in Second Wave discourses) and as markers of a 
generational divide between Second Wave and Third Wave feminisms. I am 
old enough/ young enough to occupy that uncomfortable space between 
generations: I remember the world of my childhood as the world the Second 
Wave feminists changed, and I am enduringly grateful for their contributions, 
but I also work every day with young people who are building new pol-
itics and advancing new (Third Wave) views on how to combat gendered 
violence. I see the world changing, and I see ‘me too’ conversations about 
powerful abusers being made accountable at a cultural level for their abuses 
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As I am concerned to show throughout the following history— a weaving 
together of German author Mithu Sanyal’s 2019 history, Rape:  From 
Lucretia to #MeToo, and Rebecca Solnit’s ‘me too’- threshold essays in 2014’s 
Men Explain Things to Me with the classic history Brownmiller bequeathed 
us in Against Our Will— the history of the law’s efforts to enunciate the 
harm of rape— even the crime of rape— has been abysmal. While Third Wave 
feminism has been criticised for turning away from ‘the political sphere’ 
and retreating into culture- change activism (see Gilling 102– 103, for an 
example), I think— from a peace- studies perspective— that interrogating and 
challenging cultural violence can be a ‘change- strategy’ equally as effective 
as the preventative or protest measures that are aimed against direct vio-
lence. Solnit’s history of generational transition observes that feminists of 
the Second Wave
defined and named whole categories of violation that had previously 
been unrecognized . . . [after which] the abuse of power was a serious 
problem, and . . . the authority of men, of bosses, husbands, fathers— 
and adults generally— was going to be questioned.
(Solnit 109)
This is the legacy that is being claimed by ‘me too’ movements: the Second 
Wave’s radical feminism may have seemed to fade, but in many cultures it 
left behind generations of girls and women who submit less habitually to 
male authority and feel more empowered to demand that authority make 
itself accountable.
Sanyal notes, however, in her timely and comprehensive book that, ‘[r] ape 
is a special case, always’ (70).1 This special case is ‘deeply entangled with the 
way our society thinks about and creates gender’ (Sanyal 155),2 a view of 
gender norms that we might dismiss as old- fashioned but for the fact that
all these outdated norms still reverberate through our present discourse. 
The bulk of our ‘rape knowledge’ is based on [unstated] ideas about 
masculinity and femininity that most of us would dismiss as plucked out 
of thin air if we knew what we were referring to.
(Sanyal 18)
Her point here about unacknowledged rape myths is drawn from analysing 
the role that feminism- insensitive scholarship and women’s magazines play 
in gender socialisation, but it is a message also embedded in fairy tales; 
Susan Brownmiller, for instance, tells us that ‘ “Red Riding Hood” is a par-
able of rape’ (310). Even though (as I discussed at the end of Chapter 1) rape 
is something that can and does happen to men at the hands of women, just 
as it can and does happen to women at the hands of men (and within same- 
sex encounters), it is the crime that Sanyal argues we are most likely to think 
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we do not adequately interrogate, it is also the crime we are most likely to 
confuse with non- criminal relations: sex (8).
‘What does it say about our culture that it’s so hard for us to speak about 
rape other than as a crime that only men do to only women— even though 
that’s not the whole story?’ Sanyal asks (8). What this says, I think, is that 
the toxic masculinity and complicit femininity I analysed in Chapter 2 are 
pernicious. Even as feminist arguments for gender equality and millennial 
notions of gender as non- binary are permeating our cultural discourses, we 
are still living social relations that are structured by gender assumptions that 
retain their force— as Martha Minow has argued— precisely insofar as they 
remain unspoken and unanalysed. Sanyal observes that there is still a social 
belief that women are shaped by (or into) a ‘feminine trio infernale: being 
passive, being dominated, being rapeable’ (71). And, she continues, legal and 
psychoanalytic thinking about rape have congealed around the view that 
‘[i] n the unlikely event that a woman felt a sexual urge, . . . she wouldn’t 
have to rape a man, because no man would say no to sex’ (Sanyal 18).3
Indeed, this gendered thinking is so pervasive and so entrenched that 
‘[s]exual violence is often referred to not as a specific crime but as an 
inherent risk of being a woman,’ Sanyal asserts; ‘When we say rape we think 
of aggressive men and fearful women’ (4). Rebecca Solnit names the process 
of normalisation through erasure, in her Men Explain Things to Me essay 
on rape, ‘The Longest War’ (which begins with her own accounts of the 
very incidents that awoke me to my existence in rape culture), observing 
that rape is ‘almost never treated as a civil rights or human rights issue, or a 
crisis, or even a pattern’ (21). ‘If we talked about crimes like these and why 
they are so common,’ she says,
we’d have to talk about what kinds of profound change . . . [the United 
States], or nearly every nation needs. If we talked about it, we’d be 
talking about masculinity, or male roles, or maybe patriarchy, and we 
don’t talk much about that.
(Solnit 23)
What Solnit is anticipating here is that we would, in fact, need to be having 
the kinds of conversations that ‘me too’ has been provoking. And what she 
is drawing on, as one of the arguments that rape is a civil rights and human 
rights matter, is the brutally clear definition of rape that Susan Brownmiller 
offers from the standpoint of female subjectivity:
To a woman the definition of rape is fairly simple. A sexual invasion of 
the body by force, an incursion into the private, personal inner space 
without consent . . . constitutes a deliberate violation of emotional, 
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In yet another essay from Men Explain Things to Me (‘Worlds Collide’), 
Solnit dissects the term ‘sexual assault’: ‘If that term confuses you,’ she says, 
‘take out the word “sexual” and just focus on “assault,” on violence, on the 
refusal to treat someone as a human being, on the denial of the most basic 
of human rights, the right to bodily integrity and self- determination’ (Solnit 
45). Rape, like all forms of sexual violence, is, in its worst impacts upon 
victims, ‘sexually invasive dehumanization’ (Anderson 643). Arguing that 
in all its forms, violence is ‘first of all authoritarian,’ Solnit describes it as a 
‘system’ premised on the idea ‘I have the right to control you,’ and explains 
that this is ‘why so many intimate- partner murders are of women who dared 
to break up with those partners’ (‘The Longest War’ 26– 27).4 Seeing forced 
or coerced sex (rape) as both violence and abuse of power is crucial for 
understanding the conflicting cultural narrative that we are negotiating in 
this current ‘me too’ moment:  the entrenched patriarchal mythology that 
rape is an inevitable consequence of men’s sexual desire and women’s sexual 
attractiveness is being challenged by generations of people who have also 
been exposed to what Sanyal labels the ‘new rape story’ provided by anti- 
rape Second Wave feminist activists like Susan Brownmiller (26). ‘When the 
anti- rape movement arrived on the scene, they . . . [took] all these [patri-
archal] convictions and reveal[ed] them across the board as rape myths 
whose existence was proof of the fact that we lived in a rape culture,’ Sanyal 
says (26). ‘She wanted it and I  couldn’t help myself’ was exposed as the 
cover story for the way rape functions in the ‘dominance story’ Catharine 
MacKinnon tells of the gender hierarchy: dispensing with mythology reveals 
rape motivation as ‘I wanted it so I took it.’
In my previous chapter, I  linked a sense of entitlement to public space 
to toxic masculinity and a sense of responsibility for sexual ethics to com-
plicit femininity. Both of these narratives (gender scripts) emerge in the 
Second Wave and Third Wave histories I am weaving together here. Sanyal’s 
Rape: From Lucretia to #MeToo provides a history of how complicit fem-
ininity developed, through her consideration of the question of why and 
how it came to be the case that ‘a woman’s sexuality . . . [was] put in place 
of everything that made her herself’ (37)— how, in other words, women’s 
humanity was reduced to our sex lives, and we all became, potentially, some-
body else’s sex crime. The answer she gives to that question of the reduc-
tion of our humanity to our sexuality lies in the history of Western thought 
about the concept of honour, which she exemplifies in the story of the rape 
of Lucretia in the sixth century BCE (Sanyal 37– 39).
Because a woman’s honour was co- extensive with her virtue (understood 
as her virginity, her monogamy, or her celibacy, depending on her social role 
and her age),
only a woman— possessed something that could be stolen or destroyed 
by rape. This was all the more precarious as her place in society was 
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determined by her honor: if she lost the one she lost the other, which 
often meant her livelihood as well.
(Sanyal 38)
In Sanyal’s telling, Lucretia was threatened with rape by a man who had 
lost a wager with her husband about whose wife was more virtuous, and he 
wanted to take his revenge by taking her reputation as a virtuous woman 
from her. She initially repelled his attempt, declaring she would prefer to 
die, but he threatened to kill both her and a male slave and stage their 
bodies as if they had been interrupted in the act of adultery. Seeing no 
way out of being violated, Lucretia submitted, presumably with an ethical 
desire to spare the unnecessary loss of life (the slave who would have been 
killed). After the rape, she called her husband and her father to her chamber, 
confessed the rape to them, and killed herself. ‘Lucretia had lost her honor 
by being raped and could only get it back by getting rid of her defiled body,’ 
Sanyal concludes (39). ‘From Lucretia[’s suicide] it was only a short step 
to the statement that “rape is a fate worse than death” ’ (Sanyal 41). Within 
the subsequent development of a Christian ethics and its entrenchment into 
the social world of ‘the West,’ Lucretia’s emotional reaction to her rape 
continued to be praised, but her suicide became a problem:
Augustine considered it appropriate that a woman would long to die 
after a rape— in fact, the quality of her stolen honor was measured by 
the vehemence of her death wish: the bigger her desperation, the bigger 
her erstwhile honor. She just was no longer allowed to put that wish 
into practice. At best, she would waste away and die through no fault of 
her own . . . To stop mourning would be to admit that her honor hadn’t 
been so great after all.
(Sanyal 45– 46)
In Brownmiller’s analysis, we see the authority- entitlement narrative: an 
assumption of male right to female bodies, a ‘doctrine of perpetual consent,’ 
that extends out of a socio- legal history stretching back into ‘Biblical’ times, 
where she locates the emergence of what she calls women’s ‘domestication 
by protective mating’ (16). ‘Female fear . . . was probably the single causa-
tive factor in the original subjugation of woman by man,’ she hypothesises; 
the pervasive threat of attack was what motivated a woman to seek pro-
tection by allying herself with one man (Brownmiller 16). But, ‘[t] he his-
toric price of woman’s protection by [one] man against [all other men] was 
the imposition of chastity and monogamy,’ she notes; ‘A crime committed 
against her body became a crime against the male estate’ (Brownmiller 
17)— she mattered only because he owned her. Brownmiller’s account of the 
origin of compulsorily heterosexist, male- dominated households suggests, 
however, that the high prices of chastity and monogamy paid by women 
bought precious little of that actual protection. She recounts a world in 
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which a woman identified as having had sex with a man who was not her 
husband was labelled an adulteress, regardless of whether the incident in 
question had been something to which she had consented (Brownmiller 19).
This intention- insensitive definition of adultery raises the possibility that 
Jesus Christ’s injunction in John 8:3– 11— ‘he who is without sin, let him cast 
the first stone’— can be interpreted as Jesus offering the mercy of reprieve 
from stoning to a ‘sinful woman’ who may in fact have been a rape victim. 
The possibility that one could be attacked and then face deadly punish-
ment as a result of socially sanctioned victim- blaming is a compelling reason 
why women would ‘choose’ to seclude themselves in the households of their 
fathers, husbands, or sons, as was historically the case in Levantine and 
Mediterranean societies of the West’s ancient world. If going outside exposes 
you to risk of attack and capital punishment, it is better to stay inside. But, to 
be clear, this is not protection by one’s husband; this is protection by social 
isolation, by putting the public spaces of the world off limits for women.
When we turn to the question of how rape has been dealt with as a legal 
matter, we see a core insight of (English) common law at work: while the many 
and varied legal codes and legal orders that have regimented human soci-
eties typically reflect the interests of the conquerors, rulers, and philosophes 
who imposed them, they also reflect the cultural understandings of their 
time and place. (A code that does not resonate with popular conceptions of 
harm and justice gets circumvented or misapplied.) So, when we reach back 
into the past to explain how, for example, rape laws evolved, we have to 
infer cultural understandings through the interpretive lenses of the concepts 
we understand to have been at work. As Sanyal puts the point,
rape is only coded as such when it corresponds to . . . preconceived ideas 
of what constitutes a ‘real rape’; thus the law [and the understanding of 
the law] can only be as effective as the cultural narrative upon which it 
is built.
(47)
Thus, choice of interpretive lenses is instructive: to interrogate the history of 
rape laws through the concept of honour, as Sanyal does, is to produce an 
interestingly different history than if one interrogates it through concepts of 
property and ownership, as Brownmiller does.
There is overlap, of course; for instance, it is Sanyal who tells us that 
‘[e] ven the oldest law known to us, the Code of Hammurabi, treated rape 
as the theft of virginity’ (41). It is also Sanyal who cites Roman emperor 
Justinian’s law of the sixth century CE, in which ‘[rape] was seen as a crime 
against the woman herself as opposed to a crime against her husband’ 
(211). She deems it ‘noteworthy that there was no marital rape exemption 
[in this law], so a husband could be prosecuted for raping his wife’ (Sanyal 
211), a historical data- point that asserts itself as anomalous when held up 
to the history of marital ownership that both Brownmiller and Solnit see 
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as the story to be told of women’s suppressed bodily autonomy (and, by 
implication, our suppressed personhood). They both turn to more recent 
British legal history for emblematic pronouncements on the authority of a 
man over his wife. Brownmiller cites 17th- century English jurist Matthew 
Hale’s assertion of the marriage contract as a woman’s perpetual con-
sent: ‘A husband cannot be guilty of rape upon his wife for by their mutual 
matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given up herself in this 
kind to her husband, which she cannot retract’ (Brownmiller 380). Solnit 
similarly cites 18th century jurist and commentator on English law William 
Blackstone: ‘By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law . . . 
legal existence of the woman . . . is incorporated and consolidated into that 
of the husband’ (56).
Moving from the ancient world to the era that Magna Carta enthusiasts 
hail as the birth of individual rights, we see consensus between Sanyal’s 
history and Brownmiller’s on the significance of England’s 13th- century 
Statutes of Westminster. Both of them understand that change in English 
law’s treatment of rape as shifting the nature of the crime: by stipulating 
a time period after which the Crown could prosecute even if the victim 
declined to press charges, the Statutes reconfigured rape as ‘no longer just a 
family misfortune and a threat to land and property, but an issue of public 
safety and state concern’ (Brownmiller 29). Sanyal concurs that this is the 
moment in English law at which rape becomes ‘a crime against the state, and 
not against an individual or against a family,’ an evolution which, she notes, 
did not take place in her native Germany until 1871, when rape was reclas-
sified as an ‘offense against the community’ (55).
There is, as Brownmiller documents, real progress in English law at 
this point in history:  conceiving of rape as a matter of public safety, not 
female virtue, blunted the force of the defences that 12th- century common 
law had made available to an accused man— I had sex with her on a prior 
occasion (if she consented once, she’d do it again); or I had sex with her 
that she consented to, and now she’s being vindictive or manipulated; or 
I wasn’t there; or she left some detail out of her complaint (26– 27). The 
law began to recognise rape as something more than the ‘theft of virginity’ 
that Hammurabi’s Code had sought to punish, and this meant that now 
‘matrons, nuns, widows, concubines and even prostitutes’ could seek redress 
(Brownmiller 28). In addition, the Statutes stipulated offenses we have come 
to know as ‘statutory rape,’ sex crimes that are still crimes even when the 
woman or girl consents (for instance, sex with a person the law recognises 
as a child, too young to consent) (Brownmiller 29). This legal attention to 
parity in who counts as a rape victim and to the idea that a crime might 
have taken place even if consent were coerced or claimed by the accused 
prompts Brownmiller to observe that ‘tangentially and in retrospect [we can 
interpret the Statutes as] a recognition of women’s rights; [even though] its 
inexorable, historic purpose had been to consolidate political power in the 
hands of the king’ (30).
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The ‘she really wanted it’ defence open to the 12th- century English rapist 
was not entirely invalidated by 13th- century reforms. The worldview that 
held ‘all women secretly wanted to be ravished’ continues to have force in 
law insofar as legal codes around the world still require victims to prove 
their lack of consent through overt resistance (Sanyal 45).5 In Western 
legal codes,
[t] he idea that violence was welcome . . . was still ingrained in law until 
the 1970s. In a rape case, the woman had to prove not only that she’d 
physically resisted her assailant, but that she had kept up her resistance 
constantly throughout. After all, she could have been inexplicably and 
mysteriously aroused after her ‘natural coyness’ had been overcome.
(Sanyal 11)
Even today, a requirement that the victim resist continues to be a feature of 
some countries’ legal codes, and blatant victim- blaming continues to ground 
criminal defences and media coverage.6 Notoriously, Japan’s 2017 revision of 
its rape laws— the first since rape became a crime there in 1907— continued 
to insist that, in order to secure a sexual assault conviction, victims must 
prove they fought back or, alternatively, prove that violence or intimidation 
made resistance impossible (Osaki; Liotta). By contrast, however,
[i] n 2018, Sweden again decided to be a trailblazer by passing a bill that 
sex without consent constitutes rape . . . Under the new law, a person 
must now consent to sexual activity with words or clear body language.
(Sanyal 179)
This effectively transforms legal questions about sexual assault from demands 
that a victim prove the sexual activity was unwanted into demands that both 
parties be able to attest to demonstrations of their partner’s willingness.
Legal reforms, however necessary or progressive, are not sufficient to 
combat rape myths, however; cultural understandings of events are enshrined 
not just in law but in individuals’ beliefs also, in what Sanyal describes as ‘a 
fixed set of perceptions about rape,’ that Second Wave feminism challenged:
Some will be familiar by now:  rape is sex, and women say no when 
they mean yes. Victims are beautiful young women whose attractive-
ness arouses men7 . . . or loose women who provoke men willfully and 
get their just [desserts]. Either way, the victim is at least partly respon-
sible for getting herself raped, because she asked for it by wearing a 
miniskirt. Deep down, women want to be taken against their will. . . 
. No woman can be entered against her will if she puts up a real fight 
(but, paradoxically, no woman can really defend herself against a male 
attacker, so it is better not to try at all and thus avoid getting hurt). 
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because the complainants are hysterical, want to get back at a man who 
rejected them, or want to account for an illegitimate pregnancy. Rapists 
are foreigners, outsiders, psychopaths . . . [and] Rape occurs outside, 
not in the home; victim and perpetrator are unknown to each other. 
Perpetrators are the stranger behind the bush.
(26)
It ought to be clear by now to anyone who has given even cursory attention 
to the question of who gets raped and why, that all of these ‘perceptions’ 
(rape myths) are false. In particular, in the matter of attempts to explain rape 
through the theoretical lens of evolutionary biology,
[a] nthropologists, psychologists, and sociologists from all over the 
world point out that it isn’t just women of childbearing age who are 
raped; that the probability of becoming pregnant as the result of rape is 
statistically lower than that of consensual sex— erectile dysfunction and 
lack of ejaculation are the rule rather than the exception in rape; that 
many pregnancies from rape are not carried to term; and that the evo-
lutionary advantages of being born under such stressful circumstances 
are questionable anyway.
(Sanyal 5)
But, as I  have already noted, these beliefs about the circumstances and 
justifications of rape are pernicious:  a 2017 survey of students at the 
Japanese university where I worked for part of the time I spent writing this 
book found that 70% of respondents agreed that going alone with someone 
to his or her home amounts to consenting to have sex, and a further 23.6% 
(multiple responses were permitted) agreed that getting drunk amounts to 
consenting to have sex.8
While it is true that both incidence and understanding of rape vary across 
cultures and over time— ‘rape and sexual violence are deeply rooted in spe-
cific political, economic and cultural environments’ (Sanyal, quoting Joanna 
Bourke’s Rape: A Natural History, 3)— it also seems reasonable to make the 
general claim, as Sanyal does, that rape is (an extreme form of) ‘dysfunc-
tion, in its sexual variation’ (155). ‘Sex isn’t disconnected from all other 
spheres of human existence; sexuality is woven into the fabric of our cul-
tural reality,’ she observes (Sanyal 155– 156); and that fabric is patriarchal 
in most parts of the world. Because patriarchal cultures normalise authority 
of men over women, and because— as Solnit asserts— violence is a feature of 
authoritarian reasoning, the compulsory heterosexuality of these cultures is 
also going to normalise sexual violence, coercion, and the primacy of men’s 
desires over women’s choices. This is how we come to have such dysfunc-
tion as ‘rape culture’ in countries as different from each other as Japan, the 
United States, Germany, and New Zealand.
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One of the things that I think Sanyal’s history of rape makes admirably 
clear is the relation of our beliefs about rape (our inclination to accept and 
perpetuate the rape myths handed to us by our cultures) to variations in 
data collection and reporting of statistics. For the entirety of the time I spent 
working in rape- eradication and consent- education efforts on American 
college campuses, I  was working within a discursive environment that 
presented sexual assault as something that happens far more frequently to 
women than it does to men, even as it was simultaneously acknowledged that 
sexual assaults of all kinds are significantly under- reported. For instance, in 
her discussion of how the term ‘rape culture . . . helped us stop pretending 
that rapes are anomalies,’ Rebecca Solnit cites a common statistical estimate 
that ‘a fifth of all American women (and one in seventy- one men)’ are rape 
survivors (130– 131). This one- in- five figure for women is not drawn from 
crime reports; typically, when presented as a claim about American women, 
it is a projection onto the entire population of results that have been derived 
from surveys of university students.9 Under- reporting, widely acknowledged 
as very difficult to estimate, appears to vary significantly, depending on the 
jurisdiction:  it is estimated that only about 23% of American victims of 
sexual assault report the attack to police (Kimble and Chettiar), a figure 
that drops even further in Japan to a staggering 4.3% (Ito). This means that 
we really have no evidence to substantiate assumptions that sexual violence 
is happening mostly to women at the hands of men, and as I  spoke with 
students, I  began to develop a view that these 1- in- 5 and 1- in- 71 figures 
would be a lot closer to parity if we could just reduce the stigma around 
being a victim of sexual assault. That is, I came to believe that destigmatising 
reporting would give us both more accurate numbers, overall, and an 
understanding of sexual violence in which men and boys were quite pos-
sibly just as likely to be victimised as women and girls. What I have learned 
from Sanyal’s book is that social stigma is not the whole story about why 
under- reporting happens on such a massive scale; her presentation of survey 
data suggests there is also an enormous problem in how sexual assault is 
defined in the surveys from which we draw our projections of the scope of 
sexual violence.
Historically, Sanyal tells us, in many jurisdictions, both law and society 
were committed to the view that ‘only women could be raped and only men 
could be rapists’ (7). Increasingly, this gendered thinking is changing:  she 
notes that Sweden moved to make its rape laws gender- neutral as long ago 
as 1984 (Sanyal 7). In the realm of data collection, gender- neutral language 
pertaining to victims generates unexpected results, of the kind we see in the 
2012 National Crime Victimization Survey done by the United States Bureau 
of Justice Statistics (an annual survey of households, asking about crimes 
they have experienced). ‘In 2012, 38 percent of sexual violence victims were 
male— while up until then the numbers had stayed in the 10 percent zone,’ 
Sanyal reports (125). ‘How could this be explained?’ she asks (Sanyal 125). 
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What had happened is that the Federal Bureau of Investigation had changed 
the definition of rape
from ‘the carnal knowledge of a female forcibly and against her will’ 
to ‘the penetration, no matter how slight, of the vagina or anus with 
any body part or object, or oral penetration by a sex organ of another 
person, without the consent of the victim.’
(Sanyal 125)
That, in and of itself, was enough to produce a statistical picture of sexual 
violence with even more gender parity among victims than I would have 
predicted. But, Sanyal cautions, ‘even the “gender- neutral” wording of the 
Sexual Offences Act in [the United Kingdom], like the FBI definition in 
America, is only neutral in regard to the victim’ (7); both law and statistics- 
gathering still too frequently assume that ‘one needs a penis to be able to 
commit rape’ (Sanyal 19).
Consider, however, the implications of a survey that does not make this 
assumption:
the 2011 National Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence Survey by the 
Centers for Disease Control, one of the most comprehensive surveys 
of sexual victimization conducted in the United States to date, [which] 
included ‘being made to penetrate’ into their list of ‘nonconsensual 
sex.’ Suddenly the difference between the numbers of female and male 
victims— those were the only genders listed in the survey— shrank to 
less than 1 percent:  1,270,000 women and 1,267,000 men had been 
victims of unwanted sexual intercourse in those twelve months.
(Sanyal 125)
What these numbers show is that ‘we can’t treat male victims as the excep-
tion that proves the rule any longer’ (Sanyal 125). ‘[T] he figures for “being 
made to penetrate” . . . had been disregarded in the other statistics. However, 
this is the kind of sexual violence men are most likely to experience and 
women are most likely to perpetrate’ (Sanyal 126– 127). Taking notice of this 
as a way in which someone can be sexually assaulted reveals the existence 
of myths about male rape (just as Second Wave feminism exposed myths 
about female rape): ‘that female- perpetrated abuse is rare or non- existent; 
that male victims experience less harm; . . . that for men all sex is welcome 
anyway; and that “real men” can protect themselves’ (Sanyal 126). If, as part 
of the project of dismantling rape culture, we are going to get clear on what 
rape is, we need to see the ‘non- consensual’ in all permutations of sexual 
encounters: ‘Sleeping Beauty’ would be no less violative and creepy if it were 
a princess who had made her way through the brambles to kiss a sleeping 
prince. In Sanyal’s words, ‘we should reconsider how we speak about rape 
and gender, and stop unthinkingly . . . [assuming] it is always something 
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only men do to only women’ (132). This is a standard more rigorous than 
gender- neutrality (which refuses to take note of gender as an identity char-
acteristic); this is gender inclusivity— in thinking about who is a victim of 
sexual violence, and also who is a perpetrator.
We should reconsider, and we should stop assuming, but those are quite 
difficult things to do. In coming to terms with why gender- neutral thinking 
about rape requires so much critical attention to the assumptions we are 
habitually inclined to make, we ought to recall the point I made at the end of 
Chapter 1 about pervasive discursive failure to distinguish between consent 
and arousal. I contend that this is an example of the particular epistemic 
injustice that Miranda Fricker theorises as hermeneutical injustice. Fricker 
herself explains this injustice through an account of how Second Wave fem-
inist activism and consciousness- raising helped develop awareness of sexual 
harassment, both by the individuals who experienced it and by society 
at large. Sexual harassment, in the 1970s— like female- perpetrated rape 
today— was ‘previously ill- understood by the [victim] herself [or himself], 
because collectively ill- understood’ (149). Although central (systematic) 
cases of hermeneutical injustice require a ‘structural inequality of power’ 
such that one is hermeneutically marginalised as a consequence of being a 
member of a disadvantaged group (i.e. being a woman), Fricker thinks that 
‘there can be cases of hermeneutical injustice that are not part of the general 
pattern of social power . . . but incidental’ (149, 156).10 ‘[I] ncidental cases 
will tend to involve hermeneutical marginalization only fleetingly and/ or 
in respect of a highly localized patch of the subject’s experience,’ she says, 
and therefore, ‘stem not from any structural inequality of power, but rather 
from a more one- off moment of powerlessness’ (Fricker 156). Men who 
have been sexually assaulted are neither confused about being rape victims 
nor disbelieved as rape victims because of membership in an oppressed or 
disadvantaged group (what Fricker speaks of as the ‘structural inequality’ 
suffered by women, racial minorities, gender- nonconforming persons, and 
other vulnerable ‘targets’), but they are victims of hermeneutical injustice 
when they struggle to articulate just what was wrong about the sex they had 
that they (implicitly, at least) know they didn’t consent to.11 It could also 
certainly be the case that a particular man understands very well that he had 
been aroused but had not consented; in Fricker’s theory, he might still be 
the victim of hermeneutical injustice to the extent that others to whom he 
tries to communicate his experience do not understand or accept what he is 
trying to explain (Fricker 157).
The particularly epistemic harm of gendered thinking about rape is that 
it impoverishes our collective knowledge base— as Fricker puts the point, 
‘it renders the collective hermeneutical resource structurally prejudiced’— 
because it ‘issue[s] interpretations of [a] group’s social experiences that 
are biased because insufficiently influenced by the subject group’ (Fricker 
155, emphasis in original). Being dismissed or invalidated as a producer 
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believed; a hermeneutical injustice insofar as what one is trying to explain 
is unintelligible to others— ‘tends to knock your faith in your own ability 
to make sense of the world’ (Fricker 163) and actually impair a person’s 
ability to be epistemically competent. This epistemic harm is also an eth-
ical harm because, as I discussed in Chapter 1, Fricker’s history of ration-
ality as the constitutive feature of humanity persuasively demonstrates that 
being denied participation in the community of knowers amounts to being 
denied recognition as a human being (43– 44). Testimonial and hermeneut-
ical injustice share the ability to harm us in this way, Fricker explains (168). 
‘But,’ she continues,
in other respects their primary harms are utterly different. The wrong 
of testimonial injustice is inflicted individual to individual, so that there 
are immediate questions to be answered concerning the hearer’s culp-
ability or non- culpability . . . By contrast, hermeneutical injustice is not 
inflicted by any agent, but rather is caused by a feature of the collective 
hermeneutical resource— a one- off blind spot (in incidental cases), or (in 
systematic cases) a lacuna generated by a structural identity prejudice in 
the hermeneutical repertoire. Consequently, questions of culpability do 
not arise in the same way. None the less, they do arise, for the phenom-
enon should inspire us to ask what sorts of hearers we should try to be.
(Fricker 168)
Culpability arises in a different way in hermeneutical injustice because 
we cannot be blamed for not having the concepts we don’t yet possess; 
social efforts at progress in human rights, solidarity, and empathy are all 
large- scale collective education efforts. The question of how we teach our-
selves to become better hearers is one that Fricker wrestles with throughout 
Epistemic Injustice; it requires us to develop ‘testimonial sensibility’ that 
takes notice of how we are socially positioned as hearers of the person who 
is speaking, being critically aware of how our respective places in the social 
hierarchy of the cultures in which we reside make some concepts and some 
credibility judgements difficult— or, at the outer limit, inaccessible (Fricker 
90– 92; 169– 170). Initial incredulity as a response to a man’s effort to 
speak about his experience of sexual victimisation, difficulty in accepting 
‘me too’ revelations about how pervasive sexual aggression against vulner-
able women and men is in various industries and societies, the surprising 
gender parity in sexual violence emerging from surveys constructed within 
gender- inclusive conceptual frameworks— all of these are typical reactions 
to reports that our collective knowledge base struggles to hear as accurate 
representations of social realities. And they can be hard to map onto the 
conceptual/ discursive frames given to us by liberal feminist– radical fem-
inist and Second Wave– Third Wave distinctions (rape as a harm to indi-
vidual autonomy versus rape as a cultural or structural violence against 
women).
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But, as Sanyal reminds us,
The women’s movement fought for the recognition that ‘the first thing 
in working with women who have experienced sexual violence, is the 
acknowledgment that what happened to them did happen . . . and that 
it was wrong.’ That remains a crucial first step. But it has to go further.
(quoting Ariane Brenssell, 77)
One of the places it has to go is into greater academic and popular scrutiny 
of how many more people get raped than our crime statistics suggest, how 
varied are the acts of sexual violence that meet definitions of ‘rape’ and how 
varied are the victims and perpetrators of that violence,12 and how much 
more cultural support work we need to do to restore the voices and the 
social worlds of those harmed by sexual violence (‘rape culture’). Another 
of the places it needs to go is into the fray of what counts as ‘problem-
atic sex’:  the ways in which coercion and manipulation seep into sexual 
relations that we don’t want to label rape, what psychologist Nicola Gavey 
has theorised as ‘technologies of heterosexual coercion’ (see ‘Technologies 
and Effects’).
There is a spectrum of non- consensual sexual experiences that ranges 
from vicious sexual torture (that is self- evidently wrong) all the way to 
encounters that end with one of the participants feeling violated and the 
other, if they believe the encounter to have been consensual, feeling genu-
inely confused. All points on the spectrum are problems— all of the sexual 
activity in which mutual assent is not present (i.e. rape) and also the sexual 
activity in which absence of assent/ consent may be sufficiently less clear 
that labelling it rape is genuinely questionable or controversial (the so- called 
‘grey areas’ that ‘me too’ discourses have begun to confront)— and we need 
to concern ourselves with the needs and lived emotional realities of all of 
the victims. These spectrum- points are not all ‘the same thing,’ of course, but 
each of them is harmful to the human beings whose capacity to choose was 
impaired or disregarded.
For those of us who are, to use Fricker’s terminology, hearers who are 
concerned to practice hermeneutical justice, one crucial challenge is to learn 
how to hear the harm. Another challenge is to learn how to hear differences in 
interpretations of where on the spectrum of problematic sex a particular act 
of sexual violence is most appropriately located, and learn how to intervene 
constructively into resulting (often regressive and victim- blaming) debates 
about whether any given harmful encounter meets preconceived notions of 
‘real rape’ or is just a ‘not that bad’ date. What I hope that speaking about 
a spectrum might show us is how implicit paradigms of rape can generate 
conflicting or variable evaluations. This spectrum is a frame in which all 
rapes are rape and all sexual predation should be condemned, and in add-
ition, attention is extended to ‘grey areas’ of sexual interaction in which one 
partner ‘gives in’ to pressure from another— because of a socialisation into 
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politeness or passiveness (as Brownmiller identifies the lesson of ‘Sleeping 
Beauty’ and ‘Little Red Riding Hood’), or to avoid provoking violent con-
flict, or out of a socialised belief that this sex is something that the acceding 
partner owes or should want to have. Consideration of ‘grey area’ sex— 
problematic but not obviously rape— is the topic I turn to in the next section.
Coercion and harassment: ‘You must come and see me next 
Sunday; I have already invited guests . . .’
The fairy- tale reference that subtitles this section heading is from a slightly 
more obscure tale than those that form what we might think of as ‘the prin-
cess canon’: the Brothers Grimm version of ‘The Robber Bridegroom.’ Their 
telling of a German folk- tale (story number 40 of their Household Stories) 
has many variations and is often linked to victim- blaming ’Bluebeard’- style 
tales in which young women are killed because they give in to their curiosity. 
In this Brothers Grimm tale, a young woman is betrothed by her father to a 
man she does not know and does not trust.
The man, her future husband, insists she pay a visit to his house, which 
she is reluctant to do, and eventually does so only because of persistent 
pressure from him (what gender norms present as a stereotypical dating 
situation: he asks, he plans, the encounter occurs in his ‘territory’ or com-
fort zone). As in the more well- known ‘Hansel and Gretel,’ she marks her 
path to his house so she will be able to find her way home (showing her 
to be a sensible woman, the kind who doesn’t leave her drink unattended 
in a bar). Once there, she is warned by an old serving woman that her 
intended husband is indeed a wicked man, part of a band of murderers 
who lure young women to their lair to kill and eat them (again, a sensible 
woman: she listens to warnings, and practices female solidarity). Thanks 
to the help of the old serving woman and her own ability to stay quiet 
while she witnesses the band of murderers killing and consuming another 
young woman, she manages to escape, and thanks to her own precautions 
in marking her path to the house, she and the old woman make their way 
through the darkness to the safety of her father’s house. Much later, on 
her wedding day, when her robber bridegroom urges her to share in the 
communal story- telling at the wedding feast, she tells the story of what 
she experienced that night, and with the assembled guests as witnesses, she 
produces a finger of the dead girl as evidence that she is telling the truth 
(but take note of what she needed to produce as evidence to be seen as a 
truthful woman). Because it is a fairy tale, the robber bridegroom and his 
fellow murderers are punished.
At first glance, this seems fairly obviously to be one of the fairy tales that 
Susan Brownmiller categorises as ‘parables of rape’ (310); the group canni-
balism at the robber bridegroom’s lair stands in for gang rape, and the robber 
bridegroom’s dismissal of the tale the young woman tells at their wedding 
feast as ‘only a dream’ represents the dismissal of women’s testimonies that 
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Miranda Fricker theorises as testimonial injustice. Extending the metaphor, 
we can perhaps see the wedding feast as the stand- in ritual for a legal accus-
ation and trial process. As a parable of rape— demonstrating what is con-
sensual and what is not— this tale is arguably ambiguous: the young woman 
did not choose her husband but she did take him seriously enough as her 
future husband that she agreed, however reluctantly, to visit his house. Even 
after she escaped, knowing who he was, she played along with the social 
conventions all the way up to participating in the wedding feast. As a par-
able of rape, this is a messy story. And, as a symbol of how we need to 
subvert and shift cultural narratives, a messy story is exactly what we need. 
Early on in American ‘me too’ conversations,13 attention expanded out from 
‘powerful men doing illegal and violent things’ to include side- discussions 
of ‘entitled men doing ethically compromising things.’ The ‘messy story’ 
side- discussion of ‘normal’ heterosexual dating conventions, while criticised 
as muddying the conversational waters, is some of the most necessary and 
conceptually valuable consent conversation the ‘me too’ social critique is 
producing.
Perhaps most prevalent among the critiques levelled at ‘me too’ as a 
global movement is that it ‘has gone too far.’ We need, in each instance, to 
interrogate and clarify what ‘too far’ means; anyone who has studied revolu-
tion or politically unstable governments knows that a lot of necessary truth 
lies in territory that is ‘too far’ for many to travel into comfortably. That a 
truth— or a story of any relation to reality— makes us uncomfortable does 
not mean it ought not be spoken. Indeed, I think we need to learn to appre-
ciate, as a strength of ‘me too’ movements, that they are pointing us towards 
opportunities to develop greater tolerance for messy stories. Especially when 
it unfolds online, a ‘me too’ story (or, in the case of Alyssa Milano’s Twitter 
invitation, a #me too story) is messy; personal narrative is often difficult to 
frame coherently, and social media platforms typically give a poster aston-
ishingly little control and ownership over their own story. As Sanyal notes, 
‘social media follows its own rules and patterns, escalating a lot quicker 
and shriller into victim- blaming and dehumanizing of the accused respect-
ively’ (50). This messiness is often perceived as grounds for nullification 
by those who approach interpersonal interaction as if it were governed by 
legally implementable and determinable rules; ‘messiness is hard to judge, 
so let’s not give ourselves that hard work,’ goes the thinking. When ‘me 
too’ demands that messy stories be told, and be heard, and even be taken 
seriously, it becomes a threat to our desire for easy judgements. But this 
engagement is a difficult task that we should take on precisely because it 
gives us the possibility of extending our awareness (and our empathy) fur-
ther into narratives that are now calling to account not just abuses of power 
but abuses of privilege. This is a moment that everyone who works for social 
justice and human rights needs to note with appreciation as a moral step 
forwards in societies reckoning with ‘me too’— a moment in which privilege 
is explicitly held accountable.
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The significance of ‘me too’ extending its narrative spotlight beyond 
rape accusations, into the ‘bad dates’ that many women encourage our-
selves to see as ‘not that bad,’ is that it reveals the mundane and pervasive 
characteristics of low- level sexual violence that women report experien-
cing (persistent harassment for sex in the confines of a dating encounter, 
for example). Ordinary women’s dissection of their everyday expectations 
of appropriate conduct in romantic relationships demonstrate the ongoing 
relevance of psychologist Nicola Gavey’s 1992 study of ‘heterosexual coer-
cion’— which she defines as sets of lessons and social norms heterosexual 
women use to regulate our own behaviour (and make sense of it) in ways 
that benefit men (‘Technologies and Effects’ 325). Gavey interviewed a small 
number of Pākehā [white New Zealand] women about their experiences 
with men in intimate- partner and ‘not that bad’ dating contexts, and drew 
on those interviews to illustrate how technologies of sexual coercion operate. 
Her very clear finding was that women conform to gendered behaviours— 
passivity, withdrawal, accommodation of male desire— that are normalised 
within their cultures and social circles. Conforming to a romantic partner’s 
will and setting aside one’s own preferences can, in liberal- transactional 
analyses, look like consensual interaction, but cumulative experience of 
men’s sexually self- interested behaviours as sexual aggression and low- level 
sexual violence can convince heterosexual women that rape is ‘only the 
extreme manifestation of a more pervasive coercive heterosexuality’ (Gavey, 
‘Technologies and Effects’ 325– 326).
When a story— about dating, about rape, about why an experience is 
given one label or the other— is told and it subverts expectations held by the 
listening community, it unsettles. One way to deal with being unsettled is to 
retreat. Another is to move into a space of interrogation— to listen carefully, 
to take people at their word when they speak of how they feel, and to crit-
ically assess power relations and social privileges when they speak of what 
they did. ‘Women involved in heterosexual encounters are also engaged in 
self- surveillance,’ Gavey tells us;
[we] are encouraged to become self- policing subjects who comply with 
the normative heterosexual narrative scripts which demand our consent 
and participation irrespective of our sexual desire. Thus, while women 
may not engage in conscious and deliberate submission, disciplinary 
power nevertheless produces what can be seen as a form of obedience. 
While the individual male’s behaviour in the interaction is not insig-
nificant, the operations of power involved may transcend his particular 
actions.
(‘Technologies and Effects’ 328– 329)
A ‘me too’ perspective and engagement with messy stories can be a social- 
discursive space in which male social capital (especially in interactions 
marked by gendered inequality) and heterosexist gender scripts are 
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interrogated, and male behaviour is scrutinised in greater detail. The oppor-
tunity this attention provides is a conversation about (typically) gendered 
norms of behaviour that need to be renegotiated:  in ‘me too’ engagement 
with ‘not that bad’ dating, in ‘me too’ attention to workplace harassment, in 
‘me too’ attention to stories of predation, assault, and other forms of sexual 
violence in all of the public and private spaces of human lives.
Gavey’s willingness as an interviewer to let the subjects tell their own 
messy stories, and then to develop a descriptive framework through which 
to analyse power and dominance, makes her analytic framework valuable 
for thinking about the account given by a young New York City female pho-
tographer of her September 2017 date with comedian Aziz Ansari. ‘Grace,’ 
as she is named in the babe.net publication of ‘the worst night of her life,’ 
tells a ‘me too’- era messy story that illustrates how interaction some people 
might not label coercive (interaction, we might even agree with Ansari, that 
appeared consensual) can nevertheless be experienced as dehumanising, 
even abusive. Dismissed in some corners of social media as a miscommuni-
cation between someone who thought she was going on a date and someone 
who thought he was getting casual ‘groupie sex,’ the babe.net exposé called 
Ansari to account, not for the sexual violence Harvey Weinstein was accused 
of, but for a lesser infraction of entitled insensitivity. Like the women whose 
experiences Gavey theorises as heterosexual coercion, ‘Grace’ compromises, 
evades, and deploys a mix of gendered diplomacy and straight talk to convey 
her unwillingness to have sex that evening. ‘Ansari built his career on being 
cute and nice and parsing the signals women send to men and the male 
emotions that result and turning them into award- winning, Madison Square 
Garden- filling comedy . . . [including] routines [that] paint him as the kind 
of guy who strikes out because he actually respects women,’ notes Katie 
Way, the babe.net contributor to whom ‘Grace’ told her story (emphasis in 
original). Way continues:
Grace mentioned the glaring gap between Ansari’s comedy persona 
and the behavior she experienced in his apartment as a reason why she 
didn’t get out earlier. ‘I didn’t leave because I think I was stunned and 
shocked,’ she said. ‘This was not what I expected. I’d seen some of his 
shows and read excerpts from his book and I was not expecting a bad 
night at all, much less a violating night and a painful one.’
The rape- culture landscape in which their encounter took place— what 
both ‘Grace’ and Ansari ‘knew’ going in— included things like their own 
accounts of their sexuality and relationships, and how they represent those 
aspects of self to others; how media and culture represent sexuality and 
relationships; pornography, sex manuals, and sexual humour; religious 
teachings and school sex education; laws referencing sexuality and sexual 
violence (‘Technologies and Effects’ 329). Each of them responded to the 
other through expectations they had been culturally conditioned into. This 
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includes expectations for what the other person will think of their behav-
iour, which is likely why ‘Grace’ did not consider screaming and running 
out of his apartment as one of her options when she asked Ansari to back 
off, he agreed to, and then sat down on his couch and gestured at her to 
perform oral sex on him. She may have been trying to be agentic, but she 
was still subject to social conditioning about, for example, how not to be a 
raving lunatic. For his part, Ansari may not have been openly coercive— just 
horny and insensitive— but one cost to him of symbolising the ‘woke babe’ 
in American comedy circles is the need to maintain awareness of ways in 
which he might be enacting his own privilege. None of this is about law 
and rape trials; it’s about the difficult process of learning to be a better 
human being.
A number of the elements of the ‘robber bridegroom story as dating 
script’ are present in ‘Grace’s’ story; it was a stereotypical dating situ-
ation: Ansari asked her out, and he planned the details so the date took place 
entirely within his ‘territory’ or comfort zone— meeting at his apartment for 
wine, deciding which nearby restaurant to dine at, deciding how quickly 
to leave the restaurant, returning to his apartment for more wine. Despite 
being victim- blamed by commenters on the babe.net story as a deficient 
and careless gatekeeper, ‘Grace’ was the sensible woman: she was accommo-
dating and polite when given white wine instead of the red she preferred and 
when Ansari decided that dinner in the restaurant was over; she was nice 
in her first few rejections of Ansari’s sexual invitations (‘maybe next date’); 
and she was explicit in her communication to him about not wanting to feel 
forced and not being ready to have sexual intercourse with him. She is also 
the woman who is truthful yet not believed; the article includes screenshots 
of their messaging that ‘prove’ she is not lying. No evidence other than his 
own written statement is put forth to document Ansari’s version; he gets 
to speak for himself. This is gendered exercise of power; as Rebecca Solnit 
observes in her discussion of ‘mansplaining,’ women are represented to our-
selves through cultural stereotype— the vengeful woman, the distracted or 
‘ditzy’ one, the manipulative, self- interested one, the silly, easily- influenced- 
by- trends one— as being unreliable narrators of our own experiences (7). 
‘Grace’ speaks for herself, but with a language she was taught to use to 
placate and appeal to men, and she has to speak repeatedly to be heard 
even once.
Applying Gavey’s theoretical frame for explaining how a woman might 
feel coerced in heterosexual romantic and relationship encounters, we can see 
persistent evidence of gendered norms of behaviour being used to manipu-
late ‘Grace’ into serving Ansari’s interests. The first category of coercive and 
manipulative behavioural norms is knowledge about what is ‘normal’ or 
‘expected’— what I  discussed earlier as the ‘rape- culture landscape.’ The 
second category Gavey identifies is whether the woman (person) feels she 
has the language to say ‘no,’ and is heard when she does say ‘no’: ‘Grace’s’ 
narrative makes it clear that she began immediately after their first kiss to 
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put Ansari off gently, and progressed to very clear verbal identification of 
herself to him as ‘feeling forced.’ The third category considers whether a 
woman (person) perceives herself as choosing to act/ not act on her own 
desire or whether she is ‘just letting him’ do things to her. Much of the 
victim- blaming levelled at ‘Grace’ was predicated on her having a robust 
ability to choose, despite social norms of women deferring to men’s wishes, 
and the heightened value that celebrities’ wishes and desires are accorded in 
American culture.
Gavey’s fourth category assesses the extent to which ‘Grace’ might have 
believed there was some penalty attached to being non- compliant in this 
encounter:  for many women in a man’s apartment, politeness is strategic 
and the point is to avoid provoking anger or overt violence. There is also 
the latent pressure of power— the extent to which being bad- mouthed by a 
celebrity might harm her budding career as a photographer connected to 
the American entertainment world— which is the set of previously invisible 
pressures that ‘me too’ is inviting us to recognise as coercion, as a struc-
tural violence of hierarchical and culturally influential workplaces. Also 
built into the ‘rape- culture landscape’ is Gavey’s fifth category: existence of 
a perceived obligation to be nice, to be kind or nurturing, or to go with the 
flow of what (he thought) was clearly happening (a set of pragmatic safety 
and social benefit calculations that Liz Kelly has named as ‘safety work’ and 
Chanel Miller talks about as the bomb- defusing work assigned to unaccom-
panied women in public spaces). Finally, Gavey identifies as a precondition 
for resistance the possibility that a woman (person) might recognise her own 
unwillingness and manoeuvre the situation in a way that makes it feel safe to 
act on that unwillingness— as ‘Grace’ did when Ansari finally called a car to 
take her home after her repeated insistence that she wanted to leave.
In many ways, this story fits within Gavey’s framework precisely because 
it is typical and (in the eyes of many) appears innocuous. But it is, as told, a 
story that reveals sexual violence as more pervasive within dating schemas 
than societies have previously openly acknowledged. (In peace studies terms, 
this is to say that we have begun to interrogate the structural and cultural 
violences built into dating contexts.) In addition to the epistemic harm 
women suffer from being told that our testimonies of our lives are not suf-
ficient to establish narrated events as true ones, there is also the discrediting 
and blaming that is heaped upon those who do speak (Solnit 108). ‘Grace’ 
was being brave in telling her messy story, but she was still undermined by 
commenters as a knowledge- producer in the conversation about what took 
place on her date and scrutinised for whether she had the right to tell her 
story the way she told it, a harm that Miranda Fricker would consider both 
epistemic and social. Ansari’s response to the babe.net story was, ‘oh, sorry, 
I  thought it was consensual,’ and was effectively the end of conversation. 
Continued assertion of an alternative narrative erodes ‘Grace’s’ credibility 
by casting her as a reputation- smearing accuser (a further epistemic and 
identity harm to her).14 
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As Tanya Serisier observes in her analysis of feminist narrative politics, 
some rape narratives can be understood as either feminist or feminised 
versions of the ‘hero’s quest’ narrative- pattern theorised by Joseph Campbell 
(52). Serisier points out that despite the prevalence of ‘dominant masculine 
versions of the hero’s quest . . . there is an alternative tradition of feminine 
heroes, beginning with Scheherazade, narrator and protagonist of the 1001 
Nights, who make use of language and stories to win their victories’ (52– 
53). Margaret Atwood’s narrating handmaid and journal- writing aunt in 
her dystopian Gilead similarly manipulate language, as a survival strategy 
and as a means of performing (and affirming) one’s own existence through 
speech— as do many of the central characters of feminist fiction in modern 
and contemporary literary traditions. As women’s studies scholars, historians 
among us, reach into the past to find figures like Scheherazade who sym-
bolise how speaking can save your life, we also reach back to find other 
iconography of women’s experiences of structurally and culturally violent 
worlds. In debates about whose version of a story is more credible, we have 
no more perfect figure of stereotypical female experience than Cassandra, 
the Trojan prophetess whose predictions were disbelieved.
Rebecca Solnit tells us that ‘in the most famous version of the myth, 
the disbelief with which [Cassandra’s] prophecies were met was the result 
of a curse placed on her by Apollo when she refused to have sex with the 
god’ (116– 117). An ancient source, a commentary on the Aeneid, discloses 
more graphically that, unable to take back the gift of prophecy he had 
bestowed upon Cassandra, Apollo ‘poisoned’ it by spitting into her mouth. 
This punitive act of retaliation, rendering her as the legendary prophetess 
who speaks the truth and is never believed, also produces Cassandra as 
a historico- literary emblem of the voices that have come to be identified 
with ‘me too’ discourses. Even now, with ‘me too’ and social media making 
messy stories more visible, the response to women presenting testimonies 
less organised than legal briefs is still, far too often, about blaming of 
the person who is speaking of their pain for the incident(s) that caused 
the pain, full- scale denial and gaslighting (manipulating the person into 
understanding your version of events as their reality), and sceptical ‘what 
about’- ing that equates to slut- shaming and a refusal to consider victimisa-
tion in circumstances where (someone’s) credibility cannot be established. 
The person we decide to believe doesn’t even have to be the person who is 
actually telling the truth, just the person who seems most believable. Given 
that our cultures routinely diminish the credibility of marginalised groups, 
especially ones they can label ‘weak,’ credibility favours the privileged, 
those who can mobilise rape myths to evade accountability. What ‘me too’ 
messy stories are revealing, then, is testimonial injustice at work in a world 
in which Cassandra speaks and is not just disbelieved but systematically 
harassed.
Miranda Fricker says, ‘persistent cases . . . of wrongful epistemic exclu-
sion could, especially if they are also systematic, genuinely inhibit the devel-
opment of an essential aspect of a person’s identity’ (54). Her philosophical 
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analysis of epistemic injustice helps to explain why we should pay attention 
to women’s testimonies that ‘me too’ discourses are taking up and increas-
ingly interrogating beyond standard dismissals as ‘bad dates.’15 Claims that 
these not- rapes are nevertheless problems that need to be worked out, into a 
social consensus of new and improved sexual ethics, are often dismissed as 
coming from ‘women who want to play the victim card,’ a posture of dismis-
siveness that I think is wrong, unfair, and short- sighted. For those who are 
speaking only of problems and solutions that take place in legal contexts, 
messy stories— what Anglo- American philosophy of law would recognise as 
‘penumbral cases’— are frustratingly immune to tools of interrogation and 
due process, so must be put outside the bounds of discussion. For the rest of 
us, however, these messy stories can be an invitation to extend our bound-
aries of understanding and learn to see injustices that had previously been 
invisible to us, as structural or cultural violence. If we were to take up the 
challenge they pose, messy stories could be part of facilitating rather than 
inhibiting essential epistemic development.
Fricker’s worry about persistent exclusion suggests that unwillingness 
to give a woman’s testimony a thoughtful hearing could inhibit the devel-
opment of her sexual autonomy:  if she can’t be trusted to recognise and 
describe the situation she finds herself in, how can she be held to account for 
her choices? As I read her analysis of epistemic injustice, it is indeed possible 
to experience secondary harm (identity- impairment, for example) as a conse-
quence of the primary harm of being excluded from knowledge production. 
It also, I think, makes sense to see impaired or arrested autonomy as another 
attenuated harm. Excluding a woman who is telling a messy story from par-
ticipation in communities of knowledge- production means excluding her 
from membership in communities of truth- telling; her socially constructed 
identity as a credible speaker of her own experiences is foreclosed, and this 
makes it even more difficult for her to pick her way through the cultural 
messaging about what men want from women in sexual behaviours. This, in 
turn, impairs her path to sexual autonomy, the capacity to make thoughtful, 
informed choices for which she can and should take full responsibility. 
Instead of ruling out people who are not telling coherent stories, people who 
are choosing messiness, we could be practicing the ‘learning to hear’ justice 
orientation that Fricker recommends. Engagement with details that don’t 
fit, motivations that don’t make sense, interactions that puzzle, is not just an 
orientation that creates social space in which she learns to speak for herself 
responsibly; it is also a space in which we are challenged into development of 
greater cognitive capacity for complexity and nuance (which itself appears 
to be related to emotional capacity for empathy). Both a cultural context 
more conducive to sexual autonomy and social patterns of discourse that 
appreciate and encourage complex and challenging narratives will require 
us to examine what Sanyal describes as ‘grey areas where comfortable sexu-
ality ends but rape hasn’t yet started,’ areas she says are really markers of 
‘sexual illiteracy’ (Sanyal 157). In her view, ‘sexual and relationship ethics 
are an integral part of the discussion about sexual violence, but they are not 
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the same thing. We must address them both if we really want to change our 
sexual and emotional culture’ (Sanyal 182).
A stage theory of saying yes: the princess’s choices
One way to see the history of anti- rape activism as joining Second Wave and 
Third Wave feminisms in a common project is to tell a story of the history 
of consent education. Through such a story we can see the work we need 
to do— the renegotiation of gender and socialisation that ‘me too’ messy 
stories open up for us— as being not- new at all. Those who either cham-
pion or dismiss ‘me too’ as a new way of doing things fail to see the decades 
of labour that have been poured into making this paradigm shift possible. 
The metaphors of stage theory and paradigm shift rest against each other 
uneasily here; I draw on them to tell consent education as a story that largely 
picks up from the history of rape I surveyed earlier in this chapter and brings 
us all the way to this current moment’s promise of a different worldview 
with respect to sexual violence. The history of rape is almost necessarily a 
legal story: because the idea that a woman might have sexual preferences 
and make sexual choices is relatively new in many cultures, rape had been 
understood as a property violation one man might commit against another 
man (a crime), and consent took a long time to spread as a relevant concept, 
in either social or legal discourse. As the concept has spread throughout 
popular discourse, it has followed patterns of development that look like the 
classical model of stage theory as it appears in the study of human develop-
ment: each entity goes through each stage of development in the same order, 
even if there is individual variation in the matter of when a given entity 
enters or exits any stage.
In this ‘stage theory of saying yes’ that I am offering, we begin after the 
history of perpetual consent has been put to rest and law has given us its 
doctrine of presumed consent: assuming someone has said yes unless a ‘no’ 
can be proven.16 In these social conditions, we move, through sustained and 
furious activism, into a discursive space where ‘no’ simply must be taken 
seriously and respected. This sustained and furious work to normalise a 
(woman’s) right to say no is one of the campaigns we remember today as the 
legacy of Second Wave feminism— although I have already noted the much 
longer history of sustained work in African- American communities, and it 
is always possible to find pockets of history that can strike one as startlingly 
relevant or modern.17 In the cultural narratives of many English- speaking 
developed nations— the United States and Canada, the United Kingdom, 
Australia and New Zealand are the countries I have in mind— this stage takes 
place against a backdrop of broad and radical social reforms in the 1960s 
and 1970s. It is marked by the writings of Susan Brownmiller, Catharine 
MacKinnon, Germaine Greer, Andrea Dworkin, among others, but also by 
the community organising that produced domestic violence shelters and 
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programmes in universities, and by the popularisation of feminist critiques 
of pornography, rape culture, and subordination of women to men. In the 
United States, as I have noted previously, the impact of this cultural change on 
the university was assisted by Title IX prohibition of gender discrimination 
in student populations. While Title IX’s first and most obvious reshaping of 
university life was funding an explosion of women’s sports teams, it also 
provided a justification and a framework for institutional policy- making 
in the area of sexual misconduct on campus. Administrative units respon-
sible for student well- being complied with reporting requirements for on- 
campus sexual assaults, developed investigative committees and processes 
for responding to complaints, and harnessed the power of women’s studies 
programmes and activist students to publicise consent education campaigns 
promoting the message that ‘no’ means no.
But eventually, the ‘no means no’ model that we adopt as a corrective 
to presumed consent proves inadequate. What happens in cases in which 
someone does not say ‘no’ because they are sleeping? Or unconscious? Or 
the person does not say ‘no’ because everyone knows you don’t say no 
to daddy, or auntie, or your boss? Mithu Sanyal observes that education 
campaigns in that stage reinscribe gender norms by ‘teaching girls to say 
no, and boys to accept the no’ (Sanyal 157). Being a gatekeeper whose ‘no’ 
is respected is no less social labour than being a gatekeeper whose ‘no’ is 
ignored (although the outcome is almost certainly less traumatic), but the 
‘no means no’ framework renders an obvious question unaskable: what if 
girls want to say yes? Although the writings of many Second Wave feminists 
are replete with observations about the coercive implications of gendered 
social roles,18 the consent education story tends at this point to shift its 
attention to an emerging Third Wave of feminism in these same developed 
nations during the 1990s.
Often still not well- understood by feminists of earlier generations, the 
Third Wave has been characterised by what I would argue is an engagement 
with structural and cultural violence. They have concentrated, one might 
say, on pulling up the roots of rape culture rather than chopping down 
its weeds. Derided in American cable- news circles as earnest and joyless, 
lacking some requisite ability to enjoy their youth, university students in the 
early Third Wave (millennials) nevertheless participated in an evolving array 
of conduct and consent codes designed to perform and/ or verbalise consent 
at each progressive step of their sexual activity. Antioch College’s ‘Sexual 
Offense Prevention Policy’ (SOPP), introduced in 1990, was the forerunner 
of these campus efforts to operationalise consent; however mockable or 
ham- fisted the SOPP seemed to some at the time, it has created a campus 
community that affirms the SOPP code as norms of respect and account-
ability for personal behaviour, and it has inspired ‘yes means yes’ codes that 
bill themselves variously as enthusiastic consent, communicative consent, 
and affirmative consent (Rosman). This advocacy of unambiguous commu-
nication of desires and consents is not only an American endeavour, nor 
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even an anglophone one; the ‘Believe Campaign’ students I worked with in 
Japan had crafted a sophisticated programme of consent education out of 
resources they had encountered on study- abroad semesters, including the 
now- ubiquitous but always charming ‘consent is like a cup of tea’ video 
commissioned by Thames Valley Police (UK; see May and Brian).
When ‘me too’ reporting and hashtags first impinged on American public 
consciousness in late 2017, they arrived into an ongoing contestation of 
sexual ethics that had evolved to the stage at which the standard is no 
longer just to hear the ‘no,’ but to solicit a ‘yes.’ This ‘affirmative’ model 
is an improvement over the previous way of thinking, but many of its 
articulations still build in regressive gender scripts (toxic male sexual entitle-
ment to solicit the now- mandatory ‘yes’ and complicit/ conflict- avoidant 
female gatekeeper obligations to justify that ‘yes’) that permit a coercive 
and deeply upsetting incident like ‘Grace’ had on her date with Ansari to 
be described as his attempt to  ‘get to yes.’ Sanyal explains this weakness as 
a consequence of the education model’s aim: a ‘yes- means- yes . . . focus is 
on avoiding unwelcome contact, not on teaching people how to navigate a 
self- determined sexual life’ (162). One of the critical contributions ‘me too’ 
has made to discourses on dating and sex is to demand an accounting for 
the role of social capital in delivering a privileged man’s desired ‘yes.’ It has 
also exposed the persistence of regressive social norms that make women 
the guardians of our virtue— which, unlike Aristotelian accounts of (male) 
virtue as an expansive set of moral and intellectual capacities that need to 
be nurtured and practiced, is reduced in women to a virginity– monogamy– 
celibacy triad. And it has exposed pervasive socially conditioned impulses 
to blame those to whom sexual violence happens for not having done their 
gatekeeping labour properly.
As ‘me too’ critically interrogates social norms that affirmative consent 
(yes- means- yes) education has not adequately challenged, it gives us a per-
suasive argument for moving beyond affirmative consent models. It even 
gives reason for hope that some of our cultures— again, with and thanks to 
the hard work of activists— might move into a social space in which sexual 
self- determination is seen as a significant feature of socially responsible 
adult human existence.19 My years of anti- sexual assault work on American 
college campuses have given me a profound appreciation for all of the work 
that has been poured into the creation and development of all these stages of 
consent education. The models and workshops through which consent has 
been taught have saved lives. Literally. I know that. Until ‘me too’ entered 
my awareness, I thought these affirmative models (personally, I favoured the 
label ‘enthusiastic consent’) were the best that we could reasonably hope for. 
I continue to endorse their emphasis on articulating one’s thoughts to part-
ners and on the unambiguous performance of mutual interest.
My sense that affirmative/ enthusiastic consent was the best standard we 
could articulate began to shift as I engaged myself with the messy story of 
‘Grace’ and Ansari, and with the stream of commentary it provoked. The 
 
The spectrum of problematic sex 129
crucial question that sharpened my thinking came from a column on a site 
the Washington Post sponsors to engage with readers who have a Third 
Wave feminist bent:  Latina journalist Amanda Alcántara asked whether 
consent is a matter of ‘wanting’ or ‘letting.’ I  had already been thinking 
about the crucial role that mutual desire needs to play in intimate- partner 
relationships, and this sharp question about the very implications of the 
word ‘consent’ helped push my thinking forward, helped me to see that 
the next stage I  think we need to propel ourselves towards is a discourse 
grounded in mutual wanting.
In theory, there is no terminological argument for swapping out references 
to ‘consent’ for references to ‘mutuality’:  the Latin words out of which 
‘consent’ was constructed (con- sentire) urge us to ‘feel together’— which is 
exactly the implication I am reaching for in my thinking about mutuality. 
But the connotations of words are not limited to philosophical implications 
of their origins; they also include associations— some easily apparent and 
explicable, others more historically idiosyncratic— that cultures and individ-
uals develop over time. Connotations also direct us to particular contexts of 
application: one thing I am wrestling with throughout writing this chapter 
is how to wrest this discussion of sex and its consent– choice terminolo-
gies away from the legal context that so much of the discourse assumes. 
Much of the effort to shift our thinking into a quest for, say, welcomeness 
or mutuality— or even to sensibly apply an affirmative- consent standard— is 
met with criticisms that assume legal remedies and penalties.20 Defenders 
of Ansari, for instance, point out that his actions towards ‘Grace’ did not 
amount to sexual violence and he should not be accused of rape. He was 
not, in fact, accused of being a rapist; he was accused of being a pushy, 
insensitive, entitled man. The babe.net article was not describing a crime; it 
was describing a depressing and all- too- familiar really bad date. It is on the 
spectrum of problematic sex, as rape is on the spectrum, but— importantly— 
rape and bad dates do not occupy the same point on this spectrum. The art-
icle did not do all the hard work it might have done in asking us to think 
about why we dismiss dates like this as part of the fabric of our worlds, as 
bits of the spectrum too insignificant to bother with, but its timing gave 
readers the ‘me too’ critical resources to dissect social norms and gender 
scripts that produce undesirable outcomes such as— to borrow Gavey’s 
phrase— heterosexual coercion.
The project of dismantling rape culture, eliminating it as a form of 
structural violence, does not consist only in reviewing our institutions and 
structures (the legal world, for instance) to make sure they are not perpetu-
ating structural violence. We should be doing this, yes, but there is a broader 
scope to this project as I see it. In order to meet the problem of sexual vio-
lence at its roots, in the cultural violence of oppressive and harmful norms 
and scripts, we need to move beyond consent models of thinking about 
sex— even as we recognise that they have served us well and recognise that 
they continue to save and heal lives in more ruthlessly patriarchal societies 
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that are only now moving into, or still moving through, what we think of 
as outdated discursive models. Whatever we call it— another honing of the 
consent label, or an outright swapping into language of mutuality— this new 
model of thinking about how to have sex that is not on the ‘problematic’ 
spectrum needs to be something like what Linda Martín Alcoff outlines in 
Rape and Resistance as the need to develop sexual subjectivity that supports 
agency and desire for all of us. This point is also made by Sanyal, who 
argues that ‘people who know what they want and need are a lot better at 
respecting other people’s desires and boundaries as well as their own’ (162).
Although I feel a bit of pragmatic impatience at the thought of what to 
call this stage- model that lies beyond consent— I want the norms of mutu-
ality and agency and responsibility for one’s desire, and will take them under 
any label that doesn’t undermine them— I also see a powerful role for lan-
guage in conveying behavioural expectations of consent- models.21 Sanyal’s 
account of author Bini Adamczak’s proposal that we consider the merits of 
sexual discourse adopting the word ‘circlusion’ (antonym to ‘penetration’) 
is suggestive here:
‘Both words signify the same physical process but from opposite 
perspectives. Penetration means to insert something or to put something 
in. Circlusion means to surround or to clasp. That’s it. But it allocates 
activity and passivity inversely.’ Adamczak argues that it should be easy 
to introduce this neologism, as ‘circlusion is already part of our everyday 
experiences. Just think of the net that catches the fish, the mouth that 
chews the food, the nutcracker that [crushes] the nut . . . Circlusion 
enables us to express sensations that we’ve always been experiencing,’ 
thereby changing not only language but the concept of sexuality.
(Sanyal 19)
Despite the undeniable appeal of subversive language, the priority for this 
dismantling project must be development of models of sexual ethics that 
are grounded in a celebration of mutuality, and that allow all sexual agents 
to own their own desires (and lacks), speak authentically of wanting 
(or not), and learn how to negotiate mutually agreed- upon ways of sat-
isfying these wants. All of this development work will need new norms 
affirming the value of characteristics we have previously devalued in 
cultures around the world: strong women, kind men, and whole people. 
(I don’t mean to suggest here that, for instance, only kindness should be 
valued in men or that kindness should only be valued when practiced by 
men; what I am urging is that we retire traditional gender prescriptions in 
favour of robust appreciation of self- determination/ autonomy and nurt-
uring and responsibility- taking wherever they occur, in persons of any 
gender.) Learning to value in anyone character traits that had previously 
been rigidly gendered will open up societal space for more individuals to 
live lives less constrained by stereotypes. Coupled with an agentic and 
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empathetic model of sexual consensus, I  think this could produce less 
sexual violence and fewer victims.22
‘Consent is currently the best tool we have to interact as equals,’ Sanyal 
concludes from her analysis of sexual violence, but, she warns, ‘it is more 
complex than it may initially seem. Because consent is always bound up with 
other social norms’ (159). The various stages that societies straining towards 
gender equality have moved through— from the emergence of consent as a 
legal concept, to the insistence that ‘no’ means no, to the insistence that only 
‘yes’ can mean yes— have introduced women’s interests into social discourses 
about sex: women’s desire is more readily accepted these days, even if our 
capacity to report it accurately is doubted. But we still have not shifted the 
gatekeeping burden that toxic masculinity and complicit femininity have 
heaped upon women. Women like ‘Grace’ are blamed for poor manage-
ment of men’s desire and are deemed incapable of honest testimony. This 
acceptance of disparate burden is part of the gendered social consensus— 
part of the whole spectrum of problematic sex, from rape to bad dates— that 
‘me too’ is exposing and calling on us to either justify or reform.
The specific sites of reform I see ‘me too’ opening up for us— the work 
that needs to be done— are in our expectations (for ourselves and for the 
others we share our societies with) about how we listen, how we speak, and 
how we judge (ourselves and others). Both Miranda Fricker and I would 
want to see her ‘learning to hear’ justice orientation practiced widely, as a 
corrective to the credibility deficits suffered by the many groups of people 
our social worlds deem unreliable in a range of ways. Fricker’s discussion 
of the role of listening in virtue epistemology, her corrective for epistemic 
injustice, contributes to a growing body of literature across academic dis-
ciplines about the importance of listening and being listened to in achieving 
our goals, and is only tangentially what I have drawn out here as an ethical 
practice of greater sexual knowledge.23
Learning to speak, to talk, to tell stories is also part of this work we need 
to do. Telling one’s story, messy or otherwise, talks the end of rape culture 
into being in two ways:  it reveals to similarly situated listeners that they 
are not alone and it reveals to differently situated listeners ranges of social 
experiences they would not otherwise know. I have mentioned at length in 
my discussion of messy stories my opinion that ‘me too’ can teach us to be 
better judges of testimony, but I think we also need to work on being better 
judges of what care people need.
In the next chapter, I tell stories of how ‘me too’ emerged as a discursive 
space in which women could speak of the many ways we are subjected to 
gendered injustices, and one of those foundational stories is the history of 
Tarana Burke’s consent education work transforming into ‘me too.’ Burke 
speaks movingly of the creation of her outreach organisation as an attempt 
to redress what she saw in herself as a failure to offer empathy to someone 
who needed it, and her gloss on ‘me too’ manifests a deep commitment to 
empathy, and empathy- training. Empathy that assists self- determination is a 
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matter of learning to filter our speech through the ethical screen that jour-
nalist P. Sainath urges upon us: ‘recall the face of the poorest and weakest 
person you have met, and ask yourself how the action you contemplate 
will place him or her in greater control of his or her life’ (‘Nero’s Guests’ 
53:31– 53:47).24 To varying extents, each of us can develop ourselves as 
better listeners, better speakers and better judges of social and sexual ethics, 
but we do need to keep in mind Fricker’s caution that ‘[s] hifting the unequal 
relations of power that create the conditions of hermeneutical injustice 
(namely, hermeneutical marginalization) takes more than virtuous indi-
vidual conduct of any kind; it takes group political action for social change’ 
(174). It is to that group action that I turn in the next chapter, a history of 
‘me too’ and its global challenges of women’s social conditions.
Coda: culture- jamming consent violations in ‘Sleeping Beauty’
What’s wrong with this story? Sleeping Beauty has been asleep for a hun-
dred years. The life she had known and everyone she had loved are all gone. 
The kiss that will awaken her will reveal to her that she is utterly alone in 
the world, and the first new person with whom she might make a human 
connection will be someone who has just kissed her without her consent. 
That’s really not a great basis on which to rebuild one’s life.
What if the story unfolded this way instead?
Once upon a time, there was a kingdom with no king, no queen, and a 
castle that no one could see anymore. It was overgrown with sharp- thorned 
brambles, and the legend that the people of the kingdom passed down 
through the generations said that a beautiful princess lay inside the castle. 
She had been cursed, the legend explained, by an evil fairy who had intruded 
on her christening as a baby, and who had condemned the princess to prick 
her finger on a spinning wheel as a young woman and fall into a slumber 
that would last for 100 years. According to the legend, the spell could only 
be broken by a lover’s kiss. The king and queen had been distraught when 
the fairy’s curse came to pass despite all their efforts to protect their daughter 
from spinning wheels, so they had scoured the kingdom for another fairy, 
one who could cast another spell that would protect their beautiful sleeping 
daughter once they were no longer alive to watch out for her. She would lie 
in her bed peacefully for the entire length of time of the evil fairy’s curse, and 
the castle would be protected by a profusion of thickly grown, dangerous 
brambles that could only be penetrated by the pure of heart. No one alive 
today in the kingdom knew for certain how much time the princess had been 
sleeping, but the brambles had grown so thick that some people had started 
to doubt that there even was a castle inside the thicket.
In this kingdom lived a young man who had heard tellings and re- tellings 
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princess had resonated with him; he felt sorrow for her and for the king and 
queen, for the lives that had been disrupted by the fairy’s curse. His own 
parents, who were also deceased, had been similarly protective of his well- 
being, making sure that he learned to read and write, and to cook, and to 
mend fences, encouraging him to become self- sufficient at an early age. He 
supposed that the story spoke to him because the king and queen’s efforts 
to protect their daughter sounded like something his parents would have 
done. Now, he and his grandmother, his mother’s mother, lived on a little 
plot of land that they had inherited from his parents; they grew vegetables 
and tended sheep and lived a quiet, comfortable life in a little house that had 
a view of the bramble thicket in the distance.
For years, as he and his grandmother cared for the sheep and the vege-
table garden, he would take time out from his labours to gaze at the brambles 
and wonder to himself about how much of the legend was true. Was there 
a castle inside the brambles? Was there a princess inside the castle? What 
would happen when the hundred years was over? Would she just wake up 
on her own? The legend said that a lover’s kiss would awaken her, but was 
that only a loophole to free her from the curse before the hundred years 
had elapsed? Maybe the kiss wasn’t necessary? Sometimes he would share 
these questions with his grandmother, but she wasn’t much interested in 
questioning the legend; she just liked to re- tell it the way it had been told to 
her. She was a loving and capable woman, but she didn’t have a philosoph-
ical mind. Not many of the people the young man knew did have that kind 
of mind, so he mostly kept his questions to himself. They became a game 
he played with himself in the evenings, after his work was done. He would 
sit outside his house, beside the vegetable garden, and watch the bramble 
thicket in the distance slowly fade into indistinct darkness as the dusk sky 
turned into night and his mind ground the jagged edges off his questions.
One morning he woke up and just knew somehow that this day would 
have a different rhythm to it than all his other days. It wasn’t a planting 
day, or a harvesting day, or a shearing day, or a market day. It wasn’t even 
a fence- mending day or a holiday. It was different from all his routine days, 
and different from the special days too. He didn’t know why it was different, 
or how he knew— it just was. Today was the day that he was going to satisfy 
his curiosity about the legend. He was going to ride to the bramble thicket 
and inspect it for himself.
It was a long ride, but the day was beautiful: warm, but not uncomfortably 
so, with a breeze rising and falling like the gentle breathing of the land itself. 
He could hear birdsong everywhere. When he arrived at the brambles, it was 
midday, so he ate his lunch in their shadow, watered his horse, and found her 
a secure, shady spot to rest under an old tree nearby. Then he approached 
the brambles. The thorns looked viciously sharp, like they would tear his 
flesh if he touched them, but when he reached out a tentative finger to touch 
one, the whole bramble the thorn was attached to shifted and opened a 
space for him. He touched another, and another. He could scarcely believe 
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what he was seeing, but there was quite clearly a path that had opened up, 
just wide enough for him to pass through the brambles to a grassy clearing 
inside. And there was the castle. The brambles were so high that he had to 
tilt his head all the way back to see the sky, but they had not grown into the 
castle in the way that weeds invade an abandoned house; they were simply 
a protective barrier around this still fully intact building. He passed through 
what looked like the main entrance and started exploring the quiet, dusty 
hallways and staircases. If the castle was real, maybe the princess was too.
She was. And she was beautiful. She seemed to be sleeping so peace-
fully that the young man wondered why any lover would want to disturb 
her. He was drawn to her, yet he did not want to break the peace that had 
settled over her. As he marvelled at her beauty and the calm that the evil 
fairy’s spell had unexpectedly brought to her, he noticed that the table 
beside her bed had a letter propped on it. There was no envelope, no seal; 
it was open, to be read by anyone in the room. It was a letter from the 
princess’s parents, the long- dead king and queen, explaining to the prin-
cess what had happened to her and what they had done to protect the 
castle as she slept. It ended quite simply, ‘we love you.’ The spirit of care 
that flowed from the letter brought tears to the young man’s eyes, and he 
knew immediately what he could contribute to the princess’s well- being. 
Fishing his ‘thoughts and questions only I am interested in’ notebook and 
a pencil out of his shirt pocket, he ripped out a blank page and wrote his 
own note to the princess. ‘The people of your kingdom love you too,’ he 
wrote; ‘any person in my village will help you if you come to us when you 
awaken.’ He drew a map of the route he had taken this morning to get to 
the castle and marked the village’s relative position using the sun as a dir-
ectional guide so that she would know to travel east. He drew a schematic 
map of the village, with all of the locations he hoped she might feel com-
fortable approaching: the market where food and clothing were sold, the 
inn where travellers stayed on their way through town, and— he hoped this 
wasn’t presumptuous— the house in which he and his grandmother lived, 
where he assured her there would always be a hearty meal, guest quarters, 
and transportation at her disposal.
Then he left, passing through the brambles as easily as when he had 
entered. The ride home was long, and by the time he had fed, groomed, 
and stabled his horse, dusk was approaching. His grandmother was happily 
puttering in the kitchen; it was her night to prepare their evening meal. So he 
poured himself a cup of wine, and went out to the vegetable garden to watch 
the bramble thicket in the distance slowly fade into indistinct darkness.
Notes
 1 In this formulation, it seems clear that Sanyal is acknowledging Susan Sontag’s 
observation in a 1967 essay, ‘The Pornographic Imagination,’ that ever since 
Christianity took hold of what has become known as Western civilisation, ‘every-
thing pertaining to sex has been a “special case” in our culture’ (213– 214). Sontag’s 
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point here will be familiar to those conversant with Michel Foucault’s History of 
Sexuality as what he calls ‘the repressive hypothesis’ (Volume 1, 11– 12).
 2 Sanyal quotes Randy Thornhill and Craig T. Palmer, authors of A Natural History 
of Rape, offering a particularly tone- deaf justification for the thesis of their 
book:  ‘People everywhere understand sex as something females have that males 
want’ (Sanyal 5); she also quotes feminist critic Laurie Penny’s scathing analysis of 
the messages about femininity in glossy ‘lifestyle’ magazines: ‘ “No” is one of the 
most erotic things a woman can say . . . Real men don’t want women to want what 
they want’ (Sanyal 12). In both of these cases, rape is elided into sex (or ‘sexy’).
 3 For men, on the other hand, ‘[m] any physicians considered rape immoral but 
unavoidable and, if there were no prostitutes available, “infinitely preferable to the 
perils of masturbation,” since regular sexual discharge was indispensable to men’s 
health’ (Sanyal 13). A (specious) medical preference for rape over masturbation 
(self- pleasure theorised as self- abuse, or violence directed towards oneself) explains 
crimes against humanity like World War II Japanese military sexual slavery (wide-
spread trafficking and exploitation of ‘comfort women’) on the assumption that 
it’s better to inflict violence or harm on someone else than on yourself. (There is, 
of course, no philosophical argument for why it is acceptable/ better to inflict on 
someone else something that you yourself would prefer not to experience.)
 4 This particular aspect of violence against women— that it disproportionately (rela-
tive to men’s experience of violence) occurs at the hands of an intimate partner 
(husband, wife, boyfriend or girlfriend), former partner, or close family relation— is 
a fairly common finding in all surveys of violence that organise their collected data 
by the gender of victims. See, for instance, Fyers and Ensor’s The Homicide Report, 
a publicly searchable database of homicides occurring in New Zealand between 
January 2004 and March 2019 (https:// interactives.stuff.co.nz/ 2019/ the- homicide- 
report/ #); its analysis reveals that half of all female homicide victims were killed by 
a partner or ex- partner and that these killings were more likely to be premeditated 
or planned than spontaneous or unintentional. This contrasts with the male homi-
cide victims in the report who are statistically more likely than women to be killed 
by a stranger in (often alcohol- fuelled) spontaneous episodes of violence.
 5 See Chapter  1’s extensive endnote that surveys nation- state variation in legal 
treatment of rape and some tangential sexual violences.
 6 As recently as 2019– 2020, shamefully sexist and victim- blaming defences have 
been used, in court and in media, to shield defendants of ‘sex crimes’ from respon-
sibility; the Auckland murder (not rape) trial of the killer of Grace Millane exem-
plifies this holdover of 13th- century thinking. Millane, a young British woman 
who was holidaying in New Zealand, was last seen alive in CCTV footage of her 
and a man she had met online. When her body was found several days later at 
a dump- site far from the hotel she was seen entering, her killer claimed she had 
consented to ‘rough sex,’ her death had been a tragic accident, and he wasn’t 
to blame, truly. His cover story was painstakingly picked apart in the trial that 
ended with his guilty verdict, but that did not stop the media from breathlessly 
picking up the story of Grace’s Tinder date and generating an endless stream of 
opinions about whether a ‘50 Shades’ defence is an acceptable legal strategy.
 7 Sanyal quotes German cultural studies theorist Gesa Dane as saying, ‘There is 
even evidence that women perceived as being “plain” or “obese” are less likely to 
be believed, and are therefore less likely to report a rape’ . . . the ‘who would want 
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 8 The survey was done by a group of students who were founders of Believe 
Campaign Soka, a consent- education group modelled on the bystander inter-
vention initiatives organised in the United States to address the widespread 
problem of sexual assault on college campuses. A Japanese- language graph of 
their survey results can be found at https:// believecampainsoka4.wixsite.com/ 
believecampaignsoka/ 2017. Another more informal questioning of students at a 
different Tokyo university in 2019 elicited the following observations:
‘In Japan, there is a cultural characteristic of women that they cannot say 
no. They know they have rights to say no, but the cultural atmosphere does 
not allow them to do so. Therefore, it is really difficult for Japanese women 
to [speak] up about the rights of women since I know many people who did 
it were attacked socially.’; and
‘In Japan, there is a saying, “iya- yo iya- yo, mo suki- no uchii,” which 
means that when women say no, they’re actually thinking yea, and so 
I thought it expresses the patriarchy in Japanese culture’; and
‘Although one may never have had been assaulted sexually, we experience 
this “culture” in social values such as using “assault” quantity to “measure 
attractiveness of yourself,” like people telling you that the reason you got 
harassed is because you are “attractive” or some girls feel unattractive 
because they have never been sexually harassed . . . I  think this strongly 
comes from complicit[y] of women and men to feel “better” about this 
reality.’
(Nicholls)
 9 See, for instance, the discussion of psychology professor Mary Koss’s originary 
work in 1976 surveys of Kent State (Ohio) university students in Alexandra 
Rutherford’s Behavioral Scientist analysis. In other jurisdictions, similar fig-
ures are produced by surveys of households and individuals (‘The Crime Survey 
for England and Wales’ done by the UK’s Office for National Statistics and the 
Amnesty Switzerland survey done by the GfS Bern Institute).
 10 Systematic hermeneutical injustice is defined as ‘the injustice of having some sig-
nificant area of one’s social experience obscured from collective understanding 
owing to a structural identity prejudice in the collective hermeneutical resource’ 
(Fricker 155). General hermeneutical injustice (including incidental), on the 
other hand, is defined as ‘the injustice of having some significant area of one’s 
social experience obscured from collective understanding owing to hermeneut-
ical marginalization’ (Fricker 158). One can be marginalised as an individual 
without necessarily participating in a marginalised group identity.
 11 Fricker makes a point of telling us, about the systematic- incidental distinction 
she is making in cases of hermeneutical injustice, that ‘the fact that a hermen-
eutical injustice is incidental does not mean that it is not ethically serious’ (158). 
His ‘hermeneutical participation is hindered in respect of a significant, if highly 
localized, patch of his social experience, and for this reason his case qualifies as a 
hermeneutical injustice. The injustice does not stem from any structural identity 
prejudice— on the contrary, he suffers the injustice not because of, but rather in 
spite of, the social type he is’ (Fricker 158).
 12 One of the most interesting elements of New Zealand psychologist Nicola 
Gavey’s 2019 revision of her 2005 book, Just Sex? The Cultural Scaffolding of 
Rape, is its organisational structure as an overlay of her 2019 commentary on her 
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parenthetical interjections to update statistical data and to re- think conclusions 
in light of new evidence, is at its most significant as feminist- academic scholar-
ship in its 2005/ 2019 ‘conversation’ about how rape of a man by a woman fits 
in to conceptual paradigms that shape feminist anti- rape activism.
 13 The babe.net story I discuss in this section as analysable through Nicola Gavey’s 
early work on coercive dating norms is a representative example. It contains 
January 2018 reporting of events from September 2017, that just pre- dated ‘me 
too’ revelations against Harvey Weinstein.
 14 American philosopher Kate Manne offers similar observations about male 
sexual entitlement and testimonial injustice inflicted upon women in her May 
2020 analysis of Tara Reade’s sexual assault allegations against Joe Biden, the 
presumptive Democratic nominee in the US presidential elections in November 
2020. Manne argues that the well- documented accusations of inappropriate 
touching on his part signify ‘the same sense of privileged male entitlement that 
often underlies more serious sexual breaches, including sexual assault of the kind 
Reade alleges’ (‘I Believe Tara Reade’).
 15 I am speaking here, throughout this section of the chapter, of sexual encounters 
that are only thinly, technically consensual, the not- rapes that women nonethe-
less report feeling socially coerced into out of varying combinations of a female- 
socialisation pressure to be accommodating and fear of antagonising the man.
 16 I begin my ‘stage theory’ analogy at ‘presumed consent’ because I have picked 
up from where I left off in the first section’s history of rape. That history was the 
law’s recognition that rape was not a property crime— that there was a person 
for whom the sexual act might or might not be violence depending on whether 
they had consented. Once a female person has emerged within the legal realm 
that adjudicates the male world of property use and misuse, consent is a feature 
of the act that must be either presumed or documented. Pervasive male domin-
ance throughout the cultures of the world makes presumed consent— inference 
by male judges and jurors of the victim’s state of mind— an obviously coherent 
status- quo position. Mithu Sanyal notes that ‘[m] ale force and female reluctance 
were an integral part of the construction of “normal” sexuality in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries’ and women were thought to feign resistance in order to 
stoke men’s desire (9). Because ‘resistance’ was understood as bound up in flirting 
and courting practices, the law ‘needed [a woman’s] “utmost resistance” to prove 
that the perpetrator’s force had been violence, as opposed to welcome force, i.e. 
that he had raped and not ravished her . . . [and] the victim had to uphold her 
massive physical resistance throughout’ lest others conclude that she had, at some 
point during the act, changed her mind and consented (Sanyal 53). In a social 
world that sees women as asexual and manipulative, a doctrine of presumed con-
sent does offer paths to legal judgement that would be socially coherent.
 17 In her history of consent, Mithu Sanyal notes the existence of ‘Celtic law 
(approximately 1000 to 55 BCE) . . . [which] recognized two types of rape: for-
cible rape and rape of a woman who couldn’t consent (due to intoxication or 
mental illness)’ (52). This legal recognition of capacity to consent suggests an 
understanding of personhood and autonomy consistent with the landmark 2018 
Swedish law that defined as rape any sex devoid of consent (Sanyal 179).
 18 Indeed, as Rebecca Solnit observes, ‘[t] he feminism of [the 1980s, the “Late 
Second Wave”] is often dismissed as grimly antisex because it pointed out 
that sex is an arena of power and that power is liable to abuse and because it 
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 19 Mithu Sanyal notes that ‘the right to sexual self- determination is important for 
all human beings— indeed, so important that it is considered a Sexual Human 
Right’ (Sanyal 37).
 20 Reducing social interaction to questions of how justifications and defences might 
be marshalled in a court of law misses the point of the (messy) everyday give- and- 
take negotiation I am trying to capture in this discussion. For similar reasons, 
I argue in the next chapter that ‘me too’ discourses, challenges, and movements 
are not ‘carceral feminist’ in their commitments— not necessarily. In the United 
States, Harvey Weinstein’s ‘me too’ accusers did use ‘carceral’ mechanisms of the 
state— arrest, trial, conviction— to pursue what they thought justice would look 
like; Al Franken’s and Joe Biden’s ‘me too’ accusers have not.
 21 I give this question of the subversive power of language sustained attention in 
Chapter 5, where I identify and advocate for the subversive power of culture- 
jamming practices.
 22 The question of how we might respond to the attenuated harm of impaired 
or arrested sexual autonomy that I  drew out of Fricker’s articulation of epi-
stemic injustice is more difficult. Some harms cannot be corrected, healed, or 
compensated for. They are inflicted, and the person upon whom they are inflicted 
then wears those scars— until they fade, which they sometimes don’t. This is 
not a problem we should hand- wave past— and to be clear, I do not think any 
of the ‘me too’ conversations we are having these days are doing that— but it is 
important to acknowledge that healing does have its limits. Even if impairments 
to sexual autonomy are permanent and cannot be healed, however, even if all we 
can do is prevent future impairments, dismantling rape culture still seems like a 
very worthwhile investment in better social futures.
 23 Listening as a tool that will build better outcomes is discussed extensively in 
peace studies literature, in particular but not exclusively by theorists of restora-
tive justice, like Howard Zehr, and theorists of conflict transformation (rather 
than resolution), like John Paul Lederach. Listening is also the focus of a great 
deal of work in improvisation theory, driven as it is by metaphors of music. My 
own prior work on an ethics of improvisation rests crucially upon the concept 
Ellen Waterman and Julie Smith name ‘listening trust’— a sustained engagement 
with (musical) ideas suggested by another (fellow musician), not just as a mark 
of respect for the other person but as a way to learn new ideas. This implied 
appeal to curiosity is what, for me, pulls Fricker’s corrective for hermeneutical 
injustice into conversation with a mutuality model of sexual consent: talking to 
a sex partner about what they want is caring for your partner, but it is not just 
that. It is also learning about your partner.
 24 Sainath’s speech is an account of the epidemic of debt- driven farmer suicides in 
rural India, but much of what he has to say about self- interest, apathy, and their 
roles in producing human misery applies to rape culture.
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4  Until it wasn’t anymore . . .
How ‘Me Too’ came to work
Women speaking out: who are we hearing?
As I write my way through chapters organised around stories I want to 
consider as ways we— helpfully or unhelpfully— think through rape cul-
ture, I become increasingly curious and self- conscious about how my ter-
minology (my decision to use ‘sexual violence’ as an umbrella term under 
which to gather the bits and pieces that comprise this culture, for instance) 
might be received by readers. I worry most about the appearance that I am 
shifting from rape to sexual harassment as from apples to oranges, even as 
I remain firmly convinced that my discussion is not changing the topic, that 
‘sexual violence’ is a concept encompassing coercions within workplaces 
and coercions within bedrooms. It has been reassuring, then, to think of 
my focus in this chapter through Cornel West’s dictum that ‘justice is what 
love looks like in public’ (232): in this way of thinking, harassment is the 
face of sexual violence when it shows up in the workplace and other public 
spaces. Sexual harassment appears as a ‘public face’ of sexual violence, 
and sexual assault appears as a ‘private face,’ so for those who ascribe to 
public– private distinctions, these behaviours do— unhelpfully— appear to 
be different things. My decision, in this book, to deploy a category with 
the definitional scope of ‘sexual violence’ was precisely to incorporate both 
spheres— to dissolve them in the way that radical feminists of the Second 
Wave did, and the way that #metoo did in its invitation to women who had 
experienced either form of violence.1
‘The personal is the political,’ argued Second Wave radical feminists in 
the United States— among them, Andrea Dworkin, Catharine MacKinnon, 
Susan Brownmiller— who interrogated pornography, sexualised harass-
ment and humiliation in the workplace, and rape, all from the standpoint 
of (female) subjectivity forced into performing submissiveness in order to 
survive.2 Viewing all of these phenomena through a ‘feminist peace studies’ 
lens permits us to see each of them— sexualised ‘entertainment,’ work-
place conditions, and pervasive undermining of personal autonomy— as 
structures through and around which women’s performance of femininity 
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channelled. It reveals the violence in each of them as a way of enforcing 
rigid hierarchies of value that diminish some people’s ‘menus of life choices’ 
(opportunities to direct the course of their own lives) for the benefit of other 
people— another way of describing Johan Galtung’s concept of structural 
violence. Because it challenges us to think about how and why hierarchies 
are gendered (which is to say, to think about how sex/ gender and power meet 
in different institutions and cultures), a feminist peace studies analysis also 
gives us insight into the scope and commonality of the violences presented 
in the narratives that began #metoo: the New York Times and New Yorker 
reporting about Harvey Weinstein’s decades- long sexual predation of vul-
nerable women who worked for him. (The ability to see patterns of violence 
in these stories and the struggle to see what the patterns mean, what they 
say about workplaces, is something that the Times reporters Jodi Kantor 
and Megan Twohey wrestle with in She Said, their account of breaking the 
Weinstein story.) The ways in which women have been made vulnerable 
to male power are numerous, and many different histories can be told of 
all of them. While different histories of Second Wave feminism— and more 
recently, ‘me too’ movements— are written from different standpoints, and 
emphasise different actors and events, Linda Hirshman quite aptly observes 
in the course of her history of sexual harassment that ‘[t] he fight to extend 
the notion of meaningful physical self- ownership has been ground zero at 
every stage of feminism’ (28).
Hirshman’s history is one in which the story of sexual harassment is told 
as American feminist history, and ‘me too’ is told as a workplace story, in 
a narrative starting from the twin origin points of Kantor and Twohey’s 
journalistic exposé of Harvey Weinstein and of Alyssa Milano’s tweet 
launching #metoo (x). Despite our standpoint differences, Hirshman’s take 
on the movement that I understand as global gendered resistance to preda-
tory power structures is a valuable complement to much of the analysis 
of America’s ‘me too’ reckoning, foregrounding the harassment piece of 
this cultural awakening where so many other analysts and commentators 
foreground the assault piece of it. That said, Hirshman’s decision to tell 
‘the story of women’s 50- year battle against sexual abuse and harass-
ment’ (Hirshman xi)— in which Second Wave feminism develops the con-
cept of sexual harassment— invites us to think of sexualised workplaces as 
a uniquely modern problem. When we tell and hear histories of women 
organising against sexual harassment as something that started in 1970, 
the legacy of protest that stretches back through the 20th century and 
around the globe is obscured. In 1909, Russian revolutionary Alexandra 
Kollontai was denouncing sexual predation of vulnerable female employees 
by their bosses.3 A  couple of years later, in 1911, socialist women in the 
United States were organising garment workers’ unions in response to the 
Triangle Shirtwaist Factory fire that killed 146 mostly immigrant women, 
and socialist women in Europe were organising the very first International 
Women’s Day. And well before that, as Hirshman herself observes, ‘[i] n 1833 
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the black female abolitionist Maria W. Stewart invoked women’s rights to 
control their bodies as a foundational reason for abolition’ of slavery in 
the United States (249). All of these defences of women’s rights to earn a 
livelihood, and to control what we earn, respond to a history of gendered 
oppression that Second Wave resistance itself was drawing inspiration from.
It is some of this earlier history— forgotten, erased, cast aside— that 
Kristen Ghodsee recovers in Second World, Second Sex, her account of 
a sophisticated solidarity forged between eastern European women’s- 
equality advocates of the former ‘Second World’ and women working 
within Soviet- aligned African states during the post- World War II 
period of hegemonic struggle between the United States and the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics (the ‘Cold War’). She herself describes her 
project as ‘a political act of resistance against an entrenched narrative 
that downplays and delegitimizes the contributions of women from the 
state socialist countries and their many socialist allies in the developing 
world’ (Ghodsee 242). The entrenched narrative she rejects is the same 
one Hirshman adopts as an implicit frame: a history in which the great 
progressive strides towards women’s liberation and gender equality were 
made by American women of the Second Wave.4 The counter- narrative 
Ghodsee offers as a correction of the historical record is one in which 
the Soviet bloc and the Soviet- aligned, post- colonising and developing 
nations of the Global South ‘pressured the United Nations to deal with 
women’s issues and, by extension, forced male politicians in the West 
to take those issues seriously’ (242). Without the organising done by 
‘women’s activists from the state socialist countries in Eastern Europe,’ 
Ghodsee argues, ‘the issue of women’s rights would never have garnered 
the attention of male politicians on either side of the Iron Curtain’ (2). 
In fact, she notes, in support of her history, ‘President John F. Kennedy 
created his Commission on the Status of Women in direct response to the 
supposed threat of Soviet science and technology, fearing that the com-
munist commitment to women’s education and employment gave them 
an upperhand’ (Ghodsee 234). ‘The seeds for the second wave women’s 
movement were thus planted and watered with US fears of communist 
superiority,’ she concludes (Ghodsee 234).
Although the radical- feminist projects that made American feminism of 
the 1960s and 1970s seem like a whole new way of thinking about women, 
and men, and gender equality were nourished by the work of Soviet and 
‘Third World’ women, there was no global outreach, no international 
women’s movement. Ghodsee explains that
‘feminism,’ as it was known at the time in both its western European 
and Russian variations, was considered suspect as the ideology of upper- 
class women who strove to further their own interests without concern 
for general social injustices and inequities.
(41)
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The rhetoric of a ‘global woman’s movement’ was, and still is, popular, 
but Ghodsee echoes postcolonial feminism’s critiques of sisterhood- 
solidarity when she observes that there is an enormously complex reality 
being elided when we speak of a single movement: ‘women’s activism ha[s] 
been influenced by a wide variety of vastly differing political projects, and 
it is impossible to speak of one global “feminism,” ’ she concurs (5).5 She 
understands why ‘feminist activists and authors have often found it con-
venient to speak of one singular global movement for women’s rights, a 
movement supposedly led by liberal feminists from the Western capitalist 
countries,’ the women whose names we associate with Second Wave fem-
inism (Ghodsee 6). But the historical revision she proffers, a more complex 
portrait of global struggles for gender equality, is one in which many of 
the international recognitions of women’s needs and capabilities— the 1975 
UN International Women’s Year, for example— were the result of Eastern 
Bloc advocacy (Ghodsee 3). In my view, the expanded field of activism 
that emerges from Ghodsee’s recovered history makes it one we can engage 
with very helpfully; stories of different groups of women in different 
places, cultures, and times, gives us a rather Foucauldian picture of struggle 
against patriarchy. Power is everywhere. Resistance is also everywhere. The 
powerful and empowering lesson we can learn from reflecting on Ghodsee’s 
history is that we— whoever and wherever ‘we’ happen to be— can create 
our own movements.
While I  think it important to notice with Ghodsee what is being left 
out of canonical Second Wave histories, it is also important to see how the 
voices of the Second Wave were amplifying matters that we, in our ‘me too’ 
era, are still grappling with. The canonical histories are not the only ones we 
should be sharing but, using the metaphor of a quilt of stories, I would argue 
that patches of ‘entrenched narrative’ are crucial to picking out any overall 
design. Hirshman’s account of Catharine MacKinnon’s work on sexual har-
assment law, for instance, shows how the gendered and sexualised bullying 
so many women try to stare down in the workplace meets all the tests of 
a civil rights violation, as it is defined in the US Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
As a legal achievement, this story centres Second Wave feminism in the 
United States, but it is a narrative that deserves to be entrenched as localised 
illustration of how to make a globally relevant ‘gender justice’ argument. 
MacKinnon’s focus on (cultural) dominance, rather than (biological) diffe-
rence, as producing supposedly intractable puzzles of gender and equality 
(which I discussed in the context of violences of institutional structure and 
of culture in Chapter 1) grounded a radical argument that rejected the then- 
status quo view that sex, as an activity of the private sphere, is private and 
prima facie consensual, not a matter for public- sphere litigation.
MacKinnon’s classically Second- Wave refusal to segregate ‘the political’ 
to only one area of human relations leads her to see that ‘sex at work [is] 
political, not personal, but sex at home is political, too’ (Hirshman 24). 
What becomes visible under her scrutiny is so much more than what peace 
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studies identifies as ‘direct violence’— the problems of, in Hirshman’s words, 
‘one particular woman who happened to attract her boss’s attention’ (14). 
Viewed through the lens of dominance and subordination— through cultur-
ally prescribed gender roles— sexual harassment is a phenomenon of struc-
tural and cultural violence: people in positions of authority or impunity in 
the workplace harass women ‘because sexuality [is] what being a woman 
means socially’ (Hirshman 14). As Hirshman summarises MacKinnon’s 
argument:
The wrongdoing is not in treating women differently from men, even 
though that generally results in keeping women down and making them 
unequal. The wrongdoing is in treating men as the standard for com-
parison in the first place. The civil rights violation is in treating women 
as lesser beings.
(Hirshman 15, emphasis in original)
Throughout the 1970s, American Second Wave radical feminists pushed 
back against the subordination of women in battles that were principled 
but often misrepresented. The fight against pornography that also raised 
MacKinnon’s profile in American ‘culture wars’ was anti- patriarchal in 
its intentions and messaging, but was instead framed in media commen-
taries as ‘anti- sex,’ Hirshman recounts (33). Liberal feminism, which later 
gave way to neoliberal feminism, triumphed over the supposedly anti- sex 
radical feminists, with a message of liberation, optimistic pronouncements 
of equal contracting (consenting) power regardless of gender, and the rhet-
orical flourish of asserting themselves as ‘sex- positive’ feminists (Hirshman 
38– 39). By the beginning of the 1980s, hopes for even a united national 
feminist movement in the United States (let alone a global movement) were 
dashed in a vicious battle over whether sex could ever possibly be a sphere 
of human life that occupied a space outside power and politics (Hirshman 
39). The later 1980s/ early 1990s ‘postfeminism’ backlash that pretended to 
be an evolution beyond gender equality
could be roughly divided into two types [of arguments]: feminism had 
succeeded and women should be happy with what they had achieved 
and go home, or feminism had succeeded and women were miserable 
with what they had achieved and should thus go back home.
(Hirshman 118)
At the same time this culture war was being fought over whether fem-
inism was still relevant, three African- American women— Paulette Barnes, 
Mechelle Vinson, and Sandra Bundy— pursued ground- breaking lawsuits, 
shaping a legal context in which Catharine MacKinnon’s ‘theory of the 
case’ about sexual harassment was confirmed: it was a violation of the Civil 
Rights Act. Even as MacKinnon’s view of sex and power in the workplace 
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became settled employment law, from the mid- 1980s on, US litigation in 
the area of sexual harassment was particularly concentrated on questions 
of employer liability for harassing supervisors and co- workers, and on what 
constituted a hostile work environment (Hirshman 55).6
And then, Anita Hill spoke up. In 1991, Hill, at this point a University 
of Oklahoma law professor, learned that her former boss at the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), Clarence Thomas, had been 
nominated to the Supreme Court seat vacated by retiring civil rights icon 
Thurgood Marshall (arguer before the Court of the 1954 Brown v. Board of 
Education case that desegregated American public schools). Hill had in fact 
worked for fellow Yale Law graduate Thomas, as his personal assistant, in two 
Washington, DC, government offices: at the Department of Education when 
he was newly appointed as Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights in 1981, and 
then, less than a year later, at the EEOC. By 1983, after two years of working 
for Thomas, she mobilised her contacts to get a teaching job in an Oklahoma 
law school and settled into an academic career. She had stayed mostly silent 
about her experiences in his employ until she learned of his Supreme Court 
nomination and put in motion a chain of events that brought ‘sexual harass-
ment’ into American public conversation (and helped birth the ‘Third Wave’ 
of feminism). Critics who later denounced Hill as a liar and an opportunist 
for keeping in touch with Thomas over the years and subsequently speaking 
out about her early career experience of harassment at his hands either 
missed or didn’t bother to account for what feminists understood then, and 
we all, post- Weinstein, should know. Men who want to assert their power 
through sexualising underlings often choose women who want to advance 
in careers like those the abusers already occupy, thereby forcing ambitious 
women to subsequently maintain these hollow, impeaching relationships in 
their networks of contacts.7 The story Hill told— her testimony of what it 
was like to be a junior colleague of this presumptive judicial nominee— was 
lurid, and the televised proceedings have become iconic:  images of Hill, a 
composed and serious black woman, testifying to an all- male panel of 
senators displaying a prurient curiosity about the minutiae of her allegations. 
As Hirshman describes this moment in sexual harassment history, during the 
hearing held by the Senate Judiciary Committee (the committee responsible 
for vetting Supreme Court nominees), the senators demonstrated a shifting 
commitment to separating the public and private spheres of Thomas and 
Hill’s respective lives. They avoided posing questions to Thomas about his 
pornography consumption on the grounds that it was a personal matter, but 
inquired into Hill’s personal life (as potentially impeaching of her credibility) 
with such doggedness that it was apparent, even beyond Second Wave sens-
ibilities, how the personal could be (gender-)political (Hirshman 84).
Hirshman characterises the confirmation of Thomas to his lifetime seat 
on the Supreme Court in partisan terms, explaining it as a matter of power- 
hungry Republicans and passive Democrats (85), like then- committee chair 
Joe Biden whose adversarial choreography of Hill’s testimony prompted 
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questions years later, in the ‘me too’ moment, about whether he had 
apologised, or should apologise, to Hill for creating the conditions in which 
she was so publicly discredited and impugned. (For the record, according to 
Hill, he has expressed regret but has missed the broader significance of the 
gendered silencing he constructed in his capacity as committee chair.)
The incendiary nature of Hill’s testimony could not be entirely stamped 
out by the white male power structure directing its full force of ridicule and 
testimonial injustice at this lone testifying individual. Too many women were 
watching the hearings and reflecting upon their own experiences. Perhaps 
they had not been, as Hill was, ‘deluged . . . with sex talk, questions about 
her sex life, descriptions of his sexual prowess, opinions about her dress, and 
vivid depictions of the pornographic movies he had watched’ (Hirshman 
82). Perhaps they had not been pressured to date their bosses, as Hill had 
been (Solnit 110).8 But many women recognised the powerlessness of Hill’s 
situation, and recognised that Thomas was sexualising his employee pre-
cisely because workplace conditions, including grossly inadequate employ-
ment law, protected him in his abusive exercise of power over her.9
After the hearing was over and Thomas took up his Senate- confirmed 
seat, journalists Jill Abramson and Jane Mayer spent four years writing the 
definitive book on whose testimony— Hill’s or Thomas’s— was more cred-
ible, and concluded that it was Hill who told the truth to the Senate. ‘The 
two journalists did all the work the FBI would have done, had Chairman 
Biden run the committee hearings like a normal inquiry,’ Hirshman asserts 
(90), a point on which Hill concurs. Hirshman characterises ‘the partnership 
of the two pioneering woman journalists . . . [as] a harbinger of the forces 
lining up on the other side of the subject of sexual harassment and abuse’ 
(Hirshman 91). One of those forces has turned out to be the activism of 
a generation of women who have articulated a ‘Third Wave’ of feminism, 
building on many of the demands and critiques of the radical voices of the 
Second Wave.
In a period of public discourse and media coverage that was theorised 
by Susan Faludi as a backlash and by Cristina Hoff Sommers and Katie 
Roiphe as the emergence of ‘postfeminism,’ Rebecca Walker10 channelled 
her anger about the Senate’s treatment of Anita Hill into a call to arms for 
young women: an early recruitment call for what became the Third Wave. 
The Hill– Thomas moment of conflict is presented through Walker’s eyes as 
a test of how much (how little) societies have learned to listen to women 
and believe that we can be credible testifiers. ‘Can a woman’s experience 
undermine a man’s career?’ she asks. ‘Can a woman’s voice, a woman’s sense 
of self- worth and injustice, challenge a structure predicated upon the subju-
gation of our gender?’ (398).11 These are familiar challenges, old ones that 
have awoken to provoke and disappoint us yet again, as Brett Kavanaugh’s 
Supreme Court confirmation hearings in 2019 saw the same questions 
ignored by many of the same people who instigated Walker’s coming to 
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need to be able to explain what she wants to put in place of patriarchal hier-
archies, Walker concludes her call- to- arms essay with the observation that
[t] o be a feminist is to integrate an ideology of equality and female 
empowerment into the very fiber of my life. It is to search for personal 
clarity in the midst of systemic destruction, to join in sisterhood with 
women when often we are divided, to understand power structures with 
the intention of challenging them.
(Walker 400)
What she could not have known when she wrote this essay in 1992 was 
that the work she and other Third Wave essayists and commentators— Anna 
Holmes, Jennifer Baumgardner and Amy Richards, Jessica Valenti— were 
doing then to examine and shift media cultures hostile to women helped 
prepare the ground of American civil life for the jagged eruptions of ‘me 
too’ stories.12
One effect of the work Third Wave feminists have done at the level of 
culture is that there are spaces in social media devoted to normalising 
feminist perspectives— Holmes’s website Jezebel, and Feministing, the 
blog that Valenti cofounded with her sister, for instance. Both in this 
new space, that did not exist for Second Wave battles, and in more trad-
itionally ‘pop culture’ media (movies and television, for example), Third 
Wave interventions into cultural debates made feminism something 
that young women could see as relevant in their lives. This is one way 
in which radical feminists of the Second Wave, the Third Wave, and the 
Soviet gender- equality advocates Ghodsee reintroduces to a more inclu-
sive feminist history all seem to resemble each other:  they strive to give 
real and relatable content to principles of female empowerment. Ghodsee 
aptly cites Nancy Fraser’s description of Second Wave feminism as ‘a trans-
formative political project . . . part of a broader emancipatory project’ 
(Ghodsee 18). Fraser captures what has always been the appeal of fem-
inism: its promise to change structures and cultures so that people who are 
presently constrained and exploited might build their own pathways to 
greater freedom. The ‘consciousness- raising’ that is the hallmark of Second 
Wave radicalisation might be dismissed or trivialised in some circles as 
self- indulgence, but its point and power was always to raise awareness 
(consciousness) of the structures that are shaping our paths in life. From 
a peace- studies perspective, I see Second Wave radical feminism and Third 
Wave feminism as dedicating their resources to identifying and challenging 
cultural and structural violences, in contexts in which the liberal feminism 
of the Second Wave could see only, at most, direct violences.
Ghodsee says of the liberal feminism that dominated Western delegations 
to Cold War- era international negotiations that it ‘focused on equality of 
opportunity within the existing economic structure, with an implicit or 
explicit acceptance of that structure as fundamentally just’ (19).13 Such an 
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‘establishment’ feminism, working with and within the existing systems, has 
little to say to women who are seething with rage or shaking in fear because 
of the gender- based discriminations and deprivations they are encountering. 
A  radical feminism that tells them, on the other hand, they are correctly 
perceiving oppression embedded in structures and are right to insist those 
structures be changed is a discourse that has something far more robust to 
say than ‘trust the system.’ As evidence that the radical view exerts greater 
appeal, we see that as ‘establishment’ voices become more critical of the 
status quo (as in Hirshman’s account of the rethinking prominent American 
feminists have been doing in this ‘me too’ era of their former public support 
of Bill Clinton over Monica Lewinsky in the late 1990s), one of the effects of 
‘me too’ in North America has been a surprised delight from women of 
the Second Wave generation that young women are now ‘rediscovering’ 
feminism. (I would argue that ‘rediscovery’ is mistaken language:  young 
women identifying as feminist are doing what has always been done with 
intergenerational and intercultural social movements: they are taking it up 
and reworking it to meet their own needs and contexts.)
Women being believed: from whispers to whistle- blowing
In a prescient essay written in the wake of her testimony to the Senate 
Judiciary Committee charged with confirming Justice Clarence Thomas, 
Anita Hill observes that ‘[h] ow we enlighten men who are currently in the 
workplace about behavior that is beneath our (and their) dignity is the 
challenge of the future’ (1448). That enlightenment project, retraining men 
into more gender- equal, more respectful working environments, has become 
a focal point of present- day ‘me too’ conversations, but the real transforma-
tive strength of ‘me too’ is the way it is changing conversations women are 
having with each other. This is a moment like the decolonising one Jean- Paul 
Sartre describes in his preface to Frantz Fanon’s Wretched of the Earth (11– 
12): one in which the strangers who are sitting around a fire in the darkness 
and talking to each other with blithe disregard for what their opponents 
may overhear are women telling their stories of abuse and exploitation.14 
This is a striking evolution: in many culturally significant industries, women 
have warned each other about predatory men through ‘whisper networks’— 
the most well- known of which is the ‘Shitty Media Men’ list. These covert 
warnings, often withheld from the junior women who are most vulnerable 
to manipulation and coercion by powerful men, no doubt helped some 
women avoid abuse, but their confidential nature reinforced the imperative 
of silence. Don’t tell. No one will believe you. This is what abused children 
and women are told repeatedly, insistently, and it makes coming forward to 
tell stories of abuse an act of heroic bravery.15
As moral argument, I am convinced that those of us who have the most 
social insulation (privilege) ought to take the greatest risks, but the histor-
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risks of legal battles depicts a reality in which progress is advanced by those 
least securely positioned within their societies. The women who have led 
the way forward against sexual violence in the United States have so often 
been women of colour: from Harriet Jacobs, to Recy Taylor and Rosa Parks, 
to the women like Paulette Barnes, Sandra Bundy, and Mechelle Vinson 
whose work lives became sexual harassment test cases and precedents, to 
the academics like Kimberlé Crenshaw, Anita Hill, and bell hooks who have 
theorised more inclusive and coalitional politics out of the bits of social pro-
gress they have witnessed. It should be no surprise then that the hashtag that 
broke the silencing imperative around sexual violence, #metoo, is rooted 
even more deeply in black women’s American culture than much ‘me too’ 
historiography acknowledges.
When, in the wake of the first reporting of Harvey Weinstein’s abuses, 
actress Alyssa Milano sent out her now- historic tweet on October 15, 2017, 
she was popularising a sentiment that a friend had shared with her:  that 
a simple ‘Me too.’ tweet in response by every woman who had ever been 
sexually harassed or sexually assaulted would show the world how big this 
problem of sexual violence is. She did not know at the time where the phrase 
‘me too’ came from, nor did she necessarily expect the result: an outpouring 
that can be seen as a kind of ‘Twitter census’ of victims of sexual violence. 
Although Milano did subsequently learn about Tarana Burke’s grassroots 
‘me too’ campaign to support African- American girls who had been abused 
and molested, and she has subsequently used her social- media platform and 
her celebrity to effectively amplify Burke’s messaging, in the first few days 
after Milano coined #metoo, Burke saw a very real possibility that once 
again the credit for what had been more than a decade of black activism 
would accrue to a socially privileged white woman.16 ‘Initially I panicked,’ 
she told New York Times reporter Sandra Garcia, ‘I felt a sense of dread, 
because something that was part of my life’s work was going to be co- opted 
and taken from me and used for a purpose that I hadn’t originally intended.’ 
Burke’s fear was unrealised (she noted in the same interview with Garcia 
that Milano’s amplification of her ‘me too’ message had generated pub-
licity the movement had not previously had), but it was not historically 
unfounded (see, for instance, the different historiographies of anti- sexual 
assault activism in Second Wave feminist narratives and in recovered his-
tories like Danielle McGuire’s At the Dark End of the Street).
The origin story Burke tells about the non- profit organisation she created 
in 2007 (Just Be, Inc.) and the movement she grew out of it (Me Too) is of 
grassroots community efforts to find for survivors of sexual violence the 
healing and support resources that Burke wished she had had when she was 
a victim of sexual violence and that she wished ‘Heaven,’ a young black girl 
in a low- income community who confided her own story of sexual abuse 
to Burke, had had. In an essay called ‘The Inception,’ Burke describes the 
haunting shame she felt at how inadequately she had responded to ‘Heaven’s 
secret, and how much she wished she had been able to say the only thing that 
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might have made ‘Heaven’ feel less alone in the world: me too. It was this 
failure to, in the moment, find the courage to openly empathise with a fellow 
survivor that drove Burke to build and advocate for restorative networks of 
support for girls and women of colour in underprivileged neighbourhoods. 
Although the ‘me too’ origin story is one that Burke has shared widely as 
an illustration of her ethos of empowerment through empathy, its revolu-
tionary power is under- recognised; many commentators and supporters 
stress the extent to which ‘me too’ is a call for accountability and let its call 
to empathy recede into the background.
Departing from that tendency to stress accountability over empathy, 
Mithu Sanyal’s history of rape observes that Burke’s movement, through the 
hashtag that popularised it,
has created a lot of empathy. It’s given stories and experiences the 
public space and attention they had been denied . . . It’s what the courts 
couldn’t deliver. These stories need to come out; they need a community 
and collective mourning.
(Sanyal 177)
Sanyal is right to point out both the inadequacy of legal mechanisms and the 
need for community engagement with the project of ending sexual violence; 
some forms of understanding can be advanced through adversarial methods 
of inquiry, but communication that values and promotes empathy— 
communication that centres any emotional labour, for that matter— needs 
linguistic and social norms that call forth not transcripts, but the agency and 
the humanity of the parties involved.
It is this recognition of each other, built into ‘me too’ exchanges, that 
I  identify in other writing as this movement’s ‘unapologetic blackness’ (to 
borrow the language of the Black Lives Matter movement)— a variation of 
‘call and response’ communication patterns that have developed in black 
vernacular English in the United States.17 The recognisable pattern of what 
is now known as a ‘me too’ story is this: one party in a conversation confides 
an experience of sexual violence; the other person both acknowledges the 
content of what has been confided and frames the confidence back to the 
confider as a shared experience by responding ‘me too.’18 The ‘me too’ story 
is not fully comprehensible when understood only as a call to accountability; 
it requires the response that affirms the speaker as heard, as understood, 
as believed, and as a valuable human being. And it is a robust empathy 
that Burke calls us to, not just passing moments of sympathy for someone 
in an unfortunate situation. The empathy that her ‘me too’ movement is 
building is being very consciously directed into social transformation. In the 
‘History and Inception’ Burke offers on the movement’s website, she makes 
clear that her interest is in mobilising resources for survivors of sexual vio-
lence in under- resourced communities and building a survivor- led activist 
community to end sexual violence. Reflecting, in that same section, on how 
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the work she has been doing has been changed by the worldwide attention 
Milano’s hashtag has brought to it, Burke declares:
Today, our work continues to focus on assisting a growing spectrum 
of survivors— young people, queer, trans, the disabled, Black women 
and girls, and all communities of color. We’re here to help each indi-
vidual find the right point of entry for their unique healing journey. But 
we’re also galvanizing a broad base of survivors, and working to dis-
rupt the systems that allow sexual violence to proliferate in our world. 
This includes insisting upon accountability on the part of perpetrators, 
along with the implementation of strategies to sustain long term, sys-
temic change. So that one day, nobody ever has to say ‘me too’ again.
(History and Inception)
Coming at this history of sexual violence from a peace studies perspective, 
the feature of Hill’s call for workplace transformation and Burke’s call for 
transformation tout court that most stands out for me is the centrality of the 
call to dismantle systems (as ultimately more important than incarcerating 
individuals).19 Hill’s essay on the nature of sexual harassment anticipates so 
much of what emerged, 26 years later, as the ‘me too’ moment we are all still 
trying to assimilate into our respective conceptual frameworks and habitual 
accommodations to social systems. For some of us, ‘me too’ has urged a 
rethinking of default assumptions about social interaction; for others, ‘me 
too’ is a threat— it has gone too far or has inaugurated a witch- hunt; for 
still others, it raises fears that something which might have been liberatory 
will be quashed by backlash and co- optation into privileged heterosexist or 
carceral (pro- incarceration) worldviews. ‘Me too’ means different things to 
different people, in other words.
Jodi Kantor and Megan Twohey, the New York Times journalists whose 
reporting on Harvey Weinstein is credited as the spark of the ‘me too’ 
fire, analysed the elements of the movement/ moment in an interview on 
an American cable news show, All In with Chris Hayes. In the course of 
their reporting, they became convinced that ‘me too’ draws our attention to 
three clusters of questions: kinds of behaviour (where on ‘the spectrum of 
problematic sex’ the accusations are located), the tools we use to evaluate 
stories of abuse (anonymous accusations or whisper campaigns; investiga-
tive journalism; courts of law; the so- called court of public opinion), and 
expectations we have of what punishment and accountability look like. 
The controversies of ‘me too,’ they contend, centre around problem cases, 
in which these questions are mixed up or blurred. (This is part of what 
has made the Aziz Ansari incident I  discussed in the previous chapter so 
notorious: debates about how boorish and pushy he was on his date with 
‘Grace’ are muddied by entirely warranted criticisms of the reporting, and 
with tendentious defences of him as not- a- rapist— a defence for an allega-
tion that was never made in the reporting.)
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Reflecting in their memoir on the moment they helped to produce, Kantor 
and Twohey contend that, in the popular awareness,
[t] he name Harvey Weinstein came to mean an argument for addressing 
misconduct, lest it go unchecked for decades, an example of how less- 
severe transgressions could lead to more serious ones. An emerging 
consensus that speaking up about sexual harassment and abuse was 
admirable, not shameful or disloyal. A cautionary tale about how that 
kind of behavior could become a grave risk for employers. Most of 
all, it marked an emerging agreement that Weinstein- like conduct was 
unequivocally wrong and should not be tolerated . . . Growing con-
sensus that all sorts of previously tolerated practices were wrong: sexual 
overtures from the boss, corporate mandatory arbitration policies that 
kept harassment and abuse secret, and even smaller- scale behaviors like 
bra snapping in school hallways and laughing at movie scenes in which 
girls were taken advantage of by conquering male heroes. So much was 
suddenly open to question. The reckoning, and the feeling of rapidly 
shifting social standards, seemed like a sign that progress was still pos-
sible, even at a time of partisan fracture and nonstop conflict.
(She Said 181– 182)
And although divergent perspectives in some ‘me too’ conversations are no 
doubt fuelling even more conflict in private settings, Kantor and Twohey 
also insist that they think some of these controversial ‘messy stories’ are 
giving rise to ‘more contemplative private’ conversations (She Said 244).20
Their memoir, She Said, illustrates something that Kantor’s past in 
investigative journalism had already revealed to her: that ‘gender was not 
just a topic, but a kind of investigative entry point . . . [into] how power 
functioned’ (Kantor and Twohey 10), and power relations revealed the 
‘outsider’ standpoint most women still occupy within institutions.21 They 
describe their growing awareness of how corporate structures enabled har-
assment:  complaints that could generate negative consequences for the 
corporate officers were settled and then ‘erased’ through accompanying 
nondisclosure agreements.22 The particular ‘sociology of harassment’ (She 
Said 51)  they trace, of the film industry, is one in which each victim of 
assault, harassment, and objectification— at Weinstein’s hands, or elsewhere 
in the industry— is isolated from all of the others23:  silenced by the twin 
forces of nondisclosure agreements that typically accompany settlements 
and threats that speaking out would end the victim’s career. Sometimes, in 
the case of skilled film workers or actresses on the rise, these silencing forces 
would be accompanied by inducements to be publicly cooperative: desir-
able roles in high- profile films, for instance. The whole edifice of harassment 
and abuse was built on making sure women did not speak negatively about 
their abusers. The challenge that Kantor and Twohey describe, throughout 
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same women, as many of them as possible, on the record. In an industry 
in which a man’s (the right man’s) quiet off- hand observation that ‘she’s 
hard to work with’ could end a woman’s career, it is staggering to count 
how many women’s voices needed to speak about Harvey Weinstein or Bill 
Cosby to even raise the question of accountability.
But, to return to Tarana Burke’s ‘me too’ (the community- transformation 
work that started long before #metoo- related social reckonings), the ‘me 
too’ conversations we need to be having are not just about the call issued 
by the voices of Harvey Weinstein’s accusers— or those accusing Al Franken, 
or Brett Kavanaugh, or Joe Biden— but also about our responses. What will 
we learn from being in conversation with their stories, and the others that 
might emerge? How will we become better at caring for each other? Part of 
my own defence of ‘messy stories’ in particular (see Chapter 3) is that I think 
the empathy and the critical thinking skills we need, to be able to identify 
and dismantle violent sexual cultures, are precisely the skills that get honed 
in sorting through what one thinks of the messy story, and why. Because ‘me 
too’ is challenging us to see differently, hear differently, and think differently, 
it is a disruption to our settled conceptual frameworks. That, I argue, is a 
positive thing.
Years ago, when I was living in Montreal during a period of widespread 
student protests against the provincial government, I saw a protest sign that 
captures exactly how I think we should be mentally positioning ourselves 
towards ‘me too’: Ce n’est pas un signe de bonne santé mentale d’être bien 
àdapté à une société malade [It is not a sign of good mental health to be 
well- adapted to a sick society]. Rape culture needs to change. We need to 
change it. And in order to change it, we need to recognise the scope of the 
violence we are dealing with— we need to hear, and to listen to, and to really 
think about, all of these stories. Some of them will unsettle us, and some 
will shame us. Recognising with Marx that shame can be revolutionary, we 
can choose the path Burke chose, and that Kantor and Twohey’s sources 
chose: we can harness our discomfort with the world we live in right now, 
to build collaboratively a world that has space for all of us to assert our 
humanity.
Global changes in conversations: a world without  
princes and princesses
And this is a global world- building project. Although ‘me too’ is frequently 
styled in popular media as an American or American- derived phenomenon, 
the immediacy of the global parallels strongly suggests otherwise. In the 
People’s Republic of China, in November 2017 (a month after the Weinstein 
story broke in the US), an essay was published on WeChat (the heavily 
censored Chinese version of WhatsApp) by a Shanghai woman complaining 
about a man in her neighbourhood who was serially groping women (Hong 
Fincher 5). Characterised as a ‘#MeToo- like essay,’ the post had recorded 
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more than a million viewers before it was subsequently deleted by censors, 
and when the essay was reposted on Weibo (the equally closely monitored 
Chinese version of Facebook), the woman was subjected to sustained har-
assment (Hong Fincher 5). But a few months later, in January 2018, students 
and alumni across China began signing ‘Me Too petitions’ that exposed 
the extent of sexual harassment within China’s universities (Hong Fincher 
5). ‘[T] housands of students at different universities demanded greater 
protections against sexual harassment and assault, in one of the largest 
displays of coordinated student action since the pro- democracy movement of 
1989,’ journalist Leta Hong Fincher reports in Betraying Big Brother, a book 
that details the rise of a young, activist- feminist movement in PRC (11– 12).24 
The petitions themselves were a response to the online posting of a young 
Beijing woman’s personal essay, this time an accusation of sexual assault 
by a former university professor. When her complaint was corroborated 
by other former students’ testimonies of harassment at his hands, he was 
dismissed from the university faculty (Hong Fincher 92). Looking beyond 
questions of abuser accountability, to questions of how empathy is being 
built, what I find striking to consider is how much creativity and trust are 
required of people mounting protests and circulating petitions in a society 
as censored and scrutinised as China’s. ‘As censorship of the Me Too hashtag 
increased,’ Hong Fincher explains, ‘Chinese feminist activist Qiqi came up 
with the idea of using emojis for “rice” (mi) and “rabbit” (tu) . . . to evade 
the internet monitors’ (54). This is call and response to each other, and it is 
a call for subversion (as a step towards transformation) of a system that is 
not meeting people’s needs.
We are hearing these calls, and responses to them, in many countries— 
too many and too quickly for ‘me too’ to be a trend that the United States 
has exported to the world. ‘Me too’ is gaining appeal as a catchphrase, 
in all of its many translations— just not as a single type of complaint or 
set of demands. Elsewhere in Asia, South Korea’s ‘me too’ conversations 
about sexual predation in the workplace were provoked by a female pros-
ecutor revealing on a television news show that she had been groped by a 
senior male colleague (Haynes and Hangyu Chen). In Japan, conversations 
also began with a young woman being sexually assaulted by an older male 
colleague, this time in the media. Here, though, sexual harassment protests 
are uniting around ‘we too,’ to stress solidarity and diminish cultural tenden-
cies to victim- blame (Mori and Oda). In South Asia, women in both India 
and Pakistan have deployed ‘me too’ to talk about workplace harassment, 
with the Council on Foreign Relations reporting that members of Pakistan’s 
legal community have organised pro bono legal representation for women 
coming forward (Stone). In Africa, ‘me too’ has inspired Ugandan campaigns 
to end sexual violence against women dependent on public transportation 
(Keenan). In Europe, France has been reckoning with child sexual abuse in 
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In light of these diverse protests, I argue that the idea of ‘me too’ as a sin-
gular movement emerging out of the United States and spreading to many 
other countries is too totalising, too imperialistic. It is, in fact, an oversimpli-
fication that erases some very significant local/ contextual differences among 
these various protests. And yet, there is a concept, a political commitment, 
that does seem to be shared by many, if not all, of these campaigns of pro-
test: the idea that women’s equal human dignity ought to be respected, but 
is not. If, instead of a single movement, we view ‘me too’ as a convenient 
shorthand which links these campaigns through an ‘umbrella’ concept of 
gender justice, we gain the resources to consider (without homogenising 
different cultures’ concerns) ways in which the various local campaigns are 
identifying common or overlapping points of women’s experiences of our 
social world. This steers us away from easy romanticising of an essentialised 
‘sisterhood’ of women, linked by our fundamental alikeness, and moves us 
closer to the radical- feminist insights that drive British activist and theorist 
Selma James. James notes that
[i] t has not always been easy to pull up women’s neglected interests 
from beneath the ‘general cause.’ The best way is to ask the women who 
often shout unheard: the single mothers, the teachers, the nurses, the sex 
workers, the care workers, the asylum seekers, the pensioners.
(273)
‘But,’ she continues in a searing critique of Western liberal and neoliberal 
feminism, ‘as feminists, our hearing and our focus are corrupted when we 
concentrate on getting women into the corridors of power’ (James 273). 
What she sees as feminism’s tendency to advocate in narrow terms, to focus 
on issues stereotypically conceded to be women’s concerns, has undercut 
possibilities for ‘a wider and deeper women’s movement’ (James 273), some-
thing that could be a coalition of local, national, and transnational gender- 
liberation or gender- justice movements (an umbrella), on the model of what 
Fuyuki Kurasawa theorises as ‘the alternative globalisation movement’ for 
human rights (161– 162).
If we are to make sense of ‘me too’ as a heuristic for culturally indexed 
arguments of justice or liberation, it is helpful to take account of ongoing 
human rights and development initiatives like the United Nations’ Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs). Many countries— Japan, for instance— are 
having simultaneous ‘me too’ and SDG discussions, which makes it worth-
while to consider how we can best connect (grassroots) projects of account-
ability and empathy- empowerment to (international community) projects 
of gender equality (UN SDG no.5). First, however, we need to think critic-
ally about how to define ‘gender equality.’ Women who have lived through 
the last 40 or 50  years in Western- industrialised (developed) nations can 
remember quite vividly what workplaces were like, what television adver-
tising was like, what cultural messaging was like, before. And, of course, 
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women who live in the ‘59 countries [that] provide no legal protection 
whatsoever against sexual harassment in the workplace’ are still living those 
conditions in which women are uncounted and often unremunerated labour, 
silent carers, and decoration (United Nations, ‘Women’s Workplace Equality 
Index’). Those of us who remember a time when women just were not leaders, 
soldiers, engineers, or famous entertainers and artists struggle to articulate 
to women younger than us (those for whom professed commitments to the 
social value of women’s participation have always been the cultural norm) 
the social progress we have (unevenly) made.
But one of the things that ‘me too’ has exposed for many people, and 
is still working to expose for many more, is the extent to which the social 
world has not changed as much as we want to think it has. We have women 
in positions of political and economic power now. Some women, who have 
some power. And in many workplaces, we see male and female workers in 
what looks like roughly equal proportions. At first glance, this can look like 
gender equality. It isn’t. Equal numbers of men and women in a workplace 
(numerical parity) does not mean that men and women have equal access 
to power, in the form, say, of institutionalised mechanisms for dispute reso-
lution. In ‘he said– she said’ disputes, women habitually have to work harder 
than men do to be perceived as credible. We do not get gender equality by 
mistaking equal numbers for equal power. This is precisely why we need ana-
lyses of gendered credibility gaps of the kind that Miranda Fricker offers in 
her account of testimonial injustice (17, 21): both cultural habits according 
unearned credibility to men and those withholding earned credibility from 
women produce the kind of credibility gaps that enable the normalisation 
of sexual violence.
As we survey social landscapes around the world, and pose to ourselves 
questions about what possible consensus points each society taking up ‘me 
too’ conversations has arrived at and what a path forward might look like, it 
becomes clear that we will encounter ‘crossroads’ moments. These moments 
will force upon each of us choices: of one way forward that brings us closer 
to transformation, and another route that brings us closer to having ‘me 
too’ co- opted as a hazing ritual inflicted on men in public life, or a public 
relations strategy for the world’s more privileged and insulated survivors of 
sexual violence. (In the spirit of Tarana Burke’s call to empathy, I do want 
to pause here, and acknowledge that part of the phenomenology of sexual 
violence is such that the victim feels isolated and powerless. That is a harm 
capable of doing enormous ongoing damage in a person’s life, no matter 
how insulated from harsh realities that person might appear to the rest of 
us. So, yes, there is a real cause for concern that ‘me too’ will be drained of 
its transformative potential and trivialised, but we need to navigate that pit-
fall in ways that do not compound isolation and powerlessness just because 
the sufferer of sexual violence lives what appears to be an enviable life in 
other respects.) Kantor and Twohey frame ‘me too’ as ‘an example of social 
change in our time but . . . also a test of it: In this fractured environment, will 
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all of us be able to forge a new set of mutually fair rules and protections?’ 
they ask (Kantor and Twohey 5). Each point at which we ask what path we 
should take provides possibilities for ‘me too’ to become a global call and 
conduit through which gender- justice advocates across borders and bound-
aries can organise and grow postcolonial feminist relationships.
This is a vision of women’s global solidarity that is easy to criticise: so 
many privileged women, in groups and as individuals, have set off to bring 
their insights to women who turn out to understand the world much better 
than their would- be saviours. But there are groups of women who have 
worked together for decades in ways that strive to challenge structures of 
colonisation and Global North privilege: the Women’s International League 
for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), for instance. But, also at each point, because 
of the global reach of profit- oriented news and entertainment media, we are 
confronted by possibilities that ‘me too’— most especially in its social media 
presence, #metoo— might degenerate into a privileged white heterosexist- 
centric ‘victim platform’ that serves to amplify status quo thinking and con-
ventional wisdom.
Have individuals changed? Have structures changed? Has anything 
changed? Any comprehensive answer to those questions is a future pro-
ject, constructible only with the passage of time. This question of change, 
of whether we ‘are finished’ yet paying the price ‘me too’ extracts, is one 
that has received considerable attention recently in the United States, as it 
enters its first presidential election cycle since Donald ‘Grab them by the 
pussy’ Trump was elected. A trio of ‘me too’ stories in American politics since 
2016 suggests that very little has structurally shifted in American political 
life. The Washington DC ‘flight’ of political ambitions began promisingly, 
with Al Franken’s contrite relinquishing of his Senate seat in 2017, following 
accusations of groping and inappropriate touching. It got worse, much 
worse, in Brett Kavanaugh’s 2019 farcical repetition of Clarence Thomas’ 
Supreme Court nomination, with Christine Blasey Ford bringing as serious 
an accusation and as serious a presence to confirmation hearings as Anita 
Hill had a generation ago. And now, as I write this chapter, Joe Biden, who 
appears to have learned little from his interaction with Hill, is the presump-
tive Democratic nominee for president in the 2020 election, and is categoric-
ally denying his own allegations of sexual assault and inappropriate touching.
In one of the essays of Men Explain Things to Me, Rebecca Solnit quotes 
Judith Herman on predictable cycles of ‘acknowledging’ trauma: ‘After every 
atrocity one can expect to hear the same predictable apologies,’ Herman 
writes;
it never happened; the victim lies; the victim exaggerates; the victim 
brought it on herself; and in any case it is time to forget the past and move 
on. The more powerful the perpetrator, the greater is his prerogative to 
name and define reality, and the more completely his arguments prevail.
(Trauma and Recovery, quoted in Solnit 113)
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It was disruption of this expectation that made Al Franken, initially, a model 
of ‘me too’ responsibility- taking in my eyes.
In December 2017, a year into the shared social trauma of American 
progressives wrought by the Trump presidency, Franken, the progressive 
hero of Senate hearings, was accused of impropriety; there was incontrovert-
ible video evidence and testimony from eight women. The behaviour, furtive 
groping (‘copping a feel’) that many men learn they can get away with in public 
life, was distinctly minor when stacked up against Harvey Weinstein’s bullying 
of women into submitting sexually and Bill Cosby’s drugging of women, but it 
was still inappropriate, disrespectful of the humanity of the women involved. 
He resigned the job he loved (and was really good at), and I respected him for 
being one of the men willing to pay part of the price of social transformation. 
I thought he conducted himself honourably in a difficult situation. About a 
year and a half later, Franken was given the luxury of a long- form Jane Mayer 
apology– absolution piece in the New Yorker in which he was vociferously 
defended against the set of accusations that had always seemed the most pol-
itically motivated (the allegations for which there had been video evidence). 
Linda Hirshman’s account of this white- washing explains that ‘Jane Mayer 
[who, two decades ago, co- wrote the definitive defence of Anita Hill] turned 
her self- described truth- seeking journalism machine on that most contentious 
#MeToo case’ (259). ‘Mayer devoted most of her twelve- thousand- word story 
to undermining the bona fides of the first Franken accuser, Leeann Tweeden 
. . . [and] brushed off the other seven accusers with varying degrees of quick 
treatments,’ Hirshman concludes (259).
Watching what had appeared as Franken’s principled response to calls 
for his accountability turned into a quite blatant effort to reposition him 
as unfairly targeted— a victim of ‘me too’ excess— is disheartening, to 
say the least. But it is consistent with Herman’s description of evasion by 
perpetrators, and it is a feature of the pattern that seems to be emerging in 
the US entertainment industry as an ‘aftermath’ response, once dust has pre-
sumably settled on the ‘me too’ allegations for which a prominent man may 
have first taken responsibility. Mithu Sanyal describes one example of this 
process by which men who had been removed from film or television screens 
plotted their recuperation in the public imagination:
Some [have] tried to stage comebacks, like former CBS anchor Charlie 
Rose— who after less than six months proposed a TV show in which he 
would talk with other men who had been #metoo- ed, not about what 
they had learned from the process but rather about why #metoo was 
going too far.
(Sanyal 150)
It would seem that people who are accustomed to shaping public opinion 
have a hard time with challenges that require letting public opinion (re)
shape them.
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While critical of how Joe Biden conducted himself as Senate Judiciary 
Committee chair back in 1991, Linda Hirshman is very sure things have 
changed structurally in the United States, speculating in Reckoning about 
‘what would be asked of Joe Biden, finally, should he reappear on the 
political scene’ (219).26 She insists that American ‘women— so far espe-
cially Democratic women— are no longer maintaining alliances with 
male politicians whose public commitment to feminism is shown to con-
flict with their private behavior’ (Hirshman xviii). Her optimism that 
politicians will now be held to— and will meet— higher standards in their 
treatment of women is a marked contrast to the position taken by fem-
inist philosopher Kate Manne on how Biden (at this point clearly destined 
to be the Democratic contender for the American presidency in November 
2020) should be evaluated in the wake of Tara Reade’s sexual assault accus-
ation. Manne argues:
[t] he firm conviction that Biden wouldn’t push boundaries in more ser-
ious ways, notwithstanding Reade’s corroborated testimony, rests partly 
on a misguided faith in his ‘good guy’ persona, and a wrongheaded 
belief that only veritable monsters commit sexual assault. But as the Me 
Too movement has shown, many women’s monsters can seem like nice 
guys to the rest of us. And the number of true monsters— amoral, unre-
pentant psychopaths who do nothing but evil— is vastly outstripped by 
the entitled men who commit sexual assault with the blithe, deluded 
sense that she’s enjoying it, somehow.
This, she concludes, is ‘a pattern we simply can’t afford to ignore any longer’ 
(Manne). To objections that she is condemning Biden without a ‘fair’ pro-
cess, she replies:
[i] f this was a court of law, and we were jurors, then it would be appro-
priate to deem Biden innocent until he’d been proven guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt. But a presidential campaign is not a court of law, and 
different standards apply: After all, we’re not contemplating convicting 
this man, or taking away his civil liberties. We’re contemplating not 
believing his story— knowing, moreover, that he has lied many times 
before— and potentially withholding from him the chance to run for 
highest office on this basis.
(Manne)
Any provisional answer, then, to the question of whether structures 
of power in the United States have transformed in this ‘me too’ moment 
has to take into account the willingness of progressive voters and political 
surrogates to dismiss a ‘me too’ story because the consequences of taking it 
seriously include re- electing a president who is a demonstrably worse prac-
titioner of and apologist for sexual violence. This is a political structure in 
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which fears of what’s worse can convince people to withhold their attention 
from questions of what’s bad, and it is hard to see how empathy can be built 
in such polarised and inequitable social conditions. As a society, the United 
States appears right now to be vulnerable to having this very necessary anti- 
violence movement branded a ‘witch hunt’ or an overreach— but so too do 
societies like Japan, whose victim- blaming tendencies might be even more 
deeply entrenched. In thinking through how seriously we need to take the 
worry that ‘me too’ constitutes a hostile climate or a social injustice for 
men, it is important to acknowledge honestly and openly that it shares the 
problem of every political movement: how to affirm the need for critical, 
nuanced analysis and simultaneously nurture the enthusiasm of supporters 
who might not see the need for fine- grained examination of flaws and gaps 
in the movement’s understanding of who it is and what it is trying to achieve. 
(This is a matter of needing to teach people how to speak sensitively of 
emotional realities in highly charged rhetorical situations, and also a matter 
of learning/ affirming that acknowledging flaws in a process or argument 
or testimony is not the same thing as impeaching an idea.) It is equally 
important to take note of the fact that this charge of witch- hunting (couched 
as an extreme version of ‘political correctness,’ an already- demonised con-
cern for how others might be harmed by one’s linguistic choices that is else-
where known as having good manners) is precisely how opponents will try 
to undermine and delegitimise the power of ‘me too.’ Nuanced analysis and 
self- criticism do need to be brought to bear on the three kinds of ‘me too’ 
questions Kantor and Twohey identify as central:  degrees of misconduct, 
ways of evaluating the veracity of allegations, and forms of penalty appro-
priate to the violence under scrutiny.
Considering the ways in which we have indeed seen what Judith Herman 
described as a sort of playbook of denial, I think we should probably expect 
‘me too’ backlash to be conducted through tokenised women who object to 
the movement, advancing the message that ‘me too’ is not representative of 
all women’s experiences and therefore we should ignore it. This is where we 
see complicit femininity earning its keep within a patriarchal structure: anti- 
‘me too’ women, who might appear to be acting against their own interests, 
invest in false dichotomies— for instance, in the United States, ignore Joe 
Biden’s bad behaviour or you will end up helping Donald Trump to a second 
term at the helm of American government. Meeting demands for uncritical 
support and loyalty is a way that women are trained into accommodating 
false masculinist notions of agency, which are sold to us as protection. The 
patriarchal state (‘strict daddy’ taking care of us all) is a crucial piece of 
the masculinist political ideology that both toxic masculinity and complicit 
femininity (gender stereotypes I analyse in Chapter 2) train us into; it breeds 
acceptance of a systematised sexual harassment that, as Sara Ahmed puts it, 
‘secures access to women’s bodies; . . . consigns women to some places and 
removes women from others’ (207). In this way of understanding women’s 
social value, ‘sexism [becomes] a worn thread of connection between 
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women; sexism as what you are supposed to get used to; sexism as how you 
are supposed to get used to being used’ (Ahmed 205).
Here, I  think, is the nub of the ‘me too’ challenge:  can we build soci-
eties in which we don’t, in some ways, at some levels, have some people 
living, working, and caring for other people’s well- being at the expense of 
their own? Wherever ‘me too’ sweeps through a society and leaves intact 
exploitations of some for others’ benefit, I will argue that, there, ‘me too’ 
has failed. ‘Feminism requires fronting up to who has been left behind,’ 
Ahmed reminds us pointedly (208). For ‘me too’ to be judged a success, it 
will have to generate empathy in a programmatic and action- oriented pro-
cess of structural transformation, not just a series of disconnected ‘feel good’ 
moments or lucky accidents of outcome.
In the polarised context of American discourse, ‘me too’ is increas-
ingly shaping up as yet another ‘culture war,’ dividing into two camps: the 
‘believe all women’ activists and the defenders of the patriarchal default 
(who believe no women). Like the choice to foreground accountability over 
empathy, turning ‘me too’ into yet another battleground also fails to recog-
nise the revolutionary potential of this movement. What we need to be doing 
is engaging ‘me too’ as a peacebuilding project, carving out the discursive 
space to interrogate the ways that existing social structures have both per-
mitted the exercise of power over vulnerable persons and provided cover 
for those whose ‘exercise’ of power amounts to abuse. In theory, the deploy-
ment of power against those least- positioned to deflect it is not necessarily 
gender- indexed— not something that (all) men do to (all) women— but, in 
practice, given the historical subordination and social disadvantaging of 
women, relations in which a powerful social agent victimises a vulnerable 
one frequently appear as ‘men acting badly towards women.’ This needs to 
be acknowledged as a past social practice, and acceptance of gender discrim-
ination needs to be seen as a habit that we all need to break, even as we pull 
analysis back to a focus on power (not gender).
From the standpoint of ‘me too’ being an umbrella under which many 
gendered injustices can be identified and addressed, the challenge of 
maximising its peacebuilding potential is the question of how it can ‘come 
to work’ for us, how we can pick up this moment, shape it, and adapt it 
to our needs. Calling credibility ‘a basic survival tool’ (5), Rebecca Solnit 
argues that ‘[a] t the heart of the struggle of feminism to give rape, date rape, 
marital rape, domestic violence, and workplace sexual harassment legal 
standing as crimes has been the necessity of making women credible and 
audible’ (6). This is precisely what ‘me too’ is achieving in various national 
contexts:  creating a space to tell stories in which women are encouraged 
to be vocal, audible, and credible. In peace studies terms, peace is not just 
the absence of observable, documentable violence (negative peace); it is 
also expansive conditions of social justice (positive peace). A ‘me too’ that 
focuses only or primarily on accountability can only ever achieve negative 
peace, through reductions in observable (direct) sexual violence. A ‘me too’ 
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movement that realises the empowering capacities of Tarana Burke’s vision 
of empathy— caring for another as for myself— is, on the other hand, a posi-
tive peace movement, one that reforms violent structures and reshapes vio-
lent cultures into an infrastructure that gives each of us real opportunities to 
live lives that make us feel challenged and valuable. And, obviously, giving 
all of us those opportunities means doing away with social hierarchies in 
which some of us are princes and princesses, others of us witches and frogs, 
and still others anonymous peasants who exist only to form a backdrop for 
the significant lives.
Here I want to sum up, and to foreshadow the central point of Chapter 5’s 
discussion. As Anita Hill urged in the essay she wrote in the wake of her tes-
timony to the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1991: ‘We must begin to use 
what we know to move to the next step: What we will do about it’ (1448).
Coda: culture- jamming the exploitation of women in 
‘Rumpelstiltskin’
What’s wrong with this story? The miller’s daughter is treated as the mere 
means to an end for all of the men in the story: her father, who uses her 
spinning talents to bolster his own social standing; the king, who uses her 
expertise and her dependent status in her father’s household as an easy 
way to get gold; and Rumpelstiltskin, who uses her desperation to get her 
promise that she will give him her first- born child. Surely the benefits of her 
labour should accrue to her?
What if the story unfolded this way instead?
Once upon a time, there was a young woman who was an extraordinarily 
talented spinster, of cotton, of wool, and of flax. The yarns she spun were of 
the highest quality and she worked very quickly, expertly, producing enor-
mous quantities in very short periods of time. She was also very creative, 
and would fashion her yarns into distinctive clothing and household textiles, 
which made her work highly sought- after in the local markets and prized 
treasures when she gave them as gifts.
She lived in a land where the king, following ancient tradition, would call 
in the head of each household in his kingdom every year for a personal audi-
ence. It was a tradition that had been observed for longer than any of the 
kingdom’s historical records could remember and, although it was supposed 
to be a technique of governance that would help the king develop a sense of 
connection to his subjects, it had evolved over time into a competition among 
the inhabitants of the kingdom. Each year, the head of household would go 
to his or her (his, usually) meeting with the king determined to impress the 
people of the kingdom by impressing the king. This was not an easy thing 
to accomplish; the king had been royalty his whole life, and he had always 
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often failed to appreciate the extent to which the reports his subjects offered 
about their own lives were, in fact, significant achievements.
When the day arrived for her father’s audience, the young woman could 
see he was very nervous. He was a kind and well- meaning man and, like her, 
he was a very hard worker, but he lacked confidence in his own self- worth 
and was prone to boastfulness to compensate for his self- perceived inad-
equacy. She reminded her father that his work as the village miller was an 
important contribution to the local economy and that her own textile designs 
were beginning to gain quite a good reputation locally, and offered to accom-
pany him to the audience with the king, support he gratefully accepted.
There was, as always, a steady stream of people coming and going from 
the palace and, because this was the annual week of audiences, there were 
also pockets of people gathered outside the walls, recounting audiences they 
had already had, rehearsing audiences that were yet to come, and specu-
lating feverishly about which household the king would find most impres-
sive this year. The miller and his daughter were hailed by a number of friends 
and neighbours but, not wanting to be late for their audience, they hurried 
inside. Taking his daughter’s words to heart, the miller reported to the king 
that his work at the mill over the past year had helped to keep the village 
in healthy economic shape, and he spoke with pride about his daughter’s 
spinning skills and the textiles she produced. He showed off the cloak she 
had woven for him as a birthday gift, praising her handiwork, and was 
disappointed to be greeted with disinterest, perhaps even a bit of boredom, 
from the king. Impulsively, he returned to his daughter’s skill at spinning; 
why, she was so good at it, he said, that she could spin straw into gold. Wait, 
what? Now he had the king’s full attention. ‘You mean to tell me that if I put 
her in a room full of straw, she will turn it into gold for me?’ ‘Well, um, yes, 
your majesty, she could,’ stammered the miller, knowing he was lying but 
trying desperately to save face.
That was how, before she could even fully process her father’s latest 
ridiculous boast, the miller’s daughter found herself locked in a damp, stone- 
floored room that was piled high with straw and was furnished only with a 
spinning wheel, a bucket of water, a stool, and a lantern. At first, she was so 
shocked, and frightened, and despairing, that all she could do was sit on the 
stool and weep. ‘Straw?’ she thought. What had her father been thinking? 
You can’t spin straw; everyone knows that. How on earth was she going to 
turn this barnyard mess into precious metal? She wept some more, wishing 
she had insisted her father go alone to the audience with the king. He might 
have come home deflated, but at least she would have the comfort of her 
own familiar surroundings, her own spinning wheel, her own fibres and 
yarns. But, though she despaired, the young woman was a strong and prac-
tical person, and, in her heart of hearts, she really did love a good challenge. 
She examined the spinning wheel closely; it was designed for spinning flax. 
The straw was already damp and somewhat softened. Maybe it could be 
shredded into strips and spun into something yarn- like?
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The miller’s daughter worked all night, soaking clumps of straw in the 
bucket of water, and twisting strips of the softened fibre into a scratchy, 
bulky yarn. By mid- morning the next day, when she heard the door unlock 
from the other side and saw one of the palace servants usher the king into 
the room, she had finished turning every piece of straw into a strange arti-
sanal yarn and had already started thinking about how she might fashion 
that yarn into bags and baskets, and maybe hats and rugs. Her mind raced 
with possibilities. The king, however, his imagination hampered in its devel-
opment by a lifetime of luxury, saw none of the potential wealth the young 
woman had spent the night creating. Furious with himself for having been 
taken in by the miller’s intemperate boast, he wanted nothing more to do 
with what he saw as the whole sorry situation. He ordered the servant to 
have the miller’s daughter taken back to her own house and forbade her to 
enter the palace again. She had wasted enough of his time and energy; he 
just wanted rid of her. And she could take that mess of whatever she had 
done to the straw with her. It was no longer fit for anything, even the stables.
So the miller’s daughter, the spinster, arrived home later that day with 
piles of artisanal yarn that she immediately began crafting into new pieces 
that she would take to the markets to sell. That was how she turned the 
straw into gold, through her own creativity and hard work. Because the king 
had forbidden her to enter the palace again, she knew that she would never 
be able to live independently if she remained in the kingdom; who would 
represent her household at the annual audience? So the spinster, financially 
self- sufficient working woman that she was, packed up her spinning wheel 
and her design sketches and left the kingdom, intent on making her fortune 
and her household in a foreign land.
Notes
 1 Alyssa Milano’s tweet of 15 October 2017, the origin of ‘me too’ as a hashtag, 
read: ‘Suggested by a friend: “If all the women who have been sexually harassed 
or assaulted wrote ‘Me too.’ as a status, we might give people a sense of the mag-
nitude of the problem,” ’ and invited her followers to reply if they had experienced 
these kinds of sexual violence. Throughout this discussion, as I have throughout 
the book, I  will variously refer to ‘me too’ (the empathy/ community- building 
phrase introduced by Tarana Burke) and #metoo (the hashtag coined in Milano’s 
tweet). I do this to distinguish the social media reaction following Milano’s tweet 
from the ‘work on the ground’ fostered by Burke’s life- long activism. When 
I  speak generally, I  speak of ‘me too’ and of plural movements, rather than a 
single colonising movement into which all ‘cultural variations’ are folded.
 2 There is little merit to a private– public distinction in radical feminist thought 
of the Second Wave; the distinction is seen, for the most part, as a justifica-
tion for sheltering privileged people from the (public) consequences of their 
(private) bad behaviour. Even as that argument leads me to endorse their rejec-
tion of the distinction, I do recognise it might sometimes be deployed to protect 
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decriminalisation of homosexuality in Canada by declaring that ‘there’s no place 
for the state in the bedrooms of the nation.’
 3 In ‘The Social Basis of the Woman Question,’ Kollontai talks about ‘all those 
gentlemen owning and administering industrial enterprises who force women 
among their workforce and clerical staff to satisfy their sexual whims’ (180).
 4 Ghodsee contends, as one example of distortion by the entrenched narrative, that 
erasure of ‘the contributions of East European women and socialist women from 
the developing countries allows for a particular story about the United Nations 
Decade for Women [1975– 1985] to be told, one that credits Western women and 
independent social movements for the progress of women’s rights during that 
era’ (2– 3). The story we all end up learning, in countries around the world, is the 
story of Western feminists and of American- centred movements and struggles. 
But, insists Ghodsee, ‘Western women simply had/ have more resources to record 
their histories . . . so the general story of international women’s activism at the 
United Nations has been dominated by the memoirs and oral histories of women 
from the United States’ (11). This is an international relations (IR) version of a 
familiar critique within feminist histories and organising: the objection that ‘fem-
inist’ campaigns are planned and executed by privileged women for their own 
benefit. It is the reason why African- American women working for empowerment 
have sometimes felt the need to articulate their efforts as ‘womanism’ and Latina/ 
Latinx activists have organised under a banner of ‘mujerista.’ An American aca-
demic version of this dominance through resources (in this case, by white liberal 
feminists organising conference panels) inspired the fierce rage of Audre Lorde’s 
1979 canonical critique, ‘The Master’s Tools Can Never Dismantle the Master’s 
House.’
 5 On this point, Ghodsee’s position on global female solidarity appears best 
encapsulated by Bruno Latour’s observation of the United Nations: that it is a 
hope we need to work towards, not an already fixed starting point from which 
we might embark upon any cosmopolitan aims or projects we might share (3).
 6 The former question was settled by a 1998 Supreme Court decision that 
employers could sidestep liability if they could show that they had exercised ‘rea-
sonable care,’ in the form of antiharassment policies and training that were widely 
publicised to the workforce and the management (Hirshman 55– 56). Corporate 
efforts to manage liability through assigning human resources departments the 
tasks of policy dissemination, training, and complaint resolution was an early 
part of the scaffolding that ‘me too’ came to challenge: ineffectual and unrespon-
sive to workers, these departments became a bulwark against complaints, and the 
settlement/ nondisclosure agreement process became an instrument to silence any 
complaints that did get past the gatekeepers. See Kantor and Twohey’s memoir, 
She Said, for a particularly lucid account of the structures built to silence sexu-
ally harassed employees.
 7 Sara Ahmed observes that ‘[s] exual harassment works— as does bullying more 
generally— by increasing the costs of fighting against something, making it easier 
to accept something than to struggle against something’ and notes, of its power 
to harm, that when ‘[i]t is happening all around you, and yet people seem to 
be getting on with it . . . [y]ou can end up doubting yourself, estranged from 
yourself’ (141).
 8 ‘When Hill declined [Thomas’s invitations to go out with him], she said, “He 
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valid’ reports Rebecca Solnit (110, emphasis in original). Men and women both, 
toxically and complicitly, are socialised into a curious refusal of women’s ‘no’s. 
Men with privilege are socialised to hear ‘no’ as a starting point for their nego-
tiations; women are socialised to justify any ‘no’ we might issue. Jane Fonda put 
the point succinctly in a 2018 Netflix documentary, Feminists: What Were They 
Thinking?: ‘It took me 60 years to realize that “no” is a complete sentence.’
 9 Hirshman’s history draws a fairly straight line from Hill’s testimony of sexual 
harassment to Bill Clinton’s sexual misconduct later in the 1990s:
In a campaign disturbingly reminiscent of the conservatives’ war on 
Anita Hill, the Clinton team orchestrated a series of attacks on the char-
acter of Monica Lewinsky. She was a ‘sexually demanding stalker,’ as one 
White House intimate put out. A key congressional ally, Charles Rangel, 
questioned whether she ‘played with a full deck.’ When a private conver-
sation of Hillary [Clinton]’s was revealed years later, Americans learned 
that Monica was, in the spouse’s estimation, just a ‘narcissistic loony toon’ 
whom Bill had heroically tried to rid himself of.
(Hirshman 103)
Hirshman includes in her history, Lewinsky’s ‘me too’ realisation: ‘He was my 
boss, he was the most powerful man on the planet, he was 27 years my senior, 
with enough experience to know better. He was at the time in the pinnacle of 
his career while I was in my first job out of college’ (Hirshman 218; Lewinsky). 
This aligns with Lewinsky’s other public statements these days: what she got 
from ‘me too’ was the ability to see the power structure she had walked into 
in her consensual flirtation with Clinton. She has always had the ability to see 
(and willingness to own) her own desires— which is why she has consistently 
stressed the consensual nature of their interaction— but ‘me too’ offers a lan-
guage in which to explain that just because there’s no problem on the matter of 
consent, that does not mean there’s no problem on the matter of power inequities 
(Lewinsky). It is, after all, Lewinsky who has spent decades of her adult life being 
notorious; undermined and disparaged because a powerful man who was toying 
with her wanted to protect his marriage and his public reputation. Lewinsky’s 
‘romance’ with Clinton is a paradigm of a messy story of consensual sex bound 
up with abuse of power and position; in a recent Slate podcast (Slow Burn, 
season 2) Leon Neyfakh brings alive how vulnerable she was in that situation, a 
young woman dreaming that there might be a post- White House future for her 
with the man she (thought she) loved.
 10 Walker, one of the earliest writers of feminism’s Third Wave and coiner of the 
term, lives the generationally linked feminism I am presenting as radical Second 
Wave and the Third Wave overlap; her mother is celebrated Second Wave poet 
and novelist Alice Walker.
 11 In 1991 it was clear that women’s voices could not challenge structures that 
produce and affirm male privilege:  Thomas was confirmed and sits as a US 
Supreme Court Justice to this day. Hill was savagely denounced and largely 
receded from pop- culture awareness, emerging again only recently to support 
and encourage ‘me too’ reforms. In 2019, Dr Christine Blasey Ford’s testimony 
of an attempted sexual assault perpetrated against her by then Supreme Court 
nominee Brett Kavanaugh (now Justice Kavanaugh) replicated that challenge, 
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 12 One recent example of this groundwork is ‘the 2014 hashtag #YesAllWomen . . . 
[which] shared stories of how widespread sexual abuse and harassment actually 
is’ (Hirshman 211). (#YesAllWomen was a response to a hashtag that emerged 
immediately after a high- profile California shooting spree, #NotAllMen: as in, 
no, not all men are harassers, abusers and misogynists, but, yes, all women have 
stories of encountering such men.) Valenti’s column in the Guardian newspaper 
analysed the outpouring of #YesAllWomen stories four days after the hashtag 
was instantiated to speak about the pervasive misogyny identified as a motiv-
ation for Elliot Rodger’s murders in Isla Vista, California. Holmes’ website 
Jezebel provided extensive coverage of news items related to #YesAllWomen in 
the days and weeks following.
 13 Liberal feminism’s acceptance of existing structures as the framework to which 
gender equality efforts must accommodate themselves was a marked contrast 
to ‘the suspicions of many women in state socialist countries that, without fun-
damental transformations in society, feminism would at best just give certain 
women equal access to fetishized free markets’ (Ghodsee 239).
 14 Burke herself characterises the core of ‘me too’ as ‘survivors talking to survivors’ 
(Democracy Now! interview). Without referencing Sartre’s description of fire-
side revolutionaries (and possibly unaware of it), Kantor and Twohey close their 
memoir of ‘me too’ reporting, She Said, with an account of a ‘reunion’ of some 
of the key women involved in exposing Harvey Weinstein’s abuses, in which they 
speak to each other of their own roles. The conversation, women speaking to 
each other for their own benefit, takes place in front of a fireplace in the den of 
Gwyneth Paltrow’s Hollywood home.
 15 Acknowledging how much of a burden whistleblowing and silence- breaking are 
suggests that there are moral dimensions to the question of who comes for-
ward and why: specifically, the idea that one’s ability to survive public harass-
ment and retaliation constitutes a privilege that grounds an obligation to come 
forward. This obligation to come forward, identified by both Anita Hill and 
Christine Blasey Ford, is something I think is worth normativising, as a way of 
redirecting the burden away from the many under- waged and unwaged women, 
like Carmita Wood, whose workplace experiences have become grist for law and 
activism.
 16 The discussion in this section of Alyssa Milano’s tweet and Tarana Burke’s 
empowerment work with African- American girls— the story of how #metoo 
emerged from ‘me too’— is adapted from an essay that I  originally published 
as ‘The Unapologetic Blackness of the Me Too Movement,’ on Kenyan current 
affairs and criticism website The Elephant.info in October 2019.
 17 This thesis that black vernacular English is inherently dialogical is drawn from 
the literary theory that Henry Louis Gates, Jr. develops in The Signifying Monkey. 
Gates argues that dialogicality (call and response) and double- voicedness (com-
munication that can be interpreted by uninitiated hearers as innocuous messages 
and simultaneously by those ‘in the know’ as subversive or incendiary) are 
features of communication in African- American communities, and identifies 
their origins in musical traditions that emerged from struggles to survive the 
horrors of slavery and systemic, deadly racism.
 18 Linda Hirshman suggests, mistakenly in my view, in Reckoning’s opening 
that Mary Jo Kopechne, the young woman who drowned in questionable 
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an incident that put an end to his presidential aspirations, has a ‘#MeToo’ story 
to tell (3). You might call it that, Hirshman suggests. You might— except that 
we never heard Mary Jo Kopechne speak on the matter of any abuse or pre-
dation Ted Kennedy might have engaged in with her. She died without having 
spoken and without having been listened to. She is a forever- silent woman who 
didn’t live to reveal the ways in which the highest price of Kennedy’s entitled 
womanising was paid by her, not him.
 19 Hirshman notes in her ‘me too’ history of sexual harassment that the examples of 
Bill Cosby, Roger Ailes, and Bill O’Reilly being brought down by sexual assault 
and harassment allegations from the positions of power and influence they 
occupied— which Hirshman styles as pre- shocks to the Weinstein earthquake— 
and then the New York Times and New Yorker reporting on Weinstein showed 
the world attuned to American media just how much opportunity and impunity 
‘was made possible by a universe of institutional structures of harassment . . . 
a society organized to empower abusers’ (203). The insights of Second Wave 
radical feminists, Third Wave feminists, anti- sexual violence advocates from 
African- American communities are all quite correct: sexual violence (direct vio-
lence, in peace studies terminology) will not abate until or unless we also take 
on the structural violence of lives and workplaces structured by male dominance 
and female capitulation and the cultures of impunity and isolation that abusers 
and victims are sorted into.
 20 However much complexity may or may not be leavening private conversations, 
there is no doubt that ‘me too’ has generated some fascinating public analysis of 
what story is, as a form of communication, and how its tropes produce meaning. 
Kelly Faircloth, for instance, argues in a 2018 stock- taking of ‘me too’ that 
‘Bluebeard’ has been revealed as the fairy tale most emblematic of our time. The 
real- life child predator Gilles de Rais became, in the fairy tales about Bluebeard, 
a wealthy old pirate who married and murdered a succession of young women 
and hung their bodies in a secret room that no one was to enter. Faircloth draws 
parallels between that tale and the abuses that Harvey Weinstein was able to lock 
away in the ‘secret rooms’ of nondisclosure agreements. ‘It has often been the 
very concept of “private” that has kept these stories either shut away, or trapped 
in some shadow realm where they go understood but unacknowledged,’ she 
writes, suggesting that ‘[p] erhaps #MeToo’s biggest upheaval has been dragging 
these secrets down from the proverbial attic and laying them out in public; an 
insistence that the domestic home is no longer a place to hide grisly secrets’ 
(Faircloth). But, she notes, ‘me too’ has complicated public- private distinctions 
in ways that trouble traditional boundaries in our discourse (workplace/ personal 
life, for instance), and it is stories that spill over and refuse to respect these 
demarcations that are driving critiques of ‘me too’ as ‘going too far’ (Faircloth).
 21 This idea that a gendered or feminist analysis of power structures illuminates 
power relations is also advanced in the work of, among others, feminist inter-
national relations theorists Carol Cohn and Cynthia Enloe who argue that we 
need this kind of analysis of international organisations like Oxfam, International 
Committee of the Red Cross, and Médecins Sans Frontières. In order to think 
clearly and creatively about how we build gender equality into political cultures 
governing societies, we need to understand ‘the politics’ of femininity and mas-
culinity, they argue— a point clearly true of academic and political institutions, 
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women, and without men- as- men, and “inserting gender” then appears both dif-
ficult and unnecessary,’ Cohn and Enloe observe of the difficulty in motivating 
institutional change (1193).
 22 Widespread use of both nondisclosure agreements and whisper networks in the 
entertainment industry suggest competing (possibly gendered?) approaches to 
information: one in which power is maintained by keeping information to one-
self/ as few sources as possible; another in which the power (value) of the infor-
mation exists in the process of sharing being shared. This latter view is clearly 
the one being embraced by/ as the ‘me too’ (re)orientation.
 23 Early in She Said, Kantor and Twohey recount an interview with actress Marissa 
Tomei whose career- long frustration with pay inequities and limited, limiting 
roles had led her to the theory that Hollywood dreams are ‘a cycle of misper-
ception’ in which girls are brought up to admire the beautiful ‘fantasy women’ 
they see in films and television, and develop ambitions to be part of that world 
without understanding how brutally it will treat them— all because the women 
who are this generation’s ‘fantasy women’ are also part of a cycle of silencing 
about the costs of success (29).
 24 Hong Fincher notes in her book ‘feminism’s unusual appeal to young Chinese 
women, who are fed up with being sexually harassed whenever they take public 
transportation’ (103). It is unusual in China’s history, she explains, because, as 
Ghodsee noted in her analysis of East European (Second World) women’s rejec-
tion of the term, ‘feminism’ is indelibly associated with white liberal (bourgeois) 
agendas (Hong Fincher 119).
 25 It is important also to acknowledge where these protests for equality and struc-
tural fairness have failed to materialise. In Russia, where ‘me too’ awareness 
is deemed ‘embryonic, at best,’ there is feminist organising to protest domestic 
violence laws that give very light penalties to abusers who are convicted, with 
conviction itself a rarity (Ferris- Rotman) In Italy, actress Asia Argento has been 
criticised for speaking out in the US, and ‘me too’ has been dismissed as American 
puritanism (Poggioli). In Ghana, casual joking by celebrities about sexual violence 
against women, and against even very young children, is routinely dismissed as 
mere ‘misbehaviour,’ and sexual assault allegations are more likely to ruin the life 
of an accuser than an abuser (Asante). And a quirk of Australia’s libel laws that 
puts the burden on publishers to prove allegations are true (rather than expecting 
the person who claims defamation to prove them false) has made coming for-
ward with allegations of sexual violence an action with such enormous finan-
cial consequences for the accusing individual that structural critique of industries 
from media to finance have been short- circuited (Sloman).
 26 Hirshman casts Biden as a politician committed to his ‘nice guy’ persona: Biden 
‘considered himself a friend to women,’ she observes in Reckoning (73). In 
her view, Biden had every reason to see himself this way, ‘since his whole life 
was made possible by women who had put his career first’ (Hirshman 73). 
In his default orientations, he is, she says, ‘accustomed to supportive women, 
obsessed with being liked, and suspicious of the media and of organized polit-
ical feminists’ (Hirshman 74). This is not a set of habits and assumptions that 
incline someone at the pinnacle of his career to engage deeply and self- critically 
with ‘me too’ criticisms of his past treatment of women, and one burning 
question facing American feminists in this moment is the extent to which 






How ‘Me Too’ came to work 171
Tara Reade’s serious but actively doubted allegations of sexual assault— a series 
of accusations of groping and ‘handsy’ behaviour that his campaign has written 
off as ‘just Joe, being friendly’) are or should be impeaching of his candidacy for 
president.
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5  And they all lived better than 
before . . .
Culture- jamming our way  
to a better world
We have always been doing this: tales from the past
Several years ago, I taught a course on the history of women in philosophy— 
a ‘special topics’ course, no less— and my enduring memory of that experi-
ence is the tragically mis- represented life of Cleopatra. Queen of one of the 
great empires of the ancient world, reputedly well- educated, well- spoken, 
and highly intelligent, Cleopatra is a model of the shrewd and fortunate 
woman we can find in every age and culture, the woman who mines all her 
opportunities and social privilege to allow her to be heard in a cultural con-
text that typically silences and erases non- dominant (non- male) voices. My 
understanding of Cleopatra as misrepresented comes from one of her more 
sympathetic and more recent biographers, Stacy Schiff, who explains that 
the primary sources of her life are written by Roman historians, interested in 
telling a history of Rome (Cleopatra: A Life). The result is a portrayal of this 
politically astute ruler as mere appendage to the two famous men she bore 
children to: Julius Caesar and Marc Antony; as Schiff observes in an inter-
view promoting her biography, Cleopatra is ‘only ever apparent to us when 
there is a Roman in the room, or when her story intersects with the rise of 
Rome’ (“Cleopatra: ‘A Life’ Misunderstood”). Like Kristen Ghodsee’s Soviet 
and Soviet- aligned women (see my discussion in Chapter 4), Cleopatra was 
responsible for choices and decisions that reshaped the world she lived in 
and, like them, she still lacked the power to get her story, her voice, into the 
‘great conversation’ of human history. Schiff notes (Cleopatra: A Life) that 
the Cleopatra we ‘know’ today is largely the iconic cinematic representation 
of her by Elizabeth Taylor (whose own voice was misdirected and trivialised 
in a career shaped by Hollywood film studios). Cleopatra, beautiful and 
voiceless, appears in human history as the ancient- world version of Hello 
Kitty’s mouthless femininity.
Even though, as Mark Dery, one of culture- jamming’s earliest theorists, 
points out, ‘the web may have popularized the idea of culture as a con-
versation, not a monologue’ (xiv), we cannot assume that everyone with 
something to say— about, for example, rape culture— has the ability to be 
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voices that improvisatory arts . . . both presume and place in dialogue’ (Born 
et al. 21), through strategies like culture- jamming. We can think of cultural 
interventions, like pop- culture feminist zine Bitch and Alyssa Milano’s 
#metoo tweet, as making space for voices that have otherwise been drowned 
out of conversations,1 but culture- jamming is both a broader and more 
targeted orientation to public discourse. It offers ‘a range of tactics used to 
critique, subvert, and otherwise “jam” the workings of consumer culture,’ 
but these ‘jammings’— ‘scrambling the signal, injecting the unexpected, 
jarring audiences, provoking critical thinking, inviting play and public par-
ticipation’— are most typically embedded in subaltern or oppositional art-
istic projects and practices (DeLaure and Fink 6).
Marilyn DeLaure and Moritz Fink, editors of a new anthology on 
culture- jamming, characterise these projects and practices as ‘creative acts 
of popular intervention performed by people seeking change, using what-
ever means and materials are at hand’ (6). It is where the creative meets 
the subversive that we find rich and potentially transformative examples 
of culture- jamming, a point reinforced by DeLaure and Fink’s insistence on 
both connotations of the term as definitive of its strategic focus:  culture- 
jamming is ‘jamming’ in the sense of blocking the free flow of advertising 
and consumer propaganda, but it is also and simultaneously ‘jamming’ in 
the sense of playing music experimentally with each other (7).
These two approaches, of course, need not be mutually exclusive: indeed, 
LeVine [a proponent of jamming as play] asserts that culture jamming 
should be ‘both critical and positive . . . perform[ing] an inherent cri-
tique of the existing system while also showing the way forward to a 
different future.’
(DeLaure and Fink 7)
The same tactics that culture- jamming artists and activists have used to 
expose the shoddy dehumanisation of consumer culture can be, and have 
been, used to expose the workings of rape culture. Indeed, this chapter argues 
throughout that there are recursive overlaps between culture- jamming, 
(peace studies- inflected) improvisation theory, and the empowerment- 
through- empathy that Tarana Burke’s ‘me too’ activism is building. What 
those (em)powered by empathy can do to dismantle rape culture is ‘jam’ 
its messages of patriarchal gender roles, women as prizes or rewards, sex 
as negotiating campaigns in which consent and attrition collapse into each 
other, and other normalisations of sexual and gendered violence. We can do 
culture- jamming in order to develop ‘the plurality of creative voices’ that 
Georgina Born, Eric Lewis, and Will Straw valorise in examination of ‘social 
aesthetics’ as a frame for theorising improvisation (21). Robust attention 
to the intersection of culture- jamming and improvisation theory (with its 
own paradigms of collaborative musical experimentation) demonstrates 
that culture is not a coherent ‘cover story’ created by a group of like- minded 
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people, but a patchwork quilt of contested views of ourselves. And in those 
contestations, conceptual space can be seized and turned back on itself, so 
that we can interrogate the subordination, the alienation, and the silencing 
that rape culture fosters and flourishes within.
DeLaure and Fink identify the common features of culture- jamming 
as:  an ‘appropriating’ orientation to culture, artfulness, playfulness, 
transgressiveness, a preference for anonymity and pseudonymity, partici-
patory politics, and its own (sub)cultural convention of producing and 
reproducing critiques as a series (12– 24). This might seem a grab- bag of 
artistic practices and social motivations, but they are, on closer inspection, 
reinforcing features. Culture- jamming’s treatment of commodified public 
space as furnishing raw material to be appropriated and turned into one’s 
own message is an attitude that leads jammer and self- described prankster 
Kembrew McLeod to characterise culture- jamming as ‘twisted versions of 
participatory democracy in action’ (401). Appropriating the slogans, images, 
and memes of consumer culture and presenting them as items in a series 
constitutes an invitation to a radically participatory politics, a politics that 
sees public space as an improvisatory site for ‘answering back’ to the ‘one- 
way communication’ of corporate merchandising and encourages others to 
add their own transgressive appropriations to the mix. Giving an explicitly 
transgressive cast to the imperatives of artfulness and playfulness reminds us 
that art can be fun and that play can serve very serious purposes. And, ‘[t] he 
anonymity afforded by masks and pseudonyms,’ explain DeLaure and Fink, 
‘. . . puts the critique, not its authors, center stage’ (17).2
‘Culture jamming does political work in that it critically engages 
narratives of the dominant capitalist culture,’ they argue. ‘At its most tren-
chant, culture jamming challenges existing structures of power, seeking to 
reveal hypocrisy and injustices, spark public outrage, and promote collective 
action’ (DeLaure and Fink 19). It both causes confusion, and then mines that 
confusion, to show us that there are other questions to ask that lie beyond 
our initial ‘wtf’ reactions. In this way, culture- jamming can be understood 
as a resistance to power enacted by the powerless: ‘We don’t get to make 
culture? Really? ‘Cause we’re doing it right now, by defacing this bus- stop 
poster.’ Everyone, however disempowered and apparently passive, does par-
ticipate in producing and maintaining the culture he, she, or they lives in, 
and official social norm- making (e.g. laws and political discourses) that does 
not build in an encouragement to diversity of voice will end up unwittingly 
creating the conditions of possibility for the subversive and outrage- fuelled 
‘speakings back’ that get identified as instances of culture- jamming.
Christine Harold identifies three possible ‘rhetorical postures’ adopted in 
culture- jamming interventions: sabotage, appropriation, and intensification 
(which she understands as a kind of resistance within, that does not require 
one to step outside the cultural space or concept being criticised). Speculating 
about what a ‘gender justice’ or anti- rape culture could look like seems to 
require something like Harold’s intensification strategy:  we cannot step 
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outside of culture to transform it from any kind of overarching ‘view from 
nowhere,’ so all our resistance is necessarily working inside power relations. 
It is here that I  see an overlapping space for culture- jamming, improvisa-
tion theory, and empathy- empowerment that can address Foucauldian 
thinking about power and resistance.3 The overlap of culture- jamming 
and improvisation theory is extensive: they both claim experimental music 
as a defining paradigm, and the promises made for culture- jamming and 
for improvisation by their respective proponents identify common ideals. 
‘At its best,’ DeLaure and Fink tell us, ‘culture jamming is a creative and 
inventive mode of public engagement: it cultivates critical attitudes toward 
commercial culture and dominant institutions, and helps foster belief that 
the world can be different’ (25). My own work on articulating an ethics of 
improvisation— identifying political and ethical norms of ‘free jazz’ impro-
vising ensembles that can help build more democratic political communities 
(Nicholls, An Ethics of Improvisation)— aligns well with culture- jamming’s 
aggressively anti- hierarchy stance: Kembrew McLeod, for instance, argues 
that its power lies in ‘encourag[ing] people to stop being bystanders, engage 
with their daily lives, and deviate from their daily routines . . . [in order] to 
see the world, even very briefly, from a new perspective’ (401).
Improvisation and culture- jamming benefit from being examined through 
the framework that ‘social aesthetics’ offers. A recent volume that theorises 
this new interpretive frame through analysis of improvisatory arts (predom-
inantly music) defines social aesthetics as
argu[ing] for, and investigat[ing] the details of, the many ways in which 
our interactions with art participate in or serve an array of political 
orientations and social and cultural processes: from signalling our mem-
bership in and commitment to particular social identities . . . to reifying, 
contesting, or modeling alternatives to existing social formations.
(Born et al. 3)
Locating artmaking within social relations is, the editors argue,
particularly appropriate to an analysis of improvisatory art, since impro-
visation, regardless of its medium, has often been conceived by both its 
practitioners and its theorists as being intimately inflected by the social 
formations in which it is created and as being, in aesthetically relevant 
ways, a social practice in itself. Improvised art is often created partially 
as a social commentary.
(Born et al. 9)4
While improvisation is an observable response to environment across 
human cultures broadly, there are competing traditions of improvisatory 
arts, especially improvised music. The sonic experimentation of European 
art music of the 20th century is framed as a very different adventure in 
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artmaking than the improvised jazz that I and many of the other contributors 
to the social aesthetics volume theorise from. In improvisatory art performed 
within African- American traditions, ‘improvisation’ is best understood as 
‘repetition with a signal difference,’ says Henry Louis Gates Jr., who has 
developed a literary and vernacular communication theory out of sustained 
study of black cultural practices of taking something that already exists 
and playing around with it a little bit (51). In group improvisation, dia-
logue (communication) is foregrounded as an aesthetic practice that is also 
a social interaction (Born et al. 10). Thus, improvised music, in its troubling 
of composer- performer distinctions and in its efforts to provoke audience 
engagement, is posing the same questions that culture- jamming does: whose 
voices are getting heard? what are they telling us?
In her own contribution to the social aesthetics volume she co- edited, 
music theorist and erstwhile improvising musician Georgina Born offers 
a conceptual foundation for this relatively new approach to aesthetic 
theory: an analysis of four planes of ‘social mediation,’ the term she uses to 
describe processes of speaking change into existence (43). The first plane she 
identifies, microsociality, is the community that is formed within an impro-
visatory exchange, analogous to the exchange of a ‘me too’ story and the ‘me 
too’ response. The second, imagined community, is the more durable and 
well- populated affective network that forms and is entered into as, say, one 
develops membership in a jazz scene or punk scene. As a mediation of rape 
culture, it is performed through one’s own ‘me too’ call- and- response inter-
action over time. Affective community is, however, something that needs to 
be brought into being before it can provide much in the way of support— 
and is not yet fully there in the early interventions, which is why being the 
first voices (in any discourse) is so fraught. The community that will sustain 
you does not yet exist.
The third and fourth planes are both refractions whose jaggedness reveals 
wider social relations (what we can see in our culture because of what we see 
in the improvisation’s or culture- jamming’s commentary) and institutional 
forces (the systems and structures that improvisation or culture- jamming 
reveals). Born’s analysis, explained by her through improvised music (43), 
and applied here to ‘me too’ concerns, reveals both improvised music and 
culture- jamming as having all the necessary resources to enact political cri-
tique and build community. The four planes she sees as sites of social medi-
ation within improvisatory arts are, in their application to ‘me too,’ more 
visible as two pairs of social interaction. The first two planes articulate a 
sociality within— the building of community through empathy— whereas 
the third and fourth are the transformative work of commenting on social 
structures, the revealing of pervasiveness and similarities of various ‘me too’ 
stories, that culture- jamming does so effectively.
To be judged as good/ successful culture- jamming, an intervention must 
have many of the same attributes that I have written about previously as the 
value criteria for improvised music (Nicholls, ‘Improvising Rage’ 33): it must 
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engage in dialogue or conversation (perhaps as initiator of a particular idea 
or interpretation, but in ways that signal responsiveness), it must acknow-
ledge and welcome voices (points of view) other than its own, it must speak 
to a community to which it holds itself accountable (an identity that is being 
represented by the ‘jammer,’ as in Emma Sulkowicz’s ‘Mattress Performance’ 
addressing sexual- assault survivors and the institutional processes that fail 
to support them), and it must accept the risks and contingencies of the space 
in which the culture- jamming takes place. ‘[T] o be improvisatory is to reject 
(or subvert) definitive or official versions’ (Nicholls, ‘Improvising Rage’ 
36), but it is also to build trust among the participants (broadly construed 
to include audiences) that they will be listened to generously— a notion 
theorised in improvisation studies by Julie Smith and Ellen Waterman as 
‘listening trust’— and they will be part of building some transformative 
common ground. To the extent that a culture- jamming intervention can 
plausibly convey these improvisation- theory commitments to community 
and responsiveness, it becomes more than just rage against a social machine.
To be a good judge— of improvised music or of culture- jamming— one 
must be an open and engaged listener, approaching a performance with the 
intent to listen closely to what underlying meanings there could be. This 
means one must be cognitively agile and curious about alternative inter-
pretations. Being a good judge also means being a thorough and diligent 
listener, hearing out the entire intervention and considering everything that 
can be gleaned from its context before evaluating it as success or failure. The 
ideal, in this listening, is a cultural fluency (the ability to ‘codeswitch’) that 
can only result from immersion in and sustained engagement with different 
voices, different cultures, different stories— to the point at which you can see 
points of convergence between your stories and the others you have learned. 
This is how I understand Tarana Burke to be talking about empowerment 
through empathy; improvisation theory’s emphasis on context and embodi-
ment/ voice is consistent with a ‘me too’ emphasis on empathy,5 which must 
necessarily develop out of concrete personal interaction.
What I have argued in the context of mapping shared commitments of 
improvisation theory and peace studies is that an ‘ethics of improvisation’ 
(what the good is that improvisation can do, and how) is not merely per-
formative, but transformative (Nicholls, ‘Improvisation, Peace,’ An Ethics 
of Improvisation). Like peace studies, an ethically inflected improvisation 
theory gives us a perspective on our social fields that develops us as creative 
and responsive individuals: valuing us for our capacities of generosity, will-
ingness to support others in their creative risk- taking and their struggles out 
of problem situations, forgiveness of mis- steps that arise in negotiations, and 
respect for creative performance of social responses (Nicholls, An Ethics of 
Improvisation).6 If Miranda Fricker’s work on epistemic injustice is prop-
erly labelled virtue epistemology, then I am tempted to suggest we think of 
Burke’s empowerment through empathy as a kind of virtue politics, making 
ourselves better individual (embedded in microsocialities and imagined 
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communities) agents both by making our societies better and in order to 
continue making them better.
Efforts to push societies forward— in the name of justice, or equality, 
or human rights— through subversion- as- critique are not a new feature of 
modern society. We have always been doing this kind of cultural disruption 
as social justice. Among the examples of subverted and reimagined cultural 
productions in which women have grounded demands for gender equality 
are ‘culture- jammings’ of two historic declarations of human rights:  the 
French Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen de 1789, which 
was reworked by French revolutionary and women’s rights activist Olympe 
de Gouges; and the American Declaration of Independence (1776), which 
was reworked by American suffragist Elizabeth Cady Stanton. In both 
cases, they ‘rewrote’ stirring and iconic documents proclaiming ‘the rights 
of man,’ revising them into arguments for gender equality. In fiction, we 
find equally instructive and thought- provoking depictions of gendered 
social expectations, like the example of Don Quixote, Miguel de Cervantes’ 
17th- century contribution to the canon of Spanish literature. In the English- 
speaking world, Cervantes’ central character has been cast as a fool who 
imagines and misidentifies battles and adversaries, a buffoon who ‘tilts at 
windmills.’ Yet the newest (2005) English translation of this Spanish classic 
suggests the possibility of a very different reading of Don Quixote. In trans-
lator Edith Grossman’s hands, this Spanish gentleman who we think we 
know as a simple- minded fool is reintroduced as a man whose failure to 
conform to social expectations sometimes takes the form of standing up for 
women’s rights— as in the defence he makes of a beautiful young woman 
who insists that the desire of the men who fall in love with her does not 
obligate her to reciprocate their affections (101). This Don Quixote is a 
new feminist- friendly voice emerging from literary classics, and suggests our 
previous misperception of him is yet another distorting effect of patriarchal 
culture. Re- presentation of disparaged and mocked figures in literature can, 
in cases like these, also be understood as culture- jamming.
The paradigmatic example I have used throughout the course of writing 
this book— the body of work that explained for others what I was talking 
about in references to culture- jamming— is Banksy. A studiedly anonymous 
street artist whose work is now sold at auctions, Banksy began, in the early 
1990s, to develop a style of public mural- meets- vandalism that initially 
used bits of contingent space— cracks in a concrete wall, for instance— 
as ‘canvases’ for subversive reminders that we don’t have to be passive 
consumers of commercialised messaging. Moving from a graffiti style to 
stencilling, he continued the cultural critique in public space that culture- 
jamming analyst Benedikt Feiten describes through Mark Dery’s definition 
of culture- jamming as ‘intruding on the intruders’ (219). Feiten argues that 
Banksy’s ‘intruding’ is twofold: a reclamation of the physical space in which 
corporations are relentlessly shouting their advertising at us, and a liberation 
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of our minds (219). Banksy shouts back, says Feiten, thereby showing us 
that public space is not monolithically commercial space. In this, despite a 
very different cultural background, his art has transformed public space in 
ways very similar to the emergence of hip- hop culture in inner cities of the 
United States in the 1970s.7 Banksy contributes to
what Carrie Lambert- Beatty (2010) calls invitational culture jamming . 
. . [that helps us] perceive the city and its elements not only in terms of 
the functions they fulfill, but also as an aesthetic space, open to revision 
and co- creation.
(Feiten 223, 226)
Feiten describes the deliberate disruption in his works as ‘provocation to 
think about the spatial surroundings not as something fixed (static) but 
as maybe something that needs to be fixed (amended)’ (227)— a shift of 
awareness that, expanded to include ‘fixed’ as in ‘fixed that for you,’ 
encapsulates the culture- jamming attitude.
Dery, one of culture- jamming’s early theorisers, in a foreword to DeLaure 
and Fink’s anthology, asks whether ‘jamming [is] a quaint anachronism in a 
networked world where Facebook and Twitter pass the mike to anyone with 
a Net connection, giving her access to a global PA system, free of charge?’ 
(xi).8 This positioning of contemporary culture- jamming as no longer neces-
sary and all voices as free to speak obscures the structural barriers that 
are a reality on most social media platforms: not just anyone gets access. 
Some people get amplified; others don’t. And this is not just a scattershot 
accident; whether you get heard on social media largely replicates the 
same patterns of inequality, privilege, and marginalisation that we see else-
where in society. Much of the cultural infrastructure that gives platforms to 
authorised voices and suppresses dissident ones remains unchanged from 
the conditions in which culture- jamming emerged into cultural awareness in 
the 1990s, popularising anti- consumer, anti- advertising, ‘no logo’ sentiments 
through mockery, exposure of hypocrisy and greed, and other ‘street theatre’ 
tactics.9 Concluding his case for culture- jamming’s continued relevance, 
Dery reminds us that it is a social practice with origins in the oppositional, 
norms- defying attitudes of medieval- era European carnivals, and that it 
seeks to demonstrate ‘that culture really is a contest of narratives, a war of 
stories’ (xv).
We need to do more of this: tales for the future
There are indeed ‘story wars’ for us to fight with culture- jamming strat-
egies and tools. The ‘Slutwalk’ marches that Selma James has written about 
as emblematic of ‘the new women’s movement’ (274) began in Toronto, 
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that women who didn’t want to get raped shouldn’t ‘dress like sluts’ (Gibson). 
As Rebecca Solnit recounts the history of these marches, they began
as a [Canadian] protest against victim- blaming . . . [and] became an 
international phenomenon, of mostly young, often sexily dressed 
women taking back public space (rather like the Take Back the Night 
walks of the 1980s, but with more lipstick and less clothing).
(151)
As a voice of the radical Second Wave, James is an activist who has never 
stopped her advocacy of gender justice and community empowerment; she 
sees in Slutwalks a real opportunity to build solidarity across race, class, 
and gender affiliations. She recalls of her own involvement in these Third 
Wave- driven protests that ‘[w] e were not merely marching together; we 
were one, claiming not equality but mutual respect for individuality’ (James 
275). One might object here that she is idealising her experience,10 and there 
is, I  think, no arguing with the observation that public protest can be a 
euphoric, albeit fading, experience— it is a rare experience, in a neoliberal 
society that atomises human experience and valorises the heroic individual, 
to be in a crowd who are (or appear to be) all passionately transported by 
the same ideas and feelings. It evokes similar feelings of closeness to these 
stranger- others to the feelings one might experience in the concerts, festivals, 
and performances that are objects of analysis for improvisation studies.11
Given their synthesis of creative performance and political protest,12 
I think we can see creative cultural reproaches like Slutwalks and other anti- 
sexual assault performances as analysable through Georgina Born’s four 
planes of social mediation. At the level of the microsociality of that par-
ticular London march James writes about, and at the level of imagined com-
munity that unifies all of the Slutwalks worldwide, empathy is being built. In 
the assemblage of diverse races, genders, and classes of people, wider social 
relations are being culture- jammed (as Solnit insinuates, marchers typically 
wear lingerie and other so- called slutty clothing in rejection of the notion 
that only ‘sluts’ get raped) and institutional forces (e.g. law enforcement’s 
acceptance and perpetuation of rape myths) are being exposed. ‘In this 
sense, the [London] SlutWalk was light years ahead of the 1970 women’s 
liberation march, which made way for it,’ James insists, drawing credibility 
for her assessment from the fact that she was, as she notes, ‘at both’ (275).
So, how do we and our law enforcement develop the rape- culture belief 
that Slutwalks are jamming (that women who experience sexual violence are 
probably, more likely than not, asking for it)? What is the cultural machinery 
that needs to be subverted, so that it can no longer nurture attitudes that 
cause social harm? Since the 1980s, one piece of the means of production of 
consumer capitalism that has been scrutinised with these questions in mind 
is the film industry. A 1984 review of the research findings presented at that 
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analysis about repeated viewing of violent films making ‘viewers, including 
women, become more callous in the face of the films’ portrayals of violence 
toward women and more likely to believe that a woman who was raped 
wanted to be’ (Goleman). Clover Hope, writing three decades later about the 
impact of ‘me too’ on ‘the violent male gaze’ through which and for which 
movies are made, notes the particular inadequacy of this cultural scrutiny in 
terms of enumerating its possible instances of harm. Despite three decades 
of psychological study and media theorising about the potential harms of 
violent imagery and degrading representations, Hope quotes a spokesperson 
for the Motion Picture Association of America (the organisation responsible 
for rating movies as suitable or not for viewing by children) confirming that 
‘the MPAA has never tracked specific types of violence, i.e. rape or domestic 
violence, in movies.’
Another author of ‘me too’- era analysis of rape in cinema, April Wolfe, 
documents a growing demand in Hollywood for stunt coordinators who can 
advise on filmsets in a specialisation known as ‘rape choreography.’ Rape 
choreography, Wolfe tells us, emerged in a confluence of cinematic preoccu-
pation with sexual violence and growing cultural awareness that violence 
can be traumatising to watch and to perform, even if one is acting. This is 
not a ‘me too’ evolution— rape choreography predates the ‘me too’ call to 
accountability and empathy— but it is one response to heightened cultural 
scrutiny of and discourse about representations of rape in movies and televi-
sion. The prevalence of the male gaze in the popular- culture representations 
we all consume normalises both desires to assert power over another person 
(a desire men are socialised into in a variety of contexts) and widespread 
disregard of mutuality as being a necessary factor in any choice to engage 
in sexual (or sexualised) activity. This is not just rape- culture messaging; it 
is part of the story behind philosopher Kate Manne’s observation (discussed 
in Chapter 4) that one person’s ‘me too’ monster is another social network’s 
good guy. This disconnect, in Manne’s view, explains how men can engage 
in coercive, bullying behaviours that serve their sexual pleasure at the 
expense of vulnerable others and still believe that they are ‘nice guys.’ Their 
self- perceptions are bolstered by rape culture’s male gaze:  they are ‘nice 
guys’ because they are behaving in ways that the heroes of their favourite 
movies would.
‘Using rape as a plot point most often functions to give a dull male char-
acter a reason to act, a wrong to right, while serving as the female character’s 
sole backstory,’ Wolfe observes, characterising habitual use of this device 
as ‘lazy writing.’13 Wolfe’s analysis of the toll that ‘rape cinema’ takes on 
those who produce it includes a distinction offered by indie- film director 
Jessica M.  Thompson:  ‘between rape- filmed- as- rape and rape- filmed- like- 
sex’ (Wolfe). ‘If you film [rape] like a sex scene, then it is glorifying it,’ Wolfe 
quotes Thompson as saying. One of the questions Wolfe poses is: ‘what if 
portraying rape could actually be a positive thing?’ Her interest in taking up 
a trope that has been used to reinforce women’s subordination, vulnerability, 
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and male- identification, and refashioning it into representations supportive 
of women’s agency and expanded cultural empathy, suggests a culture- 
jamming sensibility, but little is said in her piece about how, exactly, that 
re- presentation might work. Perhaps this inattention to answers is because 
‘[t] he questions are pressing:
How many rapes do viewers see in a lifetime? How many are filmed in 
a year? Does all this normalize rape or expose it as horror? Are these 
depictions power- fantasy turn- ons, victimizing exploitation, or dramat-
ically and thematically vital? What toll do they take on viewers (and 
critics)— and on the people who produce the scenes? Until recently, most 
rapes in TV and film were told from a male point of view.’
(Wolfe)
In fact, the landmark 1988 film The Accused is so (unwittingly) 
committed to the male point of view as the unquestioned norm (in Martha 
Minow’s terms, the ‘unstated’ assumption) that it does something arguably 
more undermining of empowering representation than either lazy writing or 
glorification of rape as sex; it centres the perspective of a male bystander to 
legitimise the rape at the centre of the story.
The film begins with the aftermath of the gang- rape of Sarah Tobias 
(Jodie Foster) in a bar: we see a young man (the bystander who will at the 
end of the film be depicted as a hero) on a pay phone outside the building, 
pleading for emergency services to come help a girl in danger. Then we see 
Sarah, running out of the bar to flag down a car and go to the emergency 
room. The film is, at its heart, courtroom drama; just after the film’s halfway 
mark, we see Sarah’s testimony, describing the gang- rape in explicit detail, 
but— in an illustration of the testimonial injustice of rape culture— she is 
impeached by the defendants’ legal counsel. One of them goes so far as to 
suggest that she should have said something more than ‘no,’ to make clear 
to bystanders that she needed rescuing: ‘help,’ perhaps, or ‘police.’ It is only 
at the film’s climax that the gang- rape is depicted in flashback, as it is being 
described by the ‘good guy’/ saviour bystander who testifies to witnessing 
what Sarah experienced.
In Mithu Sanyal’s words, ‘he speaks [the rape] into existence . . . the 
famous scene on the pinball machine was neither described in Sarah’s words 
nor shown from her point of view’ (33). Sanyal thinks ‘the desire to be 
unambiguous was so immense in The Accused that the makers failed to see 
the paternalism of the court- room scene’ (33). She understands the story-
telling as ‘a kind of feminist best- case scenario of how to negotiate a rape 
case in a court of law— and, by extension, the court of public opinion,’ iden-
tifying ‘[i] ts central conflict [as] how the victim can speak her truth and by 
doing so inscribe it into the law’ (Sanyal 31– 32). The persistence of this ‘car-
ceral’ logic in our cultural discourses about sexual violence (the tendency 
that is driving a lot of contemporary critiques of ‘me too’ as ‘over- reach’ or 
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‘witch- hunting’: to hear a story of wrongdoing and understand it as a story 
of crime) is something that Sanyal unpacks throughout her history of rape, 
pointing out that, although some victims of sexual violence choose to pursue 
legal recognition of the wrong done, that is not the only response available 
and we should not elevate any single response as a best course of action 
for all.
‘What happens when women direct rape scenes?’ April Wolfe asks. 
Elsewhere in her analysis of rape choreography, she raises a different 
question about the ethics of representation:  ‘What’s the right amount of 
rape to create that dialogue that might lead to actual change?’ In order to 
bring us closer to an answer to the first of those two questions, we need 
to reframe the second question, to draw attention away from questions of 
right amounts of representation of sexual violence and towards questions of 
the right kinds of representation. Possible improvements in how sexual vio-
lence is represented in film and television can be hypothesised through con-
sideration of how some more recent examples are telling stories that seem 
to be using unconventional point- of- view framing and predictable human 
responses to ‘the face of the other.’
A 2018 Australian film, The Nightingale, about a sexually brutalised con-
vict in 1820s Tasmania, explores the impact of sexual violence upon the 
whole of the central character’s life in a way that does not let the story 
become an easy ‘revenge quest.’ We do not revel in kick- ass ‘girl power’; 
we are subjected to unflinching cameos of Clare emotionally experiencing 
her powerlessness. Unlike The Accused, in The Nightingale, we are given 
both real struggles with the burden of getting one’s own ‘justice’ (how you 
actually stumble through day after day if your experience is not a feminist 
best- case scenario) and, anachronistically, a searingly modern portrayal 
of the enduring effects of trauma. In an interview about her film and the 
reactions it has provoked at film festivals, director Jennifer Kent spoke of 
her concern for the well- being of the actor playing Clare (Aisling Franciosi) 
but also her directorial determination to confront us with Clare’s humanity 
(Buckley). She explains to New York Times reporter Cara Buckley that she 
‘kept the camera focused closely on the victim’s face; her intent was to make 
the viewer experience the violence too.’ There is undeniable logic to the 
view that seeing Clare’s face in close- up as her rape happens can solicit our 
empathy for her: we see her emotional reactions, not the movements of an 
easy- to- sexualise female body, and the parts of our brains and social con-
ditioning that attune us to how others feel are fully engaged. Wolfe’s own 
empathy- creation argument for better representations of rape in film also 
identifies the singular importance of presenting a character we feel some 
connection to: ‘[i] f you can make it believable, make people care about the 
victim, then you’ve created a better story and honestly shown the horror.’
While focusing cameras on close shots of facial expressions is one way to 
foreground the inner life of an individual human being and thereby create 
a better story, a shift of camera angle to tell the story from the rape victim’s 
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point of view seems to me to be an equally powerful way of representing 
rape onscreen. This is the device used by a ‘me too’- inflected Netflix series, 
Unbelievable, that builds on a ‘catch the criminal’ story familiar to watchers 
of CSI- type television to ground more empathetic portrayals of the women 
who are the rape victims. These characters— Marie, Amber, Sarah, Doris, 
and Lilly— are distinct individuals, and part of Unbelievable’s better story-
telling is its casting and writing characters who vary in age, body type, 
class, race, and social interests, to illustrate that there is not a single kind of 
woman who becomes a rape victim. The most radically humanising thing 
this series does, however, is to film all of the ‘flashback’ representations of 
sexual assault as montages that include shots of what the scene would look 
like from Marie’s point of view (or Doris’ or Amber’s).
Like The Accused, Unbelievable starts its story- telling in the aftermath of 
the rape that centres the story: Marie’s. In the images accompanying Marie’s 
report to a responding police officer immediately after being attacked, 
we see what she saw when she was woken by an intruder: a masked face 
leaning over her. Throughout her report of what happened (given first to the 
responding officer, then to a detective, and later to a hospital nurse doing 
her rape kit, in scenes that graphically portray the burden of testimony), 
images cut back and forth between conventionally framed camera shots 
in which we see Marie and her interlocutor and the more jarring but also 
much more empathy- arousing camera shots that are thin bands of partial 
image, representing what she would have seen while blindfolded. Point- of- 
view decisions have always been recognised as crucial to storytelling, so it is 
almost surprising to see this device at work in Unbelievable and realise that 
it is not the standard in representing rape. If we want to show the horror 
honestly, as Wolfe urges, and we want to give audiences a sense of how it 
would feel to experience this horror, why would scenes of rape and other 
sexual violences ever have been filmed from any other standpoint?
Another variation of the fully humanised (fully drawn) experience of 
rape— along with the foregrounding of emotional reality through close- up 
filming and the foregrounding of cognitive reality through point- of- view 
choices— is the device of shared monologue that we find ranging over seasons 
2 and 3 of the Hulu telling of The Handmaid’s Tale. At the beginning of epi-
sode 10 in season 2, we see Emily preparing for the monthly ritualised rape 
that Gilead euphemistically calls ‘the Ceremony,’ an encounter that is timed 
to take place when the handmaid is most likely to conceive and involves the 
Commander’s wife holding her down during the rape (‘The Last Ceremony’). 
In this posting, Emily is handmaid to a Commander whose first name is 
unstated, so we don’t know her handmaid patronymic— of- (commander’s 
first name)— she is a technically nameless woman. She approaches the 
bed as we hear her monologue in voice- over:  ‘you treat it like a job . . . 
one detaches oneself . . . one describes.’ Later in the same episode, we see 
June in her posting as ‘Offred’ (handmaid to Commander Fred Waterford) 
being subjected, in the very late stages of pregnancy, to a ‘labour- inducing’ 
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Ceremony (rape); June is saying to herself in another voice- over, ‘you treat it 
like a job . . . one detaches oneself’ (‘The Last Ceremony’).
Where this repetition of self- counselled detachment starts to appear as 
culture- jamming, as items in a series that aims to subvert conventional 
reasoning, is in its reappearance in episode 10 of season 3 (‘Witness’). June 
has been reassigned to the household of Commander Joseph Lawrence and 
is now ‘Ofjoseph.’ Lawrence has a prestigious position within the Gilead 
leadership structure so he has the freedom to run a deviant household; we 
see a resistance movement enacted by marthas and handmaids largely under 
his nose, as he uses all his influence to try and maintain a steady supply 
of medication for his wife, who appears to suffer depression and manic 
episodes that would be entirely treatable in a humane social context. There 
is no monthly Ceremony in this household. At least, there isn’t until Gilead 
leaders decide to pull Lawrence into line by ‘witnessing’ the Ceremony, 
sitting in the parlour while the rape happens and then sending a doctor into 
the bedroom to verify that sexual ‘relations’ have taken place. June shares 
the monologue script with her new Commander, coaching him on how to 
comply with the ritual: ‘you treat it like a job,’ she instructs, ‘. . . it’s easier 
if you close your eyes’ (‘Witness’). In this scene, we are seeing a man who is 
being coerced into raping, learning how to endure the experience from the 
woman he will be violating. The repetition of shared monologue between 
Emily and June is itself a humanisation, in revealing how very detached 
from their humanity each needs to be in order to cope with this repeated 
experience. When the monologue is shared further, with Lawrence, it is a 
subversion of the series we have seen:  this monologue is a coping mech-
anism for rape victims, not rapists. But this is not just a small subversion, 
interior to the plot; presenting a sex- power context in which the powerful 
man does not want to perform dominance ‘jams’ the toxic masculinity that 
I analysed in Chapter 2, and humanises both the men and the women who 
suffer within rigid and damaging gender scripts.14
‘All of Hollywood is run on one assumption: that women will watch stories 
about men, but men won’t watch stories about women,’ says Hollywood 
actress Geena Davis in Miss Representation, a 2011 documentary about 
media erasure of women’s perspectives and privileging of men’s opinions, 
experiences, and agency. She continues:  ‘It is a horrible indictment of our 
society if we assume that one half of our population is just not interested in 
the other half’ (Miss Representation). Despite the periodic success of films 
that tell stories of strong female characters, and despite the introduction of 
critical media tools like the Bechdel test,15 the culturally dominant ‘male 
gaze’ continues to construct the view of the world that is given to us in 
all popular media, well beyond what I have been discussing here as ‘rape 
cinema.’ The male gaze itself needs to be jammed, as part of any sustained 
campaign to dismantle rape culture. We need to challenge the cultural attri-
bution of mouthlessness/ voicelessness to women that makes it possible for 
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point made by filmmaker Anna Biller, in Clover Hope’s analysis of violent 
film in the age of ‘me too.’ Hope quotes the filmmaker explaining that
[b] ecause there is no widespread social awareness about the way women 
are systemically blocked from achieving their ambitions, many men 
think that it’s a more or less level playing field and that women are just 
bad storytellers or that they just don’t have anything to say.
(Biller, quoted by Hope)16
For all that the world of films promotes a perception of itself as enor-
mously complex artmaking that requires many people to coordinate them-
selves and objects around sets, it too can be culture- jammed using its own 
means of cultural production. Recall that a culture- jamming initiative, like 
many ‘salvage’ art projects, is a ‘vernacular space of art making . . . one in 
which the possibility of participation is extended to ever increasing numbers 
of people, refuting the social and cultural closures inherent in the institu-
tionalization of the arts and music’ (Born et al. 21).
In the time that I have been writing the last two chapters of this book, the 
world has been grappling with the outbreaks and lockdowns of the COVID- 
19 pandemic, and I have been watching in real time the creative adaptation 
that improvisation theory says we are all capable of. We are, as I write, in the 
very process, globally, of articulating online vernacular spaces of artistic pro-
duction (as well as spaces of learning, governing, and pursuing everyday social 
interaction with colleagues, friends, and other intimate acquaintances): tele-
vision talk and news programmes, podcasts, concerts, family reunions, and of 
course activism have flooded to online platforms like Zoom, along with all of 
the ‘white- collar’ work that can be done or approximated in video format. As 
quickly as lockdowns happened in various countries, workarounds arose that 
normalised home- crafting of cultural products that had previously ‘required’ 
huge production resources. (As an example, one of my favourite podcasts is 
now apparently being beamed to me from a closet in Brooklyn, NY.) I think 
it is fascinating, and instructive, to consider how this moment will change 
our conceptions of what is possible in ‘street art’ (culture- jamming). Now 
that smartphones can make movies, the number of people who can parody, 
subvert, and outright replace cultural representations that are harming us has 
multiplied radically. We don’t need to wait for others to produce the better 
representations that The Nightingale, Unbelievable, and The Handmaid’s 
Tale are working into our cultural lexicon. We can make our own ‘movies’ 
that jam rape culture. (Personally, I would love to see hacked versions of, say, 
Victoria’s Secret commercials with the Handmaid’s Tale voice- over added 
in— ‘you just treat it like a job . . .’.) Of course, we need to take account of 
the uneven distribution of platform and voice- amplification in social media, 
but there is also grounds for optimism.
One of the things I think I have come to realise, throughout my career, 
as I have explored academic interests that range over human rights, gender 
 
Culture-jamming our way to a better world 189
justice, racial equality, privilege examination, and the potential of improvised 
music is that almost everything about our social world is more fragile than 
we like to think it is— except the things we presume to be fragile. COVID- 19 
lockdowns have contributed to a view of national economies and their local 
impacts in which economic indicators of well- being crash into nothingness 
like a melting polar ice shelf. And at the same time, more ephemeral things— 
hope, music, the nobility of ‘care work’— have emerged to sustain us. And, 
while I  am keenly aware of how easy it is to idealise these surprisingly 
resilient wisps of inspiration, I also see possibilities for deeper transform-
ation of cultural beliefs and assumptions than have previously been visible. 
The improvisation on display in this global pandemic— in artmaking, and in 
stubborn efforts to maintain communities— has been impressive, and there 
are a lot of people who deserve credit for advancing our ability these days 
to have social encounters online that meet  all the needs our face- to- face 
encounters once did. (Obviously not all social interaction is substitutable in 
this way, but I think a lot of individuals and businesses have discovered that 
technological advances have considerably expanded the scope of sociality.)
The deep transformation that I hope for in all of this global uncertainty 
and despair is illustrated by a May 2020 artwork by Banksy that appeared 
suddenly on the wall of a hospital in Southampton, England (Stolworthy). 
Apparently titled Game Changer, this latest mural is of a little boy playing 
with a female superhero dressed in a nurse’s uniform, to the exclusion of his 
Batman and Spiderman dolls (who are visible in a waste- paper basket off to 
the side of the picture). One of the differences of ‘pandemic- life’ that clearly 
caught Banksy’s attention as much as it caught my own is the unusually 
acute recognition given to healthcare workers. (In my experience of lock-
down in Aotearoa New Zealand, there was an outpouring of recognition 
for ‘essential workers’ that sometimes collapsed into empty platitudes, 
but in many of the countries whose news I was obsessively watching, the 
reporting captured a strand of seemingly visceral, and brand- new, awareness 
of how much each of us owes to all healthcare workers— not just often- 
lionised doctors, but also the nurses, nurses’ aides, orderlies, and paramedics 
who tend to work in the background of our fields of awareness.) Banksy’s 
nurse- superhero demonstrates culture- jamming’s emphasis on redescription, 
as a crucial initial part of processes that reshape cultural values through 
subverting perceptions. Redescribing the nurse— as much a paradigmatic 
figure of ‘care’ as the mother— as a superhero endorses a stark transform-
ation of cultural values, away from ideals of conspicuous consumption and 
towards an ethics of care.
Working from Virginia Held’s premise that care is a basic moral value cap-
able of grounding both an ethics and a politics of care, I would expect such 
an ethics and such a politics to be articulated within feminist peace studies as 
a programme that evaluates people and institutions according to how well 
they make space for care— as both a value and a practice, to put the point 
in Held’s words (39). As Catia Confortini observes of feminist peace studies 
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generally, an ethics and politics of care should be concerned with identifying 
the structures that shape individuals’ lives and with interrogating them for 
gendered disparities and injustices— and it should also be concerned with 
articulating a more positive vision of worlds and value systems, in this case, 
a vision in which ‘care’ is a great gift that we give to each other instead 
of a weakness to be exploited and monetised. (Indeed, I  would expect a 
positive programme within a politics of care to look very much like the 
empathy- empowerment work of Tarana Burke’s that I characterised earlier 
in this chapter as ‘virtue politics.’) Banksy’s radical redescription is emerging 
exactly at the moment that improvisation theory’s attention to contingency 
would recommend: all of us who are able to tap into newsfeeds around the 
world can see for ourselves how scared people are in the shifting contagion- 
hotspots of this pandemic, we can see healthcare systems buckling under the 
demands of the sick and the dying, and we can see the enormous efforts of 
individual healthcare workers to make their resources stretch further and 
do more. We can see, finally, what a real superhero looks like. Banksy is 
not showing us what we don’t know; he is showing us that there’s another 
(maybe better?) way of understanding what we can all see— a newly visible 
ethical and political ideal.
In culture- jamming, as in improvisatory artistic and cultural productions 
generally, it is difficult (and not always helpful) to claim that a different 
way of doing something is a better way— in improvisation theory, ‘better’ 
demands an accompanying explanation:  in what context is this different 
way better? For whom? One way we might understand how valuing care 
is better than valuing money is by looking closely at the costs of struc-
tural violence in each society’s status quo and asking, what are the costs of 
failing to care? But notice that this question has already shifted us out of 
the redescription stage of social critique and activism (the point at which 
culture- jamming can be profoundly generative of new ways of seeing), and 
into more scholarly tasks of data collection and problem articulation. This 
is how a movement evolves to into an entity capable of exerting influence in 
societal conversations about change.
Bringing that point to bear on sexual violence and rape culture, we can 
see that the ‘culture- jamming’ effects of Alyssa Milano’s Twitter census are 
helpful in opening up the conversation, but that any awareness an inten-
tional community has of itself (the Sartrean- Burkean ‘survivors talking to 
survivors’ conception of ‘me too’ that I presented in Chapter 4) needs to 
be supplemented by a narrative that can be understood in mainstream dis-
course as evidence. One way to make the scope of sexual violence visible on 
the public stage is to create and report statistics that measure the problem— 
so suggests Tarana Burke. Speaking to Democracy Now! only weeks after 
the 2017 emergence of the Harvey Weinstein story, Burke urged people to 
‘look at the numbers, look at the people, look at the survivors, and think 
strategically.’ Thinking, she says, like a community organiser and a lifelong 
activist, she observes that ‘if you apply the numbers around sexual violence 
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to any communicable disease, the World Health Organization would shut it 
down; there’d be all kind of, you know, experiments and research around it’ 
(Burke, the Democracy Now! interview).
All of the contributions being made in art, cultural representations, and 
discourses of political change (e.g. #timesup) are helping to bring cultures to 
crisis points where changing in ways that turn us towards care and empathy 
becomes easier than resisting. Once we get to the crisis points, data and 
problem- analyses that reveal the structural violences of rape culture will be 
vital for making the case about how to dismantle it, but it is culture- jamming 
representations that will get us to those points. Cultural influences, gender 
roles, social scripts— each of these are areas in which we see challenges to 
patriarchal hierarchy being advanced, and being furthered by the ‘me too’ 
culture- jamming we have seen emerging in diverse societies. The first stage in 
a collaborative dismantling project must be an explosion of voices ‘jamming’ 
rape culture: a campaign of empathy- empowerment and care- valorisation 
that pushes back against denial to women of epistemic credibility (the status 
of ‘competent knower of the world’), and instead works to help all of us feel 
‘authorised’ to participate in the mass global project of ‘authoring’ culture. 
Only once we become aware of the distorted thinking we do not want to 
endorse, can we begin the conceptual/ character conversions that will change 
the ways we act towards each other.
Coda: Walt Disney, meet Sara Ahmed
Three years into ‘me too’ reckonings and six months into a world gripped 
by pandemic and, more recently, a tragically newly energised Black Lives 
Matter movement, are there any signs of change, any signs that ‘me too’ can 
contribute to ending violence and building peace? As I noted in Chapter 4’s 
concluding analysis, signs of structural and cultural change take time to 
emerge into view, but there may already be some fuzzy outlines of the gender 
politics conversations we will be having in the years to come. Throughout 
this book I have worked to undermine fairy tales as one element of the cul-
tural propaganda that deflects and redirects our abilities to have productive 
conversations about how to end sexual violence.17 To some extent, I think 
my central thesis— that storytelling is both reflective of cultures it emerges 
from and a mechanism capable of reshaping them— could have been argued 
through a variety of genres of narrative. But, as I observe in the introduc-
tion to this book, only part of what a focus on fairy tales makes possible is 
demonstration that, to use Georgina Born’s helpful visual metaphor of social 
mediation, they refract rape culture’s mythology, acting as an interface of 
cultural hopes and fears and societal needs to train people into worldviews 
in ways that put those views beyond questioning (propaganda). This capacity 
of refraction is what makes it possible for someone to characterise a woman’s 
elevation in social rank through marriage as ‘a Cinderella story’ or to argue 
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see broken- up and reassembled versions of our own societies in these tales. 
Another part of the reason for my focus on fairy tales is the genre’s useful-
ness as a metaphor for rape- culture messaging: so much of what our cultures 
tell us who gets raped, and why, and what we can do about it is just fantasy.
The point of ending this book with a discussion of the fairy tales that 
Walt Disney has made iconic is to consider what seeing ‘the Disney princess’ 
as a figure in transition might tell us about cracks in rape- culture propa-
ganda. As I observed in the introduction and have illustrated throughout 
the book with subtitles and codas, fairy tales do a lot of cultural messaging 
work. Disney tales have fed generations of young girls dreams of romance 
as a life- project:  sparkly, glamorous, luxurious romance, available at the 
cost of passive, uncomplaining beauty. The ‘old school’ Hollywood- inflected 
princesses— Cinderella, Snow White, Sleeping Beauty, Rapunzel— all fit the 
pattern dictated by gender scripts that urge girls towards complicit femin-
inity: they are beautiful, often startled or disadvantaged in their encounters 
with princes, in need of being rescued, and of course, they meekly, blushingly, 
fall in love with their prince- rescuers. As new franchises emerged during 
my adulthood— Pocahontas, Ariel, Belle— I ignored them. The Disney prin-
cesses I grew up with had nothing to say to me about the life I was building 
for myself; what could the new ones offer? Then a young friend of mine, 
a former student whose recommendations in films and television I  really 
trusted, suggested that Frozen was worth seeing. I think I went to what was 
my first Disney- princess movie in decades more in a spirit of developing an 
argument against his recommendation than an interest in seeing the film on 
its merits, but he was right. And he was right about Moana. I do not mean 
to suggest here that Disney has done an amazing feminist turnaround in 
representations of girls and women. They haven’t.18 But there is a change 
in the Disney princess story these days. Princesses whose primary object of 
love and concern is a sister or who have been called on a quest are showing 
young girls different possibilities— and most importantly, a wider range of 
possibilities— for themselves than what I had been shown.
These more agentic, less male- identified characters look quite a lot like 
the wilful girl Sara Ahmed introduces in Living a Feminist Life’s engagement 
with the Brothers Grimm fairy tale The Willful Child.19 They disobey what 
they are told because what they are told conflicts with their own judgement— 
which they either trust from the beginning or learn to trust in the course of 
meeting the challenges of their narrative arc. They do things that they think 
are important, even in the face of ridicule and disempowerment. Ahmed’s 
wilful girl is a figure around which she wants to build a politics of wilful-
ness: ‘as standing against; . . . as creativity . . . engaged in the creation of a 
world for women’ (223). Although I reproduce her version of the story in a 
contextual note in Chapter 2, it is worth presenting it here again in full:
Once upon a time there was a child who was willful, and would not do 
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let her become ill, and no doctor could do her any good, and in a short 
time she lay on her death- bed. When she had been lowered into her 
grave, and the earth was spread over her, all at once her arm came out 
again, and stretched upwards, and when they had put it in and spread 
fresh earth over it, it was all to no purpose, for the arm always came out 
again. Then the mother herself was obliged to go to the grave, and strike 
the arm with a rod, and when she had done that, it was drawn in, and 
then at last the child had rest beneath the ground.
(Ahmed 66– 67)
The child is wilful, and therefore God is willing to let her die. The child is so 
wilful, however, that she refuses to die properly; her arm rises from her grave, 
like she is raising it (for permission to speak, perhaps?). In both versions, 
Ahmed’s and the Brothers’ Grimm, it is the mother who is obliged to go beat 
her dead child into submission. Thinking about this story through Adrienne 
Rich’s analysis of how women are subjected to male power (compulsory het-
erosexuality), it strikes me that this is one way in which the solidarity among 
girls and women is crushed: the mother (or step- mother, in many fairy tales) 
is made the instrument of harmful social responses to wilfulness. We are 
harmed in order to make us capable of surviving in a harmful world. (Note 
that this is the very antithesis of the refusal to adapt oneself to a sick society 
urged by the revolutionary slogan I discussed in Chapter 4: Ce n’est pas un 
signe de bonne santé mentale d’être bien àdapté à une société malade).
Rape- culture resistance needs to take up these so- called weapons of the 
weak I have been discussing— culture- jamming, wilfulness, intentional com-
munities of support— and teach us to value them in a way that I  imagine 
a politics of care would, acknowledging that, for some, speaking in forth-
right ways is structurally impossible or just plain terrifying. As we work to 
restructure the world in ways that will no longer force some into unchosen 
silence, we need also to be sensitive to presently existing silences, gestures, 
and other ways of communicating distress and dissent. Ahmed’s wilful girl 
raising her hand:  can she be read as an instance of performing, but not 
speaking, ‘me too’ perhaps? Is the story of the girl whose hand would not 
stay in the grave a story of desperate subversion, of symbols being deployed 
where words fail, or are not possible?20
Jessie Kindig argues in the introduction to one of the first self- consciously 
‘me too’ anthologies, Where Freedom Starts: Sex, Power, Violence, #MeToo, 
that the ‘deepest and potentially most radical, inclusive, and visionary claim 
of feminism . . . [is] that what happens to our bodies is where our pol-
itics can begin’ (23). This theorising through embodiment is yet another 
point of convergence between feminist thought in peace studies and inter-
national relations, in aesthetics (most particularly in improvisation studies), 
and in philosophy. Beginning with the idea that what happens to and within 
our bodies matters, we can draw strands of different discourses together 
to produce stories that develop empathetic, care- oriented politics. With 
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these stories we can disrupt and subvert mainstream assumptions about 
how bodies (and by extension, persons) need and deserve to be treated. As 
I  ventured in the book’s introduction, the value of these disruptions and 
subversive interventions is that they can draw our attention to the ways 
that the patriarchal thinking that perpetuates rape culture congeals in our 
perceptions of the world without us even being consciously aware of it. 
Stories alone cannot change the world, cannot dismantle rape culture, but 
telling stories differently can encourage each of us to think differently, to 
react differently to our social worlds, and to see when and how others are 
reacting differently. It is less of a smashing of rape culture than I wish for, 
but erosion over time is changing the patriarchal status quo women have 
been expected to endure for my entire lifetime (so far). The erosion con-
tinues. The story doesn’t end here.
Notes
 1 ‘Bitch, a zine on feminism and popular culture . . . [is] about thinking critically about 
every message the mass media sends; it’s about loudly articulating what’s wrong 
and what’s right with what we see’ (Hirshman 136); ‘Suggested by a friend: “If 
all the women who have been sexually harassed or assaulted wrote ‘Me too.’ as a 
status, we might give people a sense of the magnitude of the problem” ’ (Milano). 
Both display elements of culture- jamming (critical orientations, invitations to par-
ticipate) but, because they are not embedded in artistic practices and communities, 
they are perhaps better understood as ‘culture- jamming’- adjacent.
 2 DeLaure and Fink also observe that ‘[a] variation of the pseudonym deployed by 
jammers is the “multiple name,” a collective identity through which anyone can 
perform an intervention under a common name’ (17). This is the kind of idea 
I had in mind in my previous chapter when I characterised ‘me too’ as functioning 
as a global ‘umbrella term’ for gender justice activism across a variety of cultures.
 3 The improvisatory subversions of ‘authority’ that are cognisant of (responsible to) 
others who have also been silenced, the performances that fall within this over-
lapping space, are ‘addressing’ Foucault’s theory of disciplinary power insofar as 
they are yet another illustration of the point that our ability to talk ourselves into 
(internalise) power’s demands means we also have an ability, however nascent, 
to talk/ train ourselves into resistance to power. While this observation may not 
hold true for all societies, in putatively democratic ones that have to be seen to be 
respecting civic voices and also want to promote the ability to adapt to systems as 
a citizen’s/ consumer’s/ worker’s virtue, wherever disciplinary power asserts itself, 
it creates the ground for subversive resistance. Whether that resistance is realised 
and does truly transform anything depends on the contingent circumstances of its 
performance— a point true also of culture- jamming and improvised music in the 
‘free jazz’ tradition.
 4 In framing their understanding of improvisation and its heightened relevance 
within a socially cognisant aesthetic interpretive structure, Born, Lewis, and Straw 
make a point of clarifying that ‘the very notion of improvisation is itself contested 
ground— aesthetically and socially— and that distinct practitioners and communi-
ties, with their particular histories and concerns, characterize and theorize impro-
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 5 Elaine Sandoval has argued that we might want to be critical in approaches 
to theorising empathy:  as a concept only recently coined (from the German 
Einfuhlung which entered use in 19th- century aesthetic theory), it makes sense 
to ask about the discourses in which ‘empathy’ is implicated— why and how it 
emerged and ‘what lack of concept existed previously’ (Sandoval). This reference 
to a ‘lack’ suggests that one plausible way of responding to Sandoval’s concern is 
to present the concept’s emergence as an illustration of Fricker’s account of her-
meneutical injustice. The German term translates literally as ‘feeling into,’ and 
emerged from aesthetics literature informed by German idealism, so Sandoval’s 
concern is well- placed; for a concept that now functions as a stringent call to 
attend to the emotional inner worlds of others, empathy has some very dis-
embodied roots. But the coining of a term, while it does deserve the genealogy 
Sandoval advocates, does not determine all the ways that term can come to cap-
ture other ideas. And certainly, in its popular usage, ‘empathy’ has become the ‘I 
feel’ expression of similar placement (‘I feel’ as if what you are expressing is my 
experience) in contradistinction to ‘sympathy,’ the ‘I feel’ that I have when you 
are expressing something I cannot recognise as my experience but can nonethe-
less regret and deplore as a harm you have been subjected to.
 6 One critical point that needs to be examined and debated, in the context of 
exploring the extent to which songs with ‘me too’ messages could produce 
empathy capable of being developed into political solidarity, is the limitations of 
passive listening. If the responsiveness of engaged listening is the transformative 
mechanism of improvisation (and of culture- jamming), what are we to make 
of passive listening? Is ‘passive’ the same thing as ‘disengaged’? Interestingly, 
recent literature on music and empathy suggests that what we think of as pas-
sivity might be more engaged, more potentially generative, than we typically 
recognise (Clarke et  al.). Investigation of perception- action relationships in 
neuroscience over the last couple of decades has attempted ‘to ground a sense 
of empathy . . . in identifiable neural mechanisms’ (Clarke et  al. 65). Linked 
to theorising about brain plasticity and possibilities for creating and reinfor-
cing neural pathways through social interaction, this ‘neuroscience of empathy’ 
does produce data linking ‘coordinated physical activity . . . with consequences 
for social bonding and empathy’ (Clarke et al. 66). This includes mimicry and 
synchronisation, which suggests that, say, singing along to a recorded song or 
tapping one’s foot in rhythm are forms of engagement— lesser forms, perhaps, 
than the ideal of the responsive listener, but still a listener who is potentially 
ready to be engaged. Clarke et al. observe that ‘[y] oung children, for example, 
synchronize better with a pattern on drum sounds when they believe that the 
sounds are intentionally produced by another person’ (67), which suggests that 
humans do pay closer attention to things like graffiti that we take to be inten-
tional as opposed to spilled paint. (I developed preliminary discussion of this 
point in a presentation to MOMRI Virtual Conference, Min- On Music Research 
Institute, October 2019.)
 7 See Tricia Rose’s Black Noise for a history of the emergence of hip- hop as a 
popular campaign to reclaim public spaces in the way that David Harvey 
envisions in his thinking about a ‘right to the city.’
 8 Dery understands the cultures of the 21st century to have been shaped by ‘digital 
disruption that has flattened media hierarchies’ (xii), but, as William Gibson 
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they are unevenly distributed. The democratisation Dery ascribes to the internet 
means we do exist in a world less monolithic, less univocal, than the era in which 
culture- jamming gained prominence as a way of ‘speaking back to power’ (the 
1990s). But, as he himself notes, ‘the social media where most of us swap memes 
and post links . . . is private property masquerading as the town square’ (Dery 
xiii), and our ‘shared mythology . . . that is our common culture . . . is, more often 
than not, wholly owned by multinational corporations’ (Dery xiv). And what he 
does not note is that the voices that do emerge from the background noise are 
increasingly ‘influencers’ whose celebrity is tied to their ability to commodify 
their online presences.
 9 DeLaure and Fink offer a history of culture- jamming that foregrounds Mark 
Dery’s New York Times and Adbusters articles on artistic/ aesthetic social dissent 
in the early 1990s, and makes special mention of the role Canadian magazine 
Adbusters played in promoting anti- consumption, anti- inequality critiques, 
including the call for popular occupation of New  York City’s Zucotti Park 
which marked the birth of the 2011 Occupy Wall Street movement (8– 9). But 
they also identify the détournement practices of 1960s artists and intellectuals 
as antecedents of the 1990s culture critics, and they draw parallels with ‘salvage 
art,’ an appropriation and representation of ‘found’ objects that was notoriously 
inaugurated by Marcel Duchamp’s ‘Fountain’— a 1917 entry of a urinal into an 
art show, as ‘found sculpture’ (DeLaure and Fink 12– 13). Another contributor to 
their edited collection tells a history that embeds culture- jamming in the ‘appro-
priation culture’ of British punk and street art, a culture that is itself shaped 
by salvage and reclamation attitudes reminiscent of Duchamp’s ‘Fountain’ and 
the ‘pop’ art of Robert Rauschenberg and Andy Warhol (McDonnell 184– 185). 
Culture- jamming’s pessimistic ancestors, Frankfurt School theorists Theodor 
Adorno and Max Horkheimer, provided the philosophical frame that explained 
the conditions of possibility for these subversive art cultures in sustained and crit-
ical analysis. Culture, they contend, has degenerated under consumer capitalism 
into an ‘industry’ whose products— books, movies, videogames, popular music— 
are the words and images that shape our thinking, including our capacities to call 
and our capacities to respond. The commodified, advertising- drenched public 
space they bleakly predicted is the dominant voice that subversive ‘speaking 
back’ reacts to. See Adorno’s The Culture Industry for an early analysis of com-
modified social relations, and see David Harvey, ‘The Right to the City’ for 
Marxist- inflected conceptual analysis of what we might think of as ‘open access’ 
cultural life that could stand in contrast to neoliberal commodification.
 10 In a book critical of those who deny women the right to interpret our own 
experiences, I am not about to make that objection. It is true that sometimes 
an experience can have such impact that one is tempted to dress it up in ‘theory 
clothes’ and try to make it emblematic, instead of accepting it in its singularity. 
At issue for this distinction is the difficulty of sorting emblems and singular-
ities, sometimes even in retrospect. Because this chapter is written from an 
improvisation- theory perspective, it is important to me to invite observations, 
not gate- keep them.
 11 See, in particular, Ingrid Monson, Saying Something:  Jazz Improvisation and 
Interaction for an early (and influential in improvisation studies) discussion of 
how shared musical experiences can contribute to the building of communities 
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construct and participate in community, Monson argues. To put her point in 
Selma James’ words: ‘Who is with us is us’ (275).
 12 Hong Fincher documents other instances of performative resistance to sexual 
violence, in the young feminist movement that has coalesced in the People’s 
Republic of China around the 2015 pre- emptive arrest of the ‘Feminist Five’: Wu 
Rongrong, Zheng Churan, Wei Tingting, Wang Man, and Li Maizi (9, 17). These 
activities, that I think ought also to be considered culture- jamming of patriarchal 
societies, have included: protesting outside a courtroom hearing a high- profile 
domestic violence case while wearing a bloodstained wedding dress (Li Maizi); 
walking two thousand kilometres across China to raise awareness about sexual 
abuse and to assert a right to occupy public space (Xiao Meili); and walking 
around every day wearing a sign protesting sexual harassment (Zhang Leilei), 
among many other creative rejections of a status quo that subordinates women’s 
lives to men’s (9).
 13 Patterns of narrative that depict extreme sexual(ised) violence against female 
characters in order to give a male character a heroic backstory range across cul-
tural media. In graphic novels/ comics, the phenomenon is known as ‘Women in 
Refrigerators’ and the action of sacrificing a female character for the sake of a 
backstory or a plot point is referred to as ‘fridging.’ The term has been credited to 
comic- book writer Gail Simone, and refers to a plot- point in the Green Lantern’s 
quest for justice in which his girlfriend was murdered and her body was left in 
his fridge as provocation for a future battle. See the DC Comics Database/ fan 
wiki for discussion of ‘Women in Refrigerators Syndrome.’
 14 There are isolated moments across all three seasons of The Handmaid’s Tale 
that I think can be read as culture- jamming toxic masculinity. In season 1, we 
see a depiction of the Ceremony in which Fred is unable to achieve erection 
and commit his scheduled rape of June, in her posting as ‘Offred’ (episode 
4: ‘Nolite Te Bastardes Carborundorum’). Both his ‘breaking of the rules’ of the 
Ceremony (caressing June’s thigh) and the following scene of nonprocreative 
marital intimacy between him and Serena Joy, his wife, suggest that, regardless 
of what a culture says it expects of men, an empathic emotional connection 
matters more in sex to (at least some) men than physical release. In a rape cul-
ture that ascribes to masculinity, to men, a constant willingness to have sex, 
depicting a man who doesn’t want to (or can’t) perform can be a subversive 
act— especially if, as in this case, we see the powerful man not enacting (failing 
to enact, refusing to enact) power through sex but still being able to keep his 
power. That suggests ‘wiggle room’ within the social expectations that govern 
him, and raises possibilities for unexpected pockets of elasticity in Gilead’s other 
social roles. Given the recognised power of cultural representations to shape our 
thinking, watching depictions of ‘wiggle room’ can inspire us to search for these 
openings and unpoliced spaces in our own lives.
 15 The Bechdel test measures the representation of women in fiction through 
the presence or absence of fully drawn female characters. First articulated by 
American cartoonist Alison Bechdel in 1985 in her Dykes To Watch Out For 
comic strip (and credited by Bechdel to her friend Liz Wallace, therefore some-
times known as the Bechdel- Wallace test), the test requires a cultural product 
(e.g. a film) to have at least two female characters, both of whom are significant 
enough to have names, who have at least one conversation with each other on 
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 16 Biller concludes her observations by noting that this view of women not having 
stories to tell shapes how much space there is in the film industry for creative 
women, but April Wolfe’s interview with Hollywood stunt choreographer Deven 
MacNair suggests that there is little space for women at all. MacNair remarks 
almost in passing that ‘men still get the best stunt- doubling gigs (even for female 
characters). That is how persistent and systemic the exclusion is’ (emphasis 
added).
 17 Even with cracks in its monolith (some ‘me too,’ some not), rape culture is still 
a cultural edifice with a lot of heft. Fighting it, dismantling it, with culture- 
jamming tools and peace- studies analyses of violence and conflict transform-
ation will be a process of what anthropologist James C. Scott calls ‘everyday 
resistance.’ In Weapons of the Weak, an analysis of class struggle in Malaysian 
villages, he describes these
everyday forms of peasant resistance— the prosaic but constant struggle 
between the peasantry and those who seek to extract labor, food, taxes, 
rents, and interest from them. Most of the forms this struggle takes stop well 
short of collective outright defiance . . . [using instead] the ordinary weapons 
of relatively powerless groups:  foot dragging, dissimulation, false compli-
ance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander, arson, sabotage, and so forth.
(Scott 29)
Considering ‘everyday resistance’ alongside its more overt pair, ‘open defi-
ance,’ Scott cautions us that ‘even at those extraordinary historical moments 
when a peasant- backed rebellion actually succeeds in taking power, the results 
are, at the very best, a mixed blessing for the peasantry’ (32, 29). Pragmatic 
acceptance that even an unjust stability can be more conducive to survival 
than open defiance is why ‘circumstances lead many of the poor to clothe 
their resistance in the public language of conformity’ (Scott 289), even as they 
engage in acts of mockery, petty vandalism, and passive non- engagement with 
the dominant culture. Scott tells us that ‘[resistance] activities on anything 
less than a massive scale are, if they are noticed at all, rarely accorded any 
social significance’ (35). But this diminishes how very effective the weapons 
of powerless people can be. The deeply fascinating questions provoked by 
his study of revolutionary struggle are: What is strength? What is weakness? 
Are ‘the weapons of the weak’ in fact powerful enough to bring down power 
structures that look impregnable? In its sly capacity to trouble strength- 
weakness categorisations that ought to be easy, culture- jamming can be 
understood as ‘a weapon of the weak.’ You don’t need a Hollywood produc-
tion company. You don’t need to be a world leader. You don’t need Swiss bank 
accounts. You can start a revolution with a can of spray paint. (Admittedly, it 
does help if you are Banksy.)
 18 There are still many complaints one can make about the ways that women 
and cultures are portrayed in Disney movies. Moana, for instance, does seem 
problematic in its representations of Pasifika culture. And too many of these 
better- drawn princesses still embody a trope criticised as ‘the Improper Princess,’ 
defined as ‘protagonists that scorn other girls— other girls being passive, pretty, 
and having boring feminine interests’ (Nichols) and undermine the potential 
feminist force of more empathetic, solidaristic character development in a rush 
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 19 The Brothers Grimm version of the story reads (in translation) as follows:
Once upon a time there was a child who was willful and did not do what his 
mother wanted. For this reason God was displeased with him and caused 
him to become ill, and no doctor could help him, and in a short time he lay 
on his deathbed. He was lowered into a grave and covered with earth, but 
his little arm suddenly came forth and reached up, and it didn’t help when 
they put it back in and put fresh earth over it, for the little arm always came 
out again. So the mother herself had to go to the grave and beat the little 
arm with a switch, and as soon as she had done that, it withdrew, and the 
child finally came to rest beneath the earth.
The translator, DL Ashliman, notes that the child’s gender cannot be determined 
by the German text, so the male gender has been arbitrarily assigned.
 20 As Leta Hong Fincher explains, Chinese women who found ‘me too’ impossible 
to share on social media because of government censorship resorted to using 
emojis for ‘rice’ (mi in Chinese) and ‘rabbit’ (tu). As images, emojis are harder for 
censors to screen out.
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